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This research assesses how contact with Europe and America from 1853 created a new notion of 
the modern in Japan and colonial Taiwan, through exploring the architectural expressions of 
Japanese architects. Taking a detailed look at relevant theories of the modern, and the geo-political, 
governmental and intellectual histories of Meiji Japan, I analyse how Japan used architecture in 
their nation-building process, and later the role of architecture in building colonial modernity in 
Taiwan. The study explores how colonial buildings crystallised Japan’s fledgling modernity, 
cumulating in an extensive case study of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office, focusing on how 
the building spatially embedded hierarchical relationships, and how through mastery of European 
architectural forms it became an artefact of techno-cultural superiority. 
 
Through these analyses I find that whilst Japan’s modernity was genuine (in that it was rationally 
innovative and fashionably reflected up-to-date forms and technologies) the conditions that 
produced it were sufficiently different that Japan effectively created a split in the idea of what it 
meant to be modern. Whilst modernity in Europe occurred over a long period, driven by the 
Enlightenment and the growth of imperialism, in Japan the primary driver was the desire to be seen 
as civilised, which required instrumental utilisation of reason (and later colonisation) to achieve. 
Japan’s architectural modernity was intrinsically tied to the state’s drive towards Great Power status, 
dominance over East Asian neighbours and the reframing of a national Japanese cultural identity as 
intrinsically superior. These diverse aims led to a unique cultural gap between public and private life 
developing in Japan, and to Japan politically and culturally splitting off from East Asia. 
 
This thesis looks in detail at the story of kindai (modern) architecture in Japan, through exploring a 
number of themes. First, how translated concepts entered Japan through Josiah Conder, the first 
Professor of Architecture in Japan, who instituted a new ranking of building types that placed 
indigenous architecture below European masonry. Second, how political centralisation led to the 
creation of a modern Japanese architecture style promoted by Conder’s successor TATSUNO 
Kingo, which became a national style through its use first in Japan and later more extensively in 
Japan’s colonies. Third, due to the foundational splits in the basis for architectural education in 
Japan, new social boundaries were created through the Governor-General’s Office which allowed 
colonial architects to shore their sense of superiority whilst avoiding Orientalist rackets. In spite of 
this the building remains equivocal: the modern split between Japanese administration and 
residential architecture even applied to the Governor-General, and implied Euro-American authority 
remains through the necessary spatial and stylistic appropriations. As the first study that traces the 
formation of modern architecture in Taiwan to Japan and further back to Victorian Britain, this thesis 
















































In this thesis Japanese and Chinese names are displayed with surname before forename (following 
the usual Japanese and Chinese order) with capital letters used for surnames when a full name is 
given. When a Japanese or Chinese name is first introduced, the Japanese or Chinese characters 
will be also shown, for example: TATSUNO Kingo (Jap. 辰野金吾). All other names are written 
forename before surname in lower case. However, English or other languages names remain 
forename before surname. 
 
Japanese or Chinese names for places, people, and buildings are typed as English transliterations 
in regular font with the Japanese or Chinese character and a literal translation in brackets if 
necessary, for example: the Sōgaku-dō (Jap. 奏楽堂, lit. Concert Hall). All other Japanese and 
Chinese terms are written in lowercase italic using either the Japanese hiragana or Chinese pinyin 
system with the original Japanese/Chinese character and a literal translation in brackets, for 
example: daimyo (Jap. 大名, lit. big name). 
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My research assesses the impact of the ‘modern’ upon Meiji Japanese architecture, through examining 
sites of Japan announcements of itself as a nation-state and projections of a ‘universal’ self-image of 
modernity. This study investigates the reordering of public social and political institutions which 
constituted the Meiji urban state and the expression of new social hierarchies through these institutions; 
also the rationalism and chauvinistic universalism which became established into the top levels of 
Japanese society beyond the original European myth of ‘modernity’. 
 
There are a number of intertwined, dovetailing and roughly sequential matters contained in these 
government commissioned projects and their social context. Foremost was the insertion and translation 
of a framework of concepts and terminology from Western Europe and the United States. These 
shaped the Japanese world view towards creating modernity (kindai), civilisation (bunmei), 
enlightenment (kaika), progress (shinpo) and other targets, all of which were filtered into Japan during a 
time of great inequality between Japan and the Western powers. This led to a revaluation of Japanese 
history and future priorities.1 Following this, a centralised authority was created, concerned with 
forming new institutions and professions as a springboard. Rather than being guided by the people, the 
Meiji state was paternalistic in their wish to enlighten people to serve the progress of the new nation. I 
explore the creation of the unprecedented profession of architects, which became a key part of their 
empire-building process, creating symbols of civilised Japan. Finally, I examine the erection of binary 
boundaries across Japanese society: the adoption of modern practices led to the creation of a new 
layer of civilised entities and a reconceptualisation of past relationships and hierarchies. Divisions 
between modern and tradition, Occident (Seiyō) and Orient (Tōyō), civilised and primitive, architects 
and carpenters, art and craft, public and private, linear and fractured, religious and secular, coloniser 
and colonised were all (re)developed as opposites. I view these schisms as both amplified in 
government commissioned architectural sites, and leading to the first hybrid state of modernity in East 
Asia. These emergent orders serve as a lens to understand how and why government-commissioned 
architecture in Japan and colonial Taiwan developed as a platform for displaying their public face of 
modernity, which masked their pre-existing sense of belonging. When these intertwined concepts were 
manipulated into colonial Others, the fledgling Japanese modernity derived clearer progress and 
further ambition, revealing the voraciousness and dominance that serves a modern state. 
                                                   
1
 These notions led Japanese authorities to see their own history as static: “The picture of a changeless or static past is usually itself a 
construction of early-modern European historical or historical thinking. It has seldom been a non-Western society’s way of describing itself 
until recent times. Just as “traditional” societies do not usually see themselves as “traditional”, similarly societies ascribed to have changeless 
pasts – such as Indian society before British rule or the Australian Aboriginal society before European occupation – seldom saw themselves in 
those terms until their subjugation by Europeans or European modes of thought. Both arguments for and the arguments against the tendency 
to see any history or culture as static, are themselves modern.” (Chakrabarty, 1998: 286) 
 2 
Instituting kindai (modern) architecture  
 
“What we must do is to transform our Empire and our people, make the empire like the 
countries of Europe and our people like the peoples of Europe. To put it differently, we 
have to establish a new European-style Empire on the Eastern Sea…. The Japanese must 
achieve a system of self-government and a vigor of conduct sufficient to assure the 
creation of a strong people and a powerful and effective government…. How can we 
impress upon the minds of our thirty-eight million people this daring spirit and attitude of 
independence and self-government?” IONUE Kaoru, Japan’s First Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, 1887. (Quoted in Meech-Pekarik, 1987, 145)  
 
In the middle decades of the nineteenth century, following the signing of unequal treaties with the Great 
Powers2 of Seiyō (Jap. 西洋, lit. Western Sea),3 the system of several hundred mini-states ruled by 
daimyo (Jap. 大名 , lit. big name) gave way to fifty prefectures governed from the centre by 
state-appointed governors. Contacts with other countries, once limited almost entirely to traders at 
Nagasaki, were broadened, initially to a few treaty ports, and then everywhere, as Japan took part in 
the international order. Yet in the most profound change to everyday life Japan, authorities decided to 
abandon institutions adopted in the early seventeenth century for the regulation of society, politics, and 
foreign policy. Since the announcement of government organization act in 1868 under the Seitaisho 
(Jap. 政体書, lit. Regime Statement), new institutions were required simultaneously. In order to create 
a progressive image and a strong nation, Japan’s authorities looked west for inspiration. The new naval 
communications systems were modeled on the British; the police, initial legal system, and the initial 
army formation on the French; the banking system on the American; and the educational system on a 
series of models (the French, the American, the German). Other organisations were targeted for 
emulation leading to the establishment of factories, political parties, newspapers, chambers of 
commerce, clubs, museums, stock exchanges, professional societies, and more. Japan is often 
                                                   
2
 ‘Great Power’ (Jap. 列強, rekkyo, lit. strong order/list) was a term used often in Japan, Europe and America to connote the world’s leading 
powers. I use the phrase following Bill Sewell who summarises the various angles of the use of the phrase Great Power in the pre-Second 
World War Japanese context, incorporating both its progressive sense and the Saidian critique: “The term ‘Great Power,’ though value-laden 
and in some ways antiquated, expresses the identity associated with this goal [to make their societies powerful and respected] neatly. The 
term signifies an exclusive club of nations that militarily overwhelmed the world trying to imbue it with specific values and tastes while 
incorporating it into certain economies and empires. Connoting a society’s physical and mental organizational frameworks, the term combines 
perfectly the concerns for national security with an honourable identity. The desire to achieve or maintain the status of Great Power, moreover, 
helped fuel more than imperialism–competition inherent in the Great Power system was at the root of the First World War and fuelled global 
transformations. These transformations were at the heart of creating modernity.” (Sewell, 2000: 47-48) 
 
3
 Seiyō was the term most often used by Japanese in the historical period of this study to describe the Euro-American states in contact with 
Japan. This is a Japanese translation of the concept of ‘the West’ which takes the Japanese perspective: it only includes the nations of 
Western Europe and America which were both strong and had a relationship with Japan from 1853 onwards. It is used throughout the thesis 
with this Japan-centric definition, and taken to mean Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Austria-Hungary, Russia, the U.S.A. and the Netherlands, 
all of whom were well known in Japan. 
 3 
regarded as a society that modernised largely through its own internal resources, yet in nearly all areas 
the initial transformation of Japan relied heavily on the deliberate emulation of Western organisations. 
 
By the end of the Meiji period in 1912 there were few institutions in the major industrial societies that 
did not have their counterparts in Japan. This even extended to the authorities themselves: after 1888, 
the reformed Meiji oligarchy was based on a national assembly, an appointive Council of Advisors 
(Sangi), and eight Ministries. In the first four years, the initial formation of the infrastructure of Meiji 
Japan was slow, and weak although united upon the principles laid down in the first statement of the 
new regime, the Charter Oath,4 which outlined the future course for Japan. For instance, motivated by 
the idea of universal education which was a cardinal principle of the new government, elementary and 
middle schools were established in the metropolitan district of Tokyo only in 1870. It took the Iwakura 
diplomatic mission (1872-73), sent across dozens of the most powerful countries, to catalyze the 
project. A great national building programme grew from this mission as Japanese authorities first 
sought to project a view of Japan as ‘civilised’ in architecture, an easily recognisable vision of their 
aspiration for modernity and an essential image to present to the world under an era of cultural 
nationalism. These buildings required a profession of the architect, the creation of which is explored 
throughout the thesis as the most significant hook in the development of kindai (modern) architecture: 
Japanese architects learnt from and belatedly adapted a mainly British architectural educational 
system. These architects created a wide range of new building functions without historical precedent in 
Japan, and imitated a European aesthetic, particularly for national monuments. The now urgent 
creation of centralised institutions was even transferred and adapted in their dominations overseas. 
 
The transmission of ideas into the cultural context of Meiji Japan resulted in a new version of the 
modern being articulated in these works of architecture. The period following the Meiji Restoration (Jap. 
明治維新, 1868-1912) was most notable for the government and elite-led initiatives toward Great Power 
status. Therefore, I have chosen to concentrate upon authority architecture, taken to mean any building 
built by government authorities, and so including administrative, military, commercial, financial, public 
and religious architecture. These buildings implied the culture of the leaders, presenting evidence of 
how they influenced and changed the country so rapidly. By focusing on authority architecture, I 
acknowledge the power of architecture to “influence, coerce and legitimize” (Coaldrake, 1996: xix) on 
the one hand, and the central role that Meiji authorities had upon architecture on the other. 
 
Like the monuments of unification in Italy and Germany, the national architecture of Meiji was created 
during a juncture of radical political and social change. But Japan was unlike the paradigmatic state of 
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these countries in having no stone architecture, which was seen as the only true architecture by 
contemporaneous architecture historians such as James Fergusson.5 Japan had no existing stone 
palatial structures or recognizable Euro-American institutions prior to 1853 which would be readily 
available as models for the nation’s buildings. This process of self-definition of national architecture 
was therefore informed by a dominant foreign (largely British) influence. This was complicated by the 
fact that, during this early period, Japan was held as semi-civilised, lacking the progressive spirit of 
Europe and America and architecturally primitive in the eyes of most foreign commentators. In spite of 
these challenges, by the early 1900s, the visual modes of presentation were used to express a 
Japanese national image equal to, yet mostly unique from, Seiyō civilisation.  
 
With the rise of trans-disciplinary approaches, architecture is not only open to empirical studies but 
approaches such as critical research are now valid, and are suited to examining the vague 
transmission of architectural form through exploring the conditions of the Japanese encounter with 
Seiyō. This thesis critically analyses the reason for the deep impact of kindai (modern) upon the 
architectural experiment in accordance with a conceptual framework based on transculturation and 
altered identity in the historical context of the Empire Japan (1868-1949). The story of the modern 
which is told in this work begins with the genesis of the concept of modernity. It begins with the first 
appearance of ‘civilisation’ in a Japanese dictionary in 1862 (defined as behaviour made proper) to the 
public intellectual FUKUZAWA Yukichi’s (Jap. 福澤諭吉, 1835-1901)6 Outline of Civilisation of 1875 
which promoted reason, learning and identifying with Seiyō, and ends with the construction of nation’s 
first overseas domination headquarters to fulfill this idea of modernity in 1919. This is also a story of 
how freedom from Seiyō became discrimination against the rest of Asia.  
 
I have chosen to end the study in 1919 as a landmark moment, as it is important to distinguish this 
initial transmission of kindai (modern) into architecture from the subsequent modernism of the 
Secessionists and Bauhaus (1919-1932) movements which were introduced to Japan from 1920. This 
earlier period involved a marvelous merging of materialist aesthetics and rejection of Japan’s cultural 
‘tradition’. Later these ‘traditions’ were reinterpreted after the Second World War with architectural 
innovations such as the ‘Tange module’.7 This following period was twined with Americanisation and 
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all the higher branches of art [the modern Japanese] take a very low position, and seem utterly unprogressive… Their architecture stands on 
the same low level as their other arts.” (Fergusson, 1876: 710) 
 
6
 Fukuzawa’s ideas about government and social institutions had a deep influence on Meiji Japan. An exploration of his biography and 
theories can be found in Section 2.3. 
 
7
 The ‘Tange module’ was a design tool based on a re-calculated version Le Corbusier’s famous Modular to Japanese scale by TANGE Kenzō, 
which had a wide influence after the Second World War. 
 5 
later a growth of self-preservation of visible and invisible ‘traditions’ in the Metabolist movement.8 Yet 
all these movements after the Meiji modernisation were inevitably obliged to redevelop, reconsider and 
transcend to some extent the issue of Westernisation and to reconnect with Japan’s own past. So the 
opening to western Europe and America until the end of the Great War is the fundamental period in the 
filed of Japanese kindai (modern) architecture that I intend to cover and refer to as Victorian Japan. 
 
Whilst the political and intellectual context in Meiji Japan has been distinguished and explored by 
scholars, the experimental government-commissioned architecture projects remain isolated from wider 
study. These buildings performed an interlocking role in terms of cultural capital first in mainland Japan 
and later in her colonial domains. Therefore, the exploration of this research focuses on both mainland 
and colonial authority buildings, and specifically on the formative Taiwan Governor-General Office, 
home of the political elite of Taiwan which commenced their outward domination. Colonial authorities 
commissioned buildings with unprecedented procedure and status, which became a part of official 
propaganda of the Japanese nation’s progressive series and historic separation. The Office is a 
typically prima facie European looking building (in the style of red brick Renaissance revival but in the 
taste of Japanese architects) which is not only present as a case study, but in fulfillment of the prior 
theoretical basis that I argue: reification of progress can best be completed through domination. The 
building still survives as a legacy of Meiji Japan’s modernity: since its construction it has continuously 
held the highest authority in Taiwan, first of all housing the Governor-General and second, after the 
Japanese colonial period ended, the President until today (even after the civic centre of Taipei moved 
away to the East side of city in 1990). Focusing on a chronological overview and the ideological register 
of authority buildings, it becomes clear that Meiji Japan’s official definition of nation-building was 
fundamentally affected by European and American (pre) conceptions of non-Western nations in 
general and of Japan in particular. The creation of the institutional spaces within the traditional fabric in 
the late 19th century can therefore be placed in the broader context of Empire Japan’s difficult and 
paradoxical search for a new yet historically grounded identity.  
 
The argument and evidence that the thesis takes to establish this contribution is given in Chapters 1 
and 2 which examine the idea and application of Japanese modernity through researching this 
unprecedented concept and how it filtered into society.  
 
Chapter 1 sets up a framework for understanding the notion of the modern in Europe and Japan 
through a detailed look at the etymology of ‘modern’ in the English language, and the conditions which 
were required for modernity to arise in Europe. Through etymological analysis, I found that modernity is 
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an exclusively European concept, used to distinguish time periods, objects and people from the past, 
suited to times of extreme change. This concept was also claimed by Octavio Paz (1991)9 to be 
founded upon critical reason. It was understood in a programmatic sense (that the modern is a project 
of improvement) and a transitory sense (that the modern is most associated with schisms and change). 
The term was formed through a series of precise social and political conditions: first, the development 
of critical reason as a value system following the Renaissance and second, reified self-ascribed 
superiority, gained through dominating non-European peoples. These conditions filled in the concept of 
modernity as a period of progression above non-Europeans through reasoned innovation. The modern 
was essentially a self-description of how Europeans understood themselves in recent history.  
 
Subsequently I explore how Japanese modernity was distinguished by definition and use from the 
English version, and how the concept was derived from and gradually adopted within the Japanese 
vocabulary by the 1890s. Even before this time, the idea of civilisation was well utilised by authorities 
as a generic policy to progress to a new stage of history and ‘improve’ socially; through this emerged a 
critical spirit by the 1850s and the progressive self-conscious intelligentsia (the Meirokusha (Jap. 明六
社, lit. ‘the Meiji 6 Society’)) were first formed in 1873. The word kindai came to be used as ‘modern’ by 
the 1910s, and related to a new period of history, distinct from ‘feudalism’, a period later understood to 
run from 1868 until 1945 (the era of the Empire of Japan). Modernity in Japan was not contiguous to the 
European idea, as it related to a different time period, and had a different basis: modernity in English 
was a self-description whilst kindai was an aspiration and a changeable objective as a programme of 
progression which represented a cultural shift from seeing civilisation as present in China and Japan to 
Seiyō. The notion became a powerful vehicle to allow Japanese authorities to realign their country to 
Europe and the U.S.A., and to form their own future which was later claimed as a truly Confucian idea 
of civilisation and a Buddhist philosophy of impermanence. 
 
Chapter 2 begins tracing the entry of new ideas and movements to Japan by examining social and 
political structures during the Edo period and the continuities from the late Edo period until the Meiji 
period. For instance, the idea of ‘civilisation’ was present and commonly expressed throughout the Edo 
period, with reference to Confucian behavioral standards. This notion shifted along with the 
geo-political context that Japan found itself within: once Qing China had been humiliated in the First 
Opium War (Chi. 鴉片戰爭, 1839-1842) and Perry’s Black Ships had led to the signing of the ‘unfair 
treaties’, Japanese elites in the Shogunate and in the regional han began to protectively adopt 
technologies from the West, eventually leading to a brief civil war and the Meiji Restoration. Following 
this, the world-view of elites altered to accept the nations of Europe and North America as pre-eminent; 
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a new centralised regime began instituting changes which reflected this understanding. I analyse the 
factors for Japan’s success in managing the situation, and find that Japanese authorities had a 
willingness to culturally compromise that was not present in Qing China. This thread of comparison 
between Japan and China is maintained throughout the thesis because the Japan-China axis was a 
primary relationship, utilised by Japanese elites to demonstrate the new sense of cultural superiority 
they felt was required to become ‘modern’. 
 
The chapter goes on to discuss how Seiyō became idealised through contact with Europe and America 
through government missions and a new universal education system and how Japan was viewed by 
the Europeans and Americans at the time (being denigrated by some as a ‘nation of copiers’). Through 
awe, respect, idealisation and fear of the Great Powers, the idea of modernity was translated and took 
root. The exact meaning of what it meant to be kindai (modern), and to modernise, is analysed 
subsequently through the works of pre-eminent Meiji intellectuals including Fukuzawa and NATSUME 
Sōseki (Jap. 夏目漱石, 1867-1916).10 Japanese intellectuals reflected the intellectual fashions of 
Europe at this time, seeing Japan as entering a new rational era, and later using social Darwinism 
terms to understand the process which was made profound under KATŌ Hiroyuki (Jap. 加藤弘之, 
1836-1916), a strong believer in the works of Herbert Spencer. Meiji modernity consisted of 
re-identification with the world, and the adoption of a universal notion of the progress of nations as an 
inevitable consequence. This outlook led to the creation of the notion of Tōyō (Jap. 東洋, lit. Eastern 
Seas, or the Orient) as the ‘Other’ to Japan, and to Japanese distancing themselves from their own 
customary practices. 
 
Chapters 3 through 5 chronicle the architectural kindai (modern) movement (1868-1912) through 
pre-modern Edo to post-modern colony to assess how Japanese authorities were influenced by kindai 
and created a new architecture through professionalisation and systematic dominance. 
 
Chapter 3 explores how the governmental and intellectual encounter with Seiyō shaped building 
construction and architectural education in the Meiji era, first addressing the topic of Japanese 
carpentry, before and after the Meiji Restoration. This first section explores how carpentry was a 
national, literate, competitive community of practice: I challenge the twin myths that Japanese artisans 
in the Edo period were somehow idyllic and that ‘pre-modern’ Japanese architecture was 
homogeneous and static. Carpenters were brought together by hinagata writings, shared reverence for 
wood, and the religious system of hōgaku. The trend towards monumentality, which grew during the 
Edo period, was continued by carpenters in the Meiji period. Carpenters began building using their 
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interpretation of European aesthetics under the official desire for de-Japanisation, and gradually built 
more and more rationalised structures, eschewing decoration where unnecessary. Parallel to this, 
foreign surveyors and architects were hired in Japan to build important buildings for new functions such 
as a national mint, barracks, Tokyo University and the first European-style town planning. The 
subsequent rise of foreign builders represents the power dynamic between builder and natives, and the 
ad hoc nature of early Meiji commissioning practices. Initially, the master carpenter and the foreign 
architect were parallel and even rival professionals. This changed with entrance of the British architect 
Josiah Conder (1852-1920), the key figure in Japanese architecture at the time, to Japan in 1877.  
 
Conder’s arrival was the first concrete sign of a truly programmatic change in Japanese architecture: 
the Meiji government, first, established schools of engineering with foreign experts as teachers, second, 
oversaw translation of architectural books and the establishment of Japanese language architectural 
journals, and, third, instituted the introduction of European building styles and building functions without 
precedent in Japanese history. As a Victorian, Conder taught students the concerns of 19th century 
Britain that architecture was a profession separate from engineering, architecture was both an art and a 
science, and priority should be given to solidity in buildings. He maintained Orientalist notions of 
‘Eastern’ architecture as static and unchanging, and a concern with the problem of style in national 
buildings. All these concerns are revealed through Conder’s writings and key buildings in this chapter. 
Each of these concerns placed contemporaneous carpentry on a lower level than architecture, due to 
the premise of a pre-existing cultural pecking order held by Conder and other architects at the time. 
 
Subsequently, I focus upon the first Japanese architects who, within a decade, had replaced Conder as 
the architecture instructors and head government architects. This part examines the key apprentices of 
Conder and their interpretations of kindai architecture. Whilst they instituted a course on Japanese 
carpentry as part of the architecture degree at Tokyo University and understood Japanese architecture 
to be at a higher level than their European peers did, there were more continuities than departures from 
Conder’s notions of architecture. These first Japanese architects were agents of ‘civilisation’, who said 
that no nation could be compared with the Japanese who are burning with ambition to rank with the 
most civilised nations of the world.11 A hybridisation of architecture styles ensued creating a wide 
range of new buildings across the country.  
 
Chapters 4 and 5 examine how the kindai (modern) mission was fulfilled in Japan’s first colony 
(1895-1945), Taiwan, a country of conflicting culture and identity, to illuminate the progressive series 
that comprised the kindai movement. 
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Chapter 4 begins the discussion of Taiwan through analysis of the history, purposes and effects of 
Japanese imperialism. Simultaneously seeking legal equality with Seiyō and dominance over Tōyō, 
Japanese diplomats and military achieved a politically superior position over their neighbours, 
beginning with the colonisation of Hokkaidō before reversing the teacher/student relationship with 
China. This was most notably achieved through the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-5 which resulted in the 
Qing ceding Taiwan to Japan in 1895. Japan's motivation for acquiring colonies was based on the need 
for survival and self-protection but it was also a part of establishing Japan as a modern nation. 
Engagement with the modern requires engagement in the process of distinguishing from the 
non-modern, and the most direct and effective method of doing this was colonisation. Chapter 4 utilises 
the example of Taiwan to understand how the formation of notions of superiority and critical reason 
were fulfilled in Japanese imperial possessions. Taiwan was colonised after decades of forays to the 
South of Japan, beginning with the annexation of the Ryūkyū kingdom. With the arrival of GOTŌ 
Shinpei (Jap. 後藤新平 , 1857-1929), 12  the most influential head of civilian affairs in Taiwan 
(1898-1906), the ‘modernity’ imported into Taiwan became increasingly clear: scientific investigation of 
the local customs and institutions, persuasion through impressing the locals, and what was called 
‘biological politics’, a Japanese interpretation of social Darwinism adapted for colonisation. These 
policies saw material and cultural changes in Taiwan, an island which had already been growing in 
importance in the century leading up to the Japanese takeover. 
 
In order to contrast the traditional and the modern, I compare the government-built spaces in Qing 
Taipei, when a Chinese aesthetic was maintained, and Colonial Taipei, the capital city of Taiwan since 
1885. I concentrate on the city planning, the representation of the city on maps, building types, and the 
rationale for building forms and spaces as sites of projecting kindai (modern). The governor responsible 
for constructing Taipei as a provincial capital was part of the Self-Strengthening movement, a 
movement with similar slogans to Meiji Japan: adopting ‘Western technology’ and ‘Eastern ethics’. Yet 
a comparison in the cityscape demonstrates that the Qing were not ‘modernising’ in the European 
sense revealed in Section 1.2: there was no evidence of schisms and fractures with the past. City 
planning in Qing Taipei harked back to ancient planning principles, mapping was based on idealised 
representations, and building forms followed centuries-old principles of governance. Although 
European public building types were few, these new institutions were settled with urgency, in response 
and in preparation for Japan’s aggression. By contrast the city created by Japan atop this template was 
fundamentally kindai: city planning was inspired by Paris with the city walls replaced by tree-line 
boulevards, maps were scientific and accurate, public, commercial and financial buildings were 
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introduced, and the building forms purposely followed European archetypes. These products signified 
deeper and more fundamental changes to the city, from the introduction of nationalism to the changes 
to the flow of life in Taipei: the measurement and experience of time altered, the city became more 
accessible yet more closely monitored as the closing time of gates for the city was disestablished, and 
the principle that the city should change peoples’ behavior became instituted through public, leisure 
and sanitation institutions housed in new forms. The changes followed a rational line into Taiwan and 
were settled upon using elements of ‘Victorian Japan’.  
 
Chapter 5 enters the architectural empirical study to explore the prior theories that I have argued. This 
final chapter looks in depth at Japan’s planned innovation with the architectural design competition, the 
process of construction, and the space, forms and use of the building once complete. The case study is 
of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office (1919) was an example par excellence of Japanese 
modernity in colonial authority architecture, from its use of the first architectural competition onwards. 
The Office was placed on the diagonal to the provincial-level Chinese yamen (Chi. 衙門 lit. central 
administrative gate), the building that was used as the Office for the first 24 years of Japanese colonial 
rule. This is taken as an indication that Japanese bureaucrats in Taiwan were able to reasonably easily 
adapt to Chinese habitual spaces, with their common architectural vocabulary of transitional spaces 
and gates. Regardless, the new Office was set up as a diametrically opposed building to the yamen, 
focused on simultaneously incorporating the total control of building’s inhabitants which was the rule on 
the island with the imperial hierarchy headed by the emperor, a hybrid symbol of modernity and 
tradition. The spaces of the Office betray the focus on technology that was the hallmark of early 
modern Japan, which were utilised in ways that suited the habits and cultural attitudes of the 
inhabitants: cleanliness, class and harmony.  
 
The Japanese interpretation of science and technology is explored through analysis of the use of 
building as the host for the first national exhibition in 1916. This exhibition displayed the products of 
Japanese improvements in the agriculture, industry, arts and science of Taiwan, for the purpose of 
demonstrating the superiority of the colonisers. The building itself was a technical artefact of Japanese 
modernity, whose materials were almost solely from mainland Japan, and whose earthquake proofing 
was a demonstration of the mastery of Japanese scientists and architects in seismology. This in itself is 
revealing: Japan’s unique path of adopting mature Seiyō concepts such as science led towards a 
pragmatic focus in developing their own capabilities and a new path towards modernity that was 
qualitatively different to the one pursued in Europe and America.  
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The Office building played a role as a pioneering expression of Victorian Japan’s dual modernity with its 
symbolic brick facing to express civilisation and the establishment of programmatic reasoning before 
the introduction of modernism. My analysis of the building’s semiology focused on symbols of 
modernity and native artistic/cultural expression as well as the representation of the building in 
postcards. Through this examination it becomes clear that the building was purposefully designed as a 
‘pure’ example of Seiyō-influenced modernity, eschewing and masking anything that would be deemed 
‘traditional’. This expression was influential in first in Japan’s colonies in instituting a new hierarchy of 
architectural expression that implicitly denigrated customary forms, and second in mainland Japan 
where the template of revival forms atop a ferro-concrete frame became the norm for important public 
buildings until the end of the Second World War. Through this building, a significant symbol of modern 
Meiji was fulfilled in terms of cultural nationalism. 
 
 
Theories of kindai (modern) upon architecture  
The transition of Japan towards modernity has been ongoing since the middle of the 19th century, a 
period of great upheaval in the world. ‘Modernity’ was an important subject in this period in the context 
of the world’s trend of cultural nationalism. Yet there is a large gap in the field of architectural studies in 
Europe and East Asia as far as dealing with the cultural issue of ‘modernity’ is concerned. Studies on 
the movement ‘modernism’ are much more popular in art and architecture (particularly in English) and 
as a result there is little in depth understanding of ‘modernity’ and architecture. This becomes obvious 
when discussing periodisation of modern architecture: the ‘modern’ time is less convoluted for English 
language works (and more simplistic) than Japanese works. Modern architecture in Japan in English 
works is commonly interpreted as beginning with the entrance of European architecture in 1853 and 
seen as continuous from the entrance of the first European buildings, to the influence of modernism 
architecture, and to post-war architecture. A typical work such as David B. Stewart’s (1987), ‘The 
Making of Modern Japanese Architecture’ covers the modern architecture development from Meiji time 
(1868) to 1987, narrating the key empirical studies, and gives only a vague definition of what it means 
to be modern. From this it may not be easy to understand from English language works why the 
modern has been seen for so long as a large problem in East Asia: the ‘architecture of modern Japan’ 
is seen as synonymous with the ‘modern architecture of Japan’. For the Japanese, these are two 
separate issues. 
 
Before the Second World War, the term ‘modern architecture’ was not popular or widely utlised in Japan. 
Importantly, it did not indicate ‘European architecture’ which was instead so-called Western-style (yōfū) 
architecture. Since Secessionist architecture was introduced to Japan in 1920, the issues of 
reconsidering ‘modern Japan’ and the specific problem of the modern architecture movement arose. 
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The hinge of this debate was the word ‘modern’ in relation to architecture which was first claimed by 
HAMAGUCHI Ryūichi in Architecture of Humanism (1947).13 The Japanese Marxist ZUSHI Yoshihiko 
(1947) rebounded against Hamaguchi’s idea and asserted that ‘modern architecture’ is exactly the 
same as ‘modernised architecture’: as long as architecture is in a modern, capitalist society it is 
inevitably modern. Unlike Hamaguchi, Zushi believed the ‘architecture of the people’ was also to blame, 
as it was as much within the modern system as anything else. From the Marxist point of view, Zushi 
believed that the ‘modern’ should be ridden over and overcome.  
 
These two arguments caused a huge debate about the meaning of ‘modern architecture’ and later on 
the meaning of modern in Japanese history. The periodisation debate became settled in 1949 by the 
rekiken group14 of contemporary Japanese historians. They wrote that “because the contemporary 
world has become one, it is inconvenient for our country alone to be using a different chronology. Also, 
a thorough understanding of the past will prove difficult without a knowledge about what happened in 
the world at that time. Therefore the epochs of world history must from now on be unified.” (Ishimoda et 
al, 1949: 5) In order to avoid confusion with modanizumu (modernism) architecture, Japanese (and 
later Chinese language works also) distinguished the periodisation: the name kindai (modern) indicated 
pre-WWII architecture whilst gendai (Jap. 現代, modern) indicates post-war. As can be seen from the 
dating, the modern period is not simply a problem of temporal distancing in Japan, but the Pacific war 
(1941-1945) must be involved: ‘Modern architecture’ appeared categorised with the defeat of Japan, 
which gave hope and pride to post-war Japanese architects and historians. It represented the chance 
for a clean break from the past. As a result of this however, the tense debate on what kindai, gendai 
and modanizumu represent is now lost and forgotten, and the debate between a progressive notion of 
modern architecture versus the Marxist perspective has proven difficult to end. 
 
The modern architecture and modernist architecture were discussed actively and separately (because 
modern architecture became a matter of history whilst modernism was ongoing) after the Second 
World War with a split between those considered pro-modern and anti-modern. The definition of 
modern architecture and the possibility that Japan actually had a history of modern architecture was 
questioned. The pioneering books of European architecture (Jap. 洋風, Yōfū) of the early Empire 
Japan did not appear until the Showa period (1926-1989): these were the Japan Federation of 
Engineering Societies (1927); HORIKOSHI Saburō (1929); Architecture Institution of Japan (1932 and 
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1933). These books contributed to and were followed by what are considered the first books on 
Japanese modern architecture history in Japan ‘Modern architecture of Japan’ by INAGAKI Eizō (1959) 
and then ‘Japanese Architectural History of Technology’ by MURAMATSU Teijirō (1959). During this 
time many research groups tentatively established a new way for modern architecture to transcend 
Westernisation under the auspices of the Metabolist movement. 
 
In Inagaki’s first book on Japan’s modern architecture (1959) his drawings in his historical survey of 
modern architecture begins from the time of brick, steel and concrete. Inagaki tried to establish what 
can be called ‘modern architecture’ and also formed a fundamental foundation for future studies. 
According to Inagaki, the speed and rapidity of architectural development in Japan did not matter: what 
mattered was that through their architecture the architects always aimed to be progressive as one of 
the goals of modernisation. Following this foundation, individual studies on the architecture of modern 
Japan also increased after 1960. The experience of re-reading the works of this time suggests that 
starting from the current awareness, they pursued a surprisingly diverse number of targets and 
perspectives: KŌJIRO Yūichirō (1961)  described in parallel the modern architecture of the West and 
Japan; KIRISHIKI Shinjirō (1961) captured the propagation of veranda motifs across Europe and the 
United States, Asia and Japan; and INAGAKI Eizō (1961) analysed the manufacturing architecture 
system starting from the late Edo period. The implicit purpose of these books was to link Japan to the 
world story, as a parallel site of modern practice. 
 
I found that Inagaki’s (1959) book was given tribute by being used as a template and a foundational 
reference for later works by Japanese researchers such as MURAMATSU Teijirō (1977), FUJIMORI 
Terunobu (1993), and ISAMU Yoneyama and ITŌ Takayuki (2010). All the mentioned cases above later 
on became key studies in the modern architecture of Japan often indicated as further thematic and 
empirical studies. Given that these works share a definition of kindai architecture, it seems that as the 
topic was debated from the 1940s to 1960s, a consensus appeared about what is modern in Japanese 
architecture: kindai architecture is all architecture produced in kindai period (1868-1945). A different 
term exists for modernism and whilst these terms are not mutually exclusive, this framework results in 
less conceptual confusion. 
 
On the topic of how kindai (modern) architecture was understood in the Empire of Japan, architecture 
studies were never extended from Japan to its colonies in a single series. This is somewhat 
problematic as relations of domination in the Victorian era were so ubiquitous that “metropole and 
colony have to be seen in a unitary field of analysis.” (Cohn, 1996: 4) For Japan and colonial Taiwan, 
the ‘centre and periphery’ are usually analysed separately although they have a symbiotic relationship: 
they formed two parts of a whole and one part cannot be studied without the other. Unlike Japan, the 
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‘peripheral’ subject is very commonly studied in Europe: British imperialism has begun to be treated 
from a new and more critical perspective, particularly following the work of Edward W. Said (1978). 
Imperial architecture studies now loom large among other established fields from the European 
perspective with works on British Imperial architecture by many experts such as Thomas R. Metcalf 
(1989), Mark Crinson (1996), Andreas Volwahsen (2002 and 2004) and Robert K. Home (2013). 
 
In Chinese language works on colonial Japanese architecture in Taiwan, the buildings are frequently 
referred to ‘Western style’ or ‘architecture from the Japanese occupation’. However the term jìendài 
(Chi. 近代, modern, the same character as Jap. kindai) is used to describe all architecture from the 
period 1860 (the first treaty port in Taiwan) to 1945 (the end of WWII). All post-Second World War 
architecture is classified as ‘contemporary’ (for example in SUN Chuan-Wen, 2004), using the same 
term used as Japanese for contemporary, xiàndài (Chi. 現代, contemporary, same character as Jap. 
gendai). Xiàndài therefore describes modernist and functionalist architecture and any other types built 
in the post-war period. The influence of Japan on this categorisation is clear15 and there is little debate 
concerning this architectural terminology due to the compromise of definitions: the major difference is 
that in Taiwan, pre-war architecture is seen as colonial architecture as well as ‘modern’.  
 
There are very few articles in English language on architecture and urban planning which have 
included colonial Taiwan besides those by Joseph R. Allen (2000, 2005, 2007 and 2012); most 
available research is in the Chinese or Japanese language. Although there are a few books on 
Taiwan’s architecture in different centuries, there is only one book by LI Qian-Lang (2004[1979]) which 
is about Taiwan’s architecture history from the earliest architecture to present (which categorises 
1895-1945 architecture as ‘Japanese colonial period’ architecture). Yet there is a huge amount of 
research on kindai (modern) architecture under Japanese occupation (more than 100 unpublished 
theses and published books) which adds much basic knowledge. These usually take one of three 
approaches, all of which are focused on collecting and presenting as much data as possible: either 
searching for the modern in practical ways such as cataloging technologies and materials, for example 
LI Hong-Jian (1994) and YEH Nai-Chi (2002); there is good data of modern architecture facilities in 
LIAO Chen-Cheng (2007), empirical studies of kindai building types which focus on the development of 
individual cases of colonial buildings, for example YANG Qing-Wu (1995), CHEN Hsin-An (2004) and LI 
Shang-Ying (2005); or through studying the transition of urban planning, for example LIAO 
Chun-Sheng (1988), YEN Shu-Hua (2005) and CHENG Chin-Fang (2005). The state of scholarship is 
somewhat opposite to that of British imperial architecture, with a great deal of material published on the 
topic of kindai architecture but very few critical studies on the topic. Although other architecture studies 
                                                   
15
 This influence is partly a consequence that most prominent Taiwanese architectural historians were at least partly educated in Japan. 
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have focused on the pre-war period in recent Chinese and Japanese language works, and there are 
many works on the topic, yet these assume a very generic understanding of the modern as most have 
focused on empirical studies, comparative studies such as ASHIHARA Yoshinobu (1991), SHA 
Yong-Jie (2001), and NAKAMURA Shigeharu (2002), or SHEN Fu-Xu and KONG Jian’s (2008) study of 
modern schools of thought in architecture.  
 
In contrast, there is little published material on the colonial architects who worked in Taiwan, and what 
little there is (such as the work by HUANG Chien-Chun (1995) and LI Jun-Hua (2000)) focuses on the 
later stages of Japanese occupation. The featured studies on architecture policy focus on the building 
rules (YANG Chich-Hung (1996)) and the experience of weather adaptation (LIN Szu-Ling (2006)). 
Whilst various theses have been written on Taiwan’s architectural ‘modernisation’, and have been 
helpful, they contribute little to the theoretical approach I have taken in this work, and have labored 
under the assumption that ‘modern’ is the same as ‘Colonial Japanese’. One rare notable critical work 
on modernity by HSIA Chu-Joe (2002) has been translated into English: ‘Theorizing Colonial 
Architecture and Urbanism: Building Colonial Modernity in Taiwan’. There are very few existing 
Taiwanese items of literature that explicitly question the way the idea of modern was created. 
 
This is not merely an issue of lack of analysis of the modern in East Asian architecture; the idea of 
‘modern’ in architecture is also ill-researched in academia worldwide. This is something of a 
periodisation issue in Japanese and in Taiwan, and a result of fundamental definitions in English with 
too few terms to understand the modern phenomenon. In recent works in English, ‘modern architecture’ 
is usually used synonymously with ‘modernism’, under the premise that the real ‘modern architecture’ 
began when architects became conscious of their modernity and strove for change in architecture, for 
example Colquhoun (2002), Tourikiotis (1999) and Crinson (2003). This is unlike the Japanese 
definition, which sees kindai architecture as a product of the kindai age. The English definition of 
‘modern’ reflects the idea that architecture is an autonomous profession, detached and only influenced 
in a limited way by wider modernity. Due to this, when reasons are given for identifying ‘modern 
architecture’ with ‘modernism’ they are given with reference to developments in architecture rather than 
in and with society. For instance, the only reason Alan Colquhoun gave for not labelling nineteenth 
century architecture as ‘modern’ was because “Already in the early nineteenth century, there was wide 
dissatisfaction with eclecticism among architects, historians and critics.” (Colquhoun, 2002: 9) This 
statement assumes that because a number of architects and historians were dissatisfied with 
revivalism it could not be a genuine ‘modern’ architecture. Colquhoun did not feel the need to provide 
further justification for this periodisation and this shows that there is currently an implicit, general, 
mutually agreed understanding of what architects mean by ‘modern architecture’. 
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This conception has replaced an earlier one which saw modern architecture as architecture which was 
a product of modern times. For instance, the Victorian architectural historian, James Fergusson, wrote 
A History of the Modern style of Architecture (1873) which examined the development of revivalism in 
Europe, America and India. By 1921, Banister Fletcher conceptually separated modern styles from 
revival styles whilst placing them on the same level. This conceptual distancing has continued, so that 
19th century architecture is now both no longer ‘modern’ and no longer seen as the root from which 
modernism sprang: modernism is viewed as a movement characterised by its originality. This is partly 
due to a historical focus on style which gives the impression that modernism was indeed a break from 
revivalism. A recent study by Neil Levine (2009) found that in most accounts of modern architecture, 
“there is an assumption of a direct descent from the eighteenth to the twentieth century, yet an almost 
total disconnect between the early manifestations of formative ideas and their later realization.” (Levine, 
2009: 2) In this view, “The schizophrenic nineteenth century occupies a no-man’s land of historical 
revivalism and eclecticism, where engineering appears temporarily to supersede architecture as a 
place for experimentation and invention in building.” (Levine, 2009: 2) Levine instead proposes to view 
modern architecture as a continuous historical development from the 18th century onwards by not 
concentrating upon style but upon what buildings represent. (Levine, 2009: 2-14) From this view, 
modern architecture has a stable development as eclectic architects were grappling with similar notions 
of representation as modernist architects: mythologising and the creation of a new, progressive idea of 
history. 
 
However even Levine takes a view that begins with architecture and what it represents: beyond Hilde 
Heynen (1999) and MAEDA Ai (2004) there are few examples of studies of the influence of the 
‘modern’ on architecture and urbanity which begin with the idea and wider meaning of ‘modern’. 
Studies on ‘Victorian Japan’ are a popular research field whether in Japan or Taiwan, but there is 
currently no published research in the UK, Japan or Taiwan which connects the architectural traces 
from Victorian Europe, through Japan to Taiwan, and which begins with the historical and conceptual 
basis of the transformation. Although within the field of architecture it is common to see theses about 
‘Modernism’, the root of this word and of global architectural styles have come from the idea of the 
‘modern’. An early definition of modern in an English dictionary in 1485 is ‘not antiquated or obsolete’.16 
It is a concept open to interpretation and changes in fashion by its very definition. One fundamental 
reason that this study looks at the idea of the modern is because the theory of modern has been most 
significantly framed by the Western world and the aim to be modern still influences many ‘developing’ 
countries. The continued desire to be modern is also one of the reasons for the creation of the 
emerging global culture, which has a profound impact on the existence of local cultures. Yet like 
Heynen, I believe that the concept of the modern found in modernism seems a naïve rendition of what it 
                                                   
16
 The Oxford English Dictionary (1989). 
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means to be modern and denies the complex historical roots of this idea. (Heynen, 1999: 2) Likewise, I 
trace the issue of the modern from Japan to Taiwan to view the symbiosis of ‘centre and periphery’ 
which is key to understanding the story of the modern in Victorian times. 
 
The aim of this research approach is to reveal the fixed universal idea of civilisation and modernity 
across different cultures and to dispel the attendant notion that progress in the architectural space was 
synchronised with social spaces. The establishment of three layers of relationship between pre-Meiji, 
kindai (modern), to post-Second World War architecture is a tribute to the defining power of the most 
transformational era of Japanese history, the Meiji kindai period. I trace this time from the critical 
junctures from the first encounter with the modern West in 1853, the formation of a united modern 
nation-building project in 1868, the professionalisation of the architecture system from 1877, the 
establishment of first non-Western recognised legislative body in 1889, and the fulfillment of civilised 
(modernised) others by imperial aggression in 1895, until the beginning of modernism in Japan in 1919.  
 
Critically, understanding kindai architecture is not just a matter of understanding the visual appearance, 
the architects’ intentions, or the period it was built in: beyond these issues are the problems with the 
new ‘civilised’ concepts which can be seen from analysing Japanese authority architecture in early 
modern Japan. In this light I propose that kindai (modern) architecture was a result of two necessary 
conditions: 
 
1. The growth of rationality in architecture: Japanese architects were greatly influenced by 
the use of ‘reason’ in architecture. Architects made decisions largely on pragmatic 
grounds, with their own religious values playing very little role. They made use of and 
developed scientific knowledge, most exceptionally in earthquake-proofing. They also 
used an ever increasing range of masonry materials and complied in inaugurating new 
building functions throughout Japanese and colonial cities.  
 
2. Building a progressive image of Japan: As one of the most important and obvious symbols 
of a state, architecture had a crucial role in forming the image of the Meiji state and a new 
mythology of Japan. Imitation was widespread as Japanese authorities used architecture 
to become associated with the West. Japanese architects learnt from this and followed 
programmatic designs developed in the West for building types and the manipulation of 
these styles for ideological reasons. 
 
Rational architecture became bound up with the need to convey an image of Japan as a civilised and 
progressive nation, rather than being seen as the result of centuries of philosophical and scientific 
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development. The argument is that Japan had responded to the Euro-American methodical approach 
without changing the inherent nature of their systems of belief: striving for belonging to the modern 
world was most vital to the character of Meiji authority architecture and the driving force for how 
architecture developed in the period. Given that this sense of belonging was the key factor in pushing 
Japan to become modern, Japanese architectural modernity had a different basis to Europe and 
America, not based on movements in civil society but seemingly on desperate imitation and the 
adoption of the correct architectural syntax. With no real choice and urgency due to the geo-political 
context, the reaction to this period is evidence of the consequences of identifying with Seiyō. Since 
WWII Japanese architects have attempted to rediscover and reclaim the valuable elements and modes 
of being that have been excluded from adopted Seiyō-mind: once deemphasised, now different 
cultures have again become the themes of architecture according the leading Japanese architect 
KUROKAWA Kisho (1993). 
 
 
Reading architecture sociologically  
Architecture is a unique discipline in some ways: “there is no other class of object [other than buildings] 
which through the production of material forms purposefully organises space and people in space.” 
(Markus, 1993: 27) It has long been recognised that the effect that buildings have on peoples’ lives is 
not limited to behaviour; at this point, “the question is not whether architecture constructs identities and 
stabilizes meanings, but how and in whose interests.” (Dovey, 2009) However there has been a historic 
split of architecture from social science, so that the conventional understanding of buildings is as 
objects of art and engineering, rather than as objects which are a result of, and productive of culture. 
Rapprochements in studies of history and art do not tend to solve this historical split: “those social 
historians or critics – radical as they may be – who see an intimate connection between art and society, 
have left architecture out in the cold. Those architectural historians and critics who treat buildings as art 
objects, have left society out in the cold.” (Markus, 1993: 27) Similarly, almost all architectural studies of 
the modern in architecture are limited to studying modernism whilst almost all studies of modernity 
exclude architecture.  
 
The new wave of architecture historians try to embed architecture in society and society in architecture 
to give a full account of architecture and its links to society. To do this requires an understanding of 
society and the methods to study it, what I call sociology of architecture, following Paul Jones (2011). 
This approach is a vital component of this study given that the object of study is the transmission of 
Euro-American concepts into Japan through authority architecture in colonial settings: these are 
power-laden cultural fields which require a nuanced understanding. Jones uses sociology as “a proxy 
for a critical approach to the connections between the architectural field, political power, and the 
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construction, maintenance and mobilization of collective identities.” (Jones, 2011: 1) As a critical 
approach to architecture, this slant “involves revealing the ways in which power is socialised in the 
cultural sphere, with such an approach seeking to question how structures of power come to be taken 
for granted as legitimate and ‘natural’.” (Jones, 2011: 1) Without this critical approach it is impossible to 
fully situate architecture in socio-political conditions, to understand how it is used as an object of 
legitimisation, how identities are created through buildings and how cultural conditions impact on the 
profession of the architect. Following Jones (2011) there are two main objects of study in sociology of 
architecture, which will be outlined below: architectural practice, and the objectified results of that 
practice.  
 
To understand the practice of architects it is important to understand what an ‘architect’ is. This is 
particularly important given that Japan did not previously have an architectural profession. Architecture 
as a profession in Europe and America underwent drastic changes in the past two centuries: “the 
profession of architecture as we know it today emerged during the nineteenth century, as the process 
of designing buildings split from the process of building them.” (Davis, 2008: 272) In the early 
nineteenth century, the architect “designed buildings, he directly supervised construction, he worked 
out problems on the construction site, he selected materials. This was typical business at the time.” 
(Davis, 2008: 276) The training of architects at schools rather than through apprenticeships signified a 
division of labour and rationalisation of roles which was taking place in various fields across society. 
Whilst this allowed the architect to concentrate on a smaller role, the split between design and 
construction changed the building design process, so that the intuitive thinking of a builder was no 
longer present in the architect’s mind.  
 
This split took a different form in Japan. The Japanese carpentry profession was disparaged after the 
firm establishment of the architect as a new profession following 1877. Japanese carpenters were seen 
“ultimately as 'anonymous' artisans, subsuming their individual character within a group tradition which 
was antithetical to the notion of individual creativity lying at the heart of the Western humanist tradition.” 
(Coaldrake, 2001: 46) Japanese carpentry was seen by outspoken British engineers in the 1880s as 
possessing “practically no knowledge of the higher branches of carpentry… The principle involved in 
the construction of the most famous Japan temples is no higher than that embodied in the fisherman’s 
hut.” (Clancey, 2006: 48) Japanese architecture removed these contested practices by not involving 
carpenters in the ‘architectural project’ until after the profession was formed.  
 
These opinions were not formed in a vacuum: building practice is shaped by culture, education and 
through relationships with others. By being the conduit of decision-making about building choices, 
architects are put in a position of power. However, these contextual factors matter since they limit the 
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form, function and space choices of architects and building commissioners, who can “choose only from 
those possibilities that are known to them.” (Moore and Webber, 2008: 287) Very few studies of 
architecture, even those which concern the profession of the architect, relate practice to wider 
social-political and cultural trends. Notable exceptions include Paul Jones (2011), Mark Crinson (1996) 
and Gregg Clancey (2006), who all attempt to situate the architect as a product of a particular time, who 
acts politically as a unit and against one another, and who are cultured. It is their example which I 
attempt to follow in this thesis.  
 
I understand the practice of architecture as idea-laden: from ‘art’ to ‘science’, from ‘traditional’ to 
‘modern’, all these notions affect what the public, clients and builders see as good/real architecture. In 
Meiji Japan, these ideas were either imported from foreign languages or underwent complete change 
so that the original meaning bore little resemblance to the new one. The paucity of engaged literature in 
concepts that apply to architecture means that the simple notion of ‘modern’ architecture is unrelated to 
how the idea has developed in other disciplines such as sociology. Engagement with this can be 
beneficial to better connect architecture with how the ‘modern’ was understood by society and clients, 
rather than limiting the scope of study to what architects alone understand the concepts to mean. 
Architectural practice needs to be situated in its cultural and educational context to be understood with 
greater accuracy.  
 
I situate architects in their cultural context in four ways. First, by analysing the culture of the late Edo 
period in order to understand the conditions that formed the carpentry profession. Second, by analysing 
and understanding the culture of the authorities who commission the architecture in Sections 2.2 and 
4.1. By specifying the modus operandi of Meiji authorities and the context that they worked within, it is 
possible to explore the purpose of the architecture profession and what authority architecture meant for 
the state. Third, I situate architects in their cultural context by analysing Japanese culture through 
understanding the debates and concerns of the day in Meiji Japan in Section 2.3. This is done through 
analysis of secondary literature relating to the public intellectuals of the early to late Meiji period, and by 
locating where Meiji architects of different generations fit into this schema. Finally, I explore the thought 
and concerns of the Meiji architects themselves, which occurs from Chapter 3 onwards.  
 
Similarly, for education, I explore five different aspects of how the education of architects impacted on 
their practice. Beginning with the principles of education founded in the Edo period, and how these 
principles were altered and added to by contact with the Great Powers, I then analyse the institutions 
which were set up in order to emulate Seiyō in creating a new profession of architecture through 
education. In Chapter 3 I then explore the thought of key figures in the education of Japanese 
architects, beginning with Josiah Conder. The fourth aspect covered under education is the topics 
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covered in Meiji architectural education and the conceptual lenses that were inculcated. Finally, I 
explore the underlying biases present in this education system, through exploring the impact of 
Orientalism present in the structure of the architecture course. 
 
The products of these cultured, educated architects are buildings which, following Marcus, I understand 
as “metaphors, readily interpretable where a community shares the assumptions they are based on 
(e.g. the equation of a building’s height with its importance).” (Markus and Cameron, 2001: 68) 
Markus’s (1993) study on the emergence of the modern building type analysed what the building meant 
from all dimensions, and his approach allows that everything about a building has social meaning; its 
form, function, and spatial structure are each capable of being analysed according to their social 
meaning. 
 
I analyse buildings in this thesis in three main ways. First, by the feelings they transmit though their 
appearance. Buildings can inspire a sense of awe, respect, status and authority, or conversely, 
familiarity, banality and disrespect. Second, buildings transmit influence through the organisation of 
space and rooms within a building. “The articulation of space always embeds relationships of power, 
insofar as it governs interactions between users of a building, prescribes certain routines to them, and 
allows them to be subjected to particular forms of surveillance and control.” (Markus and Cameron, 
2001: 68-69) This issue can also be explored culturally: for instance, what habits does an architect 
presume in the organisation of space?  
 
The third method is the most salient for this study and requires the most unpacking. Through their 
design, buildings can transmit ideas and symbols. Importance and status can be shown by 
distinguishing them from other buildings in the general vicinity or functional group by their size, 
craftsmanship, expense, and through decorations. Beyond status, the forms of building chosen 
throughout the Meiji period were indicative of both the self-identity of the newly emerging government 
and the esteem which the Japanese government held Seiyō forms to impress and dominate the 
governed population. The particular forms thought to be ‘superior’ change over time and by culture to 
culture: “addressing the role that architecture has in codifying and reproducing social identities requires 
analysis; architecture is on cultural space in which political projects attempt to become socially 
meaningful, and where particular visions of publics are forged.” (Jones, 2011: 1-2) 
 
On this theme, architecture is not only subject to culture but a producer of it: there is a reciprocal 
relationship. A sociological approach to ideas in architecture needs to be “sensitized to the specificity of 
architecture as a form of cultural production, which involves revealing the contingencies, complicities 
and contested processes that characterise the incorporation of elements of the built environment into 
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frames of social and political meaning.” (Jones, 2011: 2) Another way to put this is that buildings are 
rhetorical; they stand in the stead of ideas as concrete reality. Representation “describes an essentially 
theatrical situation in which a virtual or ideal set of recognisable figures or elements is perceived as 
standing for, that is to say, representing, an absent set of real ones to which they are meant and 
believed to correspond.” (Levine, 2009: 5) Since buildings can be read in various ways which are not 
necessarily intended by the client or architect, the “success of the rhetoric lies in its power to make the 
fiction stand for the reality, to convince the viewer of the “truthfulness” of the representational elements” 
(Levine, 2009: 5) rather than make alternative interpretations. For instance, in Heynen’s example of the 
Heyselstadium (1999b), the rhetoric of a unified Belgium around the monarch was not taken as a 
salient symbol and hence as less truthful. The concept of ‘representation’ shows that, whilst ideas can 
be attempted to be transmitted through buildings, these are not necessarily going to be taken up by the 
public, the client or even other architects: “Like all forms of artistic representation, political meaning in 
architecture is discursive—dependent on culturally defined interpretations of form— not inherent in 
form itself.” (Wendelken, 2000: 819) 
 
In order to understand this discursive meaning, my thesis also requires a substantial amount of 
historical context. The framework for historical analysis will follow the example of Spence (1999) in 
using multiple sources and types of data including pictures as visual representations of the culture of 
the times. In addition, the historical narrative will avoid the example of Weber (1915) whose “preferred 
analytical tool is the ideal-type. This is not a description of reality but a normative and classificatory 
construct.” (Sprenkel, 1964: 350-351) Such analysis can quickly lead to ethnocentric assumptions, so 
grounding my narrative in data, the theories generated by my research will be inductively generated 
rather than deduced from prior hypotheses. As a key component to understand Japan’s ‘modern’ 
architecture, I begin the study with an analysis of meaning of modern from the root words in English 
and Japanese. Through this etymological approach I have explored the use and meaning of the 
‘modern’ from English to Japanese. My sources for this are the Oxford English Dictionary and selected 
Japanese-English Dictionaries (the details are in appendices I and II). 
 
My sources for Chapters 2, 3 and 4 come from a mixture of archives and secondary literature. The 
majority of my architecture archival work was from fieldwork in Japan in 2010 where I focused upon the 
education of Japanese architects, the works of key architects, media representations of architecture, 
and colonial records of Taiwan. The main archives I used in Japan were located in Tokyo University, the 
National Diet Library, Tokyo National Museum, and Japan’s National Archives. I also undertook further 
fieldwork in Taiwan in 2009 and 2012, together with the previous fieldwork during my study and 
conservation office work in Taiwan (2000-2005), focusing on architectural activities by the colonial 
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government. This was mostly using the National Taiwan Library,17 Academia Sinica Library, the Taiwan 
Historica,18 the National Central Library of Taiwan,19 the National Taiwan Museum and C. Y. LI 
Architecture & Engineers Office archives, as well as several field trips to key sites, including every one 
of the buildings by my thesis’s key architect, MORIYAMA Matsunosuke (Jap. 森山松之助, 1869 -1949), 
particularly the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office. In the UK I acquired the majority of my secondary 
literature and some primary sources relating to Josiah Conder. I mainly used R.I.B.A Library, the British 
Library, and the National Archives for these sources. I also visited key buildings in the UK which had 
influence over the architects of the early Meiji era such as William Burges’s Cardiff Castle, Castell Coch 
and Harrow Lecture Hall, and the Queen Anne revival buildings of Richard Norman Shaw (1-2 St. 
James Street, Pall Mall, and the Norman Shaw Buildings, Westminster).  
 
The case study (described below) and architecture history is supported by an analysis of the general 
history of the period 1853-1919 in Japan and Taiwan. The historical analysis focuses upon the contact 
zones formed in the domains of politics, education and civil society in Chapter 2 and Section 4.1. This 
ensures that an interdisciplinary approach to understanding the transmitted meanings of the 
architecture has been fully explored.20  
 
For architectural literature, there are a number of studies in English which have taken a similarly 
nuanced approach to the architecture of the period and have collated a great amount of primary 
research and combined this with contextual information. Dallas Finn (1995) and Gregory K. Clancey 
(2006) provided brilliantly sourced books with a deep insight into architectural culture in the Meiji period. 
Alice Tseng (2008) has written a well sourced and argued text on the Museums of Meiji Japan, 
connecting these buildings with the overall government nation-building project. William Coaldrake’s 
(1996) work on authority architecture provides a rich overview of the entire history of Japan. TOSAKI 
Eiichi (2004) wrote an excellent article on how style in the early Meiji period reflected socio-political 
trends. For the specific literature on the architecture profession, Azby S. Brown (1989), Cherie 
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 After the Second World War, the ruling regime alternated, and frequent earthquakes and typhoons damaged the library collections of the 
Japanese occupation. The book collections were relatively rare to survive. However, the National Taiwan Library received three major archival 
collections: ‘Taiwan Governor-General’s Library during the Japanese occupation ’, the ‘Southern archives’ and in the postwar period 
purchased the ‘Book collection from Japanese Professors of Taipei Imperial University’. These numbered up to 18 million volumes. As the 
space of Library was insufficient and most collections were sealed in stacks, Academia Sinica Library began to manage the collection from 
‘Taiwan Governor-General’s Library during the Japanese occupation’ after 1999 and is developing a Digital Archive. This includes Taiwan’s 
literature database from the Japanese occupation period: ‘the Taiwan Architectural Journal’, ‘the Taiwan Education Journal’, maps of Taiwan, 




 The Taiwan Historica stored the Archives of the Taiwan Government under Japanese Rule (Taiwan Soutokufu Archives, 13,146 volumes), 
Archives of the Monopoly Bureau of Taiwan Government under Japanese Rule (Taiwan Senbaikyoku Archives,12,815 volumes), Taiwan 
Development Corporation Archival (2871 volumes) and databases for the official newspapers of the Taiwan Government under Japanese Rule. 
These archives have been included in the National Digital Archives Program, Taiwan, since 2002. 
 
19
 Comprising a digital archive collection called ‘Taiwan Memory, the National Central Library of Taiwan has collated over 4 million volumes, 
including a large range of historic documents on Taiwan, such as Taiwanese post cards and photography from the Japanese colonial period. 
 
20
 A summary of this literature is in the section ‘Reading Victorian Japan’ further below. 
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Wendelken (1996) and Coaldrake (2001) offer well sourced works of the history of the carpentry 
profession in Japan whilst Don Choi (2002, 2003, 2007 and 2008) has given me his extensive writings 
on the formation of the architectural profession in Japan, particularly on education and the teaching of 
architecture history. All the works of literature above offer a critical and nuanced view on the topic of 
Japanese Meiji architecture, and are quoted liberally throughout the thesis. From my fieldwork I found 
that whilst there are numbers of articles written by Josiah Conder himself which formed one of my key 
sources for assessment of architectural modernity. Besides Conder’s authored works, there is a lack of 
English language publications on Josiah Conder (the British architect who is considered the Father of 
(early) Modern Japanese architecture) apart from a few papers and source books: Collection of the 
posthumous works of Dr. Josiah Conder (1931) and Josiah Conder (2009) were published in Japan 
mostly in Japanese with part English translation. I have also been able to access the dissertations of 
the first generations of Japanese architects, which are written in either English or Japanese. 
 
As noted earlier, I have chosen to focus on Taiwan, Japan’s first colony, because, as I will show in this 
thesis, Meiji Japan’s ‘modernity’ was tied to territorial expansion, which became a defining feature of 
the Meiji era. (Itō, 2004: 213) As shown above, the literature on modernity in Japanese colonial 
architecture has been poorly developed in English, Japanese and Chinese, either being limited in 
scope or in engagement in the cultural and political context. This is in some sense unsurprising given 
that the ideal of studying colonial powers and their colonies together is very rarely fulfilled in the 
historical literature on European nations and Japan. (Schmid, 2000: 951) In Japan’s case, naichi (Jap. 
内地, lit. the inner lands) are studied distinctly from gaichi (Jap. 外地, lit. the outer lands) in Japanese 
historiography, and yet the impact of relations with Asia on Japan was a powerful element in the 
construction of the Japanese national identity. (Iwabuchi, 1994: 7) This mirrored the way that Europe 
used the ‘Orient’ to create its own identity: “Japan in turn, made the rest of the ‘Orient’ as ‘Other’ in 
order to create its own identity somewhere between the Occident and Orient.” (Kikuchi, 2004: 224) This 
was not a passive, intellectual use of the Orient, but one which sought to reify Japan’s impression of 
itself as the most civilised and advanced nation in Asia, in the best position to become the leader of 
Tōyō through colonisation, development and education. Therefore I have chosen the most important 
symbol of this domination, the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office, as the case study for this thesis. 
 
I chose to only to conduct one case study for several reasons. As the building is of such a large scale 
this allows extensive analysis of spatial elements and forms, and showed a many cultural and 
behavioural facets. This meant that the building could be analysed in depth for the three criteria above: 
the feelings transmitted, the organisation of space, and the ideas and representation of the building. It 
linked very well to the main narrative of my thesis as it involved two of the main architectural figures of 
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Victorian Japan: ITŌ Chūta (Jap. 伊東忠太, 1867–1954) and TATSUNO Kingo (Jap. 辰野金吾, 1854 - 
1919). The building also makes a useful single case study as it was path-breaking on a number of 
levels including in scientific (use of ferro-concrete materials) and civilising (use of the first architectural 
competition). Finally, the building is not studied in isolation: it is used as a conclusion to the story of 
modernity before modernism where architecture is only a part of the story, not the story itself. Focusing 
on several in depth case studies would not have served this purpose as well, and would have taken 
focus away from the contextual issues that allowed the formation of this towering Renaissance revival 
architecture built by Japanese in Taiwan. Instead I have used a single large case study in Taiwan and 
several smaller case studies in Japan and Taiwan. 
 
As I have only chosen one case study, I chose a large project which was fundamentally tied to the 
authority of colonial Taiwan, beyond any other building. The Taiwan Governor-General’s Office 
represented the whole intention of the Japanese authorities in Taiwan and allows significant analysis of 
the building and its relation to urban space, and society, as this was where the policies and laws were 
decided. As the thesis focuses on authority and superiority, these concepts could be seen most clearly 
in their colonial office.  
 
Given these parameters it would have been possible to choose the Korea Governor-General’s Office. 
Ultimately, the Korean Office was not a suitable case study for my purposes and has served as little 
comparative value. This was due to six main reasons: 
 
•  The Korea Governor-General’s Office was modernist and so did not fit the aim of the thesis 
to explore modern architecture prior to modernism.  
•  The Korean Office was less an expression of nation building and did not fit the narrative of 
the thesis as it was designed by American architects rather than Japanese. 
•  The city planning in Seoul was very different and less experimental than Taipei as the 
capital had been fully built whilst Taipei was half rice fields in 1895. For the Korean office, 
the Gyeongbokgung Palace was partly demolished to construct the building whilst the 
Taiwanese office was constructed on unused land. The urban context was very different, 
allowed less innovation and originality, and did not fit the aim of the thesis to uncover the 
underlying dynamics of Japanese modernity. 
•  The Korea Governor-General’s Office was not an enduring icon of modernity and was 
more a symbol of Japanese dominance to Koreans; the building was demolished for this 
reason in 1995-1996. In contrast, the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office is today the 
Presidential Office of Taiwan: it is the symbol of highest authority as well as a symbol of 
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modernity and the nation, with the image still today used on banknotes and postcards. 
Choosing the Taiwan Office allows deeper exploration of what it still means to be modern 
and how an eclectic colonial building can be considered to be defined by the term ‘modern’. 
•  The final reason is a pragmatic one. As I am Taiwanese with a much greater 
understanding of Taiwan’s history and languages than Korea’s history and languages, it 
was logical for my study to focus on colonial Taiwan rather than Korea. I have an intimate 
understanding of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office as when I worked for the 
conservation architect C. Y. Li Architecture & Engineers, in 2003-2004; I participated in the 
conservation of the Office and other projects. My involvement was as an architectural 
assistant who had recently completed a Bachelor’s degree in Architecture. This experience 
gave me a deeper understanding of the building, the relevant sources and the building 
practices than I could have gained by studying another building.  
 
The reasons above point to the uniqueness of the Office in comparison to other similar Japanese 
colonial buildings: it was an experimental building built by Japanese, yet remained in line with the most 
recent architectural developments, which pre-dated modernism but is seen as a symbol of modernity. 
The Taiwan Governor-General’s Office is of interest for one further reason: the building process was 
the longest construction procedure of colonial times. This was in part because the building was also 
subject to Japan’s first public architecture competition. This makes it an excellent case study for a 
sociological approach: as Jones explains, “the competition process involves competition between 
architects for material and symbolic capital. A mainstay of architects’ practice, competitions are to some 
extent unrestricted by ‘real-world- constraints, the competition stage allowing the architect to embrace 
fully the aforementioned aesthetic and artistic dimensions of their role.” (Jones, 2011: 33) This provides 
another layer to the analysis of the relation between architects and authority, the profession of the 
Japanese architect, and the selection of forms. 
 
My fieldwork on the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office was later completed in two visits to the building 
on open days and accumulating all possible documentary information including recent CAD drawings, 
conservation reports, two studies on the building, Huang, J., (2004) and Shue and Huang (2003), and 
the relevant achieves of Taiwan Governor Office. Analysis of how the building was used during the 
colonial period is supported by three interviews with LI Chung-Yueh (Chi. 李重耀)21 the founder of C. Y. 
Li Architecture & Engineers, who worked in the Office during the colonial period in 1943-1945. He later 
                                                   
21
 Li is a Taiwanese architect who was educated in the Japanese colonial period. He is now 88 years old. When I worked in his architecture 
office (C. Y. Li Architecture & Engineers) Li was the recently retired head. Li held a very important role before and after WWII for Taiwan; he 
was one of the rare Taiwanese architectural technicians in the Central Construction and Maintenance Division and later an architectural 
engineer of Central Construction Department. Li conducted more than 100 historical architecture conservation projects, including the most 
important national monuments of Taiwan.  
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led on conservation projects including the building’s reconstruction in 1946, the Office site for Taiwan 
Province of Expo in 1948, restoration for the façade in 2003. Unfortunately much of the data including 
the construction reports of the Office itself (but records on the building process, materials used and 
many archives were produced by the Office) was destroyed during the Second World War, and in my 
fieldwork in Japan, I found that the National Libraries and Archives of Japan also contained 
disappointingly little data on the Office itself. In spite of this, there is a great deal of information on the 
building process, materials, form and space of the building and how it was represented after being built. 
This data has never been published in English to date and represents a unique contribution of this 
thesis. 
 
The analysis of the building’s features was accomplished through an in-depth study of the spatial 
dimensions of the building, the technologies and materials used, and the evidence of how the building 
was used. I also make use of analytical tools which Markus used such as spatial syntax maps (Markus, 
1993: 13) for my main building case study. Yet whilst Markus analysed how power infiltrated every level 
of a building, I focus on analysing how the preoccupation with becoming modern permeated the 
building case studies and how the building was designed as a representation of Japanese nationalism 
and therefore modernity.   
 
 
Reading nation-building  
In addition to the concrete elements of state building such as taxation, building an army, and putting 
down rebellions, the Meiji government also engaged in the related but different task of nation-building. 
Given the use of architecture as a means of nation-building, any study of authority architecture during 
the Meiji period must include an account of what it means to build a nation and where architecture fits 
with this. This aspect of the thesis study is crucial to understand, as cultural identity in Meiji was mainly 
under the broad rubric of nation-building. This section outlines my understanding of nation-building as a 
recent development comprising the creation of a shared culture and fostering the recognition of 
fellowship; deriving from Europe and filtered to Japan; and possessing three main strands of creating 
collective identities, existentially aligning with Seiyō, and territorial expansion. 
 
As the modernity of the ‘nation’ is a key contention in this thesis, it is worth unpacking. The attributes of 
a nation include “a mass, public culture, a single economy, and rights and duties for all members” (Smith, 
2000: 3) which corresponds to very few places in the world prior to the late 18th century. If any of these 
attributes are dropped, it appears counter-intuitive to name these as ‘nations’ because “the nations of 
the modern epoch appear to be quite different from those mooted in earlier epochs: they are mass 
nations, they form legal-political communities with a concept of citizenship, they have compact territorial 
 28 
borders… and they form part of an international system of national states.” (Smith, 2000: 3) The 
processes which created ‘the nation’ are all novel developments in history which emerged at a similar 
time to create a new phenomenon within states.22 
 
Nations and nationalism are both well-established topics in Europe and America with a good deal of 
consensus on the meaning of the nation in scholarship. The great modernist theorist of the nation, 
Ernest Gellner stated that “nations, like states, are a contingency,23 and not a universal necessity. 
Neither nations nor states exist at all times and in all circumstances.” (Gellner, 1983: 6) Gellner 
extrapolated and clarified the link between nationalism and the nation, stating that “nationalism is 
primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent.” 
(Gellner, 1983: 1) Another facet of nationalism is the centralisation of the state: “modern societies are 
always and inevitably centralized, in the sense that the maintenance of order is the task of one agency 
or group of agencies.” (Gellner, 1983: 88) 
 
Nations are a product of recent times and require people with a shared culture (a system of ideas and 
signs and associations and ways of behaving and communications) and a recognition that they belong 
to the same nation. (Gellner, 1983: 7) A shared culture does not imply a passively/naturally created 
culture: nations moulded and created their own images through salient symbols. These mechanisms 
and created symbols are what Hobsbawm described as ‘invented traditions’ which were developed due 
to the need for elites to control the newly enfranchised masses. Through rallying citizens around these 
symbols “the nation became the most important agent of social control in the time of capitalism: by 
engineering ‘invented traditions’ of a largely fabricated national history, symbolism and mythology, the 
upper classes were able to channel the energies of the masses into new forms of status system and 
new kinds of community.” (Smith, 2000: 8) The second component of a nation, recognition of belonging, 
was made possible by what Benedict Anderson refers to the ‘imagined community’. The development 
of the printing press allowed communication and dissemination to fellow nationals, creating a 
community of ‘fellows’ in the mind. This was a relatively stable community in the mind, long-lasting and 
immutable which “appeared to vouchsafe to mortals that solace of continuity beyond death which the 
great religions and dynasties had ensured.” (Smith, 2000: 8) Nations represent a form of systematic 
                                                   
22 In this sense, the nation is sharply distinguished from the idea of the ‘state’. Weber’s definition of the state – “a human community that 
(successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (Weber, 1919: 1) – is adequate except to add 
that in the past states on occasion delegated some of that monopoly to private lords, for example, the right to feud in feudalism. Under this 
conception of the state, there are four categories of differences between nations and states. First, states have existed since ancient times 
whilst nations are relatively recent. Second, states are geographically based whilst nations are culturally defined. Third, a state is a legal entity 
whilst a nation is culturally imagined entity. Finally, states are concrete and easy to distinguish whilst nations are abstract and contested. 
Because of these differences, very few states are also single nations and very few nations are completely within a single state; according to 
Walter Conner (1993) only ten percent of states contain a single ‘nation’. Due to this, building a state is a very different task to building a nation: 
building a state involves taxation, building an army, and putting down rebellions, whilst nation building involved education of the masses, 
creating national symbols, and international relations. 
 
23 This contingency is contested by perennialists who hold that nations have existed for millennia, but under the definition of a nation above 
(legal-political communities with compact territorial borders) makes perennialism seem illogical and flawed. 
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self-love: “in a nationalist age, societies worship themselves brazenly and openly, spurning the 
camouflage.” (Gellner, 1983: 88)  
 
Japan and other East Asian countries did not have the concept of the nation until after contact with the 
Great Powers in the mid-19th century. (Holcombe, 2011: 6) Prior to this contact, in Edo Japan 
(1600-1867), Japan was a loose collection of clans administered by regional, hereditary leaders. As a 
result of the caste society and decentralisation of authority, the Japanese before the Meiji period had 
less conception of a nation or nationality than of the class to which they belonged in society and their 
social status (Nish, 2000: 82; Howell, 2005: 4) or the locality. In the late-nineteenth century after the 
unification of Italy and Germany, “nationalism was viewed as a good thing for all modern states.” (Nish, 
2000: 83) This opinion on the nation in Japan entered for the first time to a ‘national’ consciousness 
only after the Restoration of the emperor Meiji. The slow creation of a Japanese ethnic and national 
identity was the product of a “long process of border drawing.” (Howell, 2005: 3) However, Sakai (1997) 
found that often in literature on the formation of Japan’s national identity assumes that ‘Japan’ must 
have existed for as long as the geographic area of ‘Japan’. (Sakai, 1997: 44) Yet embedding this 
shared assumption was a novel task for the Meiji authorities: creating a nation called ‘Japan’ bore no 
resemblance the importation of “Sui and T’ang civilization from China in early times, the permeation of 
Sung and Yuan culture in medieval times, or the influence of Iberian Catholic culture in early modern 
Japan.” (Daikichi, 1985: 51) 
 
The translation of nationalism into Japan did not conform to European definitions of what it meant to be 
a nation; the relevant notions were interpreted in a particular fashion. For instance, in the first 
theoretical statement on what it meant to be nationalist in 1878, the great Meiji intellectual, FUKUZAWA 
Yukichi, used the word kokken to mean both ‘the state’ and ‘nationality’, which he defined as ‘the 
development of national power’. (Howland, 2002: 149) Similarly, the term State Shinto in Japanese 
could also be translated as National Shinto. (Hardacre, 1989: 67) The nation then, was not a clear, 
dictionary defined term in Edo Japan. It was filtered into Japan under conditions of power imbalance 
and a struggle to reclaim sovereignty. Defining the contours of the Japanese nation requires an 
in-depth understanding of the context of the times to unpack its meaning yet this is a worthwhile 
exercise: the development of the nation in Japan is a powerful lens through which to understand the 
framing of culture change during the Meiji period. The literature on Meiji Japan suggests that there 
were three main elements that constituted the construction of the Meiji nation: new collective identities, 
new notions of time and universality, and the growth of the Japanese Empire. 
 
Much of the literature on how Japanese authorities first constructed a collective national identity 
focuses upon the figure of the emperor as a unifier: Meiji period “nationalism was identified with the 
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position and ideology of the Emperor, the focus of the new state becoming the emperor system 
(kokutai).” (Nish, 2000: 84) As far back as 1864, Japanese scholars argued that Japan’s ‘national 
essence’ was a ‘divine country’, with a divine being as emperor. (Sakai, 1978: 163) Identification with 
the ‘progressive West’ was also an important component: for example, stories about women were 
promoted by literary magazines so that that Japan could stand “shoulder to shoulder with the various 
Western nations.” (De Jardin, 2012 [1887]: 67) This realignment with Seiyō heralded some changes in 
moral values and widening of longstanding local identities. However, this aspirational identity as 
‘civilised’ was still consistently linked to Confucian principles (Shively, 1959: 304), so that ethics 
teaching in Meiji Japanese schools was a syncretic blend of Japanese, Chinese and Western moral 
teachings. (Howland 2002: 59-60) Japan’s national self-image was not a fixed position in the Meiji era, 
and fluctuated between the pivots of Japan, Seiyō, and Asia. For instance, the Japanese victory over 
Russia in 1905 led the Japanese to begin identifying more as a nation within Asia as well as in relation 
to the West. (Wendelken, 2000: 820) These collective identities were united by a strongly nationalistic 
bent: identification within Asia was part of becoming recognised as the preeminent power in East Asia. 
 
In spite of these power-laden sentiments, Japanese historians have treated nationalism and 
sovereignty as based on the premise that “sovereign nation-states co-exist on the same plane as 
equals, even if they might on occasion endorse the state’s unconstrained adventurism”. (Maruyama, 
1949: 205) Japan kept in step with the idea of linear time progression through adopting the Gregorian 
calendar in 1872 (which is discussed in Section 4.4). This compression and alignment of time between 
Japan, Europe and America “was really only possible when the old medieval cosmological frameworks 
had given way to linear conceptions of time in which communities appeared to move through an ‘empty, 
homogeneous time’ measured by clock and calendar to an unknown destiny.” (Smith, 2000: 8) This 
was a part of what I call ‘existential realignment’ with Seiyō which Sebastian Conrad (1999) found was 
established with the concept of history-as-science, imported in the 1880s in Japan at Tokyo University 
through the appointment of Ludwig Riess (1861-1928), a 26 year old German positivist historian, and 
the establishment of a Faculty of History the same year. The purpose of this establishment of the 
discipline of ‘history’ was to integrate and adapt to Seiyō worldview “in the context of nation-building 
and attempts to ward off Western imperialist encroachments.” (Conrad, 1999: 68) The Eurocentrism of 
Japanese historiographers can itself be said to be an indicator of modernity: by being fundamentally 
influenced by European historical frameworks, “the history of Japanese thought carries with it the seal 
of modernity.” (Sakai, 1997: 50) 
 
All kinds of cultural artefacts and practices, from basket making to rocket technology, may be discussed 
in terms of what they ‘say’ about the ‘imagined community’ of the nation (Anderson, 1983), but this 
tendency is especially marked in relation to architecture, reflecting the status of buildings as “relatively 
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permanent and highly salient features of the landscape: they persist over time, they stay in the same 
place, and compared to many other cultural phenomena (e.g. literary works or styles of dancing) they 
are highly obtrusive.” (Markus and Cameron, 2001: 139.) Creating sets of architectural values gave the 
illusion of a common history, and of ‘moving together’ through history. (Jones, 2011: 59) Exercises of 
identifying buildings with the nation are not always successful (see Heynen, 1999b) and require a deal 
of skill on the part of the architect and timing on the part of the commissioner in order to be so. The 
‘style’ chosen for European architecture styles was often an essentially contested choice with “social 
meanings attached to particular historicist styles and buildings taking on a ‘moral’ dimension.”(Jones, 
2011: 50) 
 
Meiji authority architecture was complicit in all three of the levels of Japanese nation-building (collective 
identities, existential alignment with Seiyō, and aggression and territorial expansion) and I aim to show 
through this thesis that architecture was an integral element in this exercise of nation creation. (Smits, 
2008: 104) As one of the most important and obvious symbols of a state, architecture had a crucial role 
in forming the image of the Meiji state and a new mythology of Japan: “Modern buildings… would show 
that Japan was not a backward nation but a country worthy of being treated as an equal among other 
developed nations.” (Watanabe, 1996: 23) Architecture was a key component in building Japanese 
elite’s standing nationally and internationally. The early Meiji architects “were to be instruments for 
accomplishing this evolution/revolution in Japanese material culture: the replacement of a “native” 
landscape with one that marked Japanese participation in the global culture of the nation-state.” 
(Clancey, 2006: 17)  
 
 
Reading Victorian Japan  
The construction of Meiji Japan can be seen as a first initiative by a non-Western country to respond to 
the world by adapting fundamentally to the international order and adopting the same mode of 
progression in spite of non-accordance. Yet the aggression from others and later from Japan was the 
key point in forming the whole system at that time, persuading Meiji elites that the values and behavior 
they were adopting were universal and necessary. The modernity of Europe and America was also a 
universalism, seen as applicable to all countries regardless of their background. The culture, the rules, 
the value systems of the strong were spread by absorbing and eliminating the weak. Indeed, the 
subsequent decline in this way of thinking after the Second World War is the reason that topos, 




In this context, on a number of levels Victorian Britain had the greatest influence on Japan during the 
period 1853-1919; being the pre-eminent imperial power in the world, Britain was a worthy role model 
for ‘modernisation’. (Ruxton, 1998; Cooper, 1992) The opinions of the British on Japan during this 
period also had a large influence in shaping the country. (Yokoyama, 1987; Jackson, 1992) The 
eventual architecture education system was designed by Victorian Brits, and what became the informal 
national architecture style was based on Queen Anne revival found in 1880s London. (Finn, 1996; 
Suzuki, 2003) I therefore describe the architecture of the time ‘Victorian Japanese’, acknowledging the 
large role played by Brits and the image of Britain in shaping the building culture. Using ‘Victorian’ as an 
adjective also points to another aspect of the period which was once ignored in the literature: the issues 
of the Meiji period were an entangled mix of issues related to becoming more synchronised with the 
Victorian world. The issues were not simply technological but also cultural, related to power and identity. 
Stefan Tanaka puts it: “It is not a contradiction to say that as Japan was becoming more modern and 
“Western,” both socially and politically, its leaders were becoming more concerned with Japan itself.” 
(Tanaka, 1993: 109)  
 
However, this conception has been used in the past to smuggle both Eurocentric notions, particularly 
the idea that modernisation is an a-cultural issue. Until the last two decades, Japanese modernisation 
has been largely seen as inevitable progressive transformation (Garon, 1994: 346) which placed Japan 
on an evolutionary scale. (Harrison, 1988: 149) This understanding was premised on the belief that the 
impact of Seiyō was only significant on the implementation of “modern technology and modern 
organizations” (Fairbank et al, 1965: 7), not on culture, and that the modernisation process managed to 
retain its essential ‘Japaneseness’. (Smith, 1997) These works have an implicit understanding that 
modernisation was inevitable, somehow natural, and do not account for the softer effects of power in 
that period. These studies also continued the vein of earlier conceptions of Japan as being the 
autonomous instigator of its modernisation.24  
 
In my use of secondary historical sources I have tended towards more recent studies which 
consciously seek to understand the impact of modernity upon the culture and collective identity of the 
Japanese archipelago, and to delve deeply into the cultural ambiguities of the Meiji time. These works 
all rely on the premise that modernity was a necessarily Eurocentric notion, a position which has been 
argued robustly by Mouzelis (2003), Barlow (1997), Dussel (1993) amongst others: these authors offer 
grounding to the genesis of the idea of modernity from a non-Western perspective. The remainder of 
literature I have used on the history of Japanese modernity can be split into 1) general histories of Meiji 
                                                   
24
 For instance, in 1878 David Wedderburn wrote an article titled “Modern Japan” which stated: “One thing is evident, that a slight external 
impulse only was required to topple down the existing fabric of Japanese society at the time when foreigners forced their way into the country 
producing an effect analogous to that of a solid dropping into a fluid of the verge of crystallization, and converting it suddenly into a solid 
mass.” (Wedderburn, 1878: 417) 
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Japan, and 2) critical analyses of the period. On the general history of Meiji Japan, Marius Jansen 
(2000) offers a well sourced book on the process of the transition from Edo to Meiji Japan. Kato (1965) 
and Daikichi (1985) offer works on the culture of the Meiji period, whilst Takeuchi (1987) produced a 
work exploring how Japan learnt from the outside. Chang and Myers (1963) offer one of the few 
analytical reviews of Japanese colonial policies in Taiwan, whilst Sewell (2004) tracks the idea of 
progressive modernity from Japan to colonsed Korea. Amongst other works on specific events such as 
the Iwakura mission (see Cobbing, 1998; Ohta, 1998; Checkland, 1998; Ruxton, 1998) and Meiji 
education (see de Maio, 1998; Hayhoe, 1995; Wada, 2007) there is an excellent chapter on the 
discourse on “Overcoming Modernity” in Japan which was buried post-WWII. (Ryoen, 1995) 
 
I have also used a large number of texts which take a more critical approach to the idea of the modern 
in Japanese history. The first type of these studies have analysed how identities were constructed in 
the Meiji period onwards: Smith sees Meiji collective identities being constructed out of a complex 
interaction of modernity and tradition (Smith, 1997), Barlow studied the role of colonialism in forming 
the Japanese modern identity (Barlow, 1997) and Silverburg tracked the cultural construction of the 
modern girl (Jap. モダンガール, pronounced modan gaaru) in the 1920s (Silverburg, 1991). A number 
of other studies have engaged with Said’s ‘Orientalism’ (1979) to understand the changes of the Meiji 
period. Prominent amongst these is Kikuchi’s (2004) study of Mingei theory, which showed how 
Orientalist notions shifted the conceptual lens of Japanese intellectuals. Iwabuchi (1994) called this 
phenomenon of complicit exoticism ‘self-Orientalism’.25 Tanaka’s book (1993) examined how the 
Japanese construction of Tōyō was used as an Other to Japan in order to raise Japan above its 
neighbours and on a level with Seiyō. Other studies have attempted to chart how the influence of Seiyō 
led to culture change, either through translation of foreign ideas (Howland, 2000, 2001; Sakai, 1997), or 
how the impact of a new notion of time helped create modern Japan. (Tanaka, 2004) 
 
One of the key contentions of this thesis is that European modernity was created in part due to critical 
reason. Reasoning led to the critical challenge of customs and created several prominent binaries in 
society between rational/irrational, modern/premodern, past/present, religious/secular and others. 
Through engaging with the Great Powers under asymmetrical power conditions from 1853 onwards26 
Japan interpreted, engaged with, and dealt with these binaries. With the insertion of the architecture 
profession into Japan when an existing profession of carpenters already existed, the most relevant 
couple for this thesis is the modern/traditional binary. This binary has long been questioned outside of 
Japan studies: Shiner (1975) critiqued the methodological utility of the tradition/modernity binary, 
                                                   
25
 Similarly, Kikuchi called the somewhat ironic phenomenon of Orientalism towards neighbours by Japanese ‘Oriental Orientalism’. 
 
26
 The Japanese had been influenced by Rangaku (Jap. 蘭學, lit. Dutch learning) from the 17th century onwards, but this had a limited impact 
on authorities and an ambiguous legal status, and was not associated with a threat of colonisation.  
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Salvatore (2009) fundamentally questions the idea that tradition is a barrier to modernity, or that there 
are ‘good’ or ‘bad’ traditions.  
 
Academics studying Japanese history have found that the idea of tradition in Japan has been used to 
create an idea that, without modernity, Japan would be static and changeless. Dipesh Chakrabarty 
concluded in the Afterword of Mirror of Modernity: Invented traditions of Modern Japan. (1998), that 
scholars of Japanese history should see the invention of tradition in Japan first conceptually, that the 
very idea of tradition did not previously exist in Japanese language, and that scholars should question 
the impact that the idea of tradition has had upon the Japanese worldview. (Chakrabarty, 1998) This 
has been fulfilled in several studies such as Jordan Sand’s (2005) excellent study of the ‘home’ in Meiji 
Japan, which found that to avoid becoming simply ‘modern’ in the Western sense or reverting to 
‘traditions’ and being labeled by foreigners, the Japanese had found a middle way in domestic life by 
searching for a ‘national’ taste between the two. Westney’s study of the adoption of Western 
organisational and institutional forms found that these institutional forms were altered rapidly to adapt 
to Japanese habits and patterns of behavior. Terakawa’s (2001) study of the architect SHIRAI Seiichi’s 
(Jap. 白井晟一, 1905-1893) thought found a sophisticated understanding of tradition that saw it as 
something which “cannot be isolated from ones existence.” (Terakawa, 2001: 9) These scholars all 
found that the idea of tradition had influence on Japan but this influence was often revised or rejected, 
at least intellectually, by Japanese.  
 
Other created boundaries in the Victorian Japan era have also been explored in the literature on this 
period, such as art against craft (Snodgrass, 2006; Kikuchi, 2004; Guth, 1996), religion against 
secularism (Kisho, 1993), and the present against the past (Tanaka, 2004; Ikuko, 1997). Many of these 
binary couples were used to create a new identity which is in opposition to an Other. This Othering was 
used as a method to create a national identity out of a clan- and class-based society. For instance, 
numerous works in recent years have concentrated on the creation of separation between Japan and 
China (Itō, 2004; Tanaka, 2004; Keene, 1998) with the adoption of the term shina, which reflected the 
English word China. Others have shown how Japan constructed a ‘civilised’ identity, partly using 
English concepts (Israel, 2006) and partly Chinese (Kleeman, 2003), and so defined themselves in 
opposition to the primitive Other. (Shimazu, 2007; Kleeman, 2003; Beasley, 1995; Barr, 1988). A vital 
part of this Othering process was Japanese imperialism. The colonisation of neighbouring countries 
provided a platform to both demonstrate their superiority to natives (Kleeman, 2003) and to create an 
experimental sphere for Japan to project their identity. (Chang and Myers, 1963) Barlow (1997) and 
Hsia (2002) argued that imperialism allowed the establishment of what they called colonial modernity, 
and that, without colonialism, there could be no modernity for Japan at that time. 
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Using these sources, I found that these ‘unstable binarisms’ (Clancey, 2006: 95) that Japanese 
architects operated in were crucial in the formation of a building a nation, and architecture therefore 
became an arena for the contestation of national identity. (Schmids, 2008: 104) Architecture became a 
symbol of what Maeda and Kisho have called dual-modernity in Japan: a symbiosis of Japanese, 
Euro-American and East Asian culture. My research complements (and challenges) these findings by 
focusing upon how this dual-modernity is fundamentally (and possibly irretrievably) biased towards a 
Seiyō conceptual lens, which can be seen most clearly in the Japanese colonial architecture of Taiwan. 
To make this point effectively I have used the idea of the contact zone (Pratt, 1991) to conceptually set 
the roots of Japanese modernity in an unfamiliar and domineering culture.  
 
This study constitutes the first in-depth look at the processes and practices of the idea of modern from 
its roots, tracing what modern means in English and the conditions which created it, to what it meant in 
Japan and how the necessary conditions differed there. Through this approach I explore the influence 
of Europe and America on the meaning of ‘modernity’, tracing how the expression changed as Japan 
moved from struggling for sovereignty to dominating her neighbours using techniques of imperialism. 
Insofar as Japanese authority architecture (1853-1919) goes, I state my contribution as follows: 
 
•  Academics in the area usually take either the approach of labeling the socio-political 
changes in the Meiji period as ‘modernisation’ or sometimes ignoring modernity in the 
period. Through my research I have found that contact with Europe and America resulted 
in a highly skewed and yet recognisable version of the modern in Japan. Although early 
Japanese officials interpreted it as such, the modern is not just a set of criteria to fulfill, but 
the result of a process that arose from a set of specific conditions in Europe. The Japanese 
interpretation of the modern as a target to be reached was due to the unequal relations 
between Japan and the Great Powers in the contact zone which led Japanese authorities 
to comply with Seiyō ideals rather than losing her sovereignty. I found clear evidence that 
modern was not a single flavour but a European version and a facsimile in Japan 
(1853-1919). 
•  Modernity was expressed in Japanese architecture as a series of separations and splits 
from the past. Whilst Meiji authorities mostly wished to present a genuine image of 
civilisation to Seiyō, the changes in the education system to achieve this authenticity were 
so fundamental that they altered the cultural logic of building, moving away from what was 
conceptualised as ‘traditional’ and ‘religious’ and towards ‘reason’ and ‘scientific’. I found 
that the conceptual lens of Japanese architects had changed so fundamentally that 
attempts to reconnect with the past were possible only through style, as authority buildings 
had come to represent entirely different issues and priorities than buildings in the Edo 
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period. Although the purpose of architectural reform was image projection, early Japanese 
architects internalised Euro-American world view, making their efforts to re-identify with 
Japan’s architectural past skewed and ultimately futile at that time. 
•  I have provided the first study that traces the formation of imperial architecture in Taiwan to 
Japan and further back to Victorian Britain. I have therefore contributed one of the first 
architectural studies in English of colonial period architecture in Taipei. In addition, I have 
given a case study of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office which has very little coverage 
in English academia. Almost all the material from the case study of the Office is not 
available in English and I have used original drawings, CAD drawings and source books on 
the building to explore one of the most interesting buildings built in East Asia in the 20th 
century. Through this case study and Chapters one to four, I supply a strong background of 
what it meant to be modern through analysing Japan’s architectural methods and results: 
how modern was re-articulated through establishing new types of construction, altering the 
flow of daily life and time, and creating a modern essence in the new territory of Taiwan. 
 
Given the importance of the ‘modern’ across the world, it is important to find out what ‘modern’ initially 
came to mean in the East, where the first recognisably ‘modern’ non-Western country is located: Japan. 
The research question for this thesis changed as I learnt more about the subject matter. The original 
aim of this research was to “understand what ‘modern’ meant in occupied Taiwan in its architectural 
context and how Japan articulated this idea in architecture.” Yet this began to seem to me to express a 
slightly naïve rendition of what it meant to be modern: that there is a single version, originated in 
Europe and propagated through the vague process of globalisation. Instead I wished to reflect the 
uniqueness of the Japanese experience in my research questions. My research questions for this 
thesis therefore are ‘How did contact with Europe and America in the mid-19th century create a 
new notion of the modern in Japan and colonial Taiwan? How was this expressed by Meiji 











Chapter 1  
Dual ‘modern’ theory 
 
 
“The modern age is a separation. I use ‘separation’ in its most obvious sense: to move 
away from something, to cut oneself off. The modern age begins as a breaking away from 
Christian society. Faithful to its origins, it is a continual breaking away, a ceaseless splitting 
apart; each generation repeats the act by which we were founded, and in this repetition we 
deny and renew ourselves. Separation unites us with the original movement of our society, 
and severance throws us back on ourselves.” (Paz, 1991: 27) 
 
As very few architectural studies directly focus directly on the relationship between people and the total 
range of aspects which constitute an environment (Franz, 1994: 442) the approach of this study is 
attempt to retain the complexity of the architectural and the historical context of Meiji Japan and 
colonial Taiwan whilst developing a strong conceptual framework able to interpret the modern in Japan. 
The objective of this study is to understand the fundamental characteristics of the process through 
which the idea and representation of modern emerged in Japan and colonial Taiwan through looking at 
the relevant aspects of how the selected buildings reflected the modern and how they were 
represented. This approach differs from the mainstream approach to Japanese architecture in Japan 
such as LI Qian-Lang (2004[1979]) whose analysis is limited to describing the buildings themselves: I 
aim to describe the cultural and social forces which help to shape which buildings are built, where these 
fit in the history of the urban environment and how the buildings were used.  
 
In order to achieve a conceptual foundation, this chapter aims to establish the idea of European 
modernity (outside its architectural context) and the conditions which caused this idea to arise. 
Subsequently, I explore the idea of the modern and associated concepts in Japanese to examine the 
differences between the two notions. The results of this exercise form the core critical framework in the 
study to understand Meiji Japan and her architectural products.  
 
Before doing so it is important to introduce some concepts that have aided my understanding of how 
the early contact with the Great Powers shaped the culture and identity of Meiji Japan. Theories such 
as Marxism and Orientalism function to produce models in which every activity must fit. This is also the 
case for Modernisation which placed nations of the Third World on an evolutionary scale, at the apex of 
which were ‘modern’ Western societies. (Harrison, 1988: 149) Yet when models attempt to explain 
everything they illuminate very little as phenomena are not perceived as unique instances but inevitable 
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consequences. Whilst modernity and modernisation have been interpreted as universal theories for 
every human, this thesis uses middle range theories to understand the development and application of 
these worldviews. Middle range theories are constructed with observed data in order to create 
theoretical problems and to be incorporated in proposals that allow empirical testing. The concepts 
used within this thesis are designed to explain specific occurrences such as first contact with imperial 
powers or how identities are formed and change.  
 
 
1.1 Conceptual framework 
This thesis uses two sets of concepts, shown in fig. 1.1, from two temporal periods in Japanese history: 
transculturation and identify formation during 185327 to 189528 and Japanese modernity during 1895 to 
1919.29 The period from when Perry’s Black Ships30 arrived in Japan (1853) to the end of the 
Sino-Japanese war (1895) is characterised as the time when the contact zone with the Europe and 
America was initiated and established. The period from the annexation of Taiwan by Japan (1895) to 
the end of World War I (1918) is deemed Japanese ‘modernity’, when Japan reified their status as a 
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27
 The year of first contact with the USA through Commodore Perry’s Black Ships. 
 
28
 The end of the Sino-Japanese war, won by Japan, and the ceding of Taiwan to Japan. 
 
29
 The date of the completion of the main case study, the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office and the recognised date that Secessionist 
architecture entered Japan. 
 
30
 ‘The Black ships (Jap. 黒船)’ was the name given to all Western vessels arriving in Japan in the 16th and 19th centuries but usually refers 
to the gun ships of Commodore Perry in 1853. 
1.1. Conceptual framework displaying the 
conditions for Japanese modernity. 
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Establishment of the contact zone  
The contact zone refers to “social spaces where cultures meet, clash, and grapple with each other, 
often in contexts of highly asymmetrical relations of power, such as colonialism, slavery, or their 
aftermaths as they are lived out in many parts of the world today.” (Pratt, 1991: 33) The idea of contact 
is borrowed from linguistics, where the phrase “contact language” indicates an improvised language 
that develops among speakers of different tongues. According to Mary Louise Pratt, the contact zone 
is: 
 
“the space of imperial encounters, the space in which peoples geographically and 
historically separated come into contact with each other and establish ongoing relations, 
usually involving conditions of coercion, radical inequality, and intractable conflict. (Pratt, 
2007: 8) 
 
Whilst talking of colonial frontiers is usual, using the idea of the “contact zone” shifts the center of 
gravity away from ‘place’ to a locus of socio-linguistics. It invokes the space and time where subjects 
previously separated by geography and history are co-present, the point at which their trajectories now 
intersect. The term “contact” foregrounds the interactive, improvisational dimensions of imperial 
encounters so easily ignored or suppressed by accounts of conquest and domination told from the 
invader’s perspective.” (Pratt, 2008: 8) Through examining relations within the contact zone, ideas of 
the profound cultural changes that occurred during the period of Westernisation, when a few men with 
limited yet gradually increasing contact with Seiyō led the ‘modernisation’ process, can be more 
accurately examined.  
 
It was in this early stage of contact that the first treaty ports were established along with diplomatic 
relations, schools of ‘Western Learning’ were established, Europeans and Americans began to take 
residence in Japan, and the Japanese government began to apply policies to please the Great Powers 
whilst upgrading its armed forces. Although Japan was not colonised in the 19th century, its cultural 
changes in that period were in some senses even deeper than what occurred in some colonies, 
because they were led by willing adopters of new arts and customs. Although this meant that Japanese 
statesmen and intellectuals could put boundaries upon the extent of their adoption of the modern, the 
uncertain and unequal context of the period meant that Japan was modernising due to the perceived 
threat of colonisation and, after the Meiji Restoration, due to the desire to be considered (at least legally) 
equal. The concept of the contact zone is applied due to this context of military threat, very similar to 
that experienced by other nations prior to colonisation; the difference being that the outcome of contact 
was not ultimately colonisation and that there appear to have been no long-term plans to do so. 
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Besides architecture, I explore several zones of contact which shaped the elite culture in Japan: 
namely diplomatic relations, government missions and education in Chapter 2. 
 
 
Through the contact zone: Transculturation 
The changes that Japan went through have been described as ‘industrialisation’ (see Hamilton and Kao, 
1987) and ‘Westernisation’ (see Wanandi, 2004). This thesis works on the premise that all Westernising 
practices in Japan had at their root the fear of colonisation by Seiyō31 and this must be acknowledged 
in the conceptual lens used. Concepts such as industrialisation do not sufficiently account for this 
power dimension, dealing with the changes as ‘inevitable’ technological development. On the other 
hand, seeing the changes in Meiji Japan as Westernisation simplifies the process by using a blanket 
term to describe a complex process which saw continuities in ethics as well as the changes in Japan’s 
use of reason, and cultural frames of reference. Rather, during the early years of contact with the West, 
the process of culture change is best described as ‘transculturation’. This better reflects the unique 
power relations between Seiyō and Meiji Japan: 
 
“Ethnographers have used the term transculturation to describe processes whereby 
members of subordinated or marginal groups select and invent from materials transmitted 
by a dominant or metropolitan culture…. While subordinate peoples do not usually control 
what emanates from the dominant culture, they do determine to varying extents what gets 
absorbed into their own [culture] and what it gets used for. Transculturation… is a 
phenomenon of the contact zone.” (Pratt, 1991: 34) 
 
As Eleanor Westney (1987) shows, whilst the transfer of Euro-American institutions to Japan was to 
almost all conceivable areas of public policy, Japanese elites were selective in which models were 
chosen and, once chosen, the models underwent innovative change to better fit Japanese priorities 
and needs. Similarly, during the period of first contact with Seiyō, Japan quickly assimilated many 
foreign concepts as well as practices and attitudes. (Howland, 2001: 1) Developing a new vocabulary 
for politics was not planned or predicted but arose as a direct result of the perceived threat of 
colonisation and the destabilising effect that this had upon Japan socially, politically, and economically. 
The potency of Europe and America in comparison to the earlier contact Japan had with Europe in the 
1500s meant that traditional understandings of how to deal with foreigners were overturned. This power 
imbalance led to a gradual understanding of Japan’s place within Western hierarchies: until the 1860s, 
Japan held Westerners to be ‘barbarians’; only ten years later, Fukuzawa claimed that Japan needed to 
move from its state of semi-civilisation to civilisation. (Fukuzawa, 1875, quoted in Shunsaku, 1993: 500) 
                                                   
31
 This veracity of this premise is explored in Section 2.1.  
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This was an indication of transculturation in that, as foreign pressure led to changes in Japanese elite 
culture, more information entered Japan from the outside. This took place on an individual level, 
starting with political elites such as diplomats, then the rising intellectuals, and then to the first 
individuals sent abroad to study in Europe and America, grappling with new concepts and ways of 
looking at the world. The case of how Japanese carpenters mixed cultural motifs as Seiyō fashions 
became preponderant is addressed in Section 3.2 whilst the individual transculturation of the first 
Japanese ‘architects’ is addressed in Sections 3.5 and 3.6 of this thesis. 
 
This rapid shift in attitude by the Japanese towards their own country was due to culture change which 
occurred as they attempted to reach the ideal of modernity, explored further in this chapter, where the 
contact with Seiyō was gradually expanded to touch almost all areas of public life. Yet the denigration of 




Through contact zone: Altered identity 
Japan’s expansion of contact with Seiyō altered the way that Japan expressed itself to the world. 
During the period of initial contact, Japan’s sense of self, and particularly its sense of place in the world, 
had to be altered in order to fit with the existential threat that was felt. This dynamic of identity and 
context is the key issue before and after the Meiji Restoration. In line with my sociological approach to 
architecture, I favour viewing the self in relation to society: for Alvesson (1996), a strong sense of ‘self’ 
is desired so as to function in relation with others. This is a commonality with psychoanalytical 
perspectives which see individuals’ sense of self as fundamentally and intrinsically affected by the 
contexts within which they find themselves. This was also the case for the political elites of the early 
Meiji period who had to decide on the extent and spheres of reform on issues such as dress, diet, 
religion, military order, and even public nudity. The change in identity is addressed in Chapters 2 and 3, 
particularly Section 2.2 which discusses the policies of the early Meiji government and the formation of 
a new identity for Japan. 
 
This identification of Japan as ‘newly civilised’ led to a strong affinity with Seiyō, especially in 
government circles during the early Meiji period. Yet this closeness had a corollary shown in the distinct 
move away from the culture of Japan’s neighbouring states and from her own past. As will be shown in 
Chapter 2, the relationship of power and patronage between China and Japan reversed entirely 
through the course of the 19th century, and influential thinkers (particularly Fukuzawa) called for Japan 
to ‘break free of Tōyō’.  
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This divorce from the past and invention of new forms in Japan can be seen vividly in architecture. The 
predominance of ‘Western-style’ (Yōfū) architecture in the Meiji period led to the decline and 
diminishment of ‘traditional’ carpentry. This was nowhere more clearly seen than in the character of 
public architecture in Japan, to the extent that the public buildings created shared no clear commonality 
with buildings of the past (until the Japan revival style in the 1910s). This meant that a new building 
idiom was adopted by the Japanese government in order to symbolise the new identities created. As 
well as revising the position of architects from a culturally dominated group, the Japanese government 
attempted to change the relationship of Japan with the world, so that it belonged in the inner sphere of 
civilised nations. The cityscape began to reflect this aspiration. Further than this, because of their 
Universalist interpretation of ‘modernity’, Japan began to express itself as having a different identity to 
‘the West’, as a unique nation simultaneously as civilised as Seiyō and a part of Tōyō. 
 
 
1.2 European Modernity 
In order to ask what effect ‘modernising’ had upon Japan and Japanese architecture it is necessary to 
first analyse the meaning of ‘modern’ in English32 and how this idea developed historically in Europe. 
This section is focused on the idea of the modern in the West from the first use in the fifteenth century 
to today. I will discuss how the word modern is defined in the English language, how it has been utilised 
in society, and the conditions appear necessary to create the modern movement.  
 
The ‘modern’ is today still an idea that has an inherent attraction to governments and civilians: to be 
called a modern nation, or to have modern views is usually a positive badge. Yet what does it mean to 
be modern, beyond existing in the contemporary world? Why is the idea of being modern attractive? 
Through etymological analysis of the word ‘modern’ and its suffixes we can begin to understand the 




There are nineteen different definitions of ‘modern’ in the Oxford English Dictionary, eleven of which are 
adjectives, eight are nouns. Within these nineteen definitions I have created six broad categories33 of 
how the word has been used. Chronologically, these categories of definitions are: present, current 
period, up-to-date, ordinary, new fashion, and against tradition. These are summarised in the table 
                                                   
32
 This is because the idea of modern in Japanese appears to have been adopted from English (rather than other languages). 
 
33
 I generated these categories by consulting the Oxford English Dictionary (1989) and with three specialist dictionaries (Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary (1961), The Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology (1966), and A Concise Etymological dictionary of the English 
Language (1927)). For a full breakdown, see Appendix I. 
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below. Many of the dictionary definitions can fit into more than one category; when the word developed 
its meaning, it could be used with both a prior meaning and a current one. This illustrates the inherent 
difficulty in neatly unpacking the history of a word whose definition has continuously but subtly changed 










1. Modern as present/current period 
The first recorded use of ‘modern’ in English was in 1485 when it was used to mean “Being in existence 
at this time, current, present”. Modern could be used to mean a current holder of a position, as in the 
following sentence: “Our maist gracious queen moderne” (Year 1485, quoted in Oxford English 
Dictionary, 1989). Later and deriving from this usage, modern was defined as current times: “Of or 
relating to the present and recent times… relating to, or originating in the current age or period.” 
(Oxford English Dictionary, 1989) For example, “The writings of the auncient and moderne 
Geographers.” (Year 1585, quoted in Oxford English Dictionary, 1989) Whilst the definition of modern 
as ‘present’ has become obsolete, the idea of modern denoting the current period is still widely used.  
 
Under this definition, the concept has a simple purpose of measurement: the intention of using the word 
is to measure which objects/periods are current and which are not. This function is reflected in the Latin 
origin or the root of the word, modus: “a measure, hence a measure one should not exceed, a limit, 
hence manner, way of doing something or behaving.” (Origin: a Short Etymological Dictionary of 
Modern English, 1958) From this root was derived modernus, meaning a measurement referring to 
time and thus for distinguishing periods. Therefore the use of modern in this sense implies a temporal 
judgment. 
 
2. Modern as up to date 
From as early as 1590 to be modern was also used to describe an entity which was up-to-date: 
“characteristic of the present time, or the time of writing; not old-fashioned, antiquated, or obsolete; 
employing the most up-to-date ideas, techniques or equipment” (Oxford English Dictionary, 1989) In 
this sense a person could also be modern: “Of a person or something personified: up to date in 
Meaning of modern First usage Number of uses 
Present (obsolete) 1485 1 
Current period 1585 6 
Up to date 1590 4 
Ordinary (obsolete) 1591 1 
New fashion 1756 7 
Against tradition 1888 4 
Table 1.1. Categories of nineteen definitions of modern. Adapted from Oxford English 
Dictionary, 1989. 
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behaviour, outlook, opinions etc.; embracing innovation and new ideas.” (Oxford English Dictionary, 
1989) Rather than a purely temporal definition of being recent, to be modern was to distinguish 
between contemporaneous people or objects. Even tables and beds can be described as modern, as in 
the following sentence: “With modern furniture it would be delightful” (Year 1811, quoted in Oxford 
English Dictionary, 1989).  
 
Whilst the word ‘modern’ initially only alluded to a temporal standard, with this adaptation, the ‘modern’ 
also became tied up in normative standards and desirability. It became a matter of debate whether or 
not a person or object was modern or not. Given that being modern meant one was not “old-fashioned, 
antiquated or obsolete”, being modern was also a desirable characteristic. Whilst one could not be 
modern if one was not contemporary, a contemporary person may not necessarily be modern; existing 
in the present was a necessary but not a sufficient condition to be modern.  
 
The adaptation and increasing usage of the word modern as being up-to-date was in the context of a 
great increase in a number of technological innovations, from steam power at the end of the eighteenth 
century to electricity by the late nineteenth century. Given the correlation between technological 
innovation and usage of ‘modern’, “the word technology is sometimes interpreted to indicate something 
that is particularly modern.” (Davis, 2006: 13) I believe this is a consequence of the constant shifting of 
technological development during the formation of modernity (a word first used in 1672) which is both a 
characteristic and a driver towards others keeping up to date with the latest developments. This 
increase in rate of change in society also underlies the next adaptation. 
 
3. Modern as new-fashioned 
By 1756 the most commonly found definition of ‘modern’ had begun to be used: modern shifted further 
towards describing innovation and became associated with new fashions. A modern could henceforth 
be “a person with modern tastes or opinions, or who belongs to the modern school of thought on any 
subject; a person who advocates a departure from traditional styles or values” (Oxford English 
Dictionary, 1989). Modern could be used to describe one on the cutting edge of fashion as in: “it will be 
deemed old-fashioned by the latest of the moderns” (1897 quoted in Oxford English Dictionary, 1989). 
This definition comes out of the idea of modern as being a standard of fashion to be reached; thus, a 
typeface can be modern, a secondary school can be modern, and even people can be moderns. With 
modern implying fashions and tastes (as well as keeping ‘up to date’), modern began to be understood 
in more hierarchical terms; some people, industries, professions and nations were modern and others 
were not. Therefore one of the key components in being modern is being fashionable and ‘keeping up’ 
with the places, people and ideas deemed as more modern.  
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It is worthwhile briefly exploring the nature of fashion in order to understand what is meant by this 
usage of the word. Fashion is a social force based on shared meanings which develop over time. 
Fashion is linked strongly with class and acceptance: in clothes fashion, the sociologist Thorstein 
Veblen (1957-1929) found that the “upper classes invented fashion to distinguish themselves from 
those below. When the styles and practices of the upper classes were imitated, when their fashions 
'trickled down' to their social inferiors, the upper classes were impelled to reconstitute themselves.” 
(Sancaktar, 2006: 38) As with clothing fashion, invented by the upper classes, being modern promotes 
feelings of superiority, whilst not being modern is to be inferior. 
 
This hierarchical differentiation implicitly leads to people who follow fashions to identify with other 
fashionable groups, and in time creates a sense of belonging for these people. If one is not modern it 
can therefore promote a sense of denigration from others, and even a desire to belong to this group. 
Charles-Clemens Rüling writes that “Fashion acts as a sign, and activates forces of differentiation in 
terms of taste, social identity, and cultural capital. It is used to create identity and differentiation. 
Fashion has normative power in setting standards and creating uniformity. It serves the accumulation of 
symbolic capital through conspicuous consumption, and it needs continuous innovation in order to keep 
up its distinctive capacity.” (Rüling, 2000: 3) With modern meaning new fashion, the notion 
encapsulated a social force which promoted change. 
 
4. Modern as against tradition 
In the 20th century the final definition of the modern arose. The definition based on anti-traditionalism 
(present in the idea of modern as a new fashion and as up-to-date) was expanded, most particularly in 
the arts and in architecture. Modern in this sense is “A work of art, architecture etc., which is a product 
of a modern trend or movement.” (Oxford English Dictionary, 1989) Modern is used in this way solely to 
describe artifacts or the creators of these artifacts: “In the visual arts the Walker Art Centre house a 
world-famous collection of moderns.” (Year 1975, quoted in Oxford English Dictionary, 1989) This 
movement arose in the early twentieth century to move away from the use of traditional forms to create 
new types of objects which were not consciously based on previous forms. This was inherently 
anti-traditional which, whilst linked to the idea of keeping up with current trends, is different in that it is a 
closed definition. Modern in this sense can only be an object identified as part of this movement which 
is itself a current trend/fashion. This use of the word modern is most commonly seen in movements 
such as modern art and Modernism in architecture. Modernism needed the modern: without the social 
changes required for the modern to arise, modernism and postmodernism would never have occurred 
as social movements.  
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Due to this fourth definition, in the field of architecture (and art) the idea of modern is confused due to 
the artistic developments of the early 20th century, when the whole profession of architecture was 
revolutionised. Previous conventions (such as historical revivalism) were disparaged in favour of a new 
aesthetic and a way of thinking about beauty. Whilst this anti-tradition type of definition has had little 
effect on discussions of modern in the social sciences, this association of the modern with ‘modernism’ 
has meant it is difficult to disentangle the notion of modern as separate from modernism in architecture. 
Indeed, modern architecture happened before modernism: for instance some architecture can have 
once been up to date, preceded modernism and still be considered to be modern (James Fergusson’s 
seminal architectural text “History of the Modern Style of Architecture”, 1873, attests to this). Therefore 
throughout this thesis I use the phrase ‘modern architecture’ to refer to architecture in the sense that it 
was viewed as either up to date or a new fashion in its own time rather than architecture which fits 
within the modernist architectural movement (as has occurred in Europe and America after the 1920s). 
To avoid confusion, in this thesis Modernist architecture will be referred to as modernist architecture 
rather than modern architecture. 
 
 
Modernity, Modernisation and Modernism 
The idea of modern, after five centuries of linguistic formation, has morphed into three main concepts: 
modernity (first used in 1672), modernisation (1770), and modernism (1929). This section explores 
each concept, taking the earliest (and most significant) first: modernity. 
 
1. Modernity: between the new and improved, and the transitory 
Modernity is a concept which shifted with the changing definitions of the modern, being defined as “The 
quality or condition of being modern; modernness of character.” (Oxford English Dictionary, 1989) 
Indeed, the meaning remains ambiguous, as we are still within the modern epoch. The categories of 
definition above (modern as current, up-to-date, new fashion, and anti-tradition), whilst accurate given 
the inductive method to create them, require refinement in order to apply them to the concept of 
modernity. This is because modernity is the state reached when a substantial number of moderns exist 
in a society; rather than the characteristic of a single person or object, it is the characteristic of a society 
full of moderns. Modernity is a qualitatively different concept to modern and has different trends and 
characteristics. The architectural critical theorist, Hilde Heynen, provides an excellent account of 
modernity in her book ‘Architecture and Modernity’. She begins by presenting her schema for the 
meaning of the word modern which is designed to fit her idea of modernity: “Etymologically speaking, 
one can identify three basic levels of meaning accorded to the word modern: ... The current, the new, 
and the transient.” (Heynen, 1999: 8-9) Of these three levels the first meaning, current, corresponds 
exactly with the first aspect of my categories of definitions, and the second and third are ideal types (as 
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no dictionary definitions exactly correspond to these). It is these second and third definitions which are 
of most interest: the two broad conceptions of modernity based on Heynen’s scheme distinguish 
between programmatic and transitory notions of modernity. 
 
What unites the rival ideas of modernity as the programmatic and as the transience is that for both 
continuous innovations are very important aspects. The idea of modernity as a period of change 
(particularly changing fashions) captures this essence of constant renewal; in modernity, fashions are 
changing all the time. Modernity is more a way of being than a checklist. As Heynen puts it: “Modernity 
refers to the typical features of modern times and to the way that these features are experienced by the 
individual: modernity stands for the attitude toward life that is associated with a continuous process of 
evolution and transformation, with an orientation toward a future that will be different from the past to 
the present.” (Heynen, 1999: 10) 
 
What is contentious between these two basic understandings is of what this future consists. The 
advocates of programmatic modernity “interpret modernity as being first and foremost a project, a 
project of progress and emancipation. They emphasise the liberating potential that is inherent in 
modernity. A programmatic concept views modernity primarily from the perspective of the new, of that 
which distinguishes the present age from the one that preceded it.” (Heynen, 1999: 11-12) This relies 
on an implicit claim that modernity is a different type of period from previous periods (or else there 
would be no need for a new word).  
 
To understand what makes modernity a different type of period it is necessary to understand the 
concept of time and repeatability in modernity. During the Renaissance “the idea began to gain 
currency that history contained a course of development that could be influenced in a certain direction.” 
(Heynen, 1999: 9) The earliest example of this was the famous Querelle des Anciens et dea Modernes 
when “the question was raised whether the “Moderns” could not rival or even surpass the “Ancients” in 
their attempts to achieve the highest ideal of art. The main result of this discussion was that the cyclical 
model was definitely replaced by a progressive model that viewed every age as unique and 
unrepeatable and as an advance on the achievements of preceding periods.” (Heynen, 1999: 9) This 
underlines the notion of modernity as something new and programmed to progress: history cannot 
repeat itself due to the project of modernity to improve upon what came before. This notion has huge 
implications for how time is thought about in the West and the role of modernity in this: Modernity, 
Octavio Paz says, “is an exclusively Western concept that has no equivalent in other civilisations. 
The reason for this lies in the view of time that is peculiar to the West, by which time is regarded as 
being linear, irreversible, and progressive.” (Heynen, 1999: 9, emphasis added)  
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The other concept of modernity, the transient, has a similarly revolutionary view of time. With one eye 
continuously on the future and staying up-to-date, the most obvious characteristic of modernity is 
change, and how transient and momentary society becomes. According to Heynen, “A first formulation 
of this sensitivity can be found in the celebrated definition of [modernity by] Charles Baudelaire 
(1821-1867): ‘Modernity is the transitory, the fugitive, the contingent, the half of art of which the other 
half is the eternal and the immutable.’” (Heynen, 1999: 12) Instead of highlighting progress (as in the 
programmatic view), this analysis of modernity sees modernity as a period in which tradition is 
discarded with ease. Yet whilst, according to Heynen (1999) the need for constant innovation and the 
rebellion against tradition are part of the generally accepted ingredients of the modern, Baudrillard 
“radicalises these elements. Modernity, according to Baurillard, establishes change and crisis as values, 
but these values increasingly lose their immediate relation with any progressive perspective. The result 
is that modern set the scene for its own downfall.” (Heynen, 1999: 12) 
 
Both views cannot be true yet neither are both false. Western modernity is an entity which is forever 
darting between the two poles of programmatic and transitory. Programmatic modernity stands for a 
more positive way of looking at the changes which characterise modernity than the transitory view. This 
openness and flux is reflected in Bill Sewell’s notion that we should conceive “modernity as a 
continuously unfolding project, an ever-distant goal beckoning energetic minds to improve their current 
situations in ways best seen fit. This means, then, that modernity is not a constant.” (Sewell, 2004: 216) 
Modern, in the sense described, is therefore a notion which is open to interpretation, yet one where 
‘moderns’ usually believe they are living in an a condition which is constantly improving. For instance, 
what is ‘up to date’ or a ‘new fashion’ is up to individuals and societies to decide: revivalism was both 
fashionable and modern in the nineteenth century, yet would not be so viewed today.  
 
What is measured as modern and what is obsolete is measured by the mores and norms of society. Yet 
this flux between the two poles of a modern programme and the transitory are the two main features of 
modernity. In an eloquent description of this state of being, Heynen writes “Marshall Berman argues 
that for the individual the experience of modernity is characterised by a combination of programmatic 
and transitory elements, by an oscillation between the struggle for personal development and the 
nostalgia for what is irretrievably lost: ‘To be modern is to find ourselves in an environment that 
promises us adventure, power, joy, growth, transformation of ourselves and the world – and at the 
same time, that threatens to destroy everything we have, everything we know, everything we are.’” 





2. Modernisation  
From a later date, 1770, modernisation, a derivative of modern, has been used to describe the activity 
by which modernity is reached: “The action or an act of modernizing; the state of being modernized” 
(Oxford English Dictionary, 1989). It was usually used to denote an object which had been updated to 
modern standards, often on historical buildings, as in: “The Marquis of Winchester’s noble house at 
Englefield has suffered by some late modernizations” (1770). It was not until the idea of modernity was 
conceptualised thoroughly that the notion of modernisation as a general process (rather than a specific 
process on objects or areas) was articulated. Given that modernisation theory had little prominence 
until the mid-twentieth century, ‘modernisation’ is a label for a process that had already happened in 
Europe, America and Japan. Adaptation of the word ‘modernisation’ to a concept used in a general 
theory means that, to a greater extent than the word modern or modernity, I will treat the idea of 
modernisation as an ideological construct created to place countries on a scale of development rather 
than an active agenda during pre-World War two industrialisation. My approach to this concept is in line 
with recent use of ‘modernisation’ in Japan studies where “few historians and historical political 
scientists of Japan consciously think about modernization theory any longer.” (Garon, 1994: 348)  
 
Given this, ‘modernisation’ can be more usefully described as “the process of social development, the 
main features of which are technological advances and industrialization, urbanism and population 
explosions, the rise of bureaucracy and increasingly powerful national states, an enormous expansion 
of mass communication systems, democratization, and an expanding (capitalist) world market.” 
(Heynen, 1999: 9-10) Modernisation theory offers an idealised Western-centred viewpoint on how 
modernity was reached and what the driving forces were behind this. Again, modernisation can be 
seen as a project to become an improved nation or one where change and innovation is valued 
regardless of its trajectory.  
 
3. Modernism  
Modernism is an artistic and cultural movement with roots in the late nineteenth century. It derived as a 
response to the separation of the individual from previous ways of living, and from a sense of aspiration 
about how the arts should respond to this development: “the experience of modernity involves a rupture 
with tradition and has a profound impact on ways of life and daily habits. The effects of this rupture are 
manifold. They are reflected in modernism, the body of artistic and intellectual ideas and movements 
that deal with the process of modernization and with the experience of modernity.” (Heynen, 1999: 3) 
This movement focused upon aspects of modernity that had salience at the time, namely, orientation 
toward the future and the desire for progress. Therefore, Davis writes, “modernism, as it has been 
defined through the twentieth century, is inherently antitraditional.” (Davis, 2006: 17) This is in part due 
to the central place that science attained in the societies from the mid-19th century in Europe and 
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America, acting as an increasingly valued critical voice that question any aspect of the status quo that 
had not been rationally queried. Due to this link, Modernist theorists such as Otto Wagner (1841-1914) 
held Enlightenment ideals as central to the fledgling Modernist movement. 
 
From this overview it is clear that modernity is central to both the process of modernisation and the 
modernism movement. The attitude and ways of thinking in modernity is the causal factor behind both 
modernisation and modernism and, both physically and etymologically, modernity is prior. Modernity 
“constitutes the element that mediates between a process of socioeconomic development known as 
modernization and subjective responses to it in the form of modernist discourses and movements. In 
other words, modernity is a phenomenon with at least two different aspects: an objective aspect that is 
linked to socioeconomic processes, and a subjective one that is connected with personal experiences, 
artistic activities, or theoretical reflections.” (Heynen, 1999: 10) These twin aspects of modernity are 
explored in the following section on the necessary conditions for modernity to flourish.  
 
 
Necessary conditions for modernity 
This section on why the ‘modern’ occurred in Europe explores three questions: Why did the concept of 
‘the modern’ need to be invented in fifteenth century Europe? What were the pre-requisites for some in 
the West to pursue the latest developments and create new fashions? What were the reasons for belief 
in modernity in Europe? The first part of the answer lies in the development of critical reason. 
 
1. Critical reason 
It is a truism that over the past 500 years technologies have been developed which have greatly altered 
the way of life in Europe. This technological development was the basis of the Industrial Revolution 
(around 1750-1850) whose pre-requisite technologies of steam and later electricity were continuously 
adapted to suit the needs of the owners. Whilst many of the most important technological applications 
were driven and propagated by economic forces, they required a way of thinking which was previously 
absent. I posit that the base of these technological improvements was a new method of reasoning 
derived from the scientific revolutions of the 16th to 18th centuries. This had a great impact on both the 
norms of society and the material life of citizenry to the extent that “during the Enlightenment the idea of 
modernity became bound up with the notion of critical reason.” (Heynen, 1999: 9) Therefore any 
examination of modernity must need to take a view on the role of critical reason to distinguish whether 
critical reason was concurrent or causing modernity. 
 
A leading proponent of the idea that critical reason is the leading principle and factor behind the rise of 
modernity was Octavio Paz, who wrote that: 
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“Critical reason, our ruling principle, rules in a peculiar way: rather than building systems 
invulnerable to criticism, it acts as self-critic. It governs insofar as it unfolds and sets itself 
up as the object of analysis, doubt and negation. It is not a temple or a stronghold, but an 
open space, a public square and a road, a discussion, a method – a road continually 
making and unmaking itself, a method whose only principle is scrutiny of all principles.” 
(Paz, 1991: 26)  
 
Under the tenet of critical reason, all knowledge is open to reason using logic. This idea is linked 
strongly to the idea of the modern, with concern with the present, and with continuous innovation: 
continuous critique is presumed to lead to progress. This ideal has its roots in Socratic dialogue 
whereby a critical figure, through questioning assumptions, leads an argument towards truth. This idea 
was later expanded by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1931) and other nineteenth century 
liberals. Hegel and other proponents such as Karl Marx (1818-1883) and John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) 
all held views that history was a process of progression attained through dialectic (the art of discussing 
and finding the truth of opinions). In the schema of dialectical reasoning, prepositions lead to counter 
prepositions which eventually lead closer and closer to a version of the truth. Given that the idea of this 
process was dynamic modernisation itself is not a static process across time: manifestations of ‘the 
modern’ have changed from the 18th century, “tugging in one direction then another… - the 
Enlightenment, critical reason, liberalism, positivism, and Marxism.” (Paz, 1991: vi) What all 
expressions of modernity have is a destructive effect on how the value of the past is viewed: “What is 
modern breaks with the past, denies it entirely.” (Paz, 1991: 2) This is because critical reason is the 
thought system that characterises modernity. When applied in Western modernity, critical reason 
systematically questions all assumptions and ways of being.  
 
It is in this sense that critical reason is part of the basis for what is called modernity. Given that the 
modern is a concept focused upon difference and improvement on previous times, the term can be 
contrasted in relief with the idea of progress. In common with ‘progress’, modernity has an end (truth) 
and means to that end (critical reason). According to Robert Alexander Nisbet (1994) ‘progress’ has 
been a highly influential trend of thought since as far back as Ancient Greece: this implies that the 
development of the notion of progress does not capture the full gamut of changes since the Scientific 
revolution, as its roots lie partly in Ancient Greek thought rather than that of recent times. In short, 
progress is not necessarily a modern concept. However, under the programmatic idea of modernity, 
progress and this ideal of modern are closely related. If critical reason is a cause of modernity, it is likely 
to have impacted upon the term progress since its advent too, and it will be worthwhile to assess to 
what extent ‘the modern’ and ‘progress’ are still distinctive concepts.  
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What is meant by progress is “first and foremost that humanity is advancing toward some goal 
continuously, inexorably, and necessarily.” (Nisbet, 1994: 139) An alternative definition is: “the idea of 
progress holds that human experience, both individual and collective, is cumulative and future-directed, 
with the specific objective being the ongoing improvement of the individual, the society in which the 
individual lives, and the world in which society must survive.” (Bowden, 2009: 50) Both the definition of 
progress and of programmatic modernity emphasise that progress is a collective endeavor and that it is 
directed towards improvement through change.  
 
Yet the idea of the modern, when considering both its programmatic and transitory sides, does not 
necessarily fulfill the criteria for progress. According to Nisbet, there are five crucial premises to the 
idea of progress. Only three of these can be strongly associated with modernity: “conviction of the 
nobility, even superiority, of Western civilisation; acceptance of the worth of economic and technological 
growth; faith in reason and in the kind of scientific and scholarly knowledge that can come from reason 
alone.” (Nisbet, 1994: 317) Of the two other premises, one may be associated with modernity but is not 
a necessary condition (“belief in the intrinsic importance, the ineffaceable worth of life on this earth”) 
whilst the other actively works against modernity (“belief in the value of the past”), particularly in 
modernity’s transitory guise. Modernity, as articulated by Paz, is a state which is not necessarily 
progressive (although the effects are usually labeled as ‘progress’) and due to the impulse to constantly 
innovate, may undermine progress made in the past.  
 
‘Progress’ is mainly distinguished from modern in that it attempts to build upon the past, not to seek to 
challenge all assumptions if these have been shown to be valuable. This being so, the idea of 
modernity in Europe is irreversibly tied to critical reason in a manner that progress is not. Before the 
establishment of critical reason as a primary value of the Enlightenment in the mid-18th century, what 
was modern referred to the current times; modern “was not critical nor did it imply the negation of 
tradition. On the contrary, it affirmed its continuity. [Baltazer] Gracian [1601-1658] says the Moderns are 
more witty than the Ancients – not that they are different.” (Paz, 1991: 2-3) What changed with the rise 
of the modern was that the current time was conceived as a period not continuous with the past but a 
new and different era: “our modernity… is a rejection, a criticism of the immediate past, an interruption 
of continuity.” (Paz, 1991: 3) This separation from the past was not a constant factor before 18th century 
Europe: “Traditionalist peoples live immersed in their past without questioning it. Unaware of their 
traditions they live with and in them.” (Paz, 1991: 8-9) The schism of time, between modernity and 




What this schism implies is that a belief in critical reason is a belief in the linearity of time. With 
continuous development and edging towards truth, there is a new way of thinking about time: “The 
modern age rejects cyclical time in the same trenchant way Augustine did: things happen only once, 
they are unrepeatable.” (Paz, 1991: 28) By focusing on what will be “modern man is pushed toward the 
future with the same violence as the Christian was pushed toward heaven or hell.” (Paz, 1991: 30) The 
rigour of critical reasoning has potentially huge consequences on the nature of modernity and can push 
society towards the transitory: 
 
“Critical reason, by its very rigor, accentuates temporality. Nothing is permanent; reason 
becomes identified with change and otherness. We are ruled not by identity, with its 
enormous and monotonous tautologies, but by otherness and contradiction, the dizzying 
manifestations of criticism. In the past the goal of criticism was truth; in the modern age 
truth is criticism. Not an eternal truth, but the truth of change.” (Paz. 1991: 26) 
 
The incessant questioning of the way things are currently done leads to continuous technological 
innovations and new fashions. This is because constant improvement requires the attitude of keeping 
up with modern trends. Constant questioning, creating new trends and innovations have all led 
modernity to be described as a condition of ‘homelessness’. (Heynen, 1999: 14) Bringing the 
consequences of modernity and critical reasoning to an individual level, Heynen writes that: 
 
“Modernity frees people from the limitations imposed on them by their family or clan or by 
their village community, offering them unheard-of options and often material improvements 
as well; there is, however, a price to pay. The renunciation of the traditional framework of 
reference for their lives means a loss of certainties and of meaning. For many people it is 
far from easy to learn to live with this.” (Heynen, 1999: 15) 
 
These material developments and social issues could only have arisen after large scale questioning of 
shared assumptions (that are usually called traditions). Centuries of questioning assumptions in 
science and engineering, as well as in society, politics, religion and economics, has produced a society 
at once more convenient and rich, as well as breaking down common beliefs such as Christianity. 
Modern people are less close to one another, more emotionally dissonant and more bereft of socially 
shared meaning. These outcomes account for modernity being between the programmatic and the 
transient. Modernity brings with it critique and judgment, but this results in a loss of identity, especially 
of collective identities. Traditions lose authority when questioned, and are looked down upon for not 
being modern. Faith in critical reason allows every foundation to be challenged.  
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Modernity also creates manifold opportunities for the agents of change. The first variable that explains 
the path that architecture took in the modern age is growth of a certain type of rationality among both 
architects and clients in authority. This increasing rationality was a logical development of the 
understanding that modernity was driven in Europe by the growth of technological sophistication and 
rational planning in its buildings. In architecture in Europe and America, ‘Reason’ was first used 
implicitly in planning and building technologies and later made a virtue: by the end of the 19th century 
there were a growing number of architects who set a value on reason above all other values.  
 
One exponent of rational architecture who was contemporaneous with the period of study was Otto 
Wagner. As he was a practitioner of Art Nouveau, the roots of modernism can be seen in his writings, 
but he was also a part of a longer movement for rationality in architecture. In his book “Modern 
Architecture” (1902) he directly linked ‘modern’ architecture with reason: “This new style, the modern, in 
order to represent us and our time, must clearly express a distinct change from previous feeling, an 
almost complete decline of the romantic, and an almost all-encompassing appearance of reason in all 
our works.” (Wagner, 1988[1902]: 79) Both Art Nouveau and Modernism saw the influence of the 
triumph of reason, declared in the 18th century, impact explicitly upon architectural forms, functions and 
spaces. For Wagner the ideal impact of reason on architecture was that: 
 
“All modern creations must correspond to the new materials and demands of the present if 
they are to suit modern man; they must illustrate our own better, democratic, self-confident, 
ideal nature and take into account man’s colossal technical and scientific achievements, as 
well as his thoroughly practical tendency – that is surely self-evident!” (Wagner, 1988[1902]: 
78) 
 
Rationality for Wagner meant that architecture should change, be separated from architecture of the 
past and fulfill the promise of man. In promising this, Wagner opened a schism within modern 
architecture,34 fulfilling Paz’s model of the consequences of critical reason. Wagner (as was later 
common with modernist architects such as Le Corbusier (Heynen, 1999: 13)) also clearly belonged to 
what Heynen describes as the programmatic notion of modernity, modernity for a better future. 
(Heynen, 1999: 10)  
 
Summarising the above, there are four categories of effects of using critical reason in modernity, which 
have affected society from artists to accountants: separation from unreasoned systems; placing value 
                                                   
34
 Conforming to Paz’s notion of modernity, Wagner himself fermented a schism in the Viennese Academy and bitter opposition to his own 
designs, eventually dying in virtual isolation. (Wagner, 1988[1902]: 185) 
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upon change; the creation of new oppositions and schisms, and; unending movement often described 
as progress.  
 
2. Reification of progress through domination  
Whilst critical reason may be a constituent part in modernity, it is not an unbiased process. As noted at 
the beginning of this chapter, the modern became a normative judgment of both time and belonging 
when it was adapted to mean up-to-date. This had a significant consequence for how non-European 
places were categorised by Europeans. The idea of modernity as a judgment of development gained 
traction when European countries began coming into contact with hunter-gatherers in the Americas: 
“The question was first raised when in the fifteen and sixteenth centuries Westerners began to come in 
contact with peoples such as the aborigines of the Americas. How do we best explain their 
differentness from us; it was asked increasingly but not only the explorers themselves, but the people 
back home to whom the explorers reported their findings.” (Nisbet, 1994: xii) The answer to this 
question “rose right out of the idea of progress and its premise of uniform development. The Indians of 
the Western Hemisphere and other aborigines on the continents of the world could be seen as 
“contemporary ancestors,” that is, as peoples still in the early stages of cultural development in which 
Western society once existed, but had long since progressed beyond.” (Nisbet, 1994: xiv) The 
explorers and intellectuals in the West began to “classify them, arrange them in a progressive series all 
the way from Tierra del Fuegians (then thought to be the most primitive of all extant people) to the 
inhabitants of London, Paris, and all the other capitals of the West.” (Nisbet, 1994: xiv) Modernity (a 
self-description of European countries) was located at the top of a framework of universal human 
development.35 
 
Yet whilst hunter-gatherers were easily categorised, more ‘advanced’ countries were not: a central 
challenge for the Enlightenment in Europe in the eighteenth century was the question of how to classify 
‘the other’. Efforts were made by the Europeans to reach general assessments of Islamic, Indian, and 
Chinese thought. But as so often in cases of attempts at cross-cultural evaluation, the result was 
curiously self-centred and limited. Western philosophers strove valiantly to grasp the fundamentals of 
classical Chinese philosophy but ended up, in the main, merely mirroring their own prior obsessions.” 
(Israel, 2006: 640) For instance, pointing to the priorities of intellectuals engaged in the rational project 
of the Enlightenment, what appealed most to one 18th century Enlightenment thinker, Bruzen de La 
Martiniere (1683-1746) in the context of the venal office system in France was that “Confucius’ China 
was a meritocracy rather than a land governed by autocracy or nobility.” (Israel, 2006: 642) This shows 
                                                   
35
 This perspective is more understandable when adopting a historical perspective: it is only in the last couple of decades that it has become 
clear through DNA analysis that we are all the same species with the same potential (see Cavalli-Sforza's The History and Geography of 
Human Genes (1994) for more details). Differences of culture and language were very alienating and it was relatively easy to believe that 
there could be primitive human beings. 
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they merely picked on the aspects they wished to see and could not analyse the Chinese deeply. This 
was somewhat inevitable given that European intellectuals had enormous physical and linguistic and 
very few Europeans went to China or had any opportunity to learn the language.  
 
Attempts to retain the complexity of other states and peoples in the face of vastly different structures of 
understanding were ultimately rendered moot after the advent of high imperialism, particularly after the 
British Empire incorporated India in the early 19th century, as one of the great centres of ‘civilisation’. 
Using the model of universal human development, the relationship between coloniser and colonised 
quickly became that of civilised and semi-civilised, developed and undeveloped, modern and 
pre-modern. This process of European colonisation reified Europe’s view of itself as the centre of 
civilisation and Enlightenment, a viewpoint first propagated in the fifteenth century.  
 
These hierarchies of development were strongly reflected in various theorists, most explicitly in the 
work of Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) and his theory of social evolution. As with the theory of universal 
human development, “of crucial importance to Spencer’s theory of social evolution was his notion of 
primitive humans. The ‘primitive’ was conceptualised as the point of departure for social evolution, the 
meeting point of animality and humanity, with the presumed attributes of the former usually 
predominating although these were wedded to distinctly human vices such as mendacity and lust.” 
(Hawkins, 1997: 98) The communal living of these primitives was a great distance from the increasingly 
individualised world of modernity. Spencer needed “to portray primitives as immoral, irrational and 
aggressive in order to show how individuality, freedom and morality emerged, during the process of 
evolution through a logic of differentiation, specialization and individuation. It enabled him to construct 
an evolutionary continuum and, by means of his recapitulation perspective, to substitute a number of 
contemporary social categories for those at the lowest point on the continuum.” (Hawkins, 1997: 98) 
 
The reason behind the European application of the idea of modernity to other countries in such a 
hierarchical fashion can be seen as due to the practice of colonialism. Colonialism displayed the 
progress of Europe starkly and cemented Eurocentricism in both European and non-European 
worldviews. That modernity is a Western centric concept is clear in the dating for stages of modernity. 
These are often said (for example Berman, 1983) to be Early modernity: 1500–1789 (or 1453–1789 in 
traditional historiography), Classical modernity: 1789–1900 or 1789–1914 in Hobsbawm's scheme and 
Late modernity: 1900–1989 or 1914–present in Hobsbawm's scheme. These dates correspond 
exclusively to events in the West: 1453, the fall of Constantinople (and the subsequent beginning of the 
Renaissance); 1789: the French Revolution; 1900: the end of the 19th century in the Julian calendar; 
and 1914: the start of the First World War in Europe. This schema separates events in the West from 
the outside world, splitting modernity into a phenomenon not only originating in the West but occurring 
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in the West also. The Eurocentric version of modernity helps to explain why the extended idea of 
modern (or modernisation) in the colonial academic field is so often confused with Westernisation. 
Therefore throughout this thesis what I describe as ‘modern architecture’ is often that which is in 































As I have explored in this section, “modernity is the self-recognition of Europe as seen within history, 
that regarding of itself as distinct from the feudalism which Europe gained in the process of liberating 
itself from the feudal.” (Yoshimi, 2005: 54) Modernity was seen as a time when critical reason allowed 
for continuous change, leading to the permanent development of technology and generation of new 
fashions, all of which undermined traditional assumptions. This was a social process unique to Europe 
and then followed in America, displayed in fig. 1.2 above. Yet without imperialist interactions with 
non-Europeans, the idea of modernity would have been very different. The set of attitudes which 
characterise modernity and the set of necessary activities which characterise modernisation were 
formed, solidified and theorised due to colonial activities: there would be no necessity for a theory of 
modernisation unless modernity was seen as a model for exporting. Yet modernisation has often been 
transplanted as a copy of the results of this process (high technology, bureaucratisation, science and 
industry) rather than the critical rationalism and continuous innovation which characterises the modern. 
Therefore whilst modernity has always been seen as peculiar to Europe it became most powerful when 
applied to non-European countries, where Europe was the pinnacle of the modern. The modern 
became an idea both influential and problematic due to the belief that modernity was possible 
1.2. Conditions for Euro-American modernity. 
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throughout the world. As will be shown in the following section the modern has been interpreted outside 
Europe in a way which does not see critical reason as the central requirement. Rather the results of the 
process (such as a strong military, democracy and industry) were seen as the main conditions. 
 
 
1.3 Meiji Japan’s dual modernity 
Modernity as understood in the previous section started to be implanted within Japanese society from 
the opening of the country in 1853 with the arrival of Commodore Perry. From this point the concept of 
the modern gradually became a symbol of the impetus for drastic change. At this time Japan was 
undergoing rapid changes: “the pace of development was extraordinarily quickened; the Emperor was 
restored to power, a modern state was established, and the Japanese were set on the path of 
progress.” (Kōsaka, 1958: 17) The social and historical development will be elaborated in Chapter 2 
whilst this section analyses the concept of the modern for the Japanese, and frames how the modern 
has been viewed, adapted and utilised by Japan since the 19th century.  
 
 
Introducing Japanese modernity 
First, ‘modern’ was not the only English word imported into the Japanese vocabulary after the contact 
established with Seiyō after the mid-19th century. It has been vehemently argued that “the concepts that 
defined the content of westernisation did not translate well: they did not have a natural fit with existing 
Japanese concepts… [The adoption of a Western political discourse] required the invention of a new 
terminology with which to engage in the new political discourse.” (Howland, 2002: 2) The word ‘modern’ 
was introduced as part of whole lexicon of new foreign words and this was a symptom of wider cultural 
change in Japan at that time.  
 
It is worth a brief exposition of this process of conceptual importation as “the semantic perspective on 
culture is something that cultural analysis can ill afford to ignore.” (Wierzbicka, 1997: 1) First the fact 
that there was no word for modern in Japanese before Euro-American contact may lead to an 
argument that even if there was no specific vocabulary, the Japanese still had the concept of ‘modern’. 
This is an argument long disputed in linguistic circles; Anna Wierzbicka writes that: 
 
To assume that people in all cultures have the concept of ‘sadness’ even if they have no 
word for it is like assuming that people in all cultures have a concept of ‘marmalade’ and 
moreover, that this concept is somehow more relevant to them than the concept of ‘plum 
jam’, even if they happen to have a word for the latter but not the former. (Wierzbicka, 1997: 
9) 
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Accepting Wierzbicka’s suggestion, the approach of this enquiry is that if there was no word for 
‘modern’ prior to 1853, then modernisation was not a process that was occurring before European and 
American contact (as modernisation theorists such as Edwin O. Reischauer (1965) suggest). Instead 
the idea arrived along with connotations of the superiority of Seiyō in the mid-19th century from Japan’s 
perspective, giving the idea a premise of a pre-existing cultural pecking order. This hierarchical 
understanding of the term was revealed when I discussed the English modern meaning of new fashion 
first used in 1756. Cultural analysis is crucial to understand the idea of modern in a theoretical 
perspective. 
 
My basic claim is that the modernisation of Japan was due to culture change rather than deriving from 
the culture of Japan. In the Ancient Chinese philosophy of time “contrary elements are not removed but 
reconciled and harmonized” (Paz, 1991: 24) an approach also encapsulated in customary Japanese 
hōgaku (Jap. 方角, lit. auspicious/inauspicious directions). The culture of Meiji Japan was manipulated 
purposefully in order to become what contemporaneous Europeans believed to be modern. This view is 
based on a notion of culture that is malleable, that is, able to be manipulated. Polish sociologist 
Zygmunt Bauman’s36 concept of culture holds that “there are things which may be changed by people, 
made different from what they are. They are to be treated differently from other things, which stay 
beyond human power. The first we call culture, the second nature. If, therefore, we think of something 
as being a matter of culture, rather than nature, what we imply is that the thing in question is 
manipulable, and that there is a desirable, ‘proper’ end-state for such a manipulation.” (Bauman, 1989: 
142-143) The modernisation of Japan in the 19th century should be seen as a massive culture change 
initiative conducted by the Japanese (particularly Japanese authorities) but not in circumstances that 
they chose. 
 
Japanese ‘modernity’ must be framed in its original context to understand it accurately. Although the 
Japanese were changing the culture of Japan, they were influenced strongly by Seiyō. The role of 
Europe and America in this process has often been underestimated. Japan was characterised by 
foreign visitors as a nation that copied others, from the 6th century influence of Tang China to its 
modernisation in the Meiji era. Japan was described as a “country without originality.” (Yokoyama, 1987: 
175) It was seen as a serial copier since first contact with China: Algernon Freeman-Mitford 
(1837-1916), the British diplomat to Meiji Japan “defined Japan as a ‘borrower’ from other civilisations 
since the very beginning of history. Mitford thought it would be easy for a borrower to cast away old 
traditions without suffering loss of pride and he wrote: ‘It must be remembered that Japan has never 
originated anything.’” (Yokoyama, 1987: 175) This explanation was highly influential in Europe and 
                                                   
36
 Bauman is one of the world's most eminent social theorists, who has written on how modernity created the conditions for the Holocaust, 
ethics in postmodernity, consumerism, and sociology more broadly.  
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America for decades and was preferred to acknowledging the existence of massive imbalances of 
power between Japan and the West. Instead of a small push given by European and American 
diplomats (the preferred explanation for Japan’s modernisation), the threat of colonisation was the main 
causal factor in Japan’s cultural changes of that time, a threat which pushed Japan towards a 
modernity whose existence was inconceivable to them prior to the mid-19th century and the coming of 
Perry in 1853, a topic expanded upon in the following Chapter.  
 
The formation of a power relation between Japan and Seiyō had been brewing since 16th century when 
the Japanese started to take an interest in ‘Western Learning’, which they “eagerly adopted because of 
its ‘extreme usefulness.’” (Kōsaka, 1958: 9) Rather than being forced upon Japan, innovations were at 
first used where needed and had little effect on the general culture of Japan. This ‘Western Learning’ 
became particularly useful by the 1830s when Japan experienced famine and bad crop conditions, for 
an understanding of socio-economic issues pushed the popularity of ‘Western Learning’.37 By the 
1850s, there emerged a critical spirit, and a spirit of practicality was awakened among the intelligentsia. 
These intelligentsia had important roles of forming ‘modern’ Japan as “they were precursors of the 
opening Japan, the modernization of Japan”. (Kōsaka, 1958: 2) According to KŌSAKA Masaaki, a 
self-conscious intelligentsia did not exist in Japan till 1873, yet I would like to emphasise that this 
‘self-conscious intelligentsia’ had adopted Seiyō-mind (to the extent that they understood ‘the West’) to 
a far greater degree than their predecessors. In 1873 the Meirokusha38 was formed. Its main intention 
was to ‘promote civilisation and enlightenment’, and to introduce Seiyō ethics and the elements 
of Seiyō civilisation to Japan (the co-founder and Minister of Education, MORI Arinori (Jap. 森有礼, 
1847-1889), even proposed to change the language of Japan from Japanese to English in 1872. 
(Seargeant, 2011: 4) Around these times, in crucial circles, a new political vocabulary was adopted: all 
ideas translated from English. 
 
For Japan, reaching the same technological and economic standards as Seiyō was a key component of 
their modernisation. By 1868 the Japanese elites were fully committed to this path: “Confronted by an 
apparently superior ‘civilization’ represented by the states of Europe, the Japanese confronted tasks of 
achieving modernity - making themselves into a "nation" and a "state" – following the opening of their 
country.” (Sukehiro, 1989: 432) Upon opening the country, the government wished to institute policies 
to quickly reach what they perceived as the next stage of development. “To create a ‘great civilization’ 
meant educating "high and low alike," and it had to be done quickly so that "Japan could take its rightful 
                                                   
37
 ‘Western Learning’ briefly became a crime during the “Trouble of Barbarian sympathizers” which started in 1839 in the Edo period 
(1603-1868). (Kōsaka, 1958: 7) 
 
38
 After six years of Meiji revolution, Meirokusha (明六社) was formed from the intellectuals who returned from the Iwakura mission (1871), 
which is explored in Section 2.1. 
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place among the nations of the world" in wealth and power.” (Sukehiro, 1989: 469) The right to be 
named ‘civilised’ was a key motivating factor to the Meiji elites: “Western models had a measure of 
propaganda and diplomatic value, insofar as their adoption might persuade foreigners of Japan's right 
to the label ‘civilized,’ and hence to their respect.”  (Crawcour, 1989: 619) Therefore Japanese 
modernity should be seen as a government and elite level initiative towards great power status, and 
this was composed of several key terms adopted from English: civilisation, enlightenment, progress 
and ‘the modern’. I will discuss how the words were defined in the Japanese language through 
examining a selection of ten English-Japanese dictionaries39 by a mix of Japanese and British authors 
published between 186240 and 1924.  
 
 
Defining modernity in Japanese 
1. Civilisation 
The first definition of civilisation in Japanese in 1862 was “behaviour made proper” (Jap. 行儀正ンキ
へ). (Hori, 1862: 129) The presence of this definition implies that civilisation was an essentially 
contested concept at this time, and one which was important to a sufficient number of people. In these 
ten dictionaries, one finds seven distinctive definitions of civilisation in Japanese. Chronologically these 
definitions of civilisation were: behavioural standard; openness; change/development; 
socio-political betterment; to teach; civilise away; and culture. These are summarised in the table 
below.41 It is important to note that none of the definitions referred to Seiyō or to ‘Westernisation’ since 
among the ruling class of Japan, even the Shogunate by the late 1860s, the attitude of ‘Revere the 
Emperor, Expel the Barbarians’ (Jap. 尊王攘夷, Sonnō jōi)42 remained a very strong motive for the 
Meiji Restoration in the first place. (Swale, 2009: 175) In Japan’s own terms ‘civilisation’ did not simply 
mean Westernisation, and given that the roots of the movement lay in the threat of colonisation, 
civilisation could never have this simple equation. Moreover, there emerged a new slogan: ‘Revere the 
Emperor, open the country’ which signalled a complete change in the Japanese elites’ opinion. 
                                                   
39 These are: Hori, Tatsnoskay, A Pocket Dictionary of the English and Japanese Language (Yedo: Kaiseijo kankō, 1862); Hepburn, James 
Curtis, A Japanese and English Dictionary: with an English and Japanese index (Shanghai: American Presbyterian mission press, 1867); 
Hepburn, James Curtis, Japanese-English and English-Japanese Dictionary. Abridged by the author [from his larger work] (New York: A. D. F. 
Randolph & Company, 1873); Satow, Ernest Mason, Right Hon., An English-Japanese Dictionary of the spoken language (London: Trübner & 
Co., 1876); Hoffmann, Johann Joseph, Japanese-English Dictionary Elaborated and edited by Le Serrurier, vol. 1-3 (Leyden: E. J. Brill, 1892); 
Hepburn, James Curtis, A Japanese-English and English-Japanese Dictionary, 7th edition (Tōkyō: Z. P. Maruya & Co., Limited, 1903); Maruya, 
Saiichi, English-Japanese conversation dictionary (Yokohama: Kelly & Walsh, Ltd, 1914); Inouye, Jukichi, English-Japanese dictionary (1915); 
Satow, Ernest, Sir, An English-Japanese dictionary of the spoken language (Tokyo: The Sanseidō, 1919); and Takehara, Tsuneta, A standard 
Japanese-English dictionary (Kobe: Taishu Wan,1924). 
 
40
 The first English-Japanese dictionary was created by FUKUZAWA Yukichi in 1860 which only included common nouns and so was not 
included in the analysis. 
 
41
 A comprehensive exposition of all the definitions of the word civilisation, progress and modern from ten English-Japanese Dictionaries can 
be found in Appendix II. 
 
42
 This social movement has its origins in China derived from Neo-Confucianism and became a political slogan in the 1850s and 1860s 
Bakumatsu (幕末, late Edo period). 
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Evidently direct Westernisation was an unappealing option for Japanese elites, who preferred to use 
other terms to describe the process. In popular debate over the issue of ‘modernisation’ after the 
Second World War, the foregoing attitude was clearly shown in Kōsaka’s Japanese though in the Meiji 
Era in 1958. He wrote: “The new Japan was not simply a copy of modern Europe. While the pursuit of 
new ideas was present in this period, there was also present the attempt to create a distinctive culture.” 
(Kōsaka, 1958: iii) 
 
Definition type Number of occurrences Instances 
Behavioural standard 1 1862 
Openness 1 1873 
Change/development 4 1873, 1903 
Socio-political betterment 5 1876, 1892, 1915, 1924 
To teach 3 1903, 1915, 1919 
Civilize away 1 1915 





The most important conception of civilisation during this period was first seen in the 1876 dictionary, 
when the word bunmei (Jap. 文明) was used to describe civilised behaviour as an aim for the nation to 
adopt. This conception was popularised by FUKUZAWA Yukichi who used the word in two particular 
ways. First it was seen as a stage of history that Fukuzawa wished Japan to enter: political betterment. 
Prior to the Meiji Restoration Fukuzawa wrote “I busied myself with writing and translation work on the 
chance of being able to lead the Japanese into civilization.” (Kōsaka, 1958: 72) For a country to be led 
into civilisation pre-supposes the existence of a state of development beyond which Japan stood at that 
time.  
 
Second, civilisation was seen by Fukuzawa as a better way of being/behaving: social betterment. In his 
influential publication of An Outline of a Theory of Civilisation (Jap. 文明論之概略, fig. 1.3) of 1875 
Fukuzawa wrote “civilization comforts man physically and elevates him spiritually… civilization 
advances the well-being and dignity of man, since man acquires these benefits through knowledge and 
virtue. Civilization can be defined as that which advances man’s knowledge and virtue.” (Kōsaka, 1958: 
73) This was understandable that civilisation was first defined as ‘behaviour made proper’ when it was 
adopted from English word in 1862. This definition is one of hope and one which fits within other 
definitions of civilisation as a process of improvement. Unlike definitions of modernity, the idea of 
civilisation has a moral dimension; rather than just being a state of improved knowledge, it is also one 
of improved virtue. This links the idea of civilisation to that of civility, commonly referred to in 
English-Japanese dictionaries.  
Table 1.2. Categories of definition of civilisation in Japanese, 1862-1924. Adapted from Hori, 1862; Hepburn, 
1867; Hepburn, 1873; Satow, 1876; Hoffmann, 1892; Hepburn, 1903; Maruya, 1914; Inouye, 1915; Satow, 







In government slogans the word bunmei, or civilisation, was usually accompanied by kaika (Jap. 開化), 
or enlightenment, used in reference to the 18th century movement towards a rational society rather than 
the indigenous Buddhist belief. Alistair D. Swale notes that the usage of kaika (enlightenment) in this 
context was often extremely vague and linked to the general movement to improve the nation: 
 
“It should be acknowledged that conceptions of enlightenment are extremely 
broad-ranging and hard to pin down. Enlightenment is a word that has come down to us 
suffering from ravages of extraordinary over-use and acquiring some less than helpful 
nuances along the way. Much like the word ‘modern’, which merely denotes that some 
thing is contemporary or of the current mode, it came to function, for the most part, as a de 
facto synonym for ‘good’ or ‘excellent’. Enlightenment has connotations of moral or 
intellectual excellence, it indicates a higher or better form of consciousness, however it 
has evolved with a decreasing sense of what is practically excellent or what makes one 
form of consciousness ‘higher’ than another.” (Swale, 1998: 9) 
 
The phrase ‘civilisation and enlightenment’ was related less to the pursuit of critical reason in society, 
as it had not arisen through social forces, and was seen more as a call to educate the Japanese people 
to raise the country’s stage of development. These two words in Japanese both meaning ‘civilisation’, 
and kaika (enlightenment) were even used before bunmei (civilisation): in 1903 the word kaika 
(enlightenment) meant ‘civilization, development’, whilst kaika sura (Jap. 開化する, enlighten) as verb 
meant ‘to be reformed, to become civilized’. In an earlier period (1873) the definition of kaika suru 
1.3. An Outline of a Theory of Civilization by Fukuzawa, 1875. 




(enlighten) was even more starkly related to change: ‘to open and change, to be reformed, to become 
civilized’. Given that no contemporaneous dictionaries contained the idea of modernising, it appears 
that in the political context of late 19th century Japan as defined after the Second World War, the idea of 
civilising was one which was important. 
 
A Kanji character analysis of the Japanese word further profoundly demonstrates the implication of 
‘civilisation and enlightenment (Jap. 文明開化, bunmei kaika). Civilisation was used as a metaphor for 
‘bright culture’ and enlightenment was a metaphor for ‘change and open’: 
 
•  Bun (Jap. 文): a man with a painted or tattooed chest which meant ‘literature, culture, 
writing and language’. 
•  Mei (Jap. 明) was composted with 日 (sun/window) and 月 (moon): a metaphor for the 
moon shining through a window which meant ‘bright, light and brilliant’.  
•  Kai (Jap. 開) was composed with 門 (door) and 开 (hands): a metaphor for a pair of hands 
opening a door. The idea of opening had salience due to the historical context of Japan, for 
during the Tokugawa Shogunate Japan had forbidden any Westerners to enter Japan until 
the treaties of 1854. Moving away from this closure to the outside world required civilising 
through opening Japan to Western influence. Such openness was a key component of 
early civilising efforts, as reflected in this meaning, and in contrast to definitions of 
civilisation in English. 
•  Ka (Jap. 化) was composed with 亻 (person) and 匕 (spoon/knife): a metaphor for a man 
with new tool which meant ‘change, convert and reform.’  
 
Taken together, ‘bunmei kaika’ in Japanese had a similar meaning to ‘modernisation’ in the English, 
programmatic sense: a positive phrase used to describe an improving culture, becoming open to 
change. Taking it as a national slogan, the Meiji authorities used the term to support their reforms in a 
positive way, against popular movements counter to adopting the ways of Seiyō. 
 
Civilisation was also used in Japanese in four ways uncommon to English. The first unusual usage was 
as a behavioural standard (‘behaviour made proper’), the remains of the Confucian concept, second to 
teach assuming a passive acceptance, third as openness which fits with enlightenment, and fourth to 
civilise away. For the final definition is important to understand the contours of Japanese modernity and 
how the idea of civilisation developed in the late Meiji period: 
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•  Civilise away (Jap. 脱する): Again unlike the English definition, civilisation could be seen 
as to civilise away or reject savage or barbarous customs (1915). Whilst by the turn of the 
20th century the word ‘modern’ in English took upon the concept of fighting against tradition, 
in Japanese this concept was added to the idea of civilisation.  
 
Civilisation in the Meiji period was defined primarily in terms of the change and process of reform that 
was being undertaken. This is reflected in the main idea of bunmei as well as the notions of civilisation 
as change/development, as in to open and change, and also to civilise away bad customs. At the same 
time, civilisation was seen as a standard to be reached, giving it a similar function to the notion of 
modernity in English.  
 
2. Progress 
Civilisation was not the only phrase that constituted the idea of modernity in the Meiji period. Take for 
instance the sentence from the 1924 dictionary “The Turks have contributed in no way to the progress 
of civilization” (Jap. 土耳其人は文明の進步に何等貢獻せしこごなし). This emphasises the notion of 
progress which had great popularity in Meiji Japan, and was tied strongly to the idea of civilisation and 
enlightenment. Fukuzawa wrote in Encouragement of learning (Jap. 學問のすゝめ) in 1872 that “if we 
seek the source of all this prosperity, we find that it is the blossom on the branches of a tree, whose 
trunk is learning… Devotion to learning may look a diversion, but it is the only way to arrive at 
progress." (Fukuzawa, 1872, quoted in Takeuchi, 1987: 7) This relates to the idea of progress in 
knowledge and progress in civilisation; increasing the sum of knowledge will lead to progress and to 
becoming more like Seiyō civilisation.  
 
The way that progress was actually defined was the most simple of all the definitions looked at in this 
section. Whilst the earliest English-Japanese dictionary defines progress as both “to improve and to 
make quicker” (1862), it is not a conception followed through in any other dictionary. Typically, progress 
was defined as ‘to advance; to go forward’ (1867). Later it was also seen as to improve (1873) and to 
develop (1919) yet these definitions are implied in the idea of advancing which are summarised in the 
table below. 
 
Definition type Number of occurrences Instances 
Advance/improve 12 1862, 1867, 1873, 1876, 1919, 1924 
Make quicker 1 1862 
Ideology 1 1919 




Table 1.3. Categories of definition of progress in Japanese, 1862-1924. Adapted from Hori, 1862; Hepburn, 1867; 
Hepburn, 1873; Satow, 1876; Hoffmann, 1892; Hepburn, 1903; Maruya, 1914; Inouye, 1915; Satow, 1919; and 
Takehara, 1924. 
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Yet, as will be seen in Meiji intellectuals’ attitudes toward modernity in Section 2.3, progress was seen 
in terms of social evolution in the main (Swale, 2008: 97) and this is reflected in the more detailed 
definitions. Ernest Mason Satow’s (1843-1929) dictionary of 1876 saw progress being used in 
Japanese to mean 1) progress in knowledge (Jap. 進); 2) progress in skill (Jap. 手上がり, lit. to ‘hand 
up’); and 3) progress in civilisation (Jap. 進歩, lit. to ‘step forward’). The Kanji character progress (Jap. 
進) was composed of 辵 (walking) and 隹 (a short-tailed bird) metaphor as walking like bird which 
meant advance, make progress and enter. The idea of an entity stepping forward in civilisation terms is 
not a common notion in English, yet it reflects the sense that Japan had of itself in the Meiji period, 
moving towards counting itself as a civilised country. 
 
3. Modern 
The English idea of modernity was either translated rather inaccurately into Japanese as ‘Civilisation’ or 
ignored until the 20th century as the logic of creating modernity through progressing towards civilisation 
was not a common notion in Meiji Japan. Modernisation was understood to be progress towards 
civilisation rather than creating modernity. This is evidenced by the fact that the idea of the modern did 
not match the English definition until after the death of the emperor Meiji in 1912.  
 
I have categorised the definitions of modern from the mid-1800s to 1924. These categories were 
generated by looking for patterns and comparing these to the definitions of modern in English. The four 
categories that definitions of ‘modern’ in Japanese fall under are: present period; new fashion; up to 
date; and new thinking as shown in the table below. 
 
 
Definition type Number of occurrences Instances 
Present period 16 1862, 1867, 1873, 1876, 1903, 1914, 1915, 1919, 1924 
New fashion 8 1867, 1915, 1919, 1924 
Up to date 3 1915, 1924 





The first definition, present period, was found in all but one dictionary and was overwhelmingly the main 
definition of the idea of modern until 1915 which is just after the Meiji period. Although a simple idea, 
the idea of modern was not merely the present, but a period of time as distinguished from previous 
periods. There was not a singular item of vocabulary which meant the ‘present period’ but several 
words which came in and out of use: chronologically, these were ima (Jap. 今, lit. now), kinsei (Jap. 近
Table 1.4. Categories of definition of modern in Japanese, 1862-1924. Adapted from Hori, 1862; Hepburn, 1867; 




世, lit. this near generation), kindai (Jap. 近代, lit. near period), and gendai (Jap. 現代, lit. visible 
period). These words conformed to the first definition of modern as shown in Section 1.2 (the definition 
separate from the notion of modernity). 
 
By 1915, these words were beginning to be redeployed in a new way: to describe the progression of 
history since the Edo period. This progression follows the Euro-American historical categories of 
savagery followed by medieval, then kinsei (Jap. 近世, early modern) kindai (Jap. 近代, modern) and 
finally gendai (Jap. 現代, contemporary). This corresponds to Kōsaka’s summary of perceived stages 
of development in the Meiji period. Expressed in the Meiji lexicon the stages were: “From savagery or 
nomadic hunting to early agriculture was one stage; barbarism was mainly an agricultural feudal state, 
civilization was the progressive, scientific stage of modern society.” (Kōsaka, 1958: 73) Whichever 
terms were used, after the changes of the Meiji period, the stages of history were described in the 
same hierarchical manner as in Europe and America, including the breakdown of stages of modernity. 
This categorisation became even more embedded after World War Two when Japanese historians 
deemed that it was necessary for the epochs of world history to be unified, so that Japanese modernity 
was seen as the same period as for the rest of the civilised world. (Minshu Shugi Kagakusha Kyōkai, 
1949: 5) This created clear boundaries of progression in history where the modern became 
synonymous with civilisation: before ‘civilisation’ was ‘barbarism’ whilst before ‘modern’ was 
‘pre-modern’.  
 
Modern also came to be employed to describe the up to date, new fashions and new thinking yet this 
did not occur until 53 years after the first dictionary studied here (1862). In 1915 all these definitions 
were used in INOUYE Jukichi’s English-Japanese dictionary: the definition of ‘modern’ began to 
approximate the same meanings as could be found in contemporaneous English dictionaries. It was 
used especially to refer to people as moderns, those who follow the latest fashions and the newest 
thinking. After 1915, modern as a description of innovation/followers of innovation became the most 
common definition. It is interesting to note that before 1924, there was not yet any definition of 
modern/modernism which included a notable anti-tradition slant, indicating that modernity in Japan was 
at first a matter of changing appearances rather than private customs, hinting at public/private 
dichotomy which developed during the Meiji period. 
 
A Japanese idea of modernity was not fully articulated until 1915 when it reflected the period of 
confidence in Japan and a crisis over what Japan stood for. After the early Meiji period when ‘civilisers’ 
such as Fukuzawa and Mori were pre-eminent, by the 1920s Japanese theorists started looking 
introspectively at the Meiji ‘progress’ and re-defined this progress by applying the idea of modernity. 
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The 1910s and 1920s “saw the debate on ‘overcoming modernity’ (kindai no chōkoku) [Jap. 近代の超
克] which questioned Occidental-style modernization and searched for an alternative indigenous 
approach.” (Kikuchi, 2004: 23) This movement cumulated in the ‘Overcoming Modernity Conference’ of 
1942. The underlying assumption throughout the symposium “was that modernity was a European 
phenomenon and that modernity in Japan was the influence of Western European civilization.” 
(Minamoto, 1995: 207) SUZUKI Shigetaka opened the conference with a speech which questioned the 
fundamental assumption of modernity: the rejection of the past: 
 
“The Renaissance was basically something born out of the Middle Ages in the sense that it 
was to reverse what the medieval had done. And here we come to a basic question. Apart 
from the fact of whether the beginnings of modernity can be traced objectively to the 
Middle Ages, I think there is something to the view that subjectively speaking, the modern 
individual began from the rejection of the Middle Ages. This is the contradiction of the 
modern age. Do we not need to overcome this contradiction? If there is something wrong 
with the spirit that rejected the Middle Ages, perhaps reflection on what we owe the Middle 
Ages…is one way to overcome modernity.” (SUZUKI Shigetaka, quoted in Minamoto, 1995: 
210; emphasis in original)  
 
Suzuki’s quote demonstrates an understanding of kindai as a phase which is defined by splits and 
schisms from the past, as containing deep contradictions, but also as something which may potentially 
be overcome through valuing and appreciating the past. Even before the 1940s, the polarity between 
seeing modernity as positive or negative had become firmly established. Yet before this time the Meiji 
government and Fukuzawa had a programmatic view of the modernity (seen as progress towards 
becoming civilised) but critics saw the modern as corrosive toward Japanese identity, and something to 
be overcome. This gave the modernisation process a specific understanding which is distinguished 
from the English definition: “encouraged by revisionist Occidental ideas, [Japanese intellectuals] 
searched for an alternative Japanese-style modernisation with its own national cultural identity.” 
(Kikuchi, 2004: 23) This stage would repay further research. 
 
Whilst the Meiji period fulfilled many of the criteria created for the purposes of modernisation theory, 
such as democracy, industrialisation, higher education, et cetera, the Japanese of the Meiji period did 
not themselves understand the process of national ‘improvement’ (in which they were engaged) in 
terms of the modern. Instead, until 1915 at least, ideas of civilisation, enlightenment and progress were 
the terms in which the European notion of modernity was expressed.  
 
 69 
Distinguishing Japanese from Euro-American modernity  
During the Meiji period ‘modern’ in Japanese was seen as the present period. The idea of modernity in 
Meiji Japan then was a temporal period; the modern distinguished the past from the present. 
Considering the usage of the word during the Meiji period, there was no clear character to the idea of 
modernity, and, in particular, the word modern in Japanese was not implicitly linked to the change and 
transience that occurred in the Meiji period.  
 
However, change was a theme which imbued the Meiji era, and this was described in the concepts 
progress and civilisation. Progress was seen as a characteristic of civilisation. Yet civilisation itself was 
also seen as a process, unlike in Europe and America. To civilise could be used as a verb, since 
civilisation in Japanese was something to aspire to. The idea of civilisation as socio-political betterment 
implies that the Japanese may have seen improvement as a key part of being civilised. This fits well 
with the idea of modernity in English as a period of change. Yet the character of this change was 
initially very different and implied opening to Seiyō rather than opening to reason.  
  
The idea of ‘civilisation’ gave a more direct idea of the cultural hierarchies of the late 19th century, and 
implies that the Japanese felt lower and needed to join the modern period, rather than that they 
considered themselves already there. Literary works of the period reveal the inferiority that the 
Japanese felt, and it is even clearer in the works of architecture produced in this period, which will be 
examined from Section 3.1 onwards.  
 
In emphasising social and political development (rather than the continuous production of innovations) 
the Japanese idea of what it meant to join modernity was one in which the state played a central part. 
Enlightenment and progress needed to be understood by the government first and then to be pursued 
systematically by the state in order to reach civilisation. This meant that the Japanese notion of 
civilisation had much less emphasis on the role of the individual than in the West: nations needed 
to become civilised first, as opposed to individuals needing to become rational and innovative. 
 
This can be seen in the political debates of the time and in the way these ideas were used in 
discussions. For example the word liberty was used in a suspicious manner in Japan: although the 
concept was firmly established by 1875, liberty was not seen as a wholly positive tendency due to the 
strong Japanese norms of loyalty, order and duty to others. Rather, liberty was seen more as “a means 
to civilization than as a necessary right of the individual.” (Howland, 2002: 97) Even Fukuzawa and 
NAKAMURA Keiu (Jap. 中村正直, 1832-1891), both proponents of individual autonomy, “both recast 
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the independence of the individual as bounded autonomy by linking him to family and others through 
duty and love.” (Howland, 2002: 107) 
  
In the previous section it was argued that one of the necessary conditions of modernity in the West was 
the critical reasoning of individuals who drove forward the enlightenment and the technologies of the 
industrial revolution. Howland concludes that for the Meiji Japanese, liberty was not causally linked to 
the creation of political institutions but was instead the product of intellectual and political tutelage, 
something that accompanied political change. He argues that for the elites of Meiji Japan “liberty does 
not produce or cause anything; it grows with knowledge and is manifest under conditions of political 
constitutionalism.” (Howland, 2002: 121) Therefore the autonomy of individuals was not central to the 
‘modernisation’ of Japan in the Meiji period and was not the driving force. Much more crucial was the 
political will of the Meiji authorities to catch up with the West. This implies that critical reason was not 
the central driving force for the establishment of Japanese modernity.43 
  
This statist drive underlies the fact that these various definitions were translated from the West and 
thus from a different cultural context. The ideas of civilisation, enlightenment, progress, liberty and 
modernity did not arise from indigenous practices. Because they were ideas adopted in the context of 
perceived external threats, the idea of modernity in Japan was ambivalent, an idea pushed upon Japan 
to some extent rather than generated from within. Thus, modernity in Meiji Japan had a very different 
flavour than in European countries. 
 
The idea of civilisation in Japanese modernity is one which remains an important concept in 
understanding the character and the rationales for change in the Meiji period. Douglas R. Howland 
writes that “Modernization theorists routinely equate civilization (bunmeikaika) [Jap. 文明開化] and 
modernization (kindaika) [Jap. 近 代 化 ] – a conflation that reduces the problem of explaining 
bunmeikaika civilization to an account of intellectual factors in the modernization process, particularly 
the rationality and scientific thought characteristic of ‘enlightenment’.” (Howland, 2002: 16) This implies 
that Japan’s process of improvement in the Meiji period is not accurately described when it is simply 
called modernisation: it was seen more at the time as a ‘civilising’ process. Howland also implies that 
modernisation theory makes the roles of political institutions and elite policy makers secondary; 
modernisation theory assumes that the cultural changes from the Enlightenment in Europe have taken 
place and are pushing the process of ‘modernisation’ forward. Instead, outside of Europe and America, 
this was never wholly the case, as the decision to embark on modernisation was taken by elites who 
needed to import a whole vocabulary of political concepts before understanding could occur between 
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 This does not preclude the notion of critical reason being utilised to progress to the ‘status’ of their modernity. 
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European and non-European countries. Indeed, the idea of modernisation later became a word specific 
for non-European countries intent on to developing the same socio-economic standards as Western 
Europe and North America. Therefore the idea of modernisation is often easily conflated with 
Westernisation due to the central role of Europe and America in the adaptation of the modern. However, 
both the process and the results of modernisation were different in Japan from Europe and America. 
 
The result of this conceptual importation is a dual idea of modernity during the period of study: 
modernity was a more-or-less shared definition between European and American nations and 
an aspirational definition in Japanese and other non-Western nations. After several decades of 
‘civilising’ by the Japanese, they reached a level of modernity that was close to parallel, yet still 
different to that of Europe and America. This created a parallel idea of the modern, split off from Seiyō, 
which was later replicated throughout Asia.44 Rather than being deeply rooted and intrinsic, the 
aspirational nature of modernity in Japan can still be seen in the overcoming modernity (kindai) 
conference, which essentially questioned whether the aspiration for modernity was sensible for Japan. 
Modernity had been opted for, but it could also be opted against. At least for the period of study, 
modernity was not something fully owned by Japan. 
  
This split understanding on the motivations of the dual definitions of modernity is well extrapolated by 
Yoshimi who described how through imperial activities, Japan took upon itself the modern: 
  
“Europe’s invasion of the Orient resulted in the phenomenon of Oriental capitalism, and 
this signified the equivalence between European self-preservation and self-expansion. For 
Europe this was accordingly conceptualised as the progress of world history and the 
triumph of reason. The form of invasion was first conquest, followed by demands for the 
opening of markets and the transformation to such things as guarantees of human rights 
and freedom of religious belief, loans, economic assistance, and support for educational 
and liberation movements… From within this movement were both the distinctive 
characteristics of modernity: a spirit of advancement that aims at the infinite approach 
toward greater perfection; the positivism, empiricism, and idealism that supports this spirit; 
and quantitative science that regards everything as homogeneous.” (Yoshimi, 2005: 55) 
  
It is only now possible to unpack this effect that European imperialism had during the 19th century, due 
to the rise of postcolonial studies and the new conceptual frameworks to understand unbalanced 
encounters (such as the contact zone, transculturation and identity formation). Whilst the critical 
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 For example the earliest time that “Chinese adopted a word meaning ‘modern’ [Chi. 現代, the same character as Japanese] was during the 
early 20th century and that was itself imported from Japanese.” (Huang, K., 2006: 76) 
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framework of how Japanese modernity came about provides general themes through which to look at 
Japan and Japanese architecture during this period, it is only in the application of this framework that 
firm conclusions can be drawn. The focus on first contact with Seiyō, described as threatening and 
invasive, and the consequences of this contact, described as homogenising, are the basis of 
discussion for the remainder of this thesis. Through this discussion, I explore the mechanisms and 
effects of smuggling the idea of the modern into Japan through exploring Japan’s contact with Seiyō 
and the effect this had upon developing Japanese architectural modernity from 1853 to 1919, through 
utilising the concepts of the contact zone and identity formation. 
 
Arguments in Japan had a different dynamic than in Europe and America towards modernisation and 
modernity. This indicates that the conditions which gave rise to modernity in the West were different 
from those in Meiji Japan. From a linguistic standpoint, Japan did not have the same definition of 
modern as in English, because modern is a culturally specific word. It arose out of the Renaissance 
and then the Enlightenment, and was used to describe and uphold the social trends which arose after 
long periods of change in culture. These social changes did not occur in the same way in Japan and 
hence the concept of modern was significantly different: rather than a self-description in English, it was 
a debatable objective. This demonstrates the perceived malleability of the idea of modern in Japanese 
and that Japan was considered to be able to construct its own version of the modern being neither 





















The formation of dual ‘kindai (modern) Japan’ 
 
 
“[A]lmost all foreigners whose work brought them to the treaty ports, especially 
the consuls and missionaries, thought of themselves as belonging to a ‘higher’ 
civilisation, which it would be in Japan’s interest to adopt. They argued not only 
that trade would bring prosperity, contributing in the long run to an improvement 
in welfare and stability, but also that the West possessed, in addition to 
advanced scientific concepts and technology, a superior system of ethics and 
social principles, even of ‘culture’. These, they argued, should be models for 
semi-civilized Japan.” (Beasley, 1995: 140) 
 
The Meiji Restoration on 3rd January 1868 was a critical step for the formation of modern Japan, the 
turning point from the feudal Edo period, a phase of Japanese history in which the islands were again 
ruled by the Tokugawa Shogunate (Jap. 徳川幕府, 1603-1868) of the Tokugawa clan. The end of the 
Edo period was a time of cultural transition in East Asia as a whole, most notable for the context of 
foreign aggression. After China refused to trade directly with some of the Seiyō powers, Britain 
launched and won the First Opium War; as a result China was forced to open five ports and Hong Kong 
was ceded to Britain in 1840. These events “brought home to many Japanese the danger they faced 
from the West”. (Hoare, 1994: 2) Japan noticed this danger and at the time was split on what to do to 
counteract it. In 1842, the Japanese repulsed American ships off their coast, and continued their policy 
to close the country to non-Dutch foreign relations with Seiyō which had stood since 1639 when all 
Europeans had been barred from the Japanese mainland.45 However at this time Japan was militarily 
unable to compete with Seiyō military technologies and as the Japanese rulers at the time were a 
military Junta, they had a more realistic assessment of the comparative state of their military and their 
vulnerability as an island state.  
 
Japan ended its isolationist foreign policy in 1854 after Perry’s Black Ships had arrived in 1853, when 
the state’s weakness led to Japan being forced to open ports with the United States and to sign the 
‘unequal’ Treaty of Kanagawa in 1854. This was during the period Bakumatsu (Jap. 幕末, lit. end of the 
curtain), which was distinguished by major events occurring between 1853 and 1867. According to 
Edwin O. Reischauer (1965) the largest immediate consequence of open ports was to cause disorder 
to the economy as cheap foreign products severely undermined natively produced goods. (Reischauer, 
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 Dutch traders continued to be allowed to trade with Japan off an artificial island near Nagasaki. This remained the only point of contact and 
sharing with the West until 1853 and meant that a number of Japanese could read and speak Dutch but no other European languages. 
 74 
1965: 210) As in China, these treaties were deemed a humiliation as they granted extraterritoriality, the 
opening of treaty ports and the right of Seiyō authorities to set their own duty rates in Japan. The wish 
to be free from the impositions of the treaties eventually led to the establishment of a new doctrine of 
self-strengthening and the Restoration of the emperor Meiji. This Japanese doctrine was promoted 
from the central government during the Empire of Japan (1868-1945), particularly the Meiji Period 
(1868-1912). This policy resulted in fundamental changes to Japanese society, caused by the opening 
of intense and sustained contact with Euro-American ideas, not least through government missions and 
the education system. This led to identity confusion as shown through the words of late Meiji 
intellectuals such as NATSUME Sōseki explored in Section 2.3.  
 
The Bakumatsu was a turning point from the Feudal Edo period to Meiji Restoration, “a transition from 
early modern [Jap. 近世] to modern [Jap. 現代] as Japanese put it; from late-feudal to modern 
institutions, as many historians have described it, from Shogunal to imperial rule, and from isolation to 
integration in the world economy.” (Jansen and Rozman, 1986: 3) These different words all point to the 
central tension in historiography of this period: that before the Meiji Restoration Japan was something 
and after the Meiji Restoration it was something else. Throughout this chapter I will attempt to show the 
dissonances and continuations of certain aspects of Japanese society and thought, so that although 
momentous, the changes in late Edo Japan were a joining of the ideas of Seiyō with Japan, who had 
ideas of their own. 
 
Becoming kindai (modern) is widely seen as the second revolutionary cultural borrowing in Japan’s 
history: “If one allows for certain changes in circumstance and technology, the methods by which Japan 
acquired a knowledge of China in and after the seventh century were not so very different from those 
that were used to study the West in modern times. The same cannot be said for what was learnt.” 
(Beasley, 1995: 8) This argument is a familiar one, which is that Japan was used to borrowing from 
China and this merely continued in the late Edo period. After the arrival of Black Ships from Europe and 
America, first in the 16th century and then again in the 19th century, Japan starting engaging with the 
‘Western outside world’. Prior to this, although described as isolationist, Japan was only isolated to the 
‘West’, even as it maintained contacts with the Dutch. According to Marius B. Jansen, “Japan’s 
“seclusion” was aimed principally at the West, and it is Western ethnocentrism to think that a country 
that chooses to cut itself off from Westerners has cut itself off from the world.” (Jansen, 2000: 87) 
Instead Japan went from voluntary, partial relations with China, Korea and the Dutch, to intense and 
imbalanced relations with the leading Great Powers of the time. 
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An account of the changes instituted by the opening of a new contact zone through Seiyō incursions 
during the Bakumatsu period is given below: the history of the transition from ‘Feudal’ Edo to the Meiji 
Restoration. This chapter begins by providing historical context for how the dual idea ‘modernity’ was 
politically constituted through an in depth examination of Edo Japan, their foreign relations, the growth 
of Seiyō imperialism and its impact on China, and how Seiyō imperialism affected Japan in the late Edo 
period. Following this, the character of the new Meiji government and the factors which led to and 
framed the changes in government policy are set out, and examined by focusing on government 
missions and educational developments. The chapter ends analysing how the wider geo-political 
context and domestic policies filtered to the ideas and ideals of the Meiji intellectuals in order to see 
how these changes were promoted, rationalised and opposed with the introduction of the idea of the 




2.1 The transition from Edo Japan to the Meiji Restoration 
Before the contact with the Great Powers of the Victorian age in the mid 19th century, Edo Japan 
was a decentralised authoritarian state, only a quarter of which was directly controlled by the 
Shogun, the head of the military Junta who used the authority of the emperor to rule feudal 
vassals. The system he ruled over was highly complex and original in world affairs, and thus 
requires some explanation. Besides the small area of direct control by the Tokugawa Shogunate 
“three-quarters of Japan was under the control of daimyo46; their domains stretched from Kyushu 
in the south west to the fringes of Hokkaido in the north” (Jansen, 2000: 49). These daimyo had 
been powerful rulers from the 10th century to the middle 19th century, and were subordinate only 
to the Shogun. Prior to the Tokugawa Shogunate, the Ashikaga Shogunate (1336–1573) had 
been feeble and their authority directly contested following the Ōnin War (1467–1477). There had 
been no de facto central power for over one hundred years until Oda Nobunaga (1534-1582) 
overthrew the Ashikaga Shogunate 1573 and, following this, no Shogunate for thirty years in 
Japan; this period of anarchy (known as the Sengoku period (Jap. 戦国時代, lit. the Warring 
States Period) named after the era in Ancient China) led to the establishment of a delicate 
political system composed of powerful daimyos ruled from afar by the Tokugawa Shogunate. 
During this period, Japan became culturally closer to China before the changing geo-political 
context prompted Japan to revise their collective notion of what civilisation meant, laying the 
foundations for modernisation in the Meiji era. 
 
                                                   
46
 Daimyo is a generic term referring to the powerful territorial lords of pre-Meiji Japan who ruled most of the country from their vast, hereditary 
land holdings as the military class. 
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Edo ‘civilisation’ 
This administration depended on an interpersonal system of fidelity to the master, or bakuhan 
taisei (Jap. 幕藩体制). The daimyo themselves used bands of sworn retainers (kashindan, Jap. 家臣団) 
to administer their domains. A council of elders (karō) held responsibility for policy and for the 
superintendence of other officials, among whom were the heads of military units, superintendents of 
the castle town, rural administration, finance, security, public works, religious affairs, education, a 
secretariat, and many other specific posts. Within their domains the greater daimyo had considerable 
freedom, even to the point of issuing their own paper currency (with the shogun’s permission).  
 
The political units of the system presided over by daimyo were known as han47  (Jap. 藩 , lit. 
domain). These domains were similar to the fiefs in early medieval Europe in that they were ruled over 
by daimyo, whose lands were inherited by their heirs. Each province contained han; some provinces 
had as many as 18 han whilst others had only one. The provinces where a single han ruled the entire 
domain were more powerful than their peers and were given the title kokushu (or ‘provincial lord’). 
Although it is widely accepted that each han should have one castle in each domain, this was only the 
case in the early Edo period. By the mid/late-Edo period, a number of the largest han had more than 
one castle, whilst some of the lowest han with little land had no castles whatsoever. Whilst it is right to 
say that domains were usually run from castles, not all daimyos did so and following the fire which 
destroyed Edo Castle in the capital there was a trend to rule from low, palatial complexes.  
 
Although the daimyo were lords of their domain, some spheres were reserved for the Shogunate. In 
this partitioned state, the Shogun controlled business and foreign trade in order to reinforce his 
authority, particularly with the growing prosperity of south-western daimyos close to Nagasaki, the only 
port opened to Dutch trade and linked to many ports which welcomed Chinese trade. However, sources 
are mixed on how the Shogunate viewed external trade. According to Hoare’s (somewhat ethnocentric) 
point of view, the Shogunate “saw trade as the sole cause of the economic difficulties that increasingly 
beset Japan, for the Japanese were neither able to understand the causes nor very inclined to search 
deeper than foreign trade for them.” (Hoare, 1994:12) This view is contradicted by other viewpoints 
which claim the Shoguate placed much importance on trade: “most bakufu [Shogunate] trade policies 
were designed for access to Chinese goods, and in this regard they were highly successful. Foreign 
trade and the Nagasaki system were so important to the bakufu that it subsidized domains that 
produced copper for export in order to keep them going and to prevent them from selling it on the 
domestic market, where it brought higher prices.” (Jansen, 2000: 87) Given the cultural benefits of this 
trade, such as ensuring a steady flow of knowledge from the Netherlands, it is likely that the Shogunate 
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 Han was the name of the estate belonging to a warrior in Japan after the 17th century. The fiefs of the daimyos of the samurai class of 
Japan during the Edo period were called han. 
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saw sufficient benefits, both economic and cultural, to support foreign trade (albeit with reservations of 
the potential influence of Christianity and firearms, both banned in the early years of the Tokugawa 
Shogunate). 
 
The goods that the Dutch sold were in fact Chinese, the trading of which was started in 1635. In 
addition, the Chinese and Koreans brought more Chinese goods to Japan than the Dutch: throughout 
the Edo period, a large number of Chinese and Korean ships traded in Japan. (Jansen, 2000: 87) The 
total number grew rapidly after the establishment of the Shogunate; there were 193 visiting Chinese 
ships in 1688. Due to this expansion, the Shogunate decided to limit their numbers and finally the trade 
began to decline in the eighteenth century. Foreign trade was neither insignificant nor exceedingly 
extensive: whilst the Shoguate controlled foreign trade, and foreign contact, it had no central treasury 
and budgeting or even tax codes. (Jansen, 2000: 60)  
 
The Tokugawa period was defined more by Confucian orders of society, whereby trade was, at least 
formally, disparaged. The segmentation of society in Tokugawa Japan materialised as part of the fidelity 
to the master system. This was the Mibunsei (Jap. 身分制), or system of status which was established 
in 1591, during the Azuchi-Momoyama period following the abolition of the Ashikaga Shogunate. In an 
attempt to bring order to the country where peasant uprisings were common and dangerous with the 
introduction of firearms from Spanish and Portuguese, lapsed division between castes in society 
became reformed, with only samurai allowed to bear arms (and guns banned completely). Following 
neo-Confucian teachings, “the principal status divisions of the period were codified in the occupational 
distinctions – samurai, farmer, artisan, merchant.” (Jansen, 2000:97) Above the samurai was the 
Imperial court. Samurai, including their family members, represented “about 5 or 6 percent of the 
population of Japan, and constitutes an extremely large privileged class.” (Jansen, 2000: 105) Having 
such a large proportion of society as member of the ruling class is quite striking in comparison to 
France before 1789, where only 0.5 percent to 0.6 percent belonged to the clergy or nobility. (Jansen, 
2000:105)  The proportions of the various classes varied by domains which each had their own social 
structures related to the percentage of samurai: some han “had so many samurai that the castle town 
could not contain them, and in consequence [the daimyo] allowed them to live in the countryside. 
(Jansen, 2000: 50) Having a high proportion of samurai caused wealth inequality in the whole domain, 
as in the example of Satsuma48 (Jap. 薩摩町) han, “whose swollen military establishment of Sengoku 
times was retained throughout the [Edo] period, had samurai families everywhere, forming 20 or 30 
percent of the total population”. (Jansen, 2000: 50) Having such large proportions of samurai in the 
outer domains was a drain on resources, given that samurai were also well educated, which meant that 
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 Satsuma was an old town before 2005 located in Satsuma District, Kagoshima, in the south West of Japan, far from their powerful and 
traditional enemy, Tokugawa. Satsuma was part of the alliance against the Tokugawa’s before the Tokugawa Shogunate had been formed.  
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these han were economically less developed than the Tokugawa heartland around Edo, renamed 
Tokyo in 1868. (Jansen, 2000: 50)  
 
In the social structure of Tokugawa Japan, farmers made up 80-90 percent of the population; 
agricultural products were the main economic outputs in the Edo period. With the high development of 
agriculture in Japan this surplus of farmers became an increasingly important group. Given the excess 
of produce in some areas, some farmers also became involved in cottage industries, often as a second 
job. (Cheng, L., 2008: 112) Other farmers capitalised on the agricultural boom and managed to become 
rich. Indeed there was also a class system within farmers measured by the land area. Farmers were a 
major, complex group: Farmers’ “productivity, welfare, and discontent mirrored the success or 
shortcomings of government.” (Jansen, 2000:111) As foreign immigration was controlled, the growth of 
farming products and cottage industries were the cause of a rise in the population of Edo Japan.  
 
Much of this population became concentrated in the cities and urban development was a strong trend 
in the Edo period. These towns were centred around the samurai: “Most of the area [in a castle town], 
and all its desirable space, was given over to samurai residences and temples, leaving artisans and 
merchants squeezed into what remained… By the eighteenth century some 10 percent of the average 
domain’s inhabitants, including virtually all its samurai, were to be found residing there.” (Jansen, 2000: 
142) As noted earlier, each han generally had only one large town, the daimyo’s castle town. Therefore, 
castle towns were planned cities and “laid out as administrative centers and created, rather than 
derived from, commercial centers. Many daimyo invited merchants from larger metropolitan areas to 
come to their towns. The towns held a monopoly position in their area.” (Jansen, 2000: 142) In addition, 
every daimyo was required to have an annual routine trip to Edo lasting months to pay respect to the 
Shogun at certain times of the year, therefore “within the castle walls… life was dominated by the 
rhythm of the annual trip to and return from Edo.” (Jansen, 2000: 143) This allowed control of the 
daimyo from the administrative centre whilst boosting the population of the capital to the extent that Ian 
Morris (2010) claims that Edo was the largest city in the world by 1720, eventually reaching over a 
million people. 
 
The character of the pre-Meiji town was also formed by the activities of the industry guild controlled by 
Shogunate and daimyo, which formed from the period of 1804-1830. Other types of town also existed, 
such as the commercial towns near the castle towns, port towns, inn towns and Temple gate towns. 
The new class chōnin (Jap. 町人, lit. townsmen) made up the majority of the population in these places, 
drawn from the third and fourth ranks of the social order: the artisans and merchants. Within this new 
class there was again great status differentials, for instance, between the Shogun’s head builder and a 
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village carpenter. Late Edo society was not simply as a strict hierarchy where no merchant was allowed 
to be richer than a farmer, but a layered complex with the samurai on top: as Jansen suggests, “it would 
be better to think of Tokugawa status society as consisting of a series of complementary hierarchies, 
each of which had its own upper, middle, and lower classes.” (Jansen, 2000: 124) The development of 
agriculture, cottage industries and urbanism in Japan in turn led to the development of cities, improved 
transportation and greater currency circulation within Japan.  
 
Yet whilst the chōnin grew in influence, the samurai were the defining class politically during the Edo 
period and had a great influence on cultural identity. Within this reformed caste system “the samurai 
was the only one who, by not having to “work,” was free to concentrate on virtue and to embody it in 
society.” (Jansen, 2000:103) The ideals of samurai became closely associated with the ideals of the 
government. During the Edo period, “peace was so rampant throughout the land that the samurai, with 
the Tokugawa encouragement, evolved from uneducated, brave warriors into learned and highly 
competitive bureaucrats… A flourishing middle-class culture bloomed that produced Kabuki theatre, 
imaginative fashions, influential painters, and lasting poetry.” (LaFeber, 1997: 8) For the 250 years 
preceding the Meiji Restoration, samurai did not represent war and martial vigour in Japan but virtue, 
good governance and other Confucian ideals.  
 
To link this to the Section 1.3 discussion on civilisation, the previously held concept of civilisation in Edo 
Japan was determined by whether or not a people held Confucian ideals; if they did not they were 
considered to be barbarians. (Pines, 2005: 60) Confucianism suggested a certain attitude towards the 
‘Other’ with the difference between ‘China’ and aliens being primarily cultural, and hence changeable. 
(Pines, 2005: 62) In Chinese history, Others were defined as siyi (Chi. 四夷, lit four barbarians/foreign 
tribes), located to the north, south, east and west of the central Chinese plains.49 Japan broadly 
followed this distinction, so that when Europeans first made contact with Japan in the 16th century they 
were known as nanban (Jap. 南蛮, lit. southern savages) as they arrived from the south. As the word 
was taken from Chinese cosmology, the Japanese characters were the same as in Chinese. According 
to Charles Holcombe, siyi does not literally refer to foreigners as barbarians unlike the European 
concept with its Greek basis: 
 
“Barbarian is an English word that derives from an ancient Greek expression for those 
unintelligible “bar-bar” noises emitted by strangers who were so uncivilized as to not speak 
Greek. Not only did the ancient Chinese naturally not use this word, there really was no 
word in classical Chinese that was exactly equivalent to it. There are, indeed, several 
                                                   
49
 There are dongyi (Chi. 東夷, lit. eastern foreign tribes), nanman (Chi. 南蠻, lit. southern savages), xirong (Chi. 西戎, lit. western rong clans) 
and beidi (Chi. 北狄, lit. northern di minorities). 
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Chinese terms that are commonly loosely translated into English as “barbarian,” but this 
(as is often the case with translations) is a little misleading. More precisely, they are all 
generic Chinese names for various non-Chinese peoples. The word Yi, for example, was 
used for non-Chinese peoples in the east.” (Holcombe, 2011: 8) 
 
The term for China, zhongguo (Chi. 中國, lit. middle state), and the term for barbarian, yi (Chi. 夷, lit. 
spread out), referred to areas rather than behaviour. The ancient name of China, Huaxia (Chi. 華夏, lit. 
grand and illustrious/describing a civilised society) referred to common standards but also to the 
ancestors of the han people from Zhongyuan (Chi. 中原, lit. central plain). In Chinese the idea of 
civilisation was distinguished by territory, and cultural affinities and superiority. As a result there was no 
ethic present for ‘civilising’ other peoples, and this led to a tendency in Confucian states to be inward 
looking. 
 
In Confucian societies such as China, Japan, Vietnam and Korea, civilisation was a concept based on 
identity and belonging, whether racial belonging or cultural belonging. (Pines, 2005: 60). This 
recognition of belonging to a wider Confucian society was strengthened in the Edo period: “As the less 
civilized Manchus swept over China in the seventeenth century, Japan saw itself as the old China, that 
is, Japan-as-central-kingdom. The Tokugawas gave refuge to Chinese scholars, and even set up a 
form of tribute system in which Korean, Ryukyu, and Dutch envoys paid homage to the Shogun.” 
(LaFeber, 1997: 8) Although often characterised as isolationist, Japanese cultural links with China were 
strengthened to their peak during the Edo period: 
 
“If some news of Western developments managed to penetrate Tokugawa Japan, contacts 
with other parts of East Asia were naturally even greater. In fact, it has actually been 
claimed that Tokugawa Japan was “orientated more than ever before toward the language 
and classical culture of continental China”. Higher education in Japan was still conceived 
primarily as mastery of the written Chinese language and the Confucian Classics... 
Yamaga Sokō [Jap. 山鹿素行] (1622-1685)50, for example, argued that samurai justified 
their economically non-productive existence because leisure from work allowed them to 
cultivated the Confucian values of loyalty, duty, and service and to lead the common 
people in the classic Confucian fashion by setting a virtuous example. The Tokugawa 
period, in fact, became the acknowledged golden age of Confucianism in Japan.” 
(Holcombe, 2011: 183) 
                                                   
50
 Yamaga was a Japanese soldier and Confucian scholar during the Edo period.  Confucius's idea of the ‘superior man’ (that individuals 
should attempt to be role models to others) was applied by Yamaga to the samurai class of Japan. This ethic became an important part of the 
samurai way of life and later became codified as bushido (Jap. 武士道, lit. the way of samurai) in the early 20th century.  
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The influence of (Neo-) Confucianism and the model of insular China meant that Japan was inward 
looking and disassociated from those considered lacking in proper behaviour; during the Edo period the 
sakoku (Jap. 鎖国, lit. locked country) policy meant that any Japanese who left the country would face 
the death penalty. Instead of outward engagement, Japan instituted a tributary system with China as 
the model, whereby foreign monarchs would give gifts to the Shogun to demonstrate respect towards 
the Shogunate. The most noted examples of tributaries were delegations from the Dutch East India 
Company and the Ryūkyū kingdom which travelled annually to Edo to deliver tribute. Notions of 
civilisation in the Edo period, taking inspiration from China and Confucius, emphasised respectful 
relations from others.  
 
After the Tang dynasty had culturally penetrated Japan in the 6th century, Japan defined itself using 
Buddhist and Confucian concepts: “A Japanese 'constitution' of 604, attributed to Prince Shotoku, 
stated in its first article that harmony, above all, was most to be valued. That early – and forever after – 
Japanese emphasized harmony, or wa, over acquisition-for-ascent…. Within this space and these 
institutions, Japanese leaders believed, wa alone held back disorder, anarchy, and destruction.” 
(LaFaber, 1997: 6) One and a half centuries after this in 756 Japan even changed its official name to 
wa [Jap. 和]. This harmony was maintained during the Edo period through an elaborate political 
system which ensured the Shogun’s allies would always be close to central power and his old enemies 
were always barred from this, as well as underlying the rigid Edo social structure. Some scholars have 
claimed that the sakoku policy was designed to cut the western han from lucrative trade with foreigners 
which had customarily been theirs in order to maintain a closed stable country with the centre stronger 
than the peripheries. (Calman, 1992: 2) 
 
Internally, the governing system had inherent tension: the strict de jure structures of Edo Japan meant 
that some daimyo were permanently barred from posts in the ruling Shogunate, and had no opportunity 
to ever be close to the central power. The ‘fidelity to master’ system had severe repercussions for those 
daimyo which had not been loyal to the Shogun: “translated to the world of Edo feudality, [paternalism 
in Japan] brought a distinction between the traditional Tokugawa house vassals, the fudai [Jap. 譜代] 
daimyo, and the tozama [Jap. 外様] or ‘outside lords’,”51 (Jansen, 2000: 38) the locations of which are 
shown in fig 2.X below. Some daimyo had opposed the Tokugawa forces at the battle of Sekigahara in 
1600 while others had cooperated; the latter were and would always be ‘inner’ daimyo and those who 
opposed the Tokugawa would always be ‘outer’ daimyo, never changing their classification throughout 
the Edo period. What was true at the high level of daimyo was even more so at the level of ordinary 
                                                   
51
 There were over 200 daimyo in the Edo period and their territories were reorganised based on their production of rice from rice paddies and 
according to how close they were to the ruling Tokugawa family: the kinsmen (Jap. 親藩, shinpan); the hereditary vassals (Jap. 譜代, fudai,) 
and the less-trusted allies (Jap. 外様, tozama). 
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samurai: “Daimyo could interact, compete, and rank themselves in relationships to the Shogunal 
hegemon, but their vassals lived within a world structured around the daimyo. The categories of fudai 
and tozama thus served to separate the Tokugawa house from its peers. Tokugawa house vassals 
could serve in the bakufu organisation, while tozama were forever outside it.” (Jansen, 2000: 38) This 
lack of social and political mobility created an era of stable prosperity and refinement in the arts but was 
one of the causes of the fall of the Tokugawa Shogunate. These splits only became a live issue after 








The growth of Seiyō imperialism  
The re-entrance of Seiyō to Japan in the mid-nineteenth century has a wide and significant geopolitical 
context in East Asia as a whole and beyond which has been studied in great detail in multi-archival 
works for the past century: issues such as the growth in global power of the ‘West’, the internal 
difficulties of the Qing dynasty and the growth of geopolitical relations between China, Japan and the 
European states have been competently covered elsewhere (for example Blanken, 2012; Bickers, 2011; 
Kayaoglu, 2010; Hevia, 2003; Bickers and Henriot, 2000; Gillard, 1977; Hobsbawm, 1975). This 
section takes a precise approach to the wider geo-political context by understanding a) the changing 
motivations and rationale of the Great Powers Europe and America (Seiyō) in East Asia before 1853, 
2.1. Map of allocation of land in Japan (1664). Adapted from the Digital Archives of 
the WhiteWind History Museum. 
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and b) how China, which was the model for the Shogunate in many aspects, particularly foreign affairs, 
reacted to the demands of these nations. 
 
 
European and American imperialism: motivations and rationale 
Blanken (2012) suggests that Seiyō imperialism can be usefully split into two periods in the modern era: 
pugnacious imperialism (1400-1800), courteous imperialism (1800-1914).52 Both periods saw varying 
motivations for the Powers involved, varying relations between these Powers, involvement in different 
areas of the world, and varying intensity of the colonial activities. Pugnacious imperialism was the first, 
and longest, phase and involved first the Spanish, Portuguese and Dutch, and later the British and 
French, who were competitive and warlike both in Europe and abroad. Foreign trade was treated as “a 
mild form of war” and continued even into the 18th century Enlightenment period, particularly between 
France and Britain from the Indian subcontinent to North America. (Blanken, 2012: 7) As argued in 
section 1.2, this period saw the slow reification of European superiority over non-Europeans and the 
erection of stable chauvinistic boundaries between Euro-Americans and others. However, these 
boundaries were not so rigid that Europeans were not inspired or respectful of cultural ‘others’, for 
example during the Enlightenment China was respected by many intellectuals for the fairness of its 
examination system in comparison to the nepotism in 18th century European governance.  
 
Following the defeat of Napoleon in 1814, the European Powers of Britain, France, Russia, Prussia, 
and Austria-Hungary negotiated a peace at the Congress of Vienna which would ensure that Western 
Europe would remain (mostly) war-free until 1914. This Congress also confirmed the colonial 
possessions of each country and began a long period where International Law became more formally 
established, with long-term decisions made on the abolition of the slave trade, regulations on shipping 
freedom, and the ranking between diplomatic representatives. This stability heralded a period of 
courteous imperialism, with continued colonial activity in abundance but with relative peace among the 
imperial rivals. This “courteous imperialism resulted in a ‘checker-boarding’ pattern of colonial 
acquisition. The competition for access to foreign goods and markets became much more peaceful 
among the colonizing powers, despite an explosion in in the actual size of formal European empires…. 
This pattern of behaviour was a stark contrast to the brutal imperial struggles of the previous two 
centuries.” (Blanken, 2012: 7) This stage of imperialism allowed largely uninterrupted shipping and 
trade for newly industrialising states to profit from. 
 
                                                   
52
 Arguably this courteous imperialism gave way to New Imperialism (1870-1914) following the unification of Italy and Germany (who defeated 
France in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871) and were better able to project their power across the world. New Imperialism has been 
deemed an unstable period of world history when the nations of Seiyō (and later Japan) had increased competition for territory and economic 
resources. This period is covered in more detail in Section 4.1 concerning Japanese imperialism as this shift in imperial tone provided the 
major context for Japan’s increased aggression and colonialism. 
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This period of relative cooperation allowed the Powers of Seiyō a collective power against other states 
that was unprecedented in world history. That this power was used to dominate other parts of the world 
was largely seen as justified by the leading thinkers of the time, whether liberal or not, and resistance to 
colonialism was uncommon in the main departments of cultural thought. (Said, 1993: 96) For instance, 
“Liberal though he was, John Stuart Mill – as a telling case in point – could still say, ‘The sacred duties 
which civilized nations owe to the independence and nationality of each other, are not binding towards 
those to whom nationality and independence are certain evil, or at best a questionable good’.” (Said, 
1993: 96)  
 
Whilst non-recognition of the rights of ‘non-civilised’ countries was not new, the intensity of feeling of 
superiority had never been so prevalent, nor had these states had the force of application to make their 
notions of superiority de facto before. The right to colonise the non-civilised was “already current in the 
English subjugation of Ireland during the sixteenth century and, as Nicholas Canny has persuasively 
demonstrated, was equally useful in the ideology of English colonization in the Americas. Almost all 
colonial schemes begin with an assumption of native backwardness and general inadequacy to be 
independent, ‘equal’, and fit.” (Said, 1993: 96) The emergence of the Encyclopaedia movement in 
Enlightenment France meant that these ideas became catalogues, written down, shared and made real 
by policy makers and explorers who fed into the notion of the world having varying levels of civilisation 
which could be accurately assigned, with little knowledge or research deemed to be required.  
 
The map in fig. 2.1 is an American cartographer’s representation of the world, made 20 years after the 
Congress of Vienna. This map represents the whole world, though I focus here on East Asia. China and 
Japan are shown as half-civilised (two ‘levels’ below enlightened, only found in Europe east of Moscow 
and in eastern North America). The notion of China and Japan as half civilised was repeated frequently 
by the envoys and ambassadors of Japan from Britain, such as Rutherford Alcock (Beasley, 1995: 141) 
and Laurence Oliphant (Oliphant, 1859: 244). It is notable how many guesses were made concerning 
these states, and the gaps in knowledge in some areas such as Korea, which was culturally similar to 
China and Japan yet remains unlabelled and assumed to be barbarous. Due to the low level of 
civilisation in East Asia (and elsewhere outside of Europe and parts of North America inhabited by 
people of European origin) all these states were seen as potential beneficiaries of enlightened rule 
through colonialism. Imperialism was seen as a “sort of pedagogical project, one designed to teach 





It is also worth noting that, given the perceived low level of civilisation outside of Seiyō, the envoys and 
traders of Europe and North America devised systems of ensuring that they would not be tried under 
native courts when crimes were committed by expatriates. This was a system of extraterritoriality, which 
was a method (sometimes unintended at the time of signing the treaties) of undermining the 
sovereignty of the country, causing instability and allowing other more invasive forms of imperialism, 
such as becoming a protectorate (that is within a country’s sphere of influence) or occupation 
(becoming a directly ruled colony). Seven of the 15 states which were subject to British extraterritoriality 
(all of which were part of the Ottoman Empire to varying degrees) preceded extraterritoriality being 
applied in China, which itself preceded similar treaties in Japan, Thailand and Korea. The process of 
how these treaties were agreed in China and Japan and the effect that these had is explored in the 
remainder of this section. 
 
Country Establishment Abolition Method of Abolition 
Algeria 1825 1830 Occupation (France) 
Tunisia 1825 1881 Occupation (France) 
Tripoli 1825 1912 Protectorate(Italy) 
Egypt 1825 1914 Protectorate (Britain) 
Turkey 1825 1923 Negotiations 
Iran 1825 1928 Negotiations 
Morocco 1825 1912 Protectorate (France) 
China 1833 1943 Negotiations 
Thailand 1855 1937 Negotiations 
Japan 1856 1899 Negotiations 
Madagascar 1865 1896 Occupation (France) 
Samoa 1879 1899 Occupation (Germany/United States) 
Tonga 1879 1890 Protectorate (Britain) 
Korea 1883 1910 Occupation (Japan) 
Congo 1884 1908 Occupation (Belgium) 
 
2.2. East Asian section of ‘Chart Of the 
Inhabited World; Exhibiting The 
Prevailing Religion, Form Of 
Government, Degree Of Civilization & 
Population Of Each Country’. Adapted 
from Woodbridge, 1837. 
 
 
Table 2.1. History of British Extraterritoriality. Adapted from Kayaoglu, 2010. 
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Seiyō imperialism in China 
The story of the relationship between China and Seiyō is important to understand the Japanese 
trajectory following the initial incursions by America in 1853. This is first because the opinions formed 
by Europeans and Americans, and the strategies that followed, had a huge influence on how Japan 
was treated by Seiyō. Secondly, China was seen as respected, civilised and impregnable by 
contemporaneous Japanese (in spite of their Manchu rulers), and the knowledge that Seiyō had 
defeated China was hugely important in how Japan dealt with the Europeans and Americans; they had 
already been mentally softened by the harsh actions of Europeans in China. This Japanese trepidation 
led to a trend towards accommodation and adaptation of Seiyō ways in Japan. Finally, the actions of 
Seiyō, particularly Britain and France, provided a template for how Japanese diplomats and politicians 
would later treat their neighbours and, eventually, the Great Powers: expansion through creating 
spheres of influence and legal imperialism, and then through formal colonisation. Architecturally too, 
the examples of Seiyō buildings in their colonies would provide templates to work with and against in 
their colonisation of Taiwan.  
 
The first significant economic contact between China and Europe was the tea trade, established by the 
Dutch in the seventeenth century. The Dutch, however, bought the product from Asian traders through 
their base in Batavia rather than dealing with the Chinese directly. Direct tea trade by European agents 
only began in 1689 chiefly in the ports of Amoy (today known as Xiamen, Chi. 廈門, in Fujian province) 
and Canton (today known as Guangzhou, Chi. 廣州, in Guangdong province) where British, French, 
Belgian and Dutch merchants vied for Chinese goods, especially tea and silk, in exchange for 
European goods and silver from the Americas. The Dutch then sold much of their Chinese goods to 
Japan, as shown above. The development of this trade was almost accidental: “Bassett argues that the 
British East India Company originally was interested only in the Japanese trade, and it was only after a 
series of rebuffs, as well as the military successes of the Qing on the Chinese mainland, that the 
Company’s directors began “toying with the possibility of opening trade with China proper” in the early 
1680s.” (Blanken, 2012: 90) 
 
The European traders were relegated to these two ports in order to prevent missionaries penetrating 
China and, “after the British trader James Flint defied Chinese law by penetrating to Tianjin in 1759, 
were consigned to the single port at Canton.” (Blanken, 2012: 93) Canton was eighty miles from the 
sea at the mouth of the Pearl River where foreigners were allowed to reside and trade, and then only 
during the October to January trading season, under the close supervision of the local authorities. A 
complex system of intermediaries was created headed by the Canton Governor, and the Chinese 
Customs superintendent, known to the Europeans as the ‘Hoppo’. (Bickers, 2011: 18-19) In spite of 
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these restrictions tea had become a massively successful import, particularly in the British Isles: “By 
1810, Britain was importing 25 million pounds of tea and duties on import constituted 6-7% of the British 
government’s total revenue. (Blanken, 2012: 90)  
 
The trade restrictions allowed for a functioning trade system in the control of China, but the burgeoning 
international self-confidence of the Europeans, as well as the vast trade networks created after the 
Congress of Vienna, meant that this situation was increasingly at odds with the European sense of 
decorum and superior status. The model of relation being forced on the European traders was a 
vassal-tribute relationship, a valid model for formal Chinese relations with foreign states. (Blanken, 
2012: 90) Bickers states that “British and Chinese, Britain and the Great Qing Empire, were not equals 
in Chinese eyes, and all relations and interactions between them needed to demonstrate this fact 
clearly.” (Bickers, 2011: 21) This interaction might have been more bearable for the Europeans except 
for “the failure of European goods in Chinese markets” which led to China developing a gross balance 
of payments surplus, while Britain, France and others were forced into trading silver reserves for tea 
and silk. (Blanken, 2012: 90) The system was therefore tolerated by China because it seemed 
harmless and supplied the Chinese with an infusion of silver bullion. (Blanken, 2012: 90-91) 
 
During the period of 1757 to 1839, foreign traders in China were quarantined to a narrow strip of 
factories along the Canton waterfront, unable to buy land, to interact with locals, to learn Chinese, or to 
sell to anyone but the cohong (state-monopoly merchants) under the jurisdiction of the hoppo. If 
disagreements broke out within these trading arrangements, these European traders, deemed 
barbarians in Chinese cosmology, had no political rights and no avenues of remedy. (Blanken, 2012: 90) 
For example, a Chinese mob burned down the foreign trading factories on May 12, 1831, and the 
hoppo refused to redress the losses of the European merchants: “The foreign factories, it was pointed 
out, rested on Chinese soil…. The regulations for the conduct of the inhabitants of such factories were 
rightly the product of Chinese authority.” (Blanken, 2012: 90-91) 
 
By the 1830s, European traders wished to increase their economic access to China and to substitute 
their payment in silver by trade in opium,53 particularly after the East India Company’s trade monopoly 
was ended in 1834. After this, aggressive commercial activity by myriad private opium traders provoked 
the Chinese state to protestation. (Blanken, 2012: 95) Trade itself was changing following the Industrial 
Revolution, with factories in England needing markets abroad. Whilst the Qing rulers were rich and had 
a complex and advanced culture, “they had little interest in European trade and diplomacy, which in 
British circles were synonyms for progress and enlightenment. Confucian administrators regarded 
                                                   
53
 Opium was “first transported from Bengal to China by the East India Company in 1729, opium increased in usage among Chinese and 
created a burgeoning market by the early part of the nineteenth century; it remained the single largest British import until 1890.” (Blanken, 
2012: 95) 
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commerce as demeaning, and diplomacy as unnecessary, while Europeans believed China’s laws, 
transport, and hygiene to be archaic and primitive. By the common tests of religion and material 
progress China appeared pagan and uncivilized.” (Daniels, 1996: 2) Further, British government 
officials “wanted direct access to the Qing emperor and his government, preferably through the 
establishment of a legation in Beijing. Commercial agents wanted an end to the 
government-sanctioned monopoly guild of Chinese traders, the Co-Hong, which Qing emperors had 
created for managing all European trade”. (Hevia, 2003: 4-5) 
 
Beyond the desire for trade and access to markets, there was a new, and arguably historically unique, 
power asymmetry between Seiyō and China, embodied in the combat and logistical capabilities of 
Europeans. (Blanken, 2012: 94) Blanken puts this Euro-American military superiority down to three 
interconnected reasons: China’s lack of competition with rivals (both in East Asia and with European 
Powers), the lack of naval capability throughout the Qing period, and a focus on internal control. 
(Blanken, 2012: 84) All three of these reasons also applied to Japan in varying degrees: the region had 
become closed to visitors since the early Qing period, with Japan’s Sakoku policy and Korea being 
known as the hermit kingdom, in addition to China’s own relative isolation. This era of isolation and 
peace meant that investment in trade and naval power was consequently low, and that internal control 
became the natural direction for the armed forces to turn to. China’s flat bottomed ships were 
qualitatively outclassed by the deep-hulled European ships with modern artillery and excellent gunnery 
skills. This naval superiority was proven during the First Opium War: in one 1839 engagement two 
frigates decisively defeated twenty-nine war-junks. (Blanken, 2012: 85-86) The focus on internal control 
meant that the armed forces were set up to deal quickly with regional conflagrations and were left 
uncoordinated to prevent potential coups: from the Sung dynasty onwards, individual military units were 
intentionally kept separate from one another. This was a theme which continued throughout the Qing 
dynasty: “This repetition of internal threats, coupled with isolation from competition with the leading 
military innovators (namely Europeans) of the 15th-18th centuries, led to a force structure that was 
thoroughly non-competitive by the mid-nineteenth century.” (Blanken, 2012: 86-87) 
 
These three reasons meant that it was in Britain’s interest to pursue war and to alter the terms of the 
relationship between Britain and China: war meant that economic concessions could be granted, trade 
could be expanded, and military losses would likely be small. Given these factors, Britain only required 
a minor pretext to become belligerent and found one in 1837 when Qing government officials seized 
and destroyed Indian opium belonging to English merchants who intended, in defiance of Qing law, to 
sell it in China.54 (Hevia, 2003: 4) However, this offense against private property and “free trade” was 
                                                   
54
 For a full account of the war itself see Peter Ward Fay, 1997, The Opium War, 1840-1842: Barbarians in the Celestial Empire in the Early 
Part of the Nineteenth Century and the Way by Which They Forced the Gates Ajar (North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press).  
 89 
only the most recent cause of friction between the British and Qing Empires: ultimately the free trade 
convictions of British diplomats and merchants, backed by military supremacy “served to justify the use 
of force against the Qing and resulted in a whole new order of “foreign relations” between China and 
other powers, which quickly came to include France, the United States, Russia, Germany, and 
eventually Japan. (Hevia, 2003: 5) 
 
The Opium War between Britain and China lasted from 1839 to 1842, and was mostly fought in the 
Pearl River delta and the Yangtze River, suiting Britain’s strengths in naval warfare. The Treaty of 
Nanjing ended the war in August 1842. This was the first of several treaties later named the ‘unequal 
treaties’, unfair because Britain and the succession of Seiyō countries who China had signed these with 
had no substantial obligations under the treaties while they made numerous substantial demands. 
These treaties were the “principal instruments for creating the new order… usually couched in terms of 
promoting “peace, friendship, and commerce.” Through these legal documents, the Qing government 
was forced to grant Westerners the host of rights they desired in China.” (Hevia, 2003: 5) The Treaty of 
Nanjing abolished the Co-Hong, ceded the island of Hong Kong to Great Britain in perpetuity, opened 
the ports of Guangzhou, Amoy, Fuzhou, Ningbo, and Shanghai to Seiyō trade, and approved the 
permanent residence of foreign consuls and their families in these treaty ports. This treaty was signed 
hurriedly, according to the British, and in the supplemental Treaty of the Bogue in 1843, Qing 
sovereignty was limited in these newly opened ports through three additional provisions: “The first 
stipulated that British consuls could try their own subjects for crimes committed in China; that is, 
Euro-Americans in China enjoyed “extraterritorial” legal rights. Second, the British were given the right 
to fix customs duties on their imports into China; they were set artificially low in the treaty itself. Third, 
Britain received most-favoured-nation status, which meant that any privileges given to other powers 
would automatically go to the British without negotiation.” (Hevia, 2003: 5) This extraterritoriality was 
gradually granted to all the major Western and Northern European nations as well as to the United 
States and Japan (see table 2.2).  
 
Home state Start of 
Extraterritoriality 
Number of Consular 
Courts in 1926 
Dates of the Abolition of 
Extraterritoriality 
Japan 1871 35 1/9/1943 
Britain 1843 26 1/11/1943 
France 1844 18 2/28/1946 
United States 1844 18 1/11/1943 
Portugal 1866 7 4/1/1947 
Italy 1863 5 2/10/1947 
Netherlands 1863 4 5/29/1945 
Belgium 1865 4 11/20/1943 
Denmark 1863 1 5/20/1946 
Sweden 1847 1 4/5/1945 





 Table 2.2. Rise and decline of Extraterritoriality in China. Adapted from Kayaoglu, 2010. 
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In addition to all the stipulations of the British treaties, further substantial concessions were made by 
France in the Treaty of Whampoa of 1844 (which included the right to propagate Catholicism in China) 
and by the United States in the Treaty of Wanghsia of 1844 (which called for revision of the treaty terms 
in twelve years’ time). (Hevia, 2003: 5) Given Britain’s “most favoured nation” clause, these provisions 
were added to the Treaty of Nanjing. It was China not honouring the renegotiation clause which directly 
led to the Second Opium War (Chi. 第二次鴉片戰爭, 1856-1860). When the time for revision of terms 
arrived, Britain demanded the opening all of China to British merchants, legalising of the opium trade, 
exempting of foreign imports from internal duties, suppression of piracy, regulation of the coolie trade, 
permission for a British ambassador to reside in Beijing, and for the English-language version of all 
treaties to take precedence over the Chinese: demands which were rejected by the Chinese. As a sign 
of the courteous imperialism of the time, France and Britain acted together to defeat China once again. 
During this war, the Europeans acted in a yet harsher manner than in the First Opium War, with the 
temporary colonisation of Guangzhou (Canton), headed by Sir Harry Parkes, and the destruction and 
looting of the Summer Palace being most prominent. The result of this war was the gain of still greater 
concessions from China: “The treaty concluding the Second Opium War in 1860 granted ten additional 
treaty ports, freedom of movement for Christian missionaries throughout China, and the right of the 
treaty powers to establish embassies in Beijing. China was required to pay indemnities to cover the 
cost of both wars.” (Hevia, 2003: 5-6) This served to bankrupt the Qing authorities who were mid-way 
through a civil war (the Taiping Rebellion, 1850-1864). 
 
This pervasive power politicking by Britain and France served to make “a wild frontier zone of East 
Asia.” (Bickers and Henriot, 2000: 1) At the root of this picture, more than any other policy concession 
were policies that elevated Seiyō sovereignty above Chinese on Chinese soil, such as extraterritoriality, 
caused a constant strain on the relationship between European states and China. In spite of this clear 
example of imperialistic behavior, it is also clear that “far from the simple dichotomy of imperial 
states/subjects and colonised states/subjects we must re-envisage the East Asian experience for what 
it was: a network of multiple overlapping imperialisms, in the interstices of which opportunistic groups 
carved out new livelihoods and new roles.” (Bickers and Henriot, 2000: 2)  
 
Whilst these activities by Britain and France were calculated, scholars of the era understand that 
imperialism in China was opportunistic, not planned. This is not to say that no planning was involved, 
but action was taken in relation to how the other acted (for instance if China had been sufficiently 
effacing and had accepted the demands for a revision of the Treaty of Nanjing, it is unlikely that the 
Second Opium War would have occurred when it did). These treaties were not a part of a grand plan or 
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project, but were adapted reactions to perceived weaknesses, exploited for maximum economic and 
political benefit. Bickers states that: 
 
“This was a connected world, and the continuities are important, but there was no grand 
scheme, design or plot. There was no imperial ‘project’ at the heart of this story, unless 
European and American history in the nineteenth century can itself be accounted a project. 
There were certainly some consistent inclinations and responses amongst the actors in 
this story, and sufficient repetition in their actions and statements to demand notice, but 
contingent event, opportunity, and even defeat, gave equally as much shape to the world 
that developed.” (Bickers, 2011: 11)  
 
The policies of Britain, France and other imperial powers in China were initially designed for extracting 
maximum value from commercial dealings: China offered the prospect of exports to Europe (silk, 
porcelain, cabinets and mostly tea) and a potential import market. (Blanken, 2012: 89) This motivation 
lent itself to adaptation and maneuvering as market forces changed and the potential for new markets 
emerged to be exploited through political means (such as abolishing the Co-Hong and opening an ever 
increasing number of treaty ports).  
 
However, as the additional, calculated move to insert a concession for extraterritoriality by the British 
treaty makers at Nanjing in 1843 suggests, the Opium wars were also about status: reversing the 
prevalent Chinese chauvinism regarding Europeans and North Americans as barbarians, so that the 
Euro-American perception of themselves as enlightened people in a half-civilised land could be 
maintained. This had not been possible when European and American traders were forced to trade in 
one city for only a few months a year, without recourse to their own legal systems. As the European 
worldview of ‘Western civilisation’ became reified following the Second Opium War, the differences 
between China and the emissaries of Seiyō became essentialised over time, a dynamic of opposition 
between two sets of opposites. It is worth noting that this group identification as ‘Europeans’ would 
have been unlikely prior to the establishment of peace following the Napoleonic War, but allowed the 
beginnings of a collective European identity, politically as well as culturally (one which American traders 
were able to skillfully avoid by not trading in opium and emphasising their difference from Europe).  
 
Key figures in China, such as the British diplomat Sir Harry Parkes, reflected these new East/West 
divisions: on the eve of the Second Opium War (1856), Parkes wrote “It is the cause of the West 
against the East, of Paganism against Christendom”. (Daniels, 1996: 7) Parkes was a somewhat 
typical example of a Briton in nineteenth century China, willfully lacking appreciation for the cultural 
achievements of China and viewing China through the prism of British technical superiority: 
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“Parkes had never completed his formal education and lacked intellectual sophistication. 
Not surprisingly, the achievements of China’s civilization rarely moved him, for they were 
too subtle for his practical and impatient nature. He preferred the steamship to Confucius 
and judged China by her politicians and poverty, not by her arts and cultural splendour. In 
China Parkes’ objective had been the advancement of trade and diplomacy. Wars had 
been fought to open ports and to establish a Legation in Beijing. However, the 
implementation of treaties which confirmed these changes was always tortuous. Chinese 
officials often accepted treaties unwillingly, in moments of defeat, and afterwards 
attempted to obstruct their working.” (Daniels, 1996: 14) 
 
The treaties, presided over by envoys such as Parkes, never had the feeling of a partnership for two 
reasons: first, Seiyō diplomats did not view the Chinese as equals; they had little respect for these 
Pagan ‘Orientals’ who did not cooperate, and attempted to ignore treaty stipulations where possible. 
Second, the Chinese did not view the Europeans and Americans as equals; the Chinese cosmology 
showed these people from the West to be barbarians. Civilisation had always been determined in 
Chinese terms, in much the same way that groups of Europeans had seen themselves as the source 
for judging what was civilised since the time of the Ancient Greeks. Foreign relations were historically 
only conducted on a tributary basis in China and, as the idea of ‘civilization’ had not changed following 
Seiyō contact in the 1600s, this Sino-centric idea was still largely extant up to the fall of the Qing 
dynasty.  
 
In addition Euro-Americans did not feel equal as, practically speaking; China could not have withstood 
Seiyō if they had used their full force against them. This was acknowledged by Chinese elites, 
especially following the Second Opium War: a memorandum written by a Chinese prince stated “Before 
the defeat at [the Battle of Taku Forts, 1860], we had the choice of either fighting against the foreigners 
or making peace with them. After it, we can only appease them…. We certainly cannot fight, not even to 
defend ourselves.” (Blanken, 2012: 88) This point seemed objectively true: “The combat casualty 
exchange ratios experienced between European and Chinese forces during the period dispel any 
notion that the Europeans could not have handily defeated the Qing Dynasty had it chosen to do so.” 
(Blanken, 2012: 88) The Europeans and Americans were in possession of the mechanisms for control 
of China, and used both soft and hard powers to affect the workings of Chinese policy in so far as they 
could.  
 
There are contrasting views about what the Seiyō powers wished to achieve in China following the First 
Opium War. Blacken’s (2012) institutional theory of imperialism states that the more democratic powers 
in China such as Britain, France and the United States “wanted to bolster local institutions capable of 
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maintaining the bargains which had been struck, but also sought to leverage bargains in their interest, 
using their military power to do so. In short, they sought to coerce China without collapsing the Qing or 
impairing its ability to quell internal unrest.” (Blanken, 2012: 101) English diplomats, “far from 
attempting to occupy or plunder China, [were] instead striving to maintain a careful balance and thereby 
gain access to the country within the refraining equilibrium.” (Blanken, 2012: 98) This was a purely 
rational calculation for these democratic countries according to Blanken, who believes that the 
Europeans feared crushing the Qing outright and being drawn onto the Chinese interior should the 
Qing dynasty collapse. (Blanken, 2012: 98) This policy was even in place to a large extent by the 
beginning of the twentieth century: in the wake of the Boxer suppression, when the government was 
split, anti-Seiyō feeling was at its height and the European powers were in control of Beijing, Great 
Britain and Germany issued a joint agreement that stated they “would not… make use of the present 
complication to obtain… any territorial advantages in Chinese dominions, and will direct their policy 
toward maintaining undiminished the territorial conditions of the Chinese empire” (Quoted in Blanken, 
2012: 99) All of this is evidence of efforts among the more democratic states to maintain the refraining 
equilibrium through diplomacy as well as through military activity. 
 
James L. Hevia (2004) by contrast sees the imperial mission as having a pedagogical function. The two 
sides of imperial pedagogy were the violence of arms and the violence of language: “Guns not only 
force compliance, they also persuade. Words and images do not simply persuade, they also coerce.” 
(Hevia, 2003: 4) The diplomatic and military agents of Great Britain in particular “often thought of 
imperialism and colonialism as pedagogical processes, ones made up of teaching and learning by 
means of gun and pen. This was especially the case in China, where warfare and treaty making 
marked critical moments of British imperial pedagogy.” (Hevia, 2003: 4) The self-identity of these 
teachers, and what they attempting to persuade the Chinese of through the multiple zones of contact, 
was that of a benevolent, if strict teacher, who had accomplished much and provided an example of 
how modern civilised nations should act. Bickers (2011) supports the notion of Seiyō pedagogy, stating 
that Europeans and Americans were proud of their achievements in China where they had: 
 
“constructed roads, drains and jetties, smart banks, busy business ‘hongs’ (offices) and 
‘godowns’ (warehouses), churches, schools and clubs…. They made, they like to recall, 
excellent harbours, ‘bunding’ the water fronts, dredging the silt, constructing lighting 
systems, and devising rational procedures for the arrival and dispatch of goods and people. 
They built railways, made maps and charts, and ordered all that they saw. They brought 
regularity and rationality, sanitation and salvation, science, revelation, and culture. They 
found, they said, a once fine civilization in decline, the ‘sick man of Asia’, and they raised 
him up… They did not want to fight, recalled the foreigners, but by jingo when they had to 
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they fought firmly and fairly…. They knew and spoke for China, they said, and they knew 
the Chinese, knew the Chinese better even than they really knew themselves…. They 
were proud of what they had done. They made Shanghai, they claimed: they built up great 
cities from those stinking mudflats, constructed hospitals and universities, brought 
employment, and aided what they saw as the reform and modernization of China’s 
government, society and culture.” (Bickers, 2011: 6-7) 
 
Yet the initial opportunism of Britain of the 1830s had continued as the modus operandi for policy in 
China: whilst this had provided a degree of relative stability when the Chinese elites were largely cowed 
following the Second Opium War, the increasing competition between Great Powers meant that 
Blanken’s theory of democratic imperial Powers ensuring minimal stability did not hold in the final years 
of the Qing dynasty when nations such as Germany, as much as Russia, were displaying increasingly 
competitive behaviour, carving out ever large spheres of influence in China. This aggressive trend, 
already seen in Africa and South-Asia over the previous 30 years was confirmed  
 
“in November 1897, when German troops were landed at Kiaochow in China’s Shantung 
province. William II was one of the first political leaders to be profoundly affected by social 
Darwinist ideas in his formulation of policy. By 1894-5 he had been convinced by current 
arguments that the British, American and Russian empires would soon come to dominate 
the world’s markets and resources, and that the Germans would have considerably to 
extend their exercise of power in the world if they were not to be squeezed out.” (Gillard, 
1977: 162)  
 
The sense that the European powers were no longer attempting to balance stabilisation with 
exploitation in China is echoed by Hevia: “By the end of the nineteenth century… some observers could 
seriously discuss the possibility that China would soon be carved up into separate European colonies. 
This scenario seemed so likely, in fact, that the U.S. government, which in the past was quick to take 
advantage of European military successes against the Qing, now called for an “Open Door” in China so 
that all of the powers would have an equal opportunity to exploit the China market.” (Hevia, 2003: 6)  
 
 
The effects of imperialism in China 
Seiyō activity in Qing China became increasingly pugnacious following the Second Opium War as more 
concessions were extracted and vulnerabilities were found/created and exploited, so that by the end of 
the nineteenth century Qing sovereignty was in effect fatally wounded. From 1839 to 1912 and beyond, 
whilst falling short of formal colonialism, the imperialistic actions of Seiyō had a huge impact on 
 95 
Chinese togetherness and prosperity. During the Second Opium War, “China was a deeply divided 
nation…. As a result, British forces could hire porters and guides with little difficulty.” (Daniels, 1996: 10) 
In the first 198 years of the Qing Dynasty before the First Opium War (1644-1842) there had been four 
major rebellions, roughly one every fifty years. From 1842 until 1912 when the Qing Dynasty was 
overthrown there were six major rebellions or one every 12 years.55 British diplomats, at least, did not 
see themselves as contributing to the strife but saw themselves as the only potential saviours of China. 
During the Taiping Rebellion, Parkes wrote in 1861 to his wife: “We have seen… misery… rife in this 
poor country owing to the weakness… of the government which in the first place gave rise to the 
rebellion and now cannot be put down.” The only hope for rejuvenation seemed to lie in a “warm stream 
of commerce” which would benefit Britain and China alike.” (Daniels, 1996: 11) Opening trade did 
appear to have some financial benefit to China from this perspective: Seiyō powers set up an 
International Maritime Customs Office and ran this for the Qing dynasty, collecting tariffs. By 1885 this 
contributed 14.5 million taels, 20 percent of the total income of China. (Blanken, 2012: 100) 
 
Yet whilst this finance may have helped keep the Qing government afloat, the fundamental attitude of 
Seiyō (and the consequences which followed this attitude) had been the key ingredient in destabilising 
the Chinese state. Previously during the Jin, Yuan, and Qing dynasties when the new rulers of China 
had been foreign, the invaders had recognised the cultural sophistication of the Chinese and the 
usefulness of adopting the culture of China in order to rule. External threats had never before come 
from invaders who had believed whole-heartedly that China was only semi-civilised and that the Middle 
Kingdom needed to be taught civilised behavior. None of these formal conquests by foreigners such as 
the Manchus had “changed the face of Chinese political economy as much as the informal imperialism 
perpetrated by European powers in the second half of the nineteenth century. This is ironic because the 
European states never replaced the imperial leadership – preferring instead to change Manchu policy 
through negotiations, threats, and restrained applications of force”. (Blanken, 2012: 91) With only 
minimal territory changing hands, by 1898 the Qing had still “lost provinces and ports, armies and fleets, 
riches, an emperor and a future.” (Bickers, 2011: 324) 
 
For China, today, the period from the First Opium War to the overthrow of the Qing is still sore, seen as 
a period of humiliation, indeed, a historically unparalleled humiliation due to the high-handed approach 
of Seiyō: 
 
“The catalogue of conflict is crowded: the Anglo-Chinese Opium wars (1839-42, 1857-60), 
the Sino-French (1884-5) and Sino-Japanese wars (1894-5); the Boxer uprising and war 
                                                   
55
 These figures differ however: according to Blanken (2012) there were four internal rebellions between 1644 and 1839, and four internal 
rebellions between 1839 and 1912. The scale and length of these later rebellions was far greater. 
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(1900-1901), when troops from eight foreign states invaded northern China; the 
subsequent Russian occupation of Manchuria and the bloody Allied ‘punishment’ 
expeditions. And then, above all, there was the Japanese invasion of the northeast from 
1931, and of China more widely from 1937…. People suffered, and culture suffered. 
Priceless treasure and relics were looted or destroyed; libraries were burned. The glorious 
Summer Palace of the ruling Manchus was vindictively and systematically destroyed in 
1860, to ‘punish’ the defeated court. Caravans of plunder made their way to the coast and 
then to Europe and America. The absolute centre of power and authority, the imperial 
palace in Peking, was seized and occupied in 1900. Foreign soldiers marched in victory 
through the gate, their officers snapped themselves posing on thrones…. At the turn of the 
twentieth century many feared the extinction of the Chinese state, and feared that China, 
like an Asian Poland, would cease to exist as European predators and Japan carved away 
slices of the ‘Chinese melon’.” (Bickers, 2011: 5-6) 
 
The Chinese elites were unable to accurately diagnose their issues and find acceptable solutions to 
their flaws, compounding this sense of being assaulted on all sides: “The Chinese recognized this 
weakness; the scholar-official Feng Kuei-fen lamented: “The largest country on the globe is… 
controlled by small barbarians…. Why are they small yet strong? Why are we large and yet weak?... 
[The answers are] solid ships and effective guns”.” (Blanken, 2012: 102) This answer was limited in 
scope and understanding, not acknowledging that the Europeans had qualitatively changed. With only 
this technical understanding of China’s deficiencies, Chinese scholars could not begin to address the 
rationality that was required to develop these ships and guns and the underlying cultural norms which 
underlay European ‘reason’. Rather than the guns themselves “it was the overall doctrine, training, 
command, and control of the British (and later other European powers) – combined with superior 
firepower and mobility – that allowed for the European mastery of Chinese forces on the battlefield”. 
(Blanken, 2012: 87)  
 
On the other hand, this technological perspective for modernisation meant that China managed to 
preserve its style of governance. It had been the certainty and conviction of Confucianism and the 
rigidity of Confucius’s principles of propriety and respect of elders which had allowed China to flourish 
for so long, and meant that Chinese self-strengthening failed, at least in absolute terms: “the Confucian 
scholar-official system could not execute the modernization policies it desired without undermining the 
cultural rigidity that ensured its own dominance and threatened the very fabric of their society.” 
(Blanken, 2012: 102) The failure to modernise the military technology of China in the nineteenth 
century was a spur for the weakened Chinese state to attempt deeper changes in their socio-political 
system: “these efforts proved, however, to be too little and too late. In 1911 the Qing emperor and his 
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imperial government, the primary objects of British pedagogy, ceased to exist as functioning political 
entities. They were replaced by the Republic of China, a nation-state modeled after those to be found in 
the West and Japan.” (Hevia, 2003: 6) 
 
As was stated in the Introduction, when Japan was beset by a similar threat, they undertook three main 
transformations: the use of new concepts and terminology to reflect Seiyō discourse, a renewed 
centralisation of authority to create a Japanese ‘nation’, and the instigation of new binary boundaries 
(for example between the old and the new, Seiyō and Tōyō, architect and carpenter). During the 
Self-Strengthening Movement in China, none of these three trends took place to a great extent: the 
Enlightenment-developed notions of reason and science (and their corollaries ignorance and 
superstition) and centralised planning meant that the self-strengthening efforts in China fell short of 
producing a recognisable version of ‘modernity’.  
 
This was not due to incapacity to imitate European and American methods; China was a literate society 
of great sophistication with a past which was able to reconcile foreign elements into its cultural identity, 
yet in this period there was little willingness to be found to compromise. Japan by contrast “was more 
willing to imitate the west than many other non-European countries and more capable of doing so.” 
(Hobsbawm, 1975: 148) The reasons why China was unwilling to imitate Europe and America have 
been explored to a wide extent in other works: the remainder of this thesis explores how and why 
Japan was more prepared to change, why they took this deeper approach to modernisation, the limits 
to these changes, and what impact that it had on the cultural identity and architecture of Japan. 
 
 
Knowledge in Japan of Western imperialism before 1853 
For Japan, prior to 1853, under the Sakoka policy regarding the Seiyō powers, only the Dutch were 
allowed direct contact and trade with Japan, and like China they were limited to one port only. This 
remained the only point of sustained contact with Seiyō until 1853. Through this contact, the Dutch had 
provided information on European science and medicine, spawning a new discipline Rangaku (Jap. 蘭
学, lit. Dutch Learning) in Japan. The relative power of the Dutch in Europe had waned significantly in 
the 18th century, and so they provided little information to raise Japan’s awareness of the state of affairs 
between European powers. This lack of knowledge of Europe was unsurprising given how Seiyō 
(besides Holland) viewed Japan in the early 19th century: “Until 1800, foreign powers all but ignored 
Japan. The most aggressive and powerful, Great Britain, disdained the tea and silk trade conducted by 
the Dutch, a trade paltry compared with the British profits from India, the Americas, and parts of 
Southeast Asia. In 1814, one British official examined the record and flatly declared ‘that the Trade with 
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Japan can never become an object of attention for the Manufactures and produce of Great Britain.’” 
(LaFeber: 1997: 9) This perceived lack of profit meant that given the closed country system and the 
distances involved, European states were largely uninterested in trade with Japan so the Dutch 
remained the only direct source of Japanese knowledge of Seiyō. 
 
Russia and the United States of America had new frontiers opening which bordered Japan in the first 
the half of the 19th century, which gave them a larger incentive and interest in trading with Japan. The 
reasons for interest in Japan were various, but “there had been popular legends about the fabled 
wealth of Japan since the days of Marco Polo, and in some quarters it was believed that enormous 
fortunes could be made if Japan was opened.” (Hoare, 1994: 2) Yet, although this myth was later 
proven untrue, strong “strategic, commercial and humanitarian reasons all prompted Western interest 
in Japan.” (Hoare, 1994: 2) First, for the Russians, as they “moved across Siberia into the Amur River 
region and over to Alaska during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, they clashed with 
fishermen from Japan’s northern islands. Both the Kurile Islands and Sakhalin were soon contested by 
the Russians and Japanese.” (LaFeber: 1997: 9) Further to this non-official contact, in 1804 the 
Russian-American Company visited Nagasaki to request trade relations in order to supply the Russian 
settlements north of Japan, which the Japanese flatly rejected. The Russians sought retribution by 
“raiding villages in the northern islands. The Japanese did not back down. Instead, they captured a 
Russian official in 1811 and held him for two years until the tsar’s officials finally apologised for the 
raids.” (LaFeber: 1997: 9) As a result of this opening aggression by a previously unknown foreign 
nation, Japanese writers began to warn that Russia posed the major threat to their country’s security. 
 
The relationship between the USA and Japan was more cordial though similarly persistent: between 
1790 and 1853 at least twenty-seven U.S. ships (including three warships) visited Japan, all of which 
were turned away. (LaFeber: 1997: 10) The concessions wrung out of China at the end of the First 
Opium War had a direct impact on Japan after 1840 when Shanghai was opened to trade. This led U.S. 
ship captains to follow the shorter way from newly settled California to Shanghai via the north circle 
route that brought them close to Japan. This route became ever more used following the 1846-48 
conquests of the California ports from the Spanish, along with an accelerated industrial and agricultural 
revolution in that state. According to LaFeber, this west coast pacification by the USA “opened a historic 
opportunity – but also a potential trap. The opportunity was noted by Secretary of the Treasury Robert 
Walker in 1848: “By our recent acquisitions in the Pacific, Asia has suddenly become our neighbour, 
with a placid intervening ocean inviting our steamships upon the track of a commerce greater than that 
of all Europe combined.” (LaFeber: 1997: 10-11) This Pacific opening was used by American politicians 
to galvanise the minds of Americans away from the pro-slave South and anti-slave North divide by 
distracting the populace with foreign problems. (LaFeber: 1997: 11) 
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Japan had been aware of this increasing interest from Russia and America for some time and had 
worried for several decades about how to confront it. Although Euro-American ships had begun to enter 
Japanese waters since 1790 “a series of edicts forbade Westerners to visit Japan and forbade 
Japanese from going abroad or building ships capable of making long voyages”. (Hoare, 1994: 1) The 
logic of isolationism was slowly being undermined prior to the entrance of Admiral Perry, however: even 
before this, thinkers such as the Confucian scholar AIZAWA Seishisai (Jap. 会沢正志斎, 1781–1863) 
had gained limited though substantial knowledge of Seiyō and the dangers of this new period of 
imperialism. Aizawa’s fundamental messages in his New Theses (1825) were that: first, the world 
situation facing Japan was dissimilar in crucial ways to anything in her history. Second, the “Western 
barbarians” had changed sufficiently that they were unlike those dealt with up to now. Third, the 
Shogunate was recommended to devise new policies to overcome the unprecedented danger it faced. 
(Wakabayashi, 1986: 108) According to Tadashi Wakabayashi, “It was these fundamental messages, 
not Aizawa’s misinformation that late Tokugawa leaders and shishi took to heart.” (Wakabayashi, 1986: 
108) Seishisai’s work bolstered the policy of the Shogunate of 1825 which called for expelling all 
foreign ships off the shores of Japan, following Russian aggression, whether or not they flew the Dutch 
flag. This underlay a semantic shift: up until this point, Japanese scholars had called for eradicating 
“what is barbarian” from Japan, after this point they called for eradicating “the barbarian”. 
(Wakabayashi, 1986: 9) Barbarism became located in a people rather than within an abstract concept. 
 
The perceived threat was interpreted by Seishisai as a prompt to strengthen the country. This arguably 
led to some ambiguity in achieving the aim of expelling the barbarian: ultimately, any means could be 
considered so long as the barbarians were expelled. This was necessary for two reasons: the strength 
of the new barbarians and the precarious geographical position of Japan. First, Seishisai attributed the 
“Western barbarians” with “an ability to employ the strategy used by Chao Ch’ung-kuo and Chu-Ko 
Liang. Like these legendary Chinese geniuses of military tactics, Western generals procured provisions 
in the enemy’s homeland and enlarged their own armies by first taking over small states and 
conscripting captured enemy troops.” (Wakabayashi, 1986: 109) Second, Japan’s position was 
compared to the Chou state during China’s warring states period (403-221 B.C.), “a tiny kingdom 
whose precarious existence hinged on the tolerance of other, greater powers though its cultural 
tradition was the richest and most venerable.” (Wakabayashi, 1986: 111) This new context meant that a 
more adaptable set of policies was required if the long-term aim of expelling the barbarians was to be 
achieved.  
 
Seishisai’s writings and the government reaction to them underlies the point that confronting the West 
was not an enormous surprise to Japan: they had been tackling this issue for around 30 years. 
 100 
(Hobsbawm, 1975: 149) However their concern was heightened after the British victory over China in 
the First Opium War (1839-42) which demonstrated to Japan the achievements and possibilities of the 
ways of Seiyō. It made Japanese question themselves: “If China itself could not resist them, were they 
not bound to prevail everywhere?” (Hobsbawm, 1975: 149) The threat of Russia in particular appeared 
to be acute by the 1840s and 1850s. The scrambling for concessions by Seiyō following the Opium war 
was concurrent with the Russians dispatching Rear Admiral Evfimii Putiatin to Japan in 1842-43 to 
open trade, “but Japanese resistance and the trade’s skimpy rewards led Putiatin to put his 
considerable talents to work elsewhere.” (LaFeber: 1997: 9) In 1842, the Japanese again repulsed 
American ships off their coast, and in 1849 James Glynn had begun negotiating with Japan, albeit 
without success.  
 
These events “brought home to many Japanese the danger they faced from the West”. (Hoare, 1994: 2) 
Japan noticed this danger and at the time was split on what to do to counteract it. They continued their 
policy to close the country to ‘barbarian’ intercourse which had stood since 1639. However at this time 
the Americans and Russians had not come at Japan with any real force so that, whilst Japan was 
militarily unable to compete with the military technologies of Russia and America, they were not 
immediately forced into any decision.  
 
 
Bakumatsu (the end of the Edo period) 1853-1867 
This situation changed when the Sakoka edicts were disbanded in the summer of 1853, broken by 
Commodore Perry’s arrival off the coast of the capital Edo. Perry’s Black Ships, four black steam 
frigates, arrived in Edo Bay near the Tokugawa’s capital in July 1853 with the intention of delivering a 
letter from President Millard Fillmore, itself aimed at securing friendship and trade between America 
and Japan. Upon being refused, Perry gave a letter to Japanese delegates stating that, if the Japanese 
chose to fight, the Americans would destroy them, and proceeded to shell some buildings in the harbor 
of Uraga (Jap. 浦賀) with newly developed shells which could be fired at high speed and exploded 
upon impact causing huge damage. Perry then had his request accepted, landed near the capital and 
delivered the letter to Japanese Shogunal delegates.These aggressive actions followed James Glynn’s 
recommendation to Congress that American ships should return with the threat of force to secure these 
treaties. 
 
Japan ended its isolationist foreign policy in 1853 following this direct confrontation. The time from 1853 
to 1868 under the late Tokugawa Shogunate has become known as the Bakumatsu. This was in many 
ways the key period of contact with Seiyō because first the US and then European states began to 
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span the gulf between Japan and foreign countries to make direct contact with Japan for the first time in 
several centuries. Without this contact there would have been no Seiyō criteria on the form of 
modernisation or civilisation that Japan needed to take on. As a result of this contact, “the bakufu 
rescinded its ban on the construction of oceangoing ships as early as 1853…and buried the last of the 
seclusion provisions in June 1866 with a tariff convention.” (Jansen, 1995: 172)  
 
In 1854 Perry returned with twice as many ships as the previous year and after another extended piece 
of gunboat diplomacy managed to achieve the signing of an edict allowing foreign ships to resupply off 
Japan. The Shogunate’s awareness of its relative weakness led to Japan being forced to open ports 
with the United States and to sign the ‘unequal’ Treaty of Kanagawa in 1854. After further diplomacy 
and shows of strength, between 1858 and 1869 Japan signed treaties with most European powers and 
with the United States, which provided trading facilities and the right to reside in Japan at certain ‘open 
ports or cities’ in Japan. Yokohama, Nagasaki, and Hakodate were opened to trade in 1859 and the 
principle of extraterritoriality was instituted at these locations. 
 
 
The threat from the West to Japan  
As Seishisai had noted in 1825, the ‘foreign barbarians’ had changed. Peter Duus notes that “In the 
early stages of industrialization, the possession of superior technologies, and the sense of superiority 
they conveyed to both dominator and dominated, made the encounter between the Western societies 
and the rest of the world a lopsided one.” (Duus, 1995: 6) Prior to this, Japan was a match for foreign 
powers who could only bring a small portion of their armies and navies halfway across the world: “In the 
early seventeenth century the Japanese had thrown the Spanish, the Portuguese, and even the English 
out of their country without much fear of retaliation, but Commodore Perry and his four black 
steamships posed a threat that threw the country into a panic.” (Duus, 1995: 6) However, the nature of 
this threat and how far it was perceived rather than real is a matter of debate, though strong evidence 
exists that suggests that Japanese kindai (modernity) was tied to the military by products of science 
and rationality: without these, and Perry’s demonstrations of force, it would have been unlikely that the 
Shogunate would have reacted with such panic. 
 
As with Britain and France in China, the motivations of the Americans and Russians were primarily 
trade, but tied in strongly with notions of civilisation and the inferiority of Japanese. On the first point, 
“Perry forced Japan open because Washington officials wanted it as a strategic way station to the 
potentially rich Chinese markets.” (LaFeber, 1997: Xviii) Without opening Japan, the long trip to China 
was more difficult to justify. On the second point, the level of Japanese civilisation was a point of 
contention for Americans wishing to expand their civilising mission. One American editor linked the 
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American Indians and the Japanese: “The same law of civilization that has compelled the red men… to 
retire before the superior hardihood of our pioneers will require the people of the Japanese empire to 
abandon their… cruelty.” (LaFeber, 1997: 4-5) This was also a pragmatic point since “Sailors washed 
ashore from the wrecks of ships once involved in China trade or the equally lucrative whaling business 
would be better treated than had been their unfortunate predecessors if the Japanese were taught 
civilized manners.” (LaFeber, 1997: 5) Given this, we can say that Japan had quickly become absorbed 
in the same discourses of market expansion and imperialistic pedagogy as China. 
 
This civilising mission was nuanced as the Japanese were clearly in possession of the idea that Japan 
was more civilised than Seiyō, given their terminology of using the blanket term of namban (Jap. 南蛮 
lit: southern barbarians, the same term used by the Chinese). This outlook was completely 
unacceptable to imperial Powers who were convinced of their superiority, which underpinned their 
actions in China and the treaties which were negotiated. The potential for trade with Japan along the 
same lines as the Dutch, who were happy to act as a vassal to Japan in order to remain trading, was 
therefore unacceptable to Americans, French, British and Russians, who sought either to trade with 
Japan with the superior status of Seiyō confirmed, or not to trade at all.  
 
British envoys in particular, representing the supreme naval power of the time, were particularly strict in 
their notion of the proper status and hierarchy of nations between themselves and the Japanese. This 
superior tone is demonstrated most clearly by the envoy Laurence Oliphant who, as an aide to Lord 
Elgin, was part of the 1858 mission to Japan. Oliphant called the Dutch practice of following the 
Japanese emperor’s Court etiquette “humiliating”. According to an interview between Oliphant and a 
German doctor, the Dutch ambassador would be signalled to enter the hall for an audience with the 
Shogun and “he crawled on his hands and knees to a place shown to him, between the presents 
ranged in due order on one side, and the place where the Emperor sat on the other; and there kneeling, 
he bowed his forehead quite down to the ground, and so crawled backwards, like a crab, without 
uttering a single word. So mean and short a thing is the audience we have with this mighty monarch.” 
(Oliphant, 1859: 246-247) Oliphant went as far as to say that “Assuredly, if our political agents in Japan 
inaugurate our intercourse with that court by crawling about on our hands and knees, playing the 
drunkard and singing love-songs, we shall very soon have a Japanese war on our hands.” (Oliphant, 
1859: 249) Overall, Oliphant believed that: 
 
“If we hope to conduct relations within Japan on a satisfactory footing, our true policy is to 
intimate distinctly to the Government that we intend to enforce every one of our rights to 
the uttermost letter.” (Oliphant, 1859: 246) 
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What did Oliphant mean by a satisfactory footing? I assume that it refers to the Japanese respecting 
the traders and envoys of Britain and a move away from the tributary relationship which was used for 
centuries by Japan (and for millennia by China on whom the Tokugawa modelled their neo-Confucian 
rule).  
 
However whilst this priority of appearing superior was held by the somewhat harsh and high-handed 
British diplomats based in China and Japan, in London, the foreign secretary of the time, John Russell, 
was apprehensive of anything which might lead to war with Japan. In 1863 anti-foreign forces from 
Choshu han attacked all foreign ships in the narrow Shimonoseki strait between two of the main islands 
of Japan, Honshū and Kyūshū, for a number of weeks. The British envoy to Japan, Rutherford Alcock, 
feared the rise of anti-foreign activity and felt that it would be better to withdraw from Japan rather than 
to lose status by being expelled by force. Alcock allied with America and the Dutch in retaliation to 
these attacks to defeat the forces of Choshu. For Alcock, success against Choshu was preferable to 
withdrawing from Japan or being expelled. (Daniels, 1996: 27) However, the British government did not 
see Alcock’s triumph from this viewpoint, and “Russell, the Foreign Secretary, believed that military 
measures could not be justified…. When London heard of Alcock’s plans for a bombardment he was 
recalled to explain his policy to his superiors. The British Government always intended that the 
Shimonoseki indemnity should be a lever to exact commercial concessions, for it realized that if the 
indemnity was paid in cash, trade would be taxed to raise the necessary revenue. As a result British 
merchants would suffer.” (Daniels, 1996: 28) The envoys’ intentions did not always align with those in 
government, with envoys more inclined to take actions that constantly kept their country’s position on a 
higher footing. For the British government, the overall purpose of Britain’s policies in Japan appears to 
have been to make money rather than to give the appearance of a colonial power. This trading 
motivation was even the case when force was actually applied.  
 
This discrepancy between the home governments and their representatives can be put down to the 
past experience of these representatives: some of the diplomats were taken from China and offered 
new posts in Japan. The most famous of these was the aforementioned Harry Parkes, the British 
representative in Japan from 1865 to 1883, who was centrally involved in the Second Opium War, even 
being the de facto ruler of Canton throughout 1858. A fluent Chinese speaker, Parkes was nonetheless 
a man who believed in the inherent superiority of Europe over ‘the Orient’:  
 
“On leaving China Parkes’ impressions must have been simple, if erroneous. The Orient 
was stagnant and its people often malicious. All enlightenment flowed from the West but, in 
their blindness, the ‘Orientals’ ignored it. Parkes believed that ‘Orientals’ should be taught 
by treaties and disciplined by force. So far he had only encountered Chinese negotiators 
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but there seemed no reason to think that Japanese officials would be different. Most 
reports made them appear much the same. They, too, had resisted the West and shown 
plentiful evidence of barbaric ways. In his new post Sir Harry would employ familiar tactics 
for these had already brought him success, fame and royal approval.” (Daniels, 1996: 15) 
  
Given this, there was continuity in approach from the British envoys in China to Japan. There are 
several examples which strengthen the view that Parkes functioned as a continuation of the belligerent 
and hard approach used by British representatives in Japan in the Victorian era, out of touch with 
official government policies towards Japan. First, Parkes had served under Rutherford Alcock (himself 
once an envoy to the Qing government) earlier in his career and prior to taking post in Edo Alcock met 
with Parkes: “In January 1865, Rutherford Alcock called at Shanghai [where Parkes was Consul] on his 
way home from Edo. He had been recalled for consultations, to explain his use of force. Sir Harry 
agreed that Alcock’s policies were right and felt that Whitehall was out of touch with Japanese realities.” 
(Daniels, 1996: 13) Second, a later example of how Parkes dealt with Korea shows that the diplomats 
to Japan were often more harsh than policy from home required. In 1875, when based in Japan, Parkes 
was worried about an attack by Japan or Russia on Korea and an annexation of a Korean port by 
Germany. He proposed annexing Port Hamilton in a pre-emptive strike for a possible future military 
action in the area, and to encourage Korea to open to foreign trade. The Foreign Office in London 
rejected this idea, as they thought it might encourage other countries such as Germany to do the same. 
(Daniels, 1996: 160) The Foreign Office believed that “the idea of a Perry-style mission” was not 
desirable “on the grounds that it might lead to an extremely unpleasant war.” (Daniels, 1996: 162) From 
this we can surmise that, Parkes had formed his impression of China through his dealings with Qing 
officials between and during the Opium Wars and applied much the same reasoning and tactics in 
‘opening Japan’. 
 
Japanese officials would form their initial opinions of Seiyō through its envoys rather than by central 
government contact, which did not occur until the Iwakura Mission of the early 1870s. To the Japanese 
it would appear that in East Asia the essence of British policy was, as Gallagher and Robinson suggest, 
“trade with informal control if possible; trade with rule when necessary.” (Quoted in Duus, 1995: 8) 
From these examples it seems that the reason that the notion of a ‘colonial threat’ is so strong in 
readings of Japanese history is not that writers and envoys of Seiyō explicitly stated their intention that 
Japan should be colonised, or that there were active plans in Europe to colonise Japan; even in China, 
when territorial possessions were eventually taken, public and private discourse tended to veer away 
from talk of invasion and formal colonialism. Instead this perception had its foundations in the power 
imbalances, the examples of other countries which had been colonised, the opportunistic nature of 
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nineteenth century imperialism where weaknesses were exploited quickly, and that Japan was 
vulnerable as an island, with few defensive points.  
 
Underpinning these factors, and making the risk of being colonised seem extremely high and imminent, 
was the communication from Seiyō diplomats from early after the intrusion of Perry,. The clearest 
example was when the American ambassador, Townsend Harris, met with the Shogunate’s senior 
councillor Hotta Masayoshi in 1868 prior to signing the crucial second treaty of Kanagawa (1858) which 
allowed for the establishment of foreign concessions, extraterritoriality for foreigners, and minimal 
import taxes for foreign goods. After meeting the Shogun, Harris first “enumerated the reasons why at a 
time when the invention of the steamship and telegraph had made communications vastly easier 
among nations and the whole world had become like one family, each country must maintain friendly 
relations with other countries. There were two requirements: the stationing of diplomatic personnel in 
the capitals of other countries and the opening of free trade.” (Keene, 2002: 35-36) Given this, Harris 
appealed to the modernity which was seen as inevitable and allowing for time to be compressed, was 
bringing all states closer together; using the language of modernity Harris attempted to persuade the 
Japanese that they were in a new era. Second, Harris fabricated a threat, exaggerated by fears of 
America, that Britain and France intended to expand their colonies in East Asia: 
 
“Harris warned the Japanese of the danger of the British waging a war with Japan if they 
failed to obtain a commercial treaty. The British navy might well occupy Sakhalin and Ezo, 
and if the British and French forces that were at the moment pressing on Peking were 
successful, France was likely to demand Korea, and England might demand Taiwan from 
China. America, though, desire only peaceful relations; moreover, if the Japanese relied on 
the America, they would repel the excessive demands of the British and French. Harris 
warned that if war broke out with England, Japan would lose.” (Keene, 2002: 36)  
 
For the Japanese envoys, signing the treaty was made to seem inevitable to avoid being engulfed in 
war and even colonisation of islands tacitly claimed by Japan,56 even though the British had no plans in 
this respect. As the first unequal treaties for Japan were signed during the Second Opium War, during 
the occupation of Canton, this would have seemed believable. The Americans greatly exaggerated the 
danger in order to get the treaty signed, and made themselves look entirely peaceful even promising 
not to sell opium, to distinguish themselves further from the British. In effect though, signing the Treaty 
first with America, and then with all European Powers active in East Asia, allowed informal colonialism 
and the erosion of Japanese sovereignty. 
                                                   
56
 As shown in Section 4.1, one of the first actions taken after the restoration of the emperor was to act on this threat to Ezo (today Hokkaidō) 
and formally annex it. 
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Whilst the Americans had painted the British as happy to make war with Japan, and happy to colonise 
Korea and Taiwan with the French, the British diplomats could have disabused the Japanese of these 
notions, but decided against it because it served to ensure that Japanese would keep their ends of the 
treaties that they signed. British diplomats were aware of this perception: 
 
“The cordiality of our reception at Yedo was, in certain quarters, the mask which a 
somewhat shallow diplomacy led them to assume, in order to avert a danger they deemed 
imminent, and which they dared not meet. They fancied they saw impending over them the 
fate of India, and they believed that the only alternative was to grant us concessions such 
as we had already wrung from China. It is only fair to ourselves to say that they were 
entirely mistaken in this assumption.” (Oliphant, 1859: 246-247) 
 
The British were aware that the Japanese believed they were under threat of colonisation when 
negotiating treaties. It appears clear that, during the 1850s and 1860s, Japan was made to believe that 
they were under the threat of Seiyō colonialism as this was a useful belief to leverage concessions. 
Colonisation was especially unlikely during the 1850s when the treaties were signed, as at this time 
European powers were largely distracted by the Crimean War (1853-1856) and then by the Second 
Opium War (1856-1860). However as shown, many of the Ambassadors in Japan had also presided 
over the subjugation of China and were therefore liable to react harshly to treaty infringement by Japan.  
 
That the Shoguate did not infringe on the treaties does not imply that Japan was not under threat if they 
had done. There was a real danger for Japanese diplomats in defying, accidently or purposefully, 
international law, which was at once unknown, complex, and crucial to how non-colonial relationships 
were performed between Seiyō and non-Seiyō countries. It has been argued that international law is an 
example of creating a system that validated the preferences of Seiyō and allowed them to be dominant. 
Using this recently constructed legal framework set up by Europeans, non-European states were  
 
“put at a disadvantage by their unfamiliarity with the framework of “international law” under which 
the European imperialist nations operated. This system of law was assumed to be universal 
among the “community of nations.” When leaders in non-Western states ignored or “violated” 
international law out of ignorance, the Westerners frequently seized the moment to impose 
sanctions, including the establishment of their own dominion… Many Western international legal 
theorists took the position that ‘backward’ or ‘uncivilized’ peoples had no sovereign rights over the 
territories they inhabited and that territorial rights should be recognized only if held by states able 
to protect its inhabitants. Such arguments, for example, sanctioned the European partition of 
sub-Saharan Africa.” (Duus, 1995: 5)  
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Small legal pretexts could allow imperial Powers such as Britain to take offence and start military 
actions to gain further concessions, as had happened in China over the jurisdiction of the ex-British 
ship, the Arrow. Actions stemming from legal pretexts had benefits for Britain and, ultimately, for the 
development of anti-Shogun forces as a demonstration of the weakness of the bakufu. For instance, 
the British Bombardment of Kagoshima (1863) (known in Japanese as the Anglo-Satsuma War (Jap. 
薩英戦争, Satsu-Ei Sensō)) following the murder of a single British man by a retainer of the daimyo of 
Satsuma, “convinced many in Satsuma of the folly of conflict with the Western powers, and the 
Kagoshima leaders began an all-out effort to strengthen ties with Britain. Neale in turn reciprocated this 
friendship. Britain’s efforts to strengthen the Shogun had so far proved unsuccessful. She now 
welcomed this new friendship.” (Daniels, 1996: 26) 
 
The ideology of Seiyō imperialists in the nineteenth century was permissive of imperialism and, if Japan 
had resisted the treaties as forcefully as China, Japan would have been more likely than China to have 
become a formal European colony. How likely colonialisation would have been for Japan if the 
Shogunate had persistently remained isolationist is very difficult to say and a matter for debate. 
Japanese scholars and politicians were aware of the possibility of Seiyō colonialisation of Japan and 
Euro-American diplomats used this possibility to their advantage in the signing of the unequal treaties.57 
I conclude this point by stating that the threat of colonisation to Japan was there unless Japan gave no 
opportunity to be colonised. There is little to suggest that, with the advent of New Imperialism in the 
1870s onwards, when increased competition between rival powers meant that harsher policies were 
taken towards China, South East Asia, and Africa, that Japan would have retained its sovereignty 
without its extreme modernisation which meant that it was seen much less as potential prey. How the 
various Japanese factions responded to this perceived threat up until the Meiji Restoration is explored 
below. 
The response in Japan 
To return to the state of Japan upon Perry’s arrival, “War was not openly threatened, but the 
implications were clear, and the Japanese were aware that they had to respond or face reprisals.” 
(Keene, 2002: 19) As noted, the Shogunate was indecisive from the first contact with Commodore Perry, 
                                                   
57
 Whilst it is interesting to explore whether ‘blame’ can be assigned in the modernisation of Japan, it is not crucial and best avoided except to 
understand the key factors in how this process began and how this helped shape the trajectory of Japan. I follow Said’s argument in not 
seeing it necessary to put all the problems of post-colonialism upon Seiyō but that the culture of Euro-American intellectuals and politicians 
was a key factor in the development of cultural hierarchies between the West and the rest. This approach to understand the cultural 
underpinnings of nineteenth century international politics has valuable explanatory value:  
 
“Part of our difficulty today in accepting any connection at all is that we tend to reduce this complicated matter to an apparently simple causal 
one, which in turn produces rhetoric of blame and defensiveness. I am not saying that the major factor in early European culture was that it 
caused late nineteenth-century imperialism, and I am not implying that all the problems of the formally colonial world should be blamed on 
Europe. I am saying, however, that European culture often, if not always, characterized itself in such a way as simultaneously to validate its 
own preferences while also advocating those preferences in conjunction with distant imperial rule. Mill certainly did: he always recommended 
that India not be given independence. When for various reasons Imperial rule concerned Europe more intensely after 1880, this schizophrenic 
habit became useful.” (Said, 1993: 96-97) 
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and this was exacerbated by the slow death of the existing Shogun at the time of Perry’s arrival. Given 
this situation, the leading advisors of the Shogun requested the opinions of other daimyos for the first 
time in the Edo period (Hobsbawm, 1975: 149) which was divided between a minority who were for 
accepting contact with America and those against it. On August the 5th 1852, the Shogunate sent a 
translation of the American President’s letter, following which “Two senior figures Tsutsui Masanori 
(1778-1857) and Kawaji Toshiakira (1801-1868), argued that the American request to open the country 
should be accepted; they contended that after more than 200 years of peace, military preparations had 
become lax, and people no longer possessed their old resoluteness.” (Keene, 2002: 16) This 
consultative action was pathbreaking in that since 1605, the shogunate had made all decisions by itself, 
“but now that the order established more than 200 years ago seemed to be crumbling, it had no choice 
but to give the daimyos a voice in national policy.” (Keene, 2002: 16)  
 
This consultation alone shows that the arrival of Seiyō was a climate changing event in itself, rather 
than a small push, as was frequently argued in the late nineteenth century by Europeans and 
Americans following Japanese modernisation. The threat of force from Perry, however minor, was 
sufficient for the Shogunate to seek outside (tozama) daimyo and Court support, as the government 
required a national response, rather than only the daimyos who were in league with the Tokugawa 
family (the fudai). With the division of han into three types (Shogun, inner and outer) there was 
inevitably potential for political divide. This gradually led to social upheaval at the end of the Edo period 
with the growing dissent of the outside (tozama) daimyo. The millennia-long disempowerment of the 
Imperial Court also began to end, because “Help was needed… from the emperor, even though he did 
not have a single soldier or gun at his command. Once a precedent of consulting with the emperor had 
been established, it proved difficult for the shoguns in future years to ignore his wishes.”  (Keene, 
2002: 19) That this consultation began the chain of events that led to the Restoration of the emperor 
meant tozama daimyo and the Court were empowered by this dangerous situation; it is hard to see how 
the Shogunate could have fallen so quickly without this crisis. 
 
Following the first and second treaties of Kanagawa (1854 and 1858), from the perspective of the 
Shogunate, the newly open ports “also contained elements of hope for the bakufu: Tariffs provided a 
new source of central income, and the purchase of foreign weapons and foreign assistance in training 
soldiers and sailors was more easily available to the bakufu than to other governments in Japan.” 
(Jansen, 1995: 171) Yet issues related to the enforced class system and the strict political structures 
were beginning to surface as Japan “was in the throes of a revolution in economic and social matters.” 
(Hoare, 1994: 3) The social class system, although still formally existing, had changed through the 
course of the Edo period as merchants and other chōnin (townsmen) in particular were no longer in the 
lowest social position and samurai were increasingly educated but unable to choose professions. From 
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Hoare’s economic perspective, “the samurai, the nominal military class, had grown lax in the long years 
of peace and had become an unproductive group, unbalancing the country’s economy.” (Hoare, 1994:3) 
The treaties brought difficulty to the Shogunate, as the Shogunate was established following civil war 
as symbolising absolute authority. The necessity to bow to Seiyō demands severely weakened the 
Shogunate’s prestige as the country’s protector: Japan was not strong enough to oppose America and 
the European Powers with military force, and this left the authorities with few palatable choices but to 
bow to their demands.  
 
That the Shogunate had potential to adapt to this world order demonstrates that Japanese cosmology 
was more flexible than Chinese: Japanese acceptance was aided by Japan not having completely fixed 
ideas about itself as centre of its world system, as during the Edo period the Tokugawa was dealt 
differently with Korea, China, the Ryūkyūs and the Dutch. For Japan, the free trade imperialism which 
entered after signing the unequal treaties had shown that “On the one hand, the ‘civilized countries’ 
refused to recognize traditional practices of interstate relations within East Asia that rested on notion of 
suzerain-vassal relations and elaborate rituals of exchange. Instead, they insisted on a new system of 
“international law”… that assumed that all members of the “community of nations” would deal with each 
other on the basis of equality and reciprocity.” (Duus, 1995:17) The swiftness with which the Japanese 
sought to understand this system is impressive: “By the mid-1860s works like Wheatley’s International 
Law had been translated into Japanese, and the Japanese leadership accepted it as a fixed and 
universal system… upheld by all 'civilized nations.’” (Duus, 1995:17) Whilst this understanding was to 
the long-term advantage of Japan, in the short-term it allowed the daimyo to understand that in signing 
the unequal treaties, the Shogunate had forced Japan into an inferior position, one which would likely 
be very difficult to get out of, particularly the right for extraterritoriality. The loss of full sovereignty 
indicated a two-way acceptance that the signatory was less civilized, although the Japanese 
magistrates in Shimoda “did not foresee the magnitude of their concession.” (Keene, 2002: 35)  
 
Whilst attempting to quickly adapt to the situation, the Shogunate were left “caught in a trap not of its 
own choosing; whichever way it turned, it failed to satisfy either the foreigners pressing it from one side, 
or its enemies in the country.” (Hoare, 1994: 4-5) Although the Shogunate at that time was unable to 
see the benefits of the system, Hoare concludes: “it may be only coincidence that such modern 
economic development is linked to former treaty ports but analysts in a variety of disciplines argue that 
the historical experience of opening to the outside world is an important factor.” (Hoare, 1994: 178) The 
treaty ports of Yokohama, Osaka and Kobe, and others, would drive an economic boom in the coming 
decades: although Osaka was only sparsely inhabited by European and American traders, both 
Yokohama and Kobe had over one thousand foreign (non-Chinese) inhabitants each in 1900. (Wason, 
1900: 27-31) Trade with the outside world would see the value of Japanese exports increase from less 
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than 1 million Mexican dollars in 1859 to over 200 million Mexican dollars in 1900 (229 times more) and 
imports increase from over 500 thousand Mexican dollars in 1859 to nearly 300 million Mexican dollars 
in 1900 (476 times more). (Hoare, 1994: 179) However in the short to medium term, this situation was 
not necessarily beneficial to Japanese merchants and commoners as cheap foreign products severely 
undermined natively produced goods. (Reischauer et al, 1965: 210) 
 
The growing perception of foreign threat, after so many years of seclusion, and the reduction in the 
power and authority of the Shogunate, whose raison d’être from the inception of the Tokugawa was in 
part to protect Japan from barbarians, led to a growing anti-Western and anti-Shogun sentiment. This 
was expressed in the phrase sonnō jōi [Jap. 尊皇攘夷], or ‘revere the emperor, expel the barbarians’.58 
The Shogunate’s decentralised political system did not help stem this opposition:  
 
“Direct resistance was hopeless, as the feeble attempts to organize it proved. Mere 
concessions and diplomatic evasions could be no more than temporary expedients. The 
need to reform, both by adopting the relevant techniques of the west and restoring (or 
creating) the will to national self-assertion, was hotly debated among educated officials 
and intellectuals, but what turned it into the ‘Meiji Restoration’ of 1868 i.e. drastic 
‘revolution from above’, was the evident failure of the feudal-bureaucratic military system of 
the Shoguns to cope with the crisis.” (Hobsbawm, 1975: 149)  
 
Opposition to the bakufu grew, coalescing around the leadership of Choshu and Satsuma han, (both of 
which had earlier been involved in short wars with Britain and her allies) while supporting the emperor: 
following the ‘Anglo-Satsuma War’, these han would eventually modify their anti-foreign stand. Indeed 
these anti-Shogunate domains were the first han to send students abroad from the early 1860s. 
Satsuma han, the most important, had grown powerful enough and independent-minded enough to 
enjoy representation at the Paris exposition in 1867 (fig. 2.3). In Satsuma, “by 1865-6 they recognised 
and acted on the need for the domain to know more about the West. Fourteen students were selected 
and sent to London under the guidance of domain officials. Once in Europe the students were set to 
studying a variety of technological and military specialities.” (Jansen, 1995: 184) The leaders of the 
resistance and ‘modernisation’ at the end of the Edo were figures from Satsuma and Choshu who were 
European-educated samurai. These han, which had been the centres for “visceral xenophobes” had 
rejected contact with foreigners in the 1850s and early 1860s because they thought that “consorting 
with Western barbarians was polluting, defiling, and disgusting.” (Duus, 1995: 13) By the late 1860s, 
                                                   
58
 “In the [Japanese phrase] ‘use the barbarian’, Westerners were described as i, a term by which both Chinese and Japanese identified those 
who were outside the bounds of Confucian society.” (Beasley, 1995:1) 
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following further examples of Seiyō military technology, this disgust had turned to the Shogunate, as 





The collapse of “secluded” Edo Japan was mainly due to the way “the Western powers had created the 
bakufu’s political problems, and they remained to complicate them by their presence in the ports that 
had been opened.” (Jansen, 1995: 171) The political divisions at this time were mainly between the 
pro-imperialists, the Shogunate forces, and highly independent han motivated by their personal power. 
The final days of the bakumatsu were a clear power struggle for the destiny of Japan. In this struggle 
the decentralisation of power became a huge drawback for the Shogunate: “even the bakufu army was 
only one, admittedly large, force among others, and bakufu efforts to coerce depended upon the 
cooperation of its vassals’ armies. When that cooperation was withheld in the 1860s the bakufu 
gradually declined to the status of a regional power.” (Jansen, 2000: 60)  
 
In the final years of the bakumatsu, the differences between potential rulers were no longer clear cut. 
The forces which supported the emperor had for some years following the Anglo-Satsuma war in 1863 
been distinguished from the Shogunate by their adoption of foreign technology, yet by 1867 the Shogun 
too had embraced reform, to a much deeper extent than was seen in Self-Strengthening China. After 
extensive discussions between the French representative Léon Roches and the new Shogun, 
“Administrative reforms followed; these set up a sort of cabinet system with specialised responsibilities 
replacing the monthly rotation of all-purpose generalists that had been the pattern. New personnel 
practices were designed to facilitate the selection of competent officials, with a regularized salary 
system for government departments… Military reforms were pushed particularly rapidly. A French 
This image can be seen in the printed thesis at the University of 
Sheffield library. 
2.3. ‘Government of Satsuma’s’ Pavilion at the 
Exposition Universelle in Paris, 1867. Source 
from Jansen, 1995. 
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military mission arrived in January 1867. Western uniforms were adopted; obsolete forces were 
disbanded.” (Jansen, 1995: 188) The Shogun’s younger brother was even sent to France to study, 
another sign of the Shogunate’s new belief in the need to adapt to Seiyō demands. 
 
Yet these efforts were to prove too little and too delayed: without enough time to strengthen his rule, “in 
January 1868, the Imperial Palace at Kyoto was seized and a decree issued stripping the shogun of all 
his power; the rule of the Tokugawa Bakufu was over. Administrative power was, nominally at least, 
restored to the emperor.” (Hoare, 1994: 5) Seen in the context of Shogunal reforms however, the 
victory of the Imperial forces was not a victory for modernisation over feudalism: “the civil war in 1868 
was fought over the issue not of whether Tokugawa feudalism would survive, but whether its demise 
would be presided over by Tokugawa or anti-Tokugawa leaders. It was no longer a matter of saving the 
bakufu system but of replacing it, now that it was collapsing.” (Jansen, 1995: 188) Indeed, both forces 
which in 1858 had been strongly anti-foreign had by 1868, and in the face of superior military 
technology, been persuaded to adopt Seiyō technology and to strengthen the country against further 
foreign intrusions through imitating the styling of Seiyō. This continuation of a trend is shown in that the 
departing shogun, TOKUGAWA Yoshinobu, “in his letter of resignation as shogun, expressed the hope 
that a change in regime would enable the country ‘to maintain its rank and dignity among the nations of 
the world.’” (Duus, 1995: 13) 
 
It was pragmatism which led the future Meiji elites to change their national aspiration from ‘Expel the 
Barbarians’ to ‘civilisation and enlightenment.’ The parallel modernisation efforts of the Shogunate and 
anti-Shogunate forces displayed logic of survival regardless of the cultural costs (which for some in 
Europe and America became seen as an example of Social Darwinism in action) but also an instance 
of rationality superseding custom, which had seen Seiyō as barbarians. This foundation of applying 
critical reason rather than sentiment and xenophobia to the issue of sovereignty set the cultural 
parameters of the Meiji period, where enriching and ‘civilising’ the country became the end purpose and 
rational means were used to achieve this.  
 
 
2.2 The Meiji’s government’s preparation for modernity  
One of the first acts of the new Meiji government was to disestablish the class and han (Jap. 藩) 
system. With the abolition of the daimyo’s feudal rights, the old han system disappeared, prefectures 
were set up, more state schools were established, wearing swords was banned, as was the bobbing of 
hair (only allowed for samurai) in order to destroy the outward signs of the samurai class. The cultural 
mores of the Shogunate system was replaced largely by systems of Seiyō modernity so that ‘Western 
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clothing’ became the official formal wear for government officials. Other more substantial changes 
occurred with the adoption of European style buildings, public carriages (rather than sedan chairs), 
trains, and gas lighting, all of which appeared in Japan within decades of the Restoration. Some 
Japanese began changing their customs, for instance eating beef and drinking beer, activities earlier 
unseen in Japan. In 1872, use of the solar calendar (rather than the previous lunar calendar) and the 
24 hour day were stipulated. (Cheng, L., 2008: 145) The principle of learning from abroad seemed to 
apply to all areas of cultural and political life. However, the process of adaptation was more subtle and 
selective than it first appears, as will be explored in the remaining sections of this chapter. 
 
 
The principles of Meiji policy 
Soon after the Meiji Restoration the new government quickly established its priorities. These were 
codified in a quasi-religious ceremony in Kyoto with the leaders of the new government and the 
emperor on 6 April 1868. These priorities were affirmed as a series of oaths taken in front of the 
emperor which were named the ‘Five Charter Oath’ (Jap. 五箇条の御誓文). The oaths from the Official 
Journal of the Imperial Government of Japan (Jap. 太政官日誌掲載) went as follows: 
 
1. We shall determine all matters of state by public discussion, after assemblies have been 
convoked far and wide; 
2. We shall unite the hearts and minds of people high and low, the better to pursue with 
vigour the rule of the realm; 
3. We are duty bound to ensure that all people, nobility, military, and commoners too, may 
fulfill their aspirations and not yield to despair; 
4. We shall break through the shackles of former evil practice and base our actions on the 
principles of international law; 
5. We shall seek knowledge throughout the world and thus invigorate the foundations of 
this imperial nation. (Breen, 1996: 410)  
 
The strong language regarding the Japanese past, labeling some practices as ‘evil’ and equating the 
future with internationalism, demonstrate the beginning of a self-identity as semi-civilised. The first and 
second oaths are key and are unambiguous in spelling out the intention to build a democratic 
nation-state in Japan, following the example of states in Europe and the U.S.A. The fifth oath for the 
immediate priorities of the state, and perhaps the most significant in relation to this thesis, was: 
“Knowledge shall be sought throughout the world so as to strengthen the foundation of imperial rule.” 
Under this principle of learning from the world (already evidenced in oaths one to four) Japan 
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established a Euro-American-based political system, set national slogans to promote Bunmei Kaika 
(civilisation and enlightenment) and Fukoku Kyohei (Enrich the Country and Strengthen the Military) 
and promoted Seiyō ideas in social and educational settings. At this time liberalism, utilitarianism and 
democracy were concepts translated into Japanese for the first time and then increasing used by the 
Meiji government, amongst other concepts (as discussed in Chapter 1). 
 
The role of the emperor in this ceremony was crucial in authorising these revolutionary Oaths. After the 
oath was taken the Chief Executive, SANJŌ Sanetomi (Jap. 三条実美, 1837-1891), said on behalf of 
the emperor: 
 
“My intention is to implement reform the likes of which have never before been seen. I 
have, therefore, seized the initiative; I have sworn an oath before the gods of heaven and 
earth; I have set forth our national goals, and I hope, thus, to establish a path of safety for 
all my subjects. May you be inspired by this initiative. Unite your hearts and be unsparing in 
your efforts.” (Breen, 1996: 412) 
 
These aims and concepts were given a platform to succeed by the state that the new government 
created; this state was the platform from which Japan achieved self-defined ‘civilisation’. During the 
Meiji period “Japan came to acquire almost all the ingredients of a modern state that other countries 
were also in the process of obtaining.” (Iriye, 1995: 276) Primarily, the early Meiji government 
established the state on the basis of three inter-linked levels: political unity, administrative reform and 
national consciousness centred on the emperor.  
 
On the first level, internal political unity replaced the cumbersome Tokugawa Shogunate system. The 
new Tokyo government “quickly established a bureaucratic apparatus so that within a few years after 
1868 it boasted of a multitude of ministries of Finance, Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs, and others for 
which ‘enlightened’ elites were recruited. These elites were mostly former samurai who had been active 
in bakufu and han affairs in the year before the Restoration, and many of them had spent several years 
studying in the West.” (Iriye, 1995: 276) The heads of Ministries and bureaucrats were picked more on 
their ability to carry out the priorities of government, than on their own connections or relationships 
(although the majority came from the two clans which drove the Restoration, Choshu and Satsuma). 
This principle of selecting according to ability (which had itself originated in Enlightenment scholars’ 
veneration of the Chinese examination system) led to the end of the feudal system and the class 
system where each han was run by a hereditary daimyo who employed retainers. Instead each subject 
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of the emperor could in principle choose their own career, and provinces were run by men who shared 
the vision of the new state. 
 
Second, the early Meiji government also undertook substantial administrative changes “involving tax 
reforms so as to obtain revenue from the agricultural sector and to turn it over for industrialisation. The 
government took steps to identify and protect merchants and industrialists, to establish model factories 
and quality inspection stations, and to instil in the people the idea that “enriching the country” was just 
as important a goal as was “strengthening the defense.” (Iriye, 1995: 276) In their respect for the 
activities of merchants these reforms constituted a complete reversal of the Confucian-inspired class 
system in which merchants were nominally at the bottom. Consequently mass incorporation of the 
citizenry into the state also proceeded, through population registers, military conscription, and 
education. By the 1870s “numerous political parties, study groups, and community organisations had 
come into being, superimposed on traditional family and religious institutions.” (Iriye, 1995: 277) By 
empowering the citizenry to take a part in the nation-building activities, in particular through supporting 
merchants, the Japanese leaders attempted to boast their trade economy and ownership of the political 
changes which were occurring.  
 
Third, the Japanese government used the symbol of the divine emperor to develop a national 
‘Japanese’ consciousness, unique compared to other nations. Most European states in the early 1870s 
were monarchies, but these did not use their monarchs as consciously as Japan to create a centralised 
bureaucratic system. This was possible due in part to the Japanese monarchy’s unique longevity 
(traditional history stated that the same family had ruled Japan since 660BC) and in part due to the 
Meiji emperor’s key role as a symbolic saviour in the years preceding the Restoration. By identifying the 
new arrangements (beginning with the Five Charter Oaths) “as rule by the sacred emperor, an aura of 
sanctity was accorded to them. Japan’s armed forces and bureaucrats would be “the emperor’s 
soldiers and Officials,” making them perhaps less vulnerable to partisan attacks than might have been 
the case in other societies with shorter periods of dynastic history. By combining a newly created 
bureaucracy, civilian and military, with the prestige of a fifteen-hundred year-old institution, the Meiji 
leaders succeeded in giving modernization almost instant legitimacy.” (Iriye, 1995: 278) Alistair D. 
Swale supports this view of the emperor as uniquely unifying, writing, “the Imperial household 
possessed what the Shogunate did not: the capacity for charismatic inspiration, a religious dimension 
that would enable incongruent forces and disparate elements to be recast into a new whole.” (Swale, 
2009: 176) As part of this, the Shintō Worship Bureau (Jap. 神祇事務局) was set up in 1868 to oversee 
the religion, since this native belief system had no formal structure beyond a set of practices, and to 
separate Buddhism from Shintō (Jap. 神道, lit. Dao of the Gods, adapted from the written Chinese 
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shén dào as in Taoism). This was followed in 1871 by nationalisation of the country’s Shintō shrines 
and in 1872 by the creation of a ranking system of the said shrines. By simultaneously cutting funding 
for Buddhist temples and establishing the purely Japanese Shinto as a coherent national religion, the 
government created conditions for a semi-state religion, with the ‘divine’ emperor Meiji at its head. 
 
Official slogans such as Fukoku Kyohei and Bunmei Kaika were important to the government. Perhaps 
the most interesting in terms of Japan’s articulation of kindai (modern) was the slogan Wakon-yōsai 
(Jap. 和魂洋才, lit. Japanese spirit, Foreign/Western technology). This phrase functioned to resist the 
argument of ‘superior Western culture and backward Japanese culture’. This phrase maintained “the 
fiction of pure Japaneseness in the clearly demarcated realm of the 'spirit’ as opposed to the 
superficial realm of 'technology'.” (Sakamoto, 1996: 114) It was crucial for Japanese authorities to 
present the modernisation efforts as not affecting the core identity of the Japanese, notable in the 
context of establishing Shintō as the state religion. Not all scholars agree with the idea that Japanese 
elites were attempting to maintain a core Japanese identity in the early Meiji period: Sakamoto states 
that “early Meiji discourse of 'civilization and enlightenment' is built on an awareness that the 'spirit' of 
Western civilisation has to be implanted successfully to resist Western imperialism, and therefore the 
notion of pure Japanese identity had to be abandoned altogether.” (Sakamoto, 1996: 114) Ultimately, 
this core idea of ‘Japaneseness’ which had developed throughout Japan’s history was greatly affected 
by the modernisation process beginning in the early 1860s. This change in core ideals was especially 
the case in areas where the basic education methods and content was adapted and undertaken by 
foreign experts. For instance, where Japanese history was taught by European and American teachers, 
the identity of Japan was viewed through the prism of Victorian scholarship and was often seen in 
negative terms. 
 
Whilst these reforms were broadly successful in building a state capable of achieving its aims, the clear 
motivation remained to match the imperialist Powers operating in East Asia in military, political and 
socio-cultural terms. This motivation was one which would not have been recognised as at all desirable 
in the years preceding the Meiji Restoration, but by 1868 the authorities had internalised a demand for 
‘civilisation’ in order to be seen as equals. These reforms became seen as necessary to secure revision 
of the unequal treaties. Zeal for treaty revision, and consequently for winning the esteem of Seiyō, 
elicited many bureaucratic efforts to reform Japanese customs. For example, an ordinance that forbade 
public nakedness and mixed bathing in public bathhouses was justified by the government with the 
claim that although “this is the general custom and is not so despised among ourselves, in foreign 
countries this is looked on with great contempt. You should therefore consider it a great shame.” (Pyle, 
1969: 101) Government efforts to win foreigners’ approval also included methods of architectural 
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persuasion, as we shall see in Chapters 3 to 5, which are worth briefly exploring here.59 To continue 
the theme of bathing, following a ban on mixed bathing, the Meiji government also built public 
bathhouses with separate sex areas, as shown in fig. 2.2. This segregation, unprecedented prior to the 
Restoration, was an example of cultural revisionism following the perceived tastes in bathing of Seiyō 







The walled complex provided shelter to the bather from public eyes whilst the parallel halves of the 
building formally segregated men and women Hobsbawm summarises the overall tenor of the 
principles of this new Japan: “What was the Meiji Restoration, if not the appearance of a new and proud 
‘nation’ in Japan?” (Hobsbawm, 1975: 84) Japan managed to navigate Seiyō’s discourse of superiority, 
adapt to their methods, techniques and conceptual language without self-identification as inferior and 
losing their pride. This was in spite of deeply profound influence by the Great Powers, particularly at the 
initial stage of change. 
 
 
Western influence over Meiji Japan 
That Japan was ultimately successful in resisting foreign pressure was a shock to observers at the time, 
for at the beginning of the nineteenth century it was held to be a less than illustrious East Asian state, 
                                                   
59
 The most striking example of architecture used to please the Euro-American residents in Japan and to provide contact with them was 
Josiah Conder’s Rokumeikan “a gaudy Victorian hall, opened in Tokyo for the purpose of entertaining foreign residents with cards, billiards, 
Western music, dances, and lavish balls.” (Pyle, 1969: 101) This is explored in detail in Section 3.4. 
2.4. Public bath house drawn by Josiah Conder in 1886. Adapted from Conder, 1886/1887. 
(Courtesy of the RIBA Library Collections) 
 118 
unlike China. The context of Japan’s rise in the late-nineteenth century is summarised by Eric 
Hobsbawm: “Of all the non-European countries only one actually succeeded in meeting and beating 
the west at its own game. This was Japan, somewhat to the surprise of contemporaries…. By the 
mid-nineteenth century it seemed to the west no different from any other oriental country, or at least 
equally predestined by economic backwardness and military inferiority to become the victim of 
capitalism.” (Hobsbawm, 1975: 147) 
 
A necessary foundation in understanding how Japan was able to adapt to the Great Powers on their 
own terms was that Japan’s notion of civilisation was altered after contact with the nations of 
Euro-America in the 19th century. One of the main factors of why Japan’s notion of civilisation changed 
was that the leading nations viewed themselves as the only source of civilisation (an opinion that had 
only truly come to fruition by the end of the 18th century). Unlike the Confucian-based criteria for 
civilisation in Japan, civilisation in Europe as conceptualised in the 19th century was based on 
quasi-objective and scientific criteria: for the liberal thinker John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), the most 
translated political author in Meiji Japan after Herbert Spencer (Nagai, 1954: 55), uncivilised societies 
were thinly scattered; had an unequal distribution of wealth; and lacked commerce, manufacturing, or 
agriculture. (Tunick, 2006: 593) Mill believed countries from Ireland to India were not fully civilised. For 
Mill such countries justified being colonised on the basis it would be “for their benefit that they should 
be conquered and held in subjection by foreigners” (Mill, 1963: 121). A dependent country that is not 
yet civilised, “if held at all, must be governed by the dominant country, or by persons delegated for that 
purpose by it,” to facilitate its “transition to a higher stage of improvement.… We need not expect to see 
that ideal realised; but unless some approach to it is, the rulers are guilty of a dereliction of the highest 
moral trust.” (Mill, 1861: 567-568) Given that Britain considered itself civilised whilst Oriental countries 
were not, Japanese elites interpreted ‘civilisation’ initially as corresponding with the characteristics and 
actions of the leading nations (or ‘Great Powers’), particularly Britain. The Meiji elites may have taken 
this approach because, unconsciously, they assumed the Confucian idea of civilisation which was 
based on territory, identity and belonging, and finding the location of superior role models. 
 
As argued in Section 1.3 civilisation, having been seen as a behavioural standard early on, became 
instead seen as openness to the outside, as some form of change or development, and socio-political 
betterment. These changes reflect the transition from a Confucian (behavioural) concept to an open 
concept, a concept which reflected what was commonly believed to be civilised in Europe and America. 
Japanese elites wished to demonstrate that they were capable of transitioning alone, without 
colonisation, to a high stage of development and becoming civilised on the terms of Euro-American 
scholars and politicians; this was required in order both to avoid colonisation and to reverse the 
Unequal Treaties.  
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As I later consider why Meiji architects wished to display ‘civilisation’ in their architecture it is worth 
establishing here that foreign attitudes toward Japanese buildings had themselves fundamentally 
shifted from first contact in the 16th century to the 19th century. In the first phase of contact with the 
‘Western barbarians’, adopting ‘Western’ architecture was not an issue for Japan, as Japanese 
architecture was viewed as both beautiful and impressive by foreign visitors, and the European powers 
such as Portugal, Britain and the Netherlands were not powerful enough to impose their views in any 
case. Consider the description of the Portuguese Jesuit priest Luis Frois (1532-1597) of Gifu castle 
(Jap. 岐阜城, rebuilt in 1567): 
 
“I wish I were a skilled architect or had the gifts of describing places well, because I 
sincerely assure you that of all the palaces and houses I have seen in Portugal, India and 
Japan, there has been nothing to compare with this as regards luxury, wealth and 
cleanliness… in order to display his magnificence and enjoy his pleasures to the full, [Oda 
Nobunaga, who overthrew the previous Shogunate] decided to build for himself at 
enormous cost this his earthly paradise.” (Frois, 1585, quoted in Cooper, 1995: 131-132) 
 
In the first period of extensive contact and trade with Europe (1543-1639) Japanese architecture of 
authority continued on its own path, and European forms, functions, spaces and materials did not 
influence Japanese architecture in any discernible way (Coaldrake, 2001: 48), which at the time was 
undergoing an enormous castle building boom. Over three hundred years, the attitudes of European 
and American scholars and government officials had changed fundamentally following the 
Renaissance, imperialism and Enlightenment: viewing the architecture of other countries from a lofty 
position meant that unabashed admiration was no longer a valid position. Instead foreigners in Meiji 
Japan adopted the role of civilised agents for change. 
 
The root causes for adapting the state to fit Seiyō expectations were the Meiji elites’ esteem for nations 
such as Britain and France and the influence of senior diplomats in Japan close to those in power. 
During the crucial period of transition from Edo to Meiji, figures such as the French and British 
ambassadors were advisors to the authorities. The content of their advice is important to note, as it 
influenced the later adoption of the slogan bunmei kaika as well as the notion that Europe was the 
centre of civilisation. William G. Beasley’s important work on Japan’s interactions with foreigners in this 
period of transition found that: 
 
“almost all foreigners whose work brought them to the treaty ports, especially the consuls 
and missionaries, thought of themselves as belonging to a ‘higher’ civilisation, which it 
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would be in Japan’s interest to adopt. They argued not only that trade would bring 
prosperity, contributing in the long run to an improvement in welfare and stability, but also 
that the West possessed, in addition to advanced scientific concepts and technology, a 
superior system of ethics and social principles, even of ‘culture’. These, they argued, 
should be models for semi-civilized Japan.” (Beasley, 1995: 140) 
 
An example of this trend could be found in the writings of Sir Rutherford Alcock (1809-1897), British 
Minister in Japan from 1859 to 1864. He wrote that “In a more general sense, although the Japanese 
possessed ‘a material civilization of a high order, in which the industrial arts are brought to as great a 
perfection as could well be attainable without the aid of steampower and machinery’, their ‘intellectual 
and moral pretentions… compared with what has been achieved in the more civilized nations of the 
West during the last three centuries, must be placed very low’. For all that, he believed, they were 
improvable. Their capacity ‘for higher and better civilization than they have yet attained’ ranked ‘far 
above that of any other Eastern nation’.” (Beasley, 1995: 141) Westerners in Japan widely held an 
attitude of cultural superiority, which when coupled with the apparent threat of colonisation, led the Meiji 
rulers to desire close ties with the ‘West’ and to replicate the products and principles of this advanced 
civilisation in the ‘East’. 
 
As adaptations to Seiyō were taking place, foreigners who had been enamored with Japanese 
traditions and mystique also began to re-evaluate their impressions of Japan. One writer (Alexander 
Innes Shand, 1832-1907, in 1874 writing about the Japanese at the Vienna exhibition in 1873) 
described Japanese in Western dress as incongruous and as a masquerade, clearly surprised that a 
non-Western people could ‘modernise’ with such confidence: 
 
“…there was one strange type of nationality you met at every turn – small, slight-made 
men, with olive complexions and black twinkling eyes slit almond-fashion. But on their way 
to Vienna they had probably passed by Paris, and were dressed in such garments as are 
able to be procured at the Belle Jardinere or the Bon Diable, with tall chimney-pot hat that 
came well down upon their foreheads. They had taken wonderfully kindly to these new 
clothes of theirs, and yet there was something about them that told you that they were 
masquerading cleverly… They hopped on behind the crowded tramway cars with an utter 
absence of dignity we regard as the birthright of oriental blood.” (Shand, 1874, quoted in 
Yokoyama, 1987: 115) 
 
This obvious Westernisation of dress with Japanese in positions of authority had a peculiar effect on 
contemporary Europeans and Americans. In the 1860s many observers of Japan wrote of the 
 121 
ambiguous feelings at the ‘West’s role in Japan, since it was America, Russia and Britain that had 
forced the opening of the ports, eventually leading to the Restoration of the emperor and prompting 
some of the Japanese customs beloved by contemporary Orientalists to disappear. Yet when the 
Japanese adapted to the Great Powers by becoming more like them and began imitating some of their 
habits, these same observers began to reassess the West’s role in the transformation. (Yokoyama, 
1987: 141) Adaptation did not fit at all well with ideas of ‘static Japan’ (widely held of a country deemed 
isolated from the outside world for centuries). One example of the rejection of any significant 
responsibility for Japan’s odd adaptive behaviour can be found in the writings of D. Wedderburn in 1878 
on the cause of the Meiji Restoration:  
 
“One thing is evident, that a slight external impulse only was required to topple down the 
existing fabric of Japanese society at the time when foreigners forced their way into the 
country producing an effect analogous to that of a solid dropping into a fluid of the verge of 
crystallization, and converting it suddenly into a solid mass.” (Wedderburn, 1878: 417) 
 
Contemporaneous Japanese would have been likely to embrace such discourse, as it supported the 
idea that Japan had changed little following the Restoration, and that Japan’s modernisation fitted with 
the slogan of ‘Japanese spirit, Western technology’.  
 
However the tone of Orientalists’ attitude towards Japan would shift again further into the Meiji period, 
from a self-propelled country to one which had always been an imitator. By the end of the 1870s, 
adaptation on a large scale to ‘Western thought’, concepts, and ways of thinking, led to a reputation of 
Japan in Europe and America that was far from that of the ‘static’ model prevalent only 20 years earlier. 
From about 1880, “the image of an unreal Japan became firmly established in Britain and began to 
exert a broader influence. For example, the image of ‘a civilization without any originality’, which was as 
romantic an idea as the tourists’ idea of Japan as an elf-land, became an element in the way British 
intellectuals thought about Far Eastern questions in general.” (Yokoyama, 1987: 175) A part of this 
reimagining was due to the fact that “raw information about Japan never appeared in magazines and 
reviews in its original complexity.” (Yokoyama, 1987: 172) 
 
This simplification of Japan as a mere imitator, though, was pervasive in Western scholarship. Even 
Algernon Freeman-Mitford, who once had a subtle knowledge of Japan (Yokoyama, 1987: 175), found 
it simple later in his career to label Japan as an easy imitator, and to suggest that this imitation held no 
drawbacks for Japan. Such a notion, even if not consciously meant, was self-serving, as in declaring 
that Japan was both uninventive and suffered no loss in changing, it implied that the British and other 
peoples of Europe and America would be foolish to feel any guilt for causing the admired Japanese 
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tradition to be eroded and in some instances replaced. Indeed, the idea that imitation was the best that 
non-Western nations could attain “was a notion on which Mitford and many of his contemporaries relied 
to defend the British Empire.” (Yokoyama, 1987: 175)  
 
Whilst it seems outlandish to downplay the role of Seiyō in Japan’s cultural changes, given how much 
effort Japan made to adapt and modernise, it fitted the times as Japan was growing in confidence. 
Further evidence of Japan’s collective aspiration to be counted amongst the civilised nations was their 
principles of dealing with their neighbours, particularly China. As will be shown in Section 4.1, the Meiji 
government’s actions towards China heralded a transitional period when the criteria for civilisation were 
filtered through a Euro-American prism rather than a Confucian one. In order to understand how and 
why this transition occurred, I will analyse two of the main points of knowledge generation for learning 
about the Europe and America during this early transitional period: government missions to the Europe 
and America and education. 
 
 
Contact zone 1: Government missions to the West 
Japanese architecture from 1850 to 1895 was a central part of a wider process of Japan becoming 
seen as ‘civilised’. Yet it was only a small if significant part of this process. I argued in Section 2.1 that 
by the mid-1860s, the only option pursued by both Shogunal and Imperial factions was adapting to 
Seiyō60: it had long been accepted by the Meiji political elites that becoming as strong as the Great 
Powers was necessary to avoid the humiliation of China and the potential for colonisation. Referring to 
the conceptual framework of Section 1.1, during this early period of modernisation, Japan was 
undergoing a long period of identity re-formation. Whilst coming to terms with the harsh international 
conditions, the Japanese had to reposition their identity as a nation with a Confucian spirit to one where 
critical reason was central, and where civilisation was not seen as residing in China but in Europe.  
 
With the theory of ‘contact zone’ in mind, it is important to examine the sites where Japan learnt about 
Seiyō and how their position of inferiority impacted upon this learning. Given this conceptual framework, 
what are most interesting to examine in these contact zones is the changes in the conceptual 
framework of Japan, and what kind of cosmology replaced the previous one following this contact. Due 
to the great geographical distances involved and the differing cultural perspectives, it was unsurprising 
that early attempts to visit and learn from Europe and America following the signing of the Unequal 
Treaties in 1858 met with little success and little genuine exchange. The first foreign mission to Seiyō 
was the 1860 Mission to America. In contrast with later missions, “officially… study of the West had no 
part in proceedings at all.” (Beasley, 1995: 58) The mission totalled 77 people, with staff inspectors (Jap. 
                                                   
60
 Incidentally, this consensus is why that the Meiji Restoration was not deemed a revolution. 
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目付, metsuke) to ensure that “the bounds of political wisdom were not exceeded.” (Beasley, 1995: 57) 
Due to the fact that the envoys had never been abroad, the mission encountered numerous difficulties, 
of which “language was the greatest obstacle of all. Official communications were in Dutch” (Beasley, 
1995: 63) which required a double translation and therefore, since the Americans did not speak Dutch, 
all translators had to be present to permit communication.  
 
One envoy of this mission, TAMAMUSHI Sadayū (Jap. 玉虫左太夫, 1823-1869), was relatively positive 
towards America and noted that there might be something to be learnt from the American navy, with the 
caveat that “I would not go so far as to esteem barbarian ways.” (Beasley, 1995: 66) While less senior 
members of the Mission were “better able than the diplomats to deal with Western technology, [the 
chief envoys were] too bound by Japanese social concepts to arrive at any real understanding of how 
Western society worked… The more senior the Japanese, it appears, the less useful were his 
observations. The pattern was to be repeated when a mission was sent to Europe in 1862.” (Beasley, 
1995: 70) 
 
This first mission to Europe occurred two years later and, like the mission to America, was supported by 
the foreign envoys in Japan “who believed that the more the Japanese became aware of the West’s 
superiority, the less they would be inclined to resist the West’s demands.” (Beasley, 1995: 70) In 
contrast with this hope, there was little evidence of learning by the Japanese envoys on the trip, the 
most noteworthy event being their visit to Holland, since trading contacts between the Dutch and 
Japanese had been so longstanding and so influential. The embassy was disillusioned in what they 
found in the Netherlands after seeing the wealth of France and Britain. This disappointment stretched 
to the Dutch language: “As a language, Dutch was not widely used. Even in Holland the people bought 
mostly books in French and German, while scholars in France and England expressed amazement 
when they heard that the Japanese relied on it in their studies. As a consequence, [one envoy wrote] 
‘we have become ashamed of it and stopped telling people’. If the Bakufu planned to send students to 
Europe, as he had heard, then they must at all costs, he believed, go to France or Britain, not to 
Holland.” (Beasley, 1995: 85) This policy was effected immediately upon return to Japan, and foreign 
students thereafter rarely studied in the Netherlands.  
 
Subsequent missions included the Shibata mission (1865, followed by a French military mission 
1867-68), and the (illegal) Satsuma mission to Europe (1865). The graduates of the Satsuma mission 
were all promoted for what they had done, “in marked contrast to the way in which the Bakufu treated 
many of its envoys” (Beasley, 1995: 113) who were often sidelined upon their return. It was only in the 
final years of the bakumatsu period that the Shogunate began to systematically send students abroad.  
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As mentioned in Section 2.1, the bakufu and the future Meiji government (in fact an Oligarchy, 
overwhelmingly consisting of elites from Satsuma and Choshu han) were keen on sending students 
abroad partly because a number of the governing clique had themselves studied in Europe and 
America. In fact, prior to the Restoration, sending students to study abroad, particularly students from 
Satsuma and Choshu, was far more important for persuading students of Seiyō’s geo-political 
dominance than the government missions were. That these students were not restricted to learning 
technical and military subjects reflects this trend. In 1870-71, the subjects that the Meiji government 
sent its students abroad to study were in three tiers of priority: “military and naval studies took first place, 
though only by a narrow margin. Next came medicine, science and non-military technology. Law, 
politics and economics, which were seen to be the proper educational concern of aspirant bureaucrats, 
were a close third. Britain (93 students) was still at this stage the most popular destination, followed by 
the United States (75), Germany (46) displaced France (37) from the third place it had held in earlier 
years.” (Beasley, 1995: 152) Around 90 private students also studied abroad in 1870-71. (Beasley, 
1995: 152) Yet although many of these students were to become a part of the government bureaucracy 
when they returned, the Meiji government was also planning to send a large proportion of the central 
leadership of Meiji Japan on a path-breaking mission across the globe, focusing on America and 
Europe.  
 
Whilst previous missions were born of political necessity, the envoys of the Iwakura mission (1871-73) 
brought with them a very different attitude. The status of the envoys had also increased beyond 
bureaucrats in the fledgling foreign office: “The embassy which left Japan in December 1871 was led by 
men of higher standing and more authority than any of its predecessors. Its senior member was 
Iwakura Tomomi (Jap. 岩倉具視, 1825-1883), who as Minister of the Left and former Foreign Minister 
was the second-highest official of the emperor’s government.” (Beasley, 1995: 157) Iwakura himself 
was close to Sir Harry Parkes who was Britain’s Ambassador in Japan, and frequently turned to the 
British for advice. As early as 1868 “Some members of the old Imperial Court showed welcome signs of 
modernity and Parkes was much impressed by the skill and ability of Iwakura, who consulted him 
closely on the policies which Japan should adopt in its attempt to become strong and respected. 
Parkes, as always, emphasized the need for a strong central government which could control defence, 
foreign policy and legislation. However caution had its place in his advice, for he stressed the need for 
continuity and ‘the grafting of new upon the old’ rather than any thoughtless search for innovation.” 
(Daniels, 1996: 92)  In 1869, Iwakura was encouraging his colleagues to “perform admirable service 
to this development enterprise and to spread civilization widely…. We must do our all to enhance the 
Empire’s power abroad.” (Mason, 2012: 1) Overall Iwakura was familiar with the political discourse of 
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Seiyō and sought to ally and identify with the Great Powers rather than with East Asians (even whilst he 
believed them to be Japan’s enemies, as shown in Section 4.1).  
 
Four powerful vice-ambassadors joined him, one of whom would later become the first Prime Minister 
of Japan and hold that position on four separate occasions: ITŌ Hirobumi (Jap. 伊藤博文, 1841-1909). 
The official party was 48 strong including an official chronicler and, in a sign of their diminished political 
responsibilities, a mere five former daimyo travelling to see the world. (Beasley, 1995: 162) Taken as a 
whole, the mission was “perhaps the first overseas mission in world history to include such a large 
percentage of a country’s leadership.” (Ruxton, 1998: 54) 
 
The envoys of the delegation had three main objectives: 
 
1. To assess the civilisation of the West, with a view to adopting those parts of it which 
would be of value to Japan.  
2. To secure international recognition for Japan’s restored imperial regime at the highest 
level. 
3. To enter into initial negotiations for the revision of the “unequal treaties”: the five treaties 
of 1858. (Beasley, 1995: 157) 
 
The first objective related to the transition towards seeing Seiyō as a valuable source of knowledge 
rather than as a barbarous area yet fulfilling this required ‘translators’ able to communicate with the 
Japanese people. One of these ‘translators’ was KUME Kunitake (Jap. 久米邦武, 1839-1931), the 
official chronicler of the Iwakura Mission, a 33 year old Confucian scholar. Kume’s great talent was to 
translate foreign activities into a language understandable to the Japanese; Kume “even contrived to 
describe industrial processes in classical terms,61 which, however impenetrable they may appear today, 
certainly struck a chord in early Meiji Japan, where many of his readers were struggling to reconcile the 
suddenly fashionable ideas from the West with their own cultural background.” (Cobbing, 1998: 4)  
 
Whilst Kume deemed that the official mission was wherever Iwakura was, members of the embassy 
split off at various points and had specific roles related to the collation of knowledge. For instance, in 
San Francisco, KIDO Takayoshi (Jap. 木戸孝允, 1833-1877), second in command of the Mission, 
“mostly spent his time [in San Francisco] visiting schools, as he was to do in other cities, observing in 
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 For instance, when describing a busy intersection in Victorian London, “Kume called on his knowledge of Chinese classics to describe this 
thoroughfare, for it reminded him of Linzi [Chi. 臨淄], the capital of the state of Qin [Chi. 秦] (379-221 B.C.), which had been renowned for its 
prosperity in ancient times. According to Sengoku Saku [Jap. 戦国策, Intrigues of the Warring States], compiled by Liu Xiang [Chi. 劉翔] (77-6 
B.C.), Linzi had once been a bustling centre, where vehicles ran so close together that the hubs of their wheels touched, and the crowds were 
so dense that people rubbed shoulders in the street. Kume believed ‘it would be no idle boast' to apply this phrase from ancient China to 
convey a sense of the thriving scenes he had seen in the streets of Victorian London.” (Cobbing, 1998: 6-7) 
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his diary that it was vital for Japan ‘to promote the enlightenment of the common people’ if the country 
was ‘to maintain our national sovereignty and prevent any infringement of our independence’.” (Beasley, 
1995: 163) Using this system of splitting the embassy allowed the political objectives to run alongside 
the aim of assessing Euro-American civilisation. 
 
On this aim of learning from Seiyō, Iwakura seems to have held strong opinions. “In January 1869, for 
example, when thanking the British minister for his government’s readiness to recognize the new 
regime, he [Iwakura] sought advice about ‘how far we might profitably adopt in Japan the institutions 
which obtain in Europe’, explaining that while the country had inherited from the past its own culture 
and traditions, ‘still we recognize, since our contact with foreign nations, that in many respects our 
civilization is inferior to theirs’.” (Beasley, 1995: 158) This was a shocking change of tone from ten 
years earlier when Japanese officials remarked they could not esteem ‘barbarian ways’. 
 
The second objective on recognising the new government as legitimate was achieved with little 
difficulty as the Japanese were welcomed as the rulers of Japan in each country visited. The admiration 
for the countries visited was not limited to the diplomats. The tone of respect adopted by the Japanese 
press towards Seiyō was striking, as shown in the passage below on the Mission’s welcome:  
 
“The distinguished men who headed [the Iwakura mission]… entertain grateful feelings 
towards those who spared neither pains, nor marks of respect, nor expense, to please… 
Rarely have men ever been received with more truly cordial warmth, or entertained with 
more lavish hospitality. Kings and Queens opened their palaces to them, nobles and 
corporations feted them, the populace followed and ran after them. Whatever was to be 
seen in America or among the nations of Europe of magnificence or beauty, of ingenious 
industry, of peaceful effort or warlike preparation, was exhibited to them with the kindliest 
readiness.” (Japan Mail, 1872 quoted in Nish, 1998: 192) 
 
This rhetoric served two functions: on the one hand a myth was being created about Seiyō as a place 
of magnificence, beauty and industry; on the other, Japan boosted its morale concerning its position in 
world affairs. 
 
On the third object, whilst in public forums such as newspapers and speeches the tones on both sides 
were respectful, the envoys encountered much resistance to their negotiations on treaty port revision. 
The leading power at the time, and the one closest to Iwakura was Britain, which strongly rebuffed the 
Ambassador’s enquiry. Iwakura, in conversation with the British Foreign Minister, Granville 
Leveson-Gower, second Earl Granville (1815-1891), indicated that: 
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“He and his colleagues had come to England… ‘to study her institutions, and observe all 
that constitutes English civilizations, so as to adopt on their return to Japan whatever they 
may think suitable to their own country’. Granville did not believe this to be Foreign Office 
business, but he did comment that Britain would only be prepared to make concessions on 
the subject of the treaties, such as might put British citizens under the jurisdiction of the 
Japanese, ‘in precise proportion to their advancement in enlightenment and civilization’.” 
(Beasley, 1995: 165)  
 
This attitude of cultural superiority was not unusual and was particularly evident at diplomatic levels. 
For instance, the biographer of James Bruce (1811-1863), 8th Earl of Elgin wrote on Elgin’s mission to 
Japan just a year after the Iwakura mission had left Britain that: “The governor goes out to a young and 
half-civilized country, invested with the dignity of an ancient sovereignty [Queen Victoria] and a great 
power.” (Reeve, 1873: 39)  
 
The Iwakura mission returned to Japan extremely dissatisfied in respect to revising the extraterritoriality 
laws in Japan, on which they received no promises for future revision. Although they contributed to 
fulfilling the other two objectives this progress was not taken to be the main purpose of the Mission 
outside of the government itself: “Outside the delegation, contemporaries tended to interpret success 
narrowly in terms of Treaty revision.” (Nish, 1998: 193) This was by far the most difficult objective: “a 
satisfactory renegotiation of the unequal treaties (including the abolition of extraterritoriality) was not 
achieved until 1894.” (Ruxton: 1998: 55) Yet though it was 22 years after the Iwakura Mission that this 
concession was granted, it was during this Mission that the method for Japan to become equal was 
spelt out: as the British foreign Minister Granville stated, Japan would be granted concessions “in 
precise proportion to their advancement in enlightenment and civilization.” (Beasley, 1995: 165) The 
resistance of both European and American diplomats to revising the unequal treaties may have been 
just as educational, as pointing towards civilisation and enlightenment, broadly conceived. The mission 
had a significant effect, not just on government and economy as was the initial intention, but also on the 
society and culture of Meiji Japan. 
 
After the Iwakura mission returned in 1872, state policy changed from the military focus adopted in the 
envoys’ absence (the returning ambassadors’ first action upon returning to Japan was preventing a war 
of aggression against Korea) to a nation-building focus. This strategy built on the initial Meiji movement 
for political unity, administrative reform, and national consciousness centred on the emperor. This 
renewed focus was a result of the rump of the Iwakura mission taking over control of Japanese politics 
and heralding the revolutionary years of the 1870s. Their “policies were influenced by their experiences 
abroad, and especially by their feelings about the backwardness of Japan and her need to learn from 
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the West.” (Nish, 1998: 191) Public figures in Japan were “divided on the most basic issues: What kind 
of culture was Japan to have? How were they to build it, what was to be its centre, and to what purpose? 
Out of these internal disputers the ‘reform’ or ‘enlightenment’ bureaucrats – a faction led by men like 
Ōkubo Toshimichi [Jap. 大久保利通 , 1830-1878], Kido Takayoshi, and Itō Hirobumi – came to 
dominate. It was they who held the reins of government under the emperor system.” (Daikichi, 1985: 52) 
Whether consciously or not, this nation building and culture change from elites appears to correlate 
directly with the desire to overturn the unfair treaties by advances in enlightenment and civilisation, 
adopting the logic of the British Foreign Minister. The experience of the delegates acted as a form of 
identity regulation, prompting efforts to reframe Japanese diplomats’ self-identities towards acceptance 
that Japan was far from ‘enlightened’ in European terms but could make efforts to become so. 
 
The mission had a great effect on the terminology used in government about the process of adopting 
new institutions. The phrase ‘civilisation and enlightenment’ was only present in English-Japanese 
dictionaries after 1876: three years after the Iwakura Mission. The change from seeing civilisation as a 
behavioural standard to a shining culture associated with openness and reform demonstrates the 
difficulty of adapting to the conditions set by Seiyō diplomacy. Second it shows that, although modernity 
was not yet defined in Japan, the transience of modern conditions was being felt in Japan where 
civilisation was synonymous with change. Whilst modernity was criticised in the mid-19th century by 
figures such as Charles Pierre Baudelaire (1821-1861), civilisation was viewed by Japanese politicians 
as a project to be embarked upon, and this was the dominant view by the end of the Edo period. Yet 
familiarity with the vocabulary of civilisation was not the only objective to be achieved: in order to keep 
its subjects satisfied, the Meiji government needed to find a sense of purpose and identity for this nation 
during its civilising process.  
 
The Iwakura Mission was the last major mission of the Meiji era. The prolonged exposure to the leading 
nations of Euro-America had altered the worldview of these Japanese leaders, prompting a rethink 
about Japan’s place in world affairs and what they could do to improve their position. “But they did not 
return to high office merely as evangelists for the West. Indeed, when they took over the administration, 
they disagreed not only over the handling of the Korean question but also over many of the reforms 
which had been introduced by their predecessors too fast… They slowed down the pace of 
modernization which, they claimed, should not be adopted until the people could understand the need 
for it.” (Nish, 1998: 191) This did not mean that the intensity of learning from Seiyō would lessen, only 
that it would take different forms. As a foreign mission, it had an unprecedented impact on Japanese 
domestic policy as most of the major social, technical and educational institutions would be formed 
following its return; indirect contact with Seiyō would continue in the Meiji education system. 
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Contact zone 2: Education from Edo to Meiji 
One of the most interesting and probably the most significant method by which the Japanese people 
found contact with Seiyō was receiving information about the rest of the world and about Japan’s status 
in the world was through schooling. This was particularly related to the events following the direct 
contact of the Iwakura Mission, as a large part of the first aim of the mission was dedicated to exploring 
educational systems, deemed the crucial method to reform Japan to become a kindai (modern) nation. 
So after the Iwakura Mission returned in 1874, the impact of the Mission continued through reforms of 
the education system which was one of the key contact zones between Seiyō and Japan during the 
Meiji period. Because of this impact, it is worth considering in detail education from the late Tokugawa 
to late Meiji period, to explore how this contact zone grew. This discussion provides a basis for later 
discussions on architectural education in Chapter 3, as the later architects of ‘Victorian Japan’ also 
went through this education system, and education had also been an important consideration for Japan 
even in the years prior to the Meiji Restoration.  
 
The main educational establishments of the Edo period were split into four broad categories: gōkō (Jap. 
鄕校, official Shogunate school), hankō (Jap. 藩校, local daimyo school), shijuku (Jap. 私塾, private 
academy), and terakoya (Jap. 寺子屋, common school). Gōgaku (Jap. 語学) as ‘village schools’ were 
also called gōkō created by the Edo bakufu were divided into hankō, state schools (local daimyo), and 
terakoya for commoners. (Frédéric, 2002: 252) This confusion over terminology was because 
distinctions between the various school types “were not clearly made during Tokugawa itself. Nor, with 
the exception of terakoya, were the terms themselves commonly used.” (Rubinger, 1986: 210) Instead 
the schools were simply called by their individual names. They are distinguished here since doing so 
aids my purpose of demonstrating changes to civil society in the Edo period, and the importance of 
education to non-samurai and the basis this provided for the efforts to create new institutions during the 
Meiji period. 
 
In reference to Section 2.1, the education system broadly reflected social hierarchies (based on 
Confucian ideals), with exceptions in the private sphere: 
 
“The private academies, unlike the official schools of the bakufu and han, had no 
geographical or class criteria for entrance… For most of the Tokugawa period the primary 
purpose of the bakufu and han schools was the moral training of an hereditary elite. The 
constituency of these schools was limited to the upper echelons of the samurai class, and 
the curriculum was narrowly based on the traditional combination of bun [Jap. 文] and bu 
[Jap. 武], letters and the military arts. In response to the military danger posed by Perry’s 
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arrival, the bakufu and the domains made efforts to upgrade their defensive capabilities. An 
important part of these efforts was reform of the official schools where leaders were trained. 
The bakufu reorganized the central institution of Confucian orthodoxy, the Shoheiko [Jap. 
昌平], regularizing lessons and establishing grade levels.” (Rubinger, 1986: 197)  
 
These traditional practices began to change during the bakumatsu. As stated earlier, samurai were 
generally educated with 200 of 215 han having a policy of compulsory schooling for higher samurai, yet 
by 1857 some han began to allow commoners into the han schools. (Rubinger, 1986: 198) Still, 
schooling in this period was characterised by “wide disparities in educational offerings, class and 
sexual discrimination at official schools, and a tradition of ad hoc and discontinuous private schooling.” 
(Rubinger, 1986: 199) 
 
The table below puts the gōkō and han schooling into some perspective: by 1868, there were only 343 
government schools (118 gōkō schools and 225 han schools) out of a total of 11,621. This is a mere 
2.95 percent of the schools established during the whole Edo period. However this proportion was 
greatly altered in relation to that of 1750, when the share of government schools was 43.6 percent. This 
means that in a period of just 117 years private schooling increased so much as to make the number of 











1600 - 1750 11 40 19 47 
1751-1788 9 48 38 194 
1789-1829 42 78 207 1,286 
1830-1867 48 56 796 8,675 
Date Unknown 8 3 18  
Total for Edo Period 118 225 1,076 10,202 
1868-1872 76 48 182 1,035 
Date not conclusive 4 3 233  




The first and most obvious conclusion from this data is that in the pre-modern era countries such as 
Japan, which chose to isolate themselves from open contact with other countries, did not remain ‘static’: 
in the education field, there was an enormous increase in the numbers of schools that were established, 
a trend which began many years before Perry’s Black Ships. Second, the growth of private academies 
(a 1760 percent increase from 1750 to 1868) is indicative of the rise of the chōnin (townsman) class 
who aspired to improve their social achievements and had the means to pay for this privilege. Finally, 
the phenomenal increase in terakoya schools (a 4133 percent increase from 1750 to 1868) shows that 
Table 2.3. Development of types of schools by date of establishment. Adapted from Rubinger, 1982. 
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at the time of the Meiji Restoration, Japan already had a large number of citizens with some form of 
schooling, a large number of towns and villages with education establishments, and a great number of 
teachers. These three factors were very helpful in establishing a national education system.  
 
The table below shows the private academies, and the most interesting to us in terms of the contact 
zone between Japan and Euro-America are the ‘Western studies’ academies. It is worthwhile pointing 
out that these schools were only 3.2 percent of the total, which whilst being a tiny percentage would 
nonetheless supply graduates and teachers who would become important at the time of the bakumatsu. 
The majority of other academies were either engaged in Chinese studies (again demonstrating that 
Japan had not isolated itself culturally) or calligraphy studies (69 percent of all academies).  
 
 
Field of Study Total Percentage of Total 
Chinese Studies 612 41.3 
Calligraphy Schools 415 28.0 
Calculation Schools 175 11.8 
Western Studies 47 3.2 
Western Studies only (English and Dutch Language schools) 5  
Western Studies and Japan-Chinese studies 5  
Medical Schools 37  
Military Studies 19 1.3 
Writing (lower level only) 30 2.0 
Japanese Studies 9 0.6 
Others 26 1.8 
Unknown 149 10.0 





The ‘Western studies’ academies “tended to be provided by the larger and more strategically placed 
domains, such as Chōshū, Tosa, Satsuma, Kaga, and Saga. Others were less enthusiastic. Kasama 
han, for example, specifically forbade Western style calculation to be taught in its school.” (Rubinger, 
1986: 199) These Western studies schools were mostly run by Dutch doctors and therefore operated 
quite differently to other academies: “The Dutch schools were advanced and specialised schools 
orientated towards practical knowledge and scientific techniques. Problems of character and morality 
were secondary, if dealt with at all. Unlike Confucian scholars such as Hirose Tanso [Jap. 広瀬淡窓, 
1782-1856] who devoted all his life and energy to running his school, most of the Dutch scholars were 
physicians who ran schools as sidelines to their medical practices.” (Rubinger, 1982: 104) 
 
From the fruits of these Dutch schools and academies for Seiyō studies came specific institutions, such 
as the bansho shirabesho (Jap. 蕃書調所, lit. Institute for the Study of Barbarian Books), established in 
Table 2.4. Total number of shijuku (private academies) through 1872 by field of study. Adapted from Rubinger, 1982. 
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1856. Once a “woefully neglected translation office” (Rubinger, 1986: 197) it became the most 
important locus for ‘Western learning’ in the late Tokugawa period:  
 
“[T]he Shirabesho, as it is usually called, opened in what is now the Kanda district of 
modern Tokyo early in 1856. It had at that time a staff of fifteen men, no less than six of 
whom had been trained as doctors. Only three were direct retainers of the Shogun, though 
four more came from the domains of vassal lords and two from those of Tokugawa 
relatives (one of them Echizen). Another three were from the ‘outside’ [Jap. 外様, tozama] 
domains of Satsuma, Chōshū and Uwajima, which were to play a major part in the politics 
of the following decade.” (Beasley, 1995: 48)  
 
These schools directly aided the translation of Seiyō thought at the opening of contact between Japan 
and the Great Powers. At first the name of the school was apt since “translation duties took priority over 
teaching, because the opening of the ports brought an enormous increase in foreign-language 
paperwork, but students were admitted from February 1857 and some two hundred soon availed 
themselves of the opportunity. Three teachers of English were appointed in 1860, reflecting Japan’s 
diplomatic and commercial needs, and there was a gradual extension of the curriculum thereafter to 
include French, German, science, geography, and history.” (Beasley, 1995: 48) To reflect the changing 
character of the institute (and the changing opinion of ‘Westerners’) the institute was renamed kaisei 
sho (Jap. 開成所, Development Institute) in 1863. This institute was a forerunner of European-style 
universities: indeed it was one of the institutions which collectively founded the University of Tokyo. 
 
Alongside the Meiji government’s centralisation process was a growing belief that education should be 
seen as fitting within other societal processes rather than being treated as a private responsibility. 
TANAKA Fujimaro (Jap. 田中不二麿, 1845-1909), the commissioner for education on the Iwakura 
Mission, “wrote that the Mission was also planning to look into museums, libraries, hospitals, 
workhouses, institutions for physically and mentally handicapped people, asylums and so on. This 
clearly indicates that the notion of ‘education’ of the Iwakura Mission not only covered a wide sphere of 
the administration of school education, but also included cultural policies and social welfare.” (Ohta, 
1998: 14) Given the emphasis on education that had preceded the Meiji era and led to the exponential 
growth of shijuku and terakoya schools, it is unsurprising that this trend continued into the new period. 
When deciding upon a new education policy, the Meiji government largely followed the American 
system because “it was industrialization that took place first in Britain, and the idea of the education of 
the mass public came later chronologically… In America, on the other hand, a systematic education of 
the general public from an early age was a prerequisite for the enhancement of industrialization and 
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national growth. In other words, mass public education and industrialization were sought 
simultaneously in America. It was quite obvious that the American model was more suited to the 
necessities of Meiji Japan than the British model.”62 (Ohta, 1998: 16)  
 
This openness to learning, regardless of the lack of fit with customary logic, was reflected in the 
planning for early Meiji educational policies. Kido, who was second in command of the Iwakura mission, 
instigated great changes to the education policy in 1872. After visiting America (and in clear reference 
to the Five Charter Oath), Kido believed “that the Meiji government’s ability to uproot social evils, create 
a true civilization, and enhance the glory of the country all depend on whether or not the Japanese 
people are educated.” (Daikichi, 1985: 55) Following the mission:  
 
“On February 1, 1872…the Ministry of Education announced the “establishment of public 
elementary schools and schools for Western studies in the Tokyo metropolitan prefecture,” 
and permission was granted for school administrators to accept applications from 
foreigners. On September 4, 1872… the government issued decree No. 214 that 
proclaimed a universal education system to ensure that ‘henceforth there shall be no 
community with an illiterate family nor a family with an illiterate person.’ This was an 
astonishingly resolute step” (Daikichi, 1985: 55-56) 
 
Yet this was an achievable step. The large number of schools established before the Meiji period 
means that “even before the modern system was established there were already large numbers of 
experienced teachers, numerous young people who had been exposed to at least the basics of reading 
and writing, and many families who had been introduced to a style of life that included school going for 
their children.” (Rubinger, 1986: 196) 
 
Due to the scale of change, the first years of universal education were less systematic than the 
following decades. The content of universal education in the first years was flexible and unrestricted, 
reflecting the ad hoc nature of the early years of Meiji rule. The Ministry's manual of 1872 said: "the 
textbooks compiled by the Ministry of Education are only to serve as examples of style and content. 
The Ministry would very much welcome those who want to write or translate textbooks.” (Education 
Ministry, 1872, quoted in Takeuchi, 1987: 5) In a reflection of the education in the Edo period, 
“textbooks for the higher grades of primary schools and all textbooks for secondary schools were left 
completely to private publication.” (Takeuchi, 1987: 5) In addition to the content of teaching materials, 
                                                   
62
 This decision was another instance of the process of rationalisation seen in various aspects in Japan from 1853. The leaders of the Meiji 
Restoration of 1868 were young and open-minded towards the value of Seiyō, implementing bureaucratic reforms on Euro-American lines 
almost immediately: “The new Tokyo government quickly established a bureaucratic apparatus so that within a few years after 1868 it boasted 
of a multitude of ministries of Finance, Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs, and others for which ‘enlightened’ elites were recruited.” (Iriye, 1995: 
276) 
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the form and content of education itself was not stipulated for a number of years. From 1872 until the 
mid 1880s, “the compilation of school textbooks was entrusted mainly to private initiative and was not 
under the strict control of central government… In this happy period there was no fundamental 
contradiction between government policies and the ideologies of the authors of the textbooks, who at 
this time, were for the most part pro-Western” (Takeuchi, 1987: 6) 
 
Whilst some theorists such as Henry Thomas Buckle (1821-1862, described in the following section) 
were deterministic towards the possibility of achieving ‘civilisation’, the Japanese education system 
promoted the opposite view:  
 
“Another distinctive feature of early Meiji geography textbooks is a strong faith in the 
possibility of economic development. For a country such as early Meiji Japan, which is just 
beginning to pursue economic development, such a belief is perhaps not surprising. 
Backwardness was never ascribed to physical factors such as climate: this might lead to a 
fatalistic attitude. Rather it is put down to the laziness of the people, misgovernment and so 
on. For instance, China had been defeated in the Opium Wars and had become a 
semicolonial country because it was ruled despotically and its people were apathetic. By 
contrast the United States, thanks to its democratic system and the industriousness of its 
people, had become comparable to Great Britain in industry and to France in culture.” 
(Takeuchi, 1987: 8)  
 
The Meiji government’s early fervour for the civilisation, progress, and the Great Powers, could not be 
sustained forever given the Japanese public’s lukewarm opinions towards the Seiyō nations who had 
been considered barbarous only a decade earlier. In the intellectual scene of the 1880s in Japan, “there 
was a growing ambivalence and hostility towards Western conceptions of representative government 
among the new wave of elites, many of whom were coming through Tokyo University (though not 
exclusively so). In tandem with this, there was a growing section of the urban public in general whose 
antipathy for the government’s program of “Westernisation”, combined with an enthusiasm for military 
expeditions in the broader Asian region, was burgeoning.” (Swale, 2009: 175) This nationalist trend 
began to be reflected in text books, with a decrease in focus on the rest of the world: “The first marked 
change in school textbooks took place with the introduction of the system of ministerial approval. This 
was the reduction of the coverage of foreign countries, their societies and cultures. For instance, in the 
primary school curriculum the history of foreign countries vanished completely, and was only taught in 
connection with Japanese history and very much from a Japan-centred viewpoint.” (Takeuchi, 1987: 9) 
Nationalism was emphasised in the education system as in other spheres after the promulgation of the 
new constitution in 1889, and the convocation of the First Diet in 1890 after many years of groping for a 
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suitable political framework. (Pyle, 1969: 144) This adoption was widely heralded, and began a period 
of self-belief in the progress Japan had made and was continuing to make: many Japanese “saw these 
institutions as a means of recovering national pride and even of demonstrating Japanese equality with 
Western nations. A leading politician wrote that, at the time the constitution was promulgated, ‘certain 
European people ridiculed the idea of Japan’s adopting constitutional government saying that… [it] is 
not suitable for an Asiatic nation, and is only adapted to the cool-headed people of Northern Europe; 
even the Southern European nations have failed in establishing constitutional government. How can an 
Asiatic nation accomplish what Southern European nations have found impossible?’” (Pyle, 1969: 145)  
 
As confidence in the strength of Japan’s civilising efforts grew over time, the adoption of Euro-American 
institutions, the education system in Japan began to move in a different direction, reaching a turning 
point in the middle of the 1880s. This related to a wider change in tenor on the idea of becoming kindai 
(modern): “Not only was there an institutional change in the system of compiling textbooks, but also 
there was a general change in Japan's modernisation process. There was a reaction against 
Westernisation, an emphasis on the mystique and divinity of the emperor, the beginnings of colonial 
expansionism and so forth. It was the start of the true period of "Japanese spirit and Western learning.” 
(Takeuchi, 1987: 8-9) Given that this change was related to strengthening nationalism following the 
largely successful attempt to create a ‘nation’ of the 215 han of Japan, we can see the assimilation of 
many ideas which were contemporary in Europe and America. Where once Japan was more willing to 
be open-minded towards countries deemed less civilised by Seiyō (for example, the Iwakura mission 
visited several countries such as Egypt, Sri Lanka and Singapore) educational textbooks began to have 
more ethnocentric views towards these countries: TAKEUCHI Keiichi wrote  
 
“In this and other secondary school textbooks, besides such environmentalist explanations, 
there are to be found the sorts of racial descriptions which hardly existed in the early Meiji 
textbooks. When discussing the population of each country, racial differences are always 
highlighted: thus, for instance, the misery of the American Indians is put down to their 
"primitive and simple nature." The Caucasians are considered the most advanced. As a 
parallel to this, the uniqueness and superiority of the Japanese is stressed in comparison 
to other, inferior, Oriental races. It is at least partly because of such racialist education, that 
the racial prejudice of the Japanese was, and to my deep regret still is, especially strong 
towards Asian peoples.” (Takeuchi, 1987: 9)  
 
This belief in the superiority of Japan formed a seed of popular anthropology towards the primitive 
which was later another evidence of the forming of ‘modern’ Japan; Japanese had absorbed ‘Western 
learning’ and digested an Orientalist and ethnocentric viewpoint. 
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These political developments were being achieved whilst the education system was still dealing with 
basic terminological difficulties. As schools were not defined as such in the Edo period, the deliberate 
choice of the word for ‘school’ in the Meiji period is of interest. According to ISHIZUKI Minoru, before 
the Meiji period the Kanji character kō (Jap. 校, lit. institution) in gakkō (Jap. 学校, lit. learning 
institution) had only infrequently been combined with the character for learning (Jap. 学, gaku) to 
indicate a school institution. Gakkō was more often used to denote a sense of restriction, limitation, or 
conformity to a uniform standard. That being the case, the choice of characters for the modern word 
gakkō, Ishizuki suggests, was entirely appropriate, symbolising a shift to a new kind of institution that 
was part of a larger system whose goals were fashioned by a central authority. (Ishizuki, 1972: 78) By 
centralising schooling in an era of patriotism, the government was able to engineer its populace in its 
own image of what it was to be both ‘civilised’ and ‘Japanese’.  
 
In terms of higher education, in addition to the bansho shirabesho mentioned earlier, two technical 
schools were established prior to the Iwakura Mission: seitetsusho kōsha (Jap. 製鉄所公社, lit. the 
ironworks school, established in 1865) and the shugi-kō (Jap. 手技校, the school to master techniques, 
established in 1870). (de Maio, 1998: 164) After this, as will be explored in more detail in Chapter 3, 
more formal and centralised engineering institutions were set up, most exceptionally the College of 
Engineering in Tōkyō, set up by the Scot, Henry Dyer (1848-1918) in 1873, recruited as part of the 
Iwakura Mission.63 It has been said that “Dyer realized his own programme for the college and that 
there was no such college in any other part of the world that balanced theory and practice in this way, 
the former being preferred in French and German engineering education, the latter in British tradition… 
In fact, after the Iwakura mission, Japanese attitudes towards foreign employees, the oyatoi gaikokujin 
[Jap. お雇い外国人], had changed: Japanese were now more self-reliant and more conscious of the 
priorities in the modernization of their country.” (de Maio, 1998: 167)  
 
Japanese education as a contact zone then was largely informed by the Iwakura Mission’s desire to 
follow foreign models, implementing these with the help of foreign experts, and absorbing the basic 
assumptions. This allowed Japan to be free of direct foreign influence because assimilation of view 
points and concepts from Seiyō after these unequal contact zones had been opened meant that 
foreigners were no longer needed to direct the modernising project; Japanese elites and educated 
persons had internalised the ‘Victorian’ frame of mind sufficiently to go their own way in creating 
Japanese modernity. As we shall see in the following section, Japan did suffer greatly following the 
Meiji Restoration. Whilst the government pushed through policies against the traditions and the 
                                                   
63
 Henry Dyer was recommended to ITŌ Hirobumi by his professor, William John Macquorn Rankine during the Iwakura Mission. He was 
appointed to the post of Principal and Professor of Engineering at the new Imperial College of Engineering in Tokyo in 1872 when just 25 
years old. 
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previous identity of the country, many citizens and intellectuals of Japan experienced great difficulty in 
adapting to new notions and ideals. 
 
 
2.3 Meiji Intellectuals’ attitudes towards modernity 
Whilst the previous section mapped the causes and drivers of modernisation in Meiji Japan this section 
links these changes to Japanese civil society. What did the intellectuals of the period think of the social, 
political and cultural changes during the Meiji era? In what terms did they conceptualise kindai 




Early Meiji thought: Fukuzawa 
It is worth restating that the changes which occurred during the early Meiji period were unprecedented 
in Japanese and possibly in world history: “A major survey of modern world history concluded that the 
change undergone by Japan in the Meiji period (1868-1912) ‘Still stands as the most remarkable 
transformation ever undergone by any people in so short a time.’” 64 (Pyle, 1969: 3) This process 
latently and actively began eroding Japan’s ‘traditional’ culture; such changes were difficult to take for 
many Japanese. The protests which followed the Restoration were not grassroots movements calling 
for another new system but were reactionary, to economic difficulties partly, and against the changes 
which affected the lives of ordinary Japanese. Between 1868 and 1872 there were 343 village protests 
and disturbances in the Japanese countryside (Koji, 1967: 35). One typical riot of around 1000 people 
in Tottori (Jap. 鳥取), 1873, led to a petition of six demands: 
 
1. The lowering of rice prices; 
2. The banning of all traffic with foreigners; 
3. Abolition of the military conscription law; 
4. Abolition of primary schools; 
5. Opposition to the solar, or Western, calendar; 
6. Opposition to the law ordering Western style haircuts. (Kōsaka, 1958: 81-82) 
 
                                                   
64
 It is worth noting from the outset that this culture change was a very different type to previous historical changes in Japan, in a large part 
due to the stimulus: “The situation [of culture change in Meiji Japan] bore no similarity to the introduction of Sui [Chi. 睢] and T’ang [Chi. 唐] 
civilization from China in early times, the permeation of Sung [Chi. 宋] and Yuan [Chi. 元] culture in medieval times, or the influence of Iberian 
Catholic culture in early modern Japan. … The main concerns of its leaders was not so much one of protecting traditional culture as mastering 
the secrets of their (Western) enemies’ wealth and power quickly – in other words, the utilization of Western civilization to strengthen Japan” 
(Daikichi, 1985: 51) 
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Such complaints all had at their root resistance to the ‘modernisation’ of Japan. However after the 
Satsuma Rebellion in 1877, no group appeared which tried to resist the government by military power, 
and the conflicts moved instead to civil society. Although the ruling class of Japan, even the Shogunate, 
had by the late 1860s shed the slogan of “Revere the Emperor, Expel the Barbarians”, this “sentiment 
was the overriding factor influencing the majority of the samurai class, who threw their support behind 
the Satsuma and Choshu led Restoration in 1868.” (Swale, 2009: 176)  
 
In this context, Japanese intellectuals began to formulate ideas on how best to deal with the process of 
modernisation. As shown in Section 1.3, the key concept discussed and debated by Meiji intellectuals 
was ‘civilisation’: how could Japan become a civilised country? How much of their traditions would have 
to be shed? What would be the effects of this process? In attempting to find answers to these questions, 
Meiji intellectuals informed government actions, and shifted the ways in which cultural arts were studied 
and performed. Without the influence of these intellectuals, and without the dovetailing vision of Meiji 
government elites, the scale and depth of change in the early Meiji period would not have been 
possible. 
 
The key intellectual figure in the transition from the late Edo period to the early Meiji period was 
FUKUZAWA Yukichi. Although he was a samurai raised on studies of Confucius, Fukuzawa went to 
Nagasaki and began studying Dutch in 1855 at the age of 20 in spite of strong societal resistance. His 
success in ‘Barbarian studies’ led clan authorities to order him to go to Edo and start a school to teach 
Dutch to young clan samurai in 1858. When visiting Yokohama he could not find any foreigners 
speaking Dutch so he began learning English, which seemed a more useful language. After travelling 
to America in 1860 with the first government mission to Seiyō, he published his debut book, the first 
English-Japanese Dictionary. In 1862 he visited France, England, Holland, Prussia, and Russia with 
the second official Shogunate embassy. The first volume of his Conditions in the Western World (Jap. 
西洋事情, Seiyō-jijo) was published in 1866 and sold a quarter of a million copies. In 1858 he started 
the Keio Gijuku (Jap. 慶應義塾, a private school on ‘Western studies’) in Edo which grew quickly and 
eventually became Keio University, the oldest higher education institute in Japan.  
 
Fukuzawa was a prolific writer. By 1869 he had published fifteen more books explaining Western 
science and social customs. Between 1872 and 1876, he published 17 volumes of Gakumon no 
Susume (Jap. 学問のすゝめ, lit. an encouragement of Learning or (more idiomatically) On Studying). 
Fukuzawa advocated his most lasting principle, "national independence through personal 
independence”. To achieve this independence, as well as personal independence, Fukuzawa 
advocated ‘Western learning’. 
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Given his wide experience of Europe and America in an era when few Japanese had any, his popularity 
and his prolific writing, Fukuzawa represents an example of a model contact zone intellectual, whose 
thought lay between Japan and the outside world. Before the 1868 revolution, he had already been part 
of Tokugawa embassies to five Seiyō countries, produced a dictionary as well as producing many 
volumes of studies of Seiyō for the Japanese public and created a school of ‘Western learning’ in Edo 
(Tōkyō). He was probably the foremost expert on Seiyō in early Meiji Japan, whilst also possessing an 
accomplished understanding of traditional Japanese cultural arts. The fact that he so distinctly 
promoted full ‘Westernisation’ of Japanese thought had a great impact on the thinking and government 
policies in the Meiji era. Unlike other writers, it is difficult to consider Fukuzawa mainly as a result of his 
times, given his influence on the Meiji reforms as Japan transitioned from the han system to one 
modeled on Seiyō: he was a strong force in himself and played an active role in ensuring his beliefs 
would become the Meiji reality. 
 
Concerning the transition from the Edo to the Meiji period, Fukuzawa famously stated at the start of the 
Meiji period, Japanese people were each one person with two lives: they were among the few people in 
history to have had experience of both old (Japanese) traditions and new (Seiyō) civilisation. Fukuzawa 
did not desire Japanese to be followers of only the ‘second life’ however, he wanted intellectual 
independence from the universalistic theories produced in Europe and believed it was possible: Japan 
was in a better position to talk about civilisation than Euro-Americans since they were currently going 
through the civilising process. (Hiraki, 1984: 211)  
 
Fukuzawa had a highly original idea of the meaning of civilisation for the period, based in the original 
and independent method of development by individuals rather than collective projects such as ‘industry’ 
and ‘democracy’: “in Western civilization,” Fukuzawa wrote, “the social fabric includes various theories 
that have developed side by side, have drawn closer to one another, and finally united into one 
civilization – in the process giving birth to freedom and independence.” (Fukuzawa, 1973[1874]: 37) In 
describing Western civilisation in such a way, Fukuzawa pinpointed the faculty of critical reason which 
was a necessary condition for European modernity (see Section 1.2). For Fukuzawa: 
 
“civilization means not only comfort in daily necessities but also the refining of knowledge 
and the cultivation of virtue so as to elevate human life to a higher plane... [Thus] it refers 
to the attainment of both material well-being and the elevation of the human spirit, [but] 
since what produces man’s well-being and refinement is knowledge and virtue, civilization 




This was an idea which resonated with Japanese educated in Confucian ideals, and this moral focus 
may also have helped bridge the intellectual gap between Chinese (Confucian ideal of an orderly and 
harmonious society) and Seiyō ideas of civilisation. Fukuzawa believed that civilisation was relative to 
time and circumstance, as well as comparative nations. For example Fukuzawa believed that at the 
time China was relatively civilized in comparison to some African colonies, and European nations were 
the most civilized of all. He claimed that “ dualistic representations such as Western control over 
nature versus Japanese dependence on nature, or Western technology and Japanese lack thereof, 
these differences embody a time-lag between the two identities, not an essential difference.” 
(Sakamoto, 1996: 118) Thus Fukuzawa followed the belief of the American diplomat, Townsend 
Harris, who had stated that “the invention of the steamship and telegraph had made communications 
vastly easier among nations and the whole world had become like one family” (Keene, 2002: 35-36): 
this temporal squeeze meant that the thought that all states were on a single development path 
became much more seductive and truthful. 
 
The process of becoming civilised was not as straightforward as the government’s rapid adoption policy 
seemed to suggest; for Fukuzawa although Japan could create the “external elements of civilisation” 
(such as modern armies, communications and buildings), it was more important to adopt the “spirit of 
civilisation”. Indeed “it was impossible, in Fukuzawa’s thinking, to be able to catch up with the leaders 
simply by purchasing modern arms, machinery and external structures, since civilization meant the 
development of the inner spirit, namely the virtue and knowledge, of the entire nation.” (Shunsaku, 
2000: 500)  
 
This idea very much chimed in with some foreign books, particularly British, being translated into 
Japanese at this time. NATAMURA Masanao, as mentioned earlier, translated a book renamed “Stories 
of Self-made Men in the West”. It was in fact a translation of the Scot Samuel Smiles's Self-Help (1859). 
In the preface Natamura writes: "is it true that a strong army secures public peace and order? Do you 
mean that the strength of Western countries derives from military might? No. The strength of Western 
countries relies upon people's strong faith in Heaven's way. In other words Western countries are 
strong because the people's right of self-government is widely recognised there and both 
administration and legislation are based on this principle." (Takeuchi, 1987: 7)  
 
Fukuzawa and Nakamura therefore wished for a more radical ‘Westernisation’, adopting the ideas and 
perspective of Seiyō, not just the external products, (Hiraki, 1984: 212) as was desired by Chinese 
scholars such as Feng Kuei-fen. The dangers of not undergoing mental revolution were manifold 
according to Fukuzawa: either countries would adopt the movement to “taste the fruit of civilisation” or 
they would be left without a choice in their own destiny. However there was no ultimate goal of the 
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modernising process, humans would all progress, and one day in the future “current Western 
civilization would be regarded as barbarous.” (Hiraki, 1984: 213) 
 
The idea of the public intellectual and a strong and independent civil society, separated from the 
government, was key in Fukuzawa’s writings, and was modeled explicitly on the functioning of 
European and American societies. This can be seen very clearly in its effect upon the architecture of 
Japanese authority in following sections, where architects were trained as autonomous agents. For 
Fukuzawa, “to be a nation meant to be ruler and be ruled simultaneously. The Japanese were not a 
nation since, historically, they had only been subjects… Progress for Japan would depend on the 
people becoming a nation by assuming the dual role of ruler and subject.” (Kōsaka, 1958: 80) This 
remained an issue throughout the Meiji period, when public participation was generally shallow and the 
modern tendency was led by government forces. This was in contrast to development in Europe and 
America at the time where, in spite of repression abroad, liberalism was the dominant political 
philosophy. 
 
Although he was a social critic of ‘traditional’ Japan, Fukuzawa also riled against foreign ideas which 
discriminated against Japan, particularly ideas which opposed his trust in the possibility of ‘progress’. 
For example he criticised Henry Thomas Buckle’s History of Civilisation in England (1857), which 
posited the binary notion of a world divided in two: civilisation in Europe and civilisation exterior to 
Europe. Buckle suggested that it was impossible for other places, including Asia, to become civilised to 
the same extent as Europe, due to physical matters such as climate and supply of food. (Hiraki, 1984: 
211-212) By the time that Fukuzawa was writing such theories no longer held much weight, however. 
By the 1870s:  
 
“the thing that contemporary English-speaking intellectuals discussed earnestly was 
“progress” in the sense of promoting the scientific advancement of social institutions 
according to a conception of social evolution, not the ad hoc dispensing of high culture or 
‘enlightened’ manners. Indeed it could be said that we can find a measure of how thorough 
a particular intellectual figure’s grasp of the contemporary English-speaking intellectual 
milieu was precisely by establishing how far they were inclined to discuss the dynamic 
implications of the evolutionary model; if they were quoting Buckle and Guizot (or Bacon 
and Newton) rather than Smiles and Spencer, one could conclude that they were either 
working with stale material or were perhaps simply more interested in the literati-orientated 




Fukuzawa, whilst preceding Spencer into Japan, fitted neatly into this overweening interest in progress 
because it enabled him (and other Japanese intellectuals) to conceive of progress outside of 
predetermined cultural models.  
 
This belief that Japan could (and currently was engaged in) progress was against the background that 
prejudice against other Asians had become common in the Meiji period. Asia, and particularly China 
and Korea, underwent a period of Othering by many Japanese intellectuals, with Fukuzawa (1885) 
leading the movement to ‘escape from Asia’. By 1885, Fukuzawa believed that Japan had become 
aligned more closely with Seiyō than with its neighbours: 
 
“Not only have we escaped the old habits of Japan, but we have devised a new strategy 
concerning Asian countries; its fundamental idea is “escape from Asia”…. Today China and 
Korea are no help at all to our country. On the contrary, because our three countries are 
adjacent we are sometimes regarded as the same in the eyes of civilized Western peoples. 
Appraisals of China and Korea are applied to our country… and indirectly this greatly 
impedes our foreign policy. It is really a great misfortune for our country… It follows that in 
making our present plans we have not time to await the development of neighbouring 
countries and join them in reviving Asia. Rather, we should escape from them and join the 
company of Western civilized nations. Although China and Korea are our neighbours, this 
fact should make no difference in our relations with them. We should deal with them as 
Westerners do. If we keep bad company, we cannot avoid a bad name. In my heart I 
favour breaking off with the bad company of East Asia.” (Fukuzawa, 1885 quoted in Pyle, 
1969: 149, my emphasis)  
 
In terms of approach to foreign policy, pragmatism, power politics, and interference in other nations’ 
affairs, all accelerated after the Meiji Restoration. These were all activities practiced by the 19th century 
Great Powers and promoted by Fukuzawa. Cultural affinity, for instance, had no bearing on Fukuzawa’s 
view on how to deal with Japan’s neighbours. This is partly because Fukuzawa saw culture as a 
malleable substance that should be shaped to promote civilisation. I can state that Fukuzawa had a 
view of culture similar to the sociologist Zygmunt Bauman: “If… we think of something as being a 
matter of culture, rather than nature, what we imply is that the thing in question is manipulable”. 
(Bauman, 1989: 142-143) Through cultural distancing Fukuzawa created a legitimate discourse of 
breaking from Asia. Concern with progress appeared to hinder connections to the past irrevocably in 
Fukuzawa’s thought, and this can be seen as part of a broader movement of Othering Japan from Asia. 
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As mentioned in the Introduction, this identity formation and differentiation was achieved through study 
of the Orient from an ethnocentric historical viewpoint, which involved the creation of a new 
geographical entity comprised of Japan, Korea and China alongside other ‘Oriental’ countries from 
Turkey to India. This area was named Tōyō, (with its corollary as Seiyō) and a discipline dedicated to its 
study, Tōyō-shi (Jap. 東洋史, lit. Oriental history), was created. According to TANAKA Stefan:  
 
“tōyō played a dual role: like the Western Orient, it was the respected antiquity, but for 
Japan it was also one that was older than the beginning of Europe. In this way Japan was 
able to place itself on the same level as the Occident and incorporate the figurative future – 
the West – into its world. However, contemporary shina (China) was a disorderly place – 
not a nation – from which Japan could both separate itself and express its paternal 
compassion and guidance.” (Tanaka, 1993: 108) 
 
Intellectually, this split was very helpful to both Japanese intellectuals and Japanese statesmen, who 
could historically recognise their link to Tōyō whilst distancing themselves from the current 
unprogressive states in Korea and China. In doing this, Japan was put into a better bargaining position 





The establishment of five schools of thought 
Following Fukuzawa’s early writings, the arguments that followed on what Japan’s path should be 
resulted in a new discourse. Several distinct streams of attitude towards the civilisation mission 
pursued by the Meiji government began to develop on the direction that Japan was taking, a somewhat 
This image can be seen in the printed thesis at the University of Sheffield library. 
 
2.5. Japanese 
popular print, kaika 
injun kohai kagami, 
1873. Source from 
Tachibana, 2004. 
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chaotic situation, and the source of popular satire as shown in fig. 2.5. By 1888 SHIGA Shigetaka (Jap. 
志賀重昂, 1863-1927), a public intellectual and educator, had identified five schools of thought that 
dominated the debates over the course Japan should take. These splits indicated the growing schism 
between ‘traditional’ ways of understanding the world and new Seiyō-based world-views, as well as the 
growth of a syncretic approach to these issues: 
 
•  The first school of thought was that of the influential journalist, TOKUTOMI Sohō (Jap. 
徳富蘇峰, 1863-1957), and his group, the Min'yū-sha (Jap. 民友社, lit. People’s Friends), 
who argued for Nihon bunshi Daha Shugi (Jap. 日本分子打破主義, lit. eliminating 
Japanese traditional elements), or Heimin Shugi (Jap. 平 民 主 義 , lit. total 
modernisation/westernisation of Japan from the grass roots). This advocacy called for 
constructing a productive, democratic society and for reforming the previous feudalistic, 
militant one. The Min'yū-sha also had a magazine, Kokumin no tomo (Jap. 国民之友, lit. 
the Nation’s Friend), as their tool.  
•  The second was the Seikyōsha (Jap. 政教社, lit. Society for Political Education), to 
which Shiga belonged. They advocated Kokusui Shugi (Jap. 国粋主義), which called for 
preservation of what had been unique to Japan while modernising the country. They 
campaigned for Japan's adaptation of Seiyō ideas and institutions, but insisted that this 
adaptation should be selective, based on the needs and particular character of the 
Japanese people. Other than Shiga the other key intellectuals were MIYAKE Setsurei 
(Jap. 三宅雪嶺, 1860-1945) and KUGA Katsunan (Jap. 陸羯南, 1857-1907) and the 
journal, Nihonjin (Jap. 日本人 , lit. the Japanese) was set up and supported their 
viewpoints. 
•  The third group was comprised of intellectuals such as Jukyōshugi Sha (Jap. 儒教主義
社, lit. Confucian scholars) and Kokugaku Sha (Jap. 国学社, lit. scholars of National 
Learning) who supported Nihon Kyūbunshi iji Shugi (Jap. 日本旧分子維持主義, lit. 
maintenance of Japanese traditional elements, particularly Confucian principles). The 
most representative scholars of this school were MOTODA Eifu (Jap. 元田永孚 , 
1818-1891), who taught the emperor Meiji, and NISHIMURA Shigeki (Jap. 西村茂樹, 
1828-1902), who established the Tōkyō Shyûshin Gakusha (Jap. 修身学社, lit. the 
Tokyo Morality School) in 1881 which expanded and was renamed as Nihon Kōdō-kai 
(Jap. 日本弘道会, lit. the Japan Morality School) in 1888. 
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•  The fourth group advocated Setchū shugi (Jap. 折衷主義, lit. the syncretic or eclectic 
approach), the blend of matter and spirit through which the scientific ethos of ‘the West’ 
could be synthesised with the moral values of the Orient. 
•  The fifth group was represented by the Meiji government. Government policy was 
discussed at some length in Section 2.2: their policies for the indiscriminate 
Westernisation of Japan were criticised by most of the other groups as disguising with 
coats of paint. (Gavin, 1999: 12-14)  
 
In the late 1880s the first two groups were particularly influential. The critical period of debate on the 
purpose of modernisation in Japan began in 1885 with the publication of an influential book proclaiming 
the emergence of a new generation of ‘Meiji youth.’ Tokutomi, the leader the People’s Friends “urged 
youth to seek total Westernisation of Japanese society along the lines of nineteenth-century liberal 
doctrine. Only thus, he argued, could Japan become a strong industrial nation, the equal of the 
Western powers. Tokutomi became a leading spokesman for the new generation; and the Westernism 
advocated in Min'yū-sha periodicals enjoyed for a time great vogue among educated young Japanese.” 
(Pyle, 1969: 4-5) Given the modernisation efforts of the early Meiji leaders, who were mostly in their 
20s in 1868, this movement was very influential and credible. 
 
Tokutomi wrote in the years after Fukuzawa’s heyday on eliminating Japanese traditional elements; his 
key works were Youth of the New Japan (1885) and Japan in the Future (1886). Like Fukuzawa, 
Tokutomi was born of a samurai family, became a student of English and later a prominent journalist. 
Tokutomi wrote in the same vein as Fukuzawa, emphasising the positive aspects of Seiyō and taking 
on the idea that civilisation could be achieved in Japan. This argument was based on the assumption 
that the differences between Japan and Euro-America were not essential, categorical differences but 
the lack of Japanese civilisation was due to a current lack of ‘progress’ that could be overcome in time.  
 
According to Tokutomi, the main issue facing Japan was that the old power structure of Japan 
remained strong and the new enlightened people establishing civilisation were still immature. (Hiraki, 
1984: 214) These people in the future would be able to break down the power structure through 
industrialisation. Tokutomi had followed the intellectual fashion of the English speaking world in 
following Spencer; he held that all societies of the world were either of the ‘military type’ or the 
‘industrial type’. Tokutomi was particularly influenced by Herbert Spencer’s notion of unilinear progress 
of humanity, arguing that every society in the world would progress from military to industrial society in 
a straight line. To do this Japan should follow ‘the general trend of the world’ and introduce civilisation 
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appropriately. The main mechanism to gain it was through industry which would lead to a “democratic 
society [as] an inevitable result”. (Hiraki, 1984: 216) 
 
Taking the idea of evolution into the human sphere, Tokutomi was also an advocate of the “escape from 
Asia” movement of Fukuzawa, believing that Japan should rise above its pre-industrial neighbours. 
This was particularly since “countries that did not follow this trend would be dominated by the industrial 
nations.” (Pyle, 1969: 40) Tokutomi held to Spencer’s theory that the old world (the West) would 
struggle against the new (other countries) and that in the end the old world would be defeated. (Hiraki, 
1984: 217) Tokutomi’s writings were optimistic for the future, but reflected the perception that Japan 
was currently on a lower rung of the evolutionary ladder than the ‘Occident’.  
 
Tokutomi was criticised by his contemporaries such as NAKAE Chōmin (Jap. 中江兆民, 1847-1901) 
particularly concerning his idiosyncratic idea of ‘progress’ and heimin shugi (Jap. 平民主義 lit. broad 
people rule righteously (a phrase used to describe democracy)) the total modernisation of Japan. 
Tokutomi’s belief in the God of Progress was related to his belief in Spencer’s theory of progress, which 
he may have considered the latest theory to emerge from Seiyō. (Hiraki, 1984: 216-217) Tokutomi saw 
pre-Meiji Japan as fitting neatly into the militaristic phase, where society was subject to strict 
hierarchies in which: “from the despot down to the slave, all are masters of those below and subjects of 
those above”. (Pyle, 1969: 38) Tokutomi, “believing that Japan was subject to the same kinds of forces 
that Spencer had described in Western nations,… pictured Meiji Japan as moving from an aristocratic, 
militant social structure toward a democratic, industrial society.” (Pyle, 1969: 39) Tokutomi’s thought 
was “dominated by a negative image of Japan’s traditional culture and the character traits it had bred… 
One searches Tokutomi’s early writings in vain for some sense of Japanese individuality that might give 
a modern Japanese pride. But one finds only a shameful negative identity” (Pyle, 1969: 49), and this 
was an identity taken up by a great many of his acolytes and other adherents in civil society. The 
Min'yū-sha could find no worth in the particularistic values and achievements of Japanese culture. 
Tokotomi stated that: “Our country can never be preserved by… the Tosa [Jap. 土佐] school of painters, 
or by the architecture of the Horuji [Jap. 法隆寺, Hōryū-ji] or the Shosoin [Jap. 正倉院], or by sculpture, 
or by the celebrated capitals Nara and Kyoto.” (Pyle, 1969: 147-148) 
 
This group, though influential, were by no means representative of the wider society, many of whom 




“For many Japanese in this period of intense national consciousness, alienation from their 
own cultural heritage posed perplexing dilemmas. Building a powerful industrial nation 
required supplanting much of Japanese tradition with techniques and practices borrowed 
from the West. Young Japanese were troubled by the implications of this process, for the 
very modernity they sought had in some sense to be regarded as alien in origin. They were 
in fact painfully sensitive to the self-effacement that cultural borrowing implied. They saw in 
Westernization the destruction of Japanese identity.” (Pyle, 1969: 4)  
 
The anti-traditional groups did not garner much wider appeal beyond government officials and other 
reactionaries, and so genuine cultural revolution to copy the social results of the Enlightenment did not 
fully occur. 
 
As the decade wore on, the Seikyōsha (Society for Political Education) developed as a rival group, and 
gained increasing appeal. The group was founded in 1888 with the declared purpose “the preservation 
of Japan’s cultural autonomy. Although its members… were imbued with Western values and 
committed to the adoption of many Western institutions, they believed that only by maintaining a 
distinct cultural identity could Japanese feel equal to Westerners and recover their national pride. In 
their writings they sought to define Japan’s uniqueness and to formulate an independent Japanese role 
in international society.” (Pyle, 1969: 5) The emphasis of the Seikyōsha was on the necessity of reform 
of Japanese society due to external factors rather than the intrinsic worth of ‘Westernisation’. Yet at the 
same time, leading theorists, such as Kuga, wrote of their respect for Seiyō: 
 
“We recognise the excellence of Western civilization. We value the Western theories of 
rights, liberty, and equality; and we respect Western philosophy and morals. We have 
affection for some Western customs. Above all, we esteem Western science, economics, 
and industry. These, however, ought not to be adopted simply because they are Western; 
they ought to be adopted only if they contribute to Japan’s welfare. Thus we seek not to 
revive a narrow xenophobia, but rather to promote the national spirit in an atmosphere of 
brotherhood.” (Kuga, 1889: 2-3) 
 
The Seikyōsha posited that a country needs to be centrally administered with spiritual integrity, while 
advancing technologically according to the imagined model of Seiyō; otherwise the country’s very 
existence could be threatened by a ‘superior’ race such as the Anglo-Saxons, as had happened to the 
native Maori in New Zealand. Shiga himself was convinced that this was in accordance with the 
theories of Darwinism; New Zealand being perfect proof of the survival of the fittest. Britain was the 
most ‘superior’ nation at that time and there was an urgent need to build Japan’s economic, political 
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and spiritual foundations in a more constructive way than by merely copying everything European or 
American.  
 
An intellectual who fitted the thinking of the fourth school of thought, the eclectics and synthesisers, 
was MORI Ogai (Jap. 森鴎外, 1862-1922), a doctor who had trained in Western medicine in Germany. 
For Mori, Seiyō symbolised science and a logical, systematic way of thinking. For him modernisation 
was an unfinished process in Japan: 
 
“It was not without regret that I returned to a country which does not yet afford necessary 
conditions for exploration of new fields in science,- I say ‘not yet,’ because I do not think 
that there is no hope for the Japanese race.” (Mori, 1911 quoted in Kato, 1965: 432) 
 
Due to the lack of advancement in technology and industry, Mori stated that “Japan is yet in 
construction.” (Mori, 1910: quoted in Kato, 1965: 432) As late as 1910, Mori emphasised the 
transitional nature of his contemporary Japan, which still required considerable building. Whilst 
disparaged, the Meiji government stood for the fifth school of thought; the most powerful and dominant 
viewpoint was characterised by indiscriminate Westernisation of Japan. 
 
 
Meiji critics of superficial Westernisation 
As was the dynamic in government policy, the overall state of confusion and self-castigation was 
influenced by how Seiyō opinions and theories fed into the debates. For instance, Buckle’s ideas of the 
permanent lack of progress outside of Europe were necessarily rejected by Japanese and, as seen 
throughout this thesis, the ideas of progress and civilisation were informed most strongly in the 1870s 
by Herbert Spencer. This rejection can be seen as a blow to the strict structural Orientalism of Said. 
Said states “Western Orientalist literature has created the image of the Orient as the West's Other, 
which signifies primitiveness, stagnation and unreason.” (Sakamoto, 1996: 115) Yet such theories, 
whilst present in intellectual circles under Buckle and others, were important in Japan for providing a 
starting point: theories which characterised the East as stagnant and primitive acted as a spur in Japan 
to become kindai (modernize). Whilst this may not have been the case in countries which failed to resist 
Seiyō imperial power in the 19th century, overcoming the idea of the static East explains a great deal of 
how Japan was able to overcome the perceived threat from abroad. Japanese intellectuals refuted the 
idea that Japan was inherently static, and stated the importance of joining the stream of progress: 
 
“Japan should follow “the general trend of the world.” (Pyle [quoting Tokutomi], 1969: 49)  
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“[Innovations] ought not to be adopted simply because they are Western; they ought to be 
adopted only if they contribute to Japan’s welfare.” (Pyle [quoting Kuga]65, 1969: 119) 
 
Whilst largely united by the notion that progress was desirable, Meiji ‘enlightenment’ was “highly 
pluralistic and indicative of more than a single set of ideas.” (Najita, 1974: 89) These process 
orientated theories underlined a general recognition that Japan was ‘civilising’, that is, undergoing 
changes that would lead to it being viewed as a civilised nation. To do so required contesting past 
identities as with TOKUTOMI Sohō.  
 
Outside the mainstream, other thinkers were critics of the modernisation process though these were 
not so unified as to create a ‘school of thought’; the manifest emptiness of copying the forms of another 
culture and only partially transplanting the content was the strongest complaint. The Christian 
UCHIMURA Kanzō (Jap. 内村鑑三, 1861-1930) developed his theories outside of the five established 
schools of thought laid out by Shiga above; his key works were The Earth and Man (1897) and A New 
Civilisation (1926). For Uchimura, ‘Westernisation’ was an empty process without ‘Western’ religion 
because the progress of Seiyō was essentially connected to the Christian faith. For the purpose of 
progress, heathen nations should be converted to Christianity as the “religion of Civilization” modelling 
themselves on the Christian nations that gave concrete form to it. (Hiraki, 1984: 217-218) Christianity 
was another perspective for viewing Seiyō culture: the Japanese were even trying to find the 
perspective of religion, which shows how they sought the foundations of ‘modernity’ in any possible 
way throughout the Meiji period and after. 
 
As modernisation without religious change occurred in Japan, the products of the process were 
distorted imitations of the culture: “Ancient Jews described hypocrites with the words ‘whited sepulcher’; 
‘white painted house’ may be the best word to call the present Japanese.” (Uchimura, 1897, quoted in 
Kato, 1965: 432) This may be a reference to the ‘Western’ buildings built by Japanese carpenters in the 
Meiji period, explored in Section 3.2, showing the influence of architecture as a symbol of 
‘Westernisation’. Uchimura went as far to say that: 
 
“Japan [is] adopting this Western civilization which is no civilisation… True, Japan by her 
adoption of the Western methods of warfare, has won her place among the Great Powers 
of the world in less than a century;… but she lost the love of the world… Japan 
Westernized herself and the West has disowned her.” (Hiraki, 1984: 220) 
 
                                                   
65
 The quote is from ‘Tōkyō Dempō’ (Jap. 東京電報, Tōkyo Telegraph) on 9th June 1888 by KUGA Katsunan. 
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The novelist and playwright NAGAI Kafū (Jap. 永井荷風, 1879-1959), on the other hand, represented a 
secular, ambivalent attitude towards modernity. For him Seiyō symbolised sensitive forms in which a 
historical culture was incarnated; it was not possible to simply transfer Europe elsewhere. Nagai often 
stated assertions such as Meiji “is not reform, not progress, not construction. Meiji means nothing but 
destruction: the beauty of old aspects was destroyed only to be replaced by a confusion of all bad 
qualities produced in one night.” (Nagai, 1909: quoted in Kato, 1965: 433) Reflecting the pressure to 
conform to the Westernising path, Nagai said “There may be no country where you can do so many 
things so easily as in present day Japan. If you refuse, however, to live in such a way, you have to give 
place to others and retire.” (Nagai, 1915: quoted in Kato, 1965: 433) For him, the civilising process led 
to the false and untrue. 
 
NATSUME Sōseki, known by his pen name ‘Sōseki’, was the most significant of the critics of 
‘Westernisation’: a wildly popular novelist, he is still considered the greatest literary figure of the Meiji 
era. He was a scholar of British literature and composer of haiku (Jap. 俳句 lit. no separate plural 
form), Chinese-style poetry, and fairy tales. In many ways he can be considered a melancholy product 
of his times, ambiguity and confusion being central to his character. Born in 1867, he was the eighth 
and final child of his family and was adopted twice and mistreated and left twice. Although unwanted 
until age ten, he became the hope of his family after his brothers grew sick. Sōseki grew to love 
Chinese art and literature in childhood, and enrolled at a private academy where only Chinese classics 
were taught. He decided at 16 to go to Tokyo Imperial University and knew he needed to study English 
to do so: his choice was made in a society when telegraphs, trains, baseball, Western-architecture, and 
beef serving restaurants were being introduced: an expertise in Chinese literature did not seem 
conducive to a good career. Although he flirted with the idea of becoming an architect, he instead chose 
English studies which he studied and taught until the age of 40.  
 
After graduating Sōseki gained a prestigious job teaching English studies at the University, but 
unexpectedly quit to teach at a provincial high school. He also wrote and submitted haiku and Chinese 
verse. After a number of years working in the provinces he was brought to the attention of the 
government who ordered him to London (1901-1903) on a government scholarship where he became 
the first Japanese scholar in English literature. His years there were not happy. Describing the time later, 
he said: “the two years I spent in London were the most unpleasant years in my life. Among English 
gentlemen I lived in misery, like a poor dog that had strayed among a pack of wolves.” (Sōseki, 
2009[1907]: 48) At 40 Sōseki wrote his first novel, I Am A Cat, and soon became a full time writer. He 
subsequently wrote 8 books in 9 years, as well as essays and lectures. Although his career was brief 
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he was heralded in own life time, and had a number of disciples; unfortunately his physical and mental 
health had always been poor and he died at the early age of 49. 
 
For Sōseki Seiyō symbolised individualism and internalised moral values. Because Japan underwent a 
process of hurried transfer rather than a lengthy translation, the process of ‘Westernisation’ had 
produced a large number of superficial actions which Soseki highlighted: 
 
“What we are doing now is not a result of our own development, but of the influences from 
outside. In one word, the modernization of contemporary Japan can be summed up as a 
superficial one. I am not saying all of it must be superficial. On such a complicated problem 
we should refrain from any sweeping generalisation. Yet I cannot help admitting that the 
large part of our modernisation is at its best like this. My point is not that we should stop it, 
but that we actually have no choice, however sad it may be, other than to go on with this 
superficial way.” (Sōseki, 1911, quoted in Kato, 1965: 432) 
 
Yet he tried to explain and make sense for why Japan had taken this step in his earlier novel Sanshirō 
(Jap. 三四郎, a protagonist’s name): 
 
“We are the young people who cannot stand the oppression of old Japan, but at the same 
time, we cannot stand the oppression of the new Occident. We have to shout out loud to 
the public that we are living under these two oppressions. The oppression of the new 
Occident is as torturous for our generation as the oppression of old Japan. We are 
scholars of Occidental literature and art and this is just study. It is totally free from any idea 
that we surrender to them. We do not study Occidental literature and art to be 
captured by them. We study them so that we can release ourselves from them.” 
(Sōseki, 1908, quoted in Kikuchi, 2004: 78, my emphasis) 
 
In Soseki the cultural ambiguity of Japan’s pursuit of kindai (modern) is best seen, for the process was 
a transplanted and hurried one: “because the enlightenment in the West – what Soseki called ‘general 
enlightenment’ – in an internal development and the enlightenment in Japan is externally derived, 
Japan, perforce, must suffer twofold agonies. It is Japan’s fate that its enlightenment, which must be 
transformed into an internal one if it is not to be false, must remain an externally developed one.” 
(Kōsaka, 1958: 446) Whilst Fukuzawa successfully pushed for a policy of leaving Asia and joining the 
West (in diplomatic terms certainly), it was a joining where it was difficult to feel any sense of true 
belonging.  
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It is interesting to note the similarities between FUKUZAWA Yukichi and NATSUME Sōseki in spite of 
their divergent attitudes towards Seiyō. They were two of the most important intellectual figures in the 
Meiji period, and, retrospectively, the most important figures overall. First, much of what they wrote 
came grounded in life experiences, with interest and respect for both the Occident and Japan gained 
through direct contact with both. Second, a particularly striking commonality between them was their 
shared interest and expertise in ‘Western learning’, particularly in English. Their strong understanding 
of the culture of Seiyō led to a more balanced appreciation of both the value and the havoc that 
adopting foreign practices would cause in Japan. Finally, both were fierce critics of the superficial 
character of Meiji modernisation; by changing so much at only a shallow material level, modernisation 
only spread confusion and lacked a cohesive national identity. 
 
Sōseki was a less conventional figure than Fukuzawa, since his views came from a more personal 
position of alienation and ambivalence concerning the modernisation project. He wrote later than 
Fukuzawa and so the political climate was no longer so uncritically positive towards Westernisation; 
when Sōseki was appointed Professor of English literature at Tokyo University it was to replace the 
popular foreign professor Patrick Lafcadio Hearn (Japanese name KOIZUMI Yakumo, Jap. 小泉八雲, 
1850-1904) as part of a process of promoting Japanese graduate students to become University 
teachers, a process that the British architect Josiah Conder (explored from Section 3.3) also felt the 
force of midway through his career in Japan. (Sōseki, 1978: 263) The bitterness and conflict between 
Japanese and Western values is a much more apparent theme in Sōseki’s works. For example, the 
main character, Sanshirō (in the 1908 novel Sanshirō) was “one of those destined to stand wistfully 
between worlds, never able to step in.” (Sōseki, 1978: 269) This resonates with Fukuzawa’s prophetic 
phrase ‘one person with two lives’.  
 
According to my notion of Japanese institution of kindai (modernisation) as a reactive culture change 
driven by external conditions, Sōseki is the intellectual who gets closest to the heart of the issue and 
ambiguity of the Japanese condition in the Meiji period, for he points to the inevitability of modernisation 
in the context. His own depression and identity crisis can be put down to some extent to these 
geo-political issues, particularly his years in the UK. Yet given the political context of Seiyō latent 
aggression, change and strengthening was the only positive path to be taken in Japan. Hearn wrote in 
1894 that “Japan has attempted too much; yet under the circumstance she could not have attempted 
less.” (Hearn, 1894, quoted in Pyle, 1969: 3) This caters to Bauman’s idea of ‘modernity’: once you 
have become modern there is no way to retire. (Lecture in 2012)  
 
 153 
To sum up, fearing the fate of China after 1842, and after directly experiencing the new geo-political 
context of the late-Edo period in which Seiyō was politically and militarily dominant, it became clear to 
the leaders of both the Shogunate and anti-Shogunate forces that Japan must change. From the 
evidence presented in this Chapter, we can see that for scholars and intellectuals of the Meiji period, 
there was little disagreement with the necessity for fundamental change to Japan. This agreement 
points to the deep and fundamental impact that the unequal relations of the contact zone had exerted 
on Japan: at the elite level, transculturation occurred, fusing two cultures, the original Japanese culture 
and the new, ‘powerful’ one from abroad. Given this fusion, we can say that the desire for maintaining 
the existing cultural identity came into conflict with the desire for cultural evolution to fit with the ‘modern 
times’ presented to Japan.  
 
The question dealt with by government officials and intellectuals was therefore a question of 
boundaries and where to set these: what limits should there be to the changes to the Japanese cultural 
identity? Different answers were given to this question, from changing the religion to Christianity, 
adopting ‘Western’ culture totally, or maintaining a Confucian identity to the maximum possible extent. 
Even detractors of the ‘total Westernisation’ school such as the Seikyōsha either held or engaged with 
the assumptions of social Darwinism and other ‘modern’ theories. But no school or intellectual 
questioned that fundamental change was necessary for Japan: there was a deep seated will (or a 
deeply taken decision) to change and adapt at the elite level.  
 
This situation resulted in a large contrast with the approach taken in China to a similar threat. When 
Hobsbawm considers why Japan alone successfully took the change and strengthening approach, he 
points out that Japan was the only country to possess both the will and capacity to do so: 
 
“China was plainly capable of beating the westerners at their own game, at least in as 
much as it amply possessed the technical skills, intellectual sophistication, education, 
administrative experience and business capacities required for the purpose. But China was 
too enormous, too self-sufficient, too accustomed to considering itself the centre of 
civilization for the incursion of yet another brand of dangerous and long-nosed barbarians, 
however technically advanced, to suggest immediately the wholesale abandonment of the 
ancient ways. China did not want to imitate the west. Educated men in Mexico did want to 
imitate liberal capitalism… [but] the will was greater than the capacity. But Japan 
possessed both.” (Hobsbawm, 1975: 148) 
 
This will to change in Japan, coupled with the skills and sophistication to adapt, was mirrored in the 
sphere of carpentry and architecture, which, as we have seen, had gained a status as symbolic of the 
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wider approach to modernisation in Japan by Meiji critics. Yet, as shall become apparent, the changes 
in the field of carpentry were largely forced on practitioners by changes in taste and in the new purpose 
of public buildings: to display to Seiyō that Japan could match the Great Powers in artistic and scientific 
endeavors. This trend left customary carpentry practice as a low priority and had a large effect upon the 





































Architectural dual kindai (modern) movement in Japan 
 
 
“So far as our knowledge at present extends, there is not a single permanent building 
in the island [of Japan] of so monumental a character as to deserve being dignified by 
being classed among the true architectural examples of other countries. It may be 
that the dread of earthquakes has prevented them raising their buildings to more than 
one or two storeys in height, or constructing them of more solid materials than wood. 
It may be, however, that the Japanese do not belong to one of the building races of 
mankind, and have no taste for this mode of magnificence…. Such information as we 
have is very discouraging; and it is to be feared that, though quaint and curious in 
itself, and so far worthy of attention, it is of little interest beyond the shores of the 
islands themselves. On the other hand, it is feared that the extent of our knowledge is 
sufficient to make it only too clear that the art, as practised in Japan, has no title to 
rank with that already described in the preceding pages, and consequently no claim 
to a place in a general history of architectural art.” (Fergusson, 1876: 709-710) 
 
“Chinese structures have nothing durable about them, for perishable wood forms an 
essential element in their construction… The architecture of the Chinese temples 
does not differ from that of the other buildings…. Chinese architecture is as invariable 
as everything else in the Celestial Empire, and Chinese art, generally, is the same as 
it was many hundreds of years ago.” (Rosengarten, 1876: 54-56) 
 
In order to discuss the effect that the centralisation of administration, fundamentally changing the 
notion of civilisation, and the drive to create a new vision of Japan had upon architecture, it is important 
to first explore ‘traditional’ buildings in contrast with those called modern. This is because in many ways 
the kindai (modern) buildings were created in response to existing Japanese buildings and the growing 
negative perception of them abroad and then consequently in Japan. The quotes from James 
Fergusson and Albert Rosengarten are from the architectural history textbooks used in England and 
then imported into Japan in the first university architecture course; whilst written by Europeans from 
positions of ignorance (Rosengarten wrote only three sweeping pages on Chinese architecture and did 
not mention Japan), the propagation of Orientalist viewpoints on the architecture of China and Japan 
led students to see traditional buildings as lacking permanence, monumentality, dynamism, and a place 
in the world history of architecture. 
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This section begins with the stereotypes attributed to pre-Meiji carpenters by Seiyō and Japanese, 
what their building practices were and what these practices produced. By examining these issues we 
can more accurately judge why a profession of ‘architect’ was deemed necessary and how kindai 
(modernity) infiltrated the practice of Japanese carpentry. Subsequently this chapter explores how 
carpenters adapted to the conditions of Meiji Japan before exploring the role of foreign experts and the 
education system they set up. Finally this chapters looks in depth first at the buildings of Victorian 
Japan built by foreign architects before exploring how the first two generations of Japanese ‘architects’ 
inherited their mission of modernity.  
 
 
3.1 The practices of carpentry before the ‘kindai (modern)’ 
From the Meiji period until today, a legacy of the early Orientalist studies on East Asia has been that 
Japanese craftsmen have been largely characterised as 1) idyllic and perfectionist and 2) static and 
‘pre-modern’. The first myth was particularly created by foreigners in the Meiji period to represent 
Japanese carpenters as people who lived their art, never stopping until reaching perfection, yet never 
striving to reach beyond the collective to create unique and individual works of art. Such ideas about 
the Japanese proliferated in the Victorian age, when fascination with exotic cultures led to states such 
as Japan being characterised as being pure and somewhat naïve, leading to fashions for Japanese art 
and landscape gardening as a taste of the pre-modern.  
 
Prior to the Meiji Restoration “writers sought the 'Old Japan' of the interior which was idealized as a 
paradise, a dreamlike 'wonderland' peopled by 'chubby children and rosy maidens'.” (Jackson, 1992: 
280) Such myths were propagated by those who had lived in Japan and had idealised the conditions 
there: for instance, the founder of the College of Engineering in Tokyo, Henry Dyer, wrote in his book, 
Japan: the Britain of the East:  
 
“During the Tokugawa period, extending over two hundred and sixty years, Japan was in a 
state of perfect tranquillity, and the feudal chiefs did a great deal to encourage and protect 
manufacturing industry, especially that of an artistic nature. The energy which was formerly 
spent on internecine war was expended in friendly rivalry in the industrial arts, and the 
consequence was that a very high standard of excellence was attained. The best work was 
not made for sale, but for use or presentation; time was not money, and the artificers and 
artists threw their personalities and all their skill into their work. Both artists and workmen 
were free to work when they felt in the mood to do justices to their objects, and equally free 
to seek repose the instant fatigue notified them of their failing powers. They therefore had 
real pleasure in their work, and each of the products was a distinct specimen of skill, 
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perfect, novel, and idiosyncratic. Nothing short of what they considered perfection was 
allowed to pass; for their honour as craftsmen and artists was at stake.” (Dyer, 1904: 153) 
 
Works such as Dyer’s promoted the naïve view that Japanese craftsmen (whose products were prized 
and fashionable in Europe and America as part of the Japonisme trend) were not under economic 
pressures themselves, that strife did not exist and that industrialisation was not present in any sense: 
Japan was everything that Industrial Britain was not. These ideas of high attainment of art and lack of 
organisation are only understandable alongside the second myth of Japanese carpenters: Japanese 
architectural development was stuck in one style and distinctly pre-modern, a view propagated in part 
by post-war architectural historians such as: 
 
“We can divide the history of Japanese architecture into two periods by this [Meiji] 
revolution; it may be said that Japanese architecture had developed continuously without 
its style being changed before this revolution and since then it has developed into modern 
architecture under the strong influences of the West.” (Abe, 1954: 13) 
 
Both the statement on Japanese craftsmen by Dyer and the pre-modern/modern distinction by Abe 
represent a gross simplification and a lack of rigour in scholarship. As for the first myth on craftsmen, 
this section will explore whether this idyllic imagining of the Edo-period was accurate for carpentry. For 
the pre-modern/modern stylistic separation in Abe’s work, 1954, whilst some distinctions are needed 
between periods it is dangerous to apply hard labels to architecture work. Stylistic categories in 
Japanese architecture such as Wayo (Jap. 和様, lit. Japanese style) and Zenshuyo (Jap. 禅宗様, lit. 
Zen style), are only useful in indicating collections of commonly held characteristics: they are historical 
afterthoughts. When classifying work as ‘Classicist’, ‘Gothic’ or ‘Baroque’ it is necessary to bear in mind 
that historical architects decided from the limited palette of styles available to them and did not always 
‘choose’ styles. The divisions between styles often say more about the divider than the divided. 
Grouping pre-Meiji carpenters together into one category does as great a disservice to the 
sophistication and development of those carpenters as dividing British architectural history into 
‘pre-Victorian’ and ‘Modern’ architecture would do to British architectural development.  
 
As scholarship in architecture has moved on in recent decades, “it has proved more useful to examine 
the contribution of architects as individuals or, in the case of customary building traditions, to identify 
the characteristic contributions of families of master artisans.” (Coaldrake, 1996: 172) This method of 
rigour and study of individuals and currents is what makes distinctions by academics such as Ade of 
dividing Japanese architecture into simple pre-modern/modern dichotomies so unsatisfactory. This 
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section will use contextualised case studies of individuals/guilds and their products to understand the 
development of the profession of carpentry in Japan. In doing so the myths surrounding pre-Meiji 
carpenters will be addressed, particularly their supposed lack of professionalism and development. 
 
It is important to ask in this section, who were Japanese carpenters? How did they work? What did they 
build? Most carpenters worked within a family tradition (which individuals could marry into). Master 
carpenters were in the artisan rank and so were below the samurai and farmers but above merchants. 
By the Edo period many carpenters were chōnin (Townsmen), a new class for upwardly mobile artisans 
and merchants; chōnin could more easily socialise with samurai and even be given extraordinary titles 
for great work. Usually carpenters operated within family guilds and worked together along a division of 
labour, having different tasks in the building process; master carpenters though were expected to have 
knowledge of every part of the design and construction process.  
 
The education of a carpenter goes some way to explaining how they worked. During the Edo period, 
the education of carpenters mostly took place at work through allocation of tasks. This apprentice 
system was at once a part of the division of labour at the building site and an opportunity for learning 
from elders in practice. The carpenter was a part of a system within which he worked, and education 
was difficult to separate from work. This method of education is explained by the contemporary master 
carpenter, NISHIOKA Tsunekazu (Jap. 西岡常一, 1908-1995), who saw his education as coming from 
an equally valid approach to academic study which has “1,300 years of experimental observation in 
Japan alone.” (Brown, 1989: 30) This education was through on the job learning and an apprentice 
system: “this means providing them with the best possible example and allowing them to learn through 
observation and experience.” (Brown, 1989: 32) 
 
In his study of the roots and philosophy of Japanese carpentry, Azby Brown writes of this process of 
learning that “once an apprentice has begun to develop the proper attitude, he is gradually introduced 
to tools and begins to assist the senior carpenters with their individual responsibility. In about seven 
years, he will be capable of shaping a complex piece from shop drawings and templates; after fifteen 
years or so, he will know how to make the templates themselves from the master’s drawings.” (Brown, 
1989: 32) The correct attitude was fundamental to carpentry education, which was taught before skills 
were learnt. The attitude learnt was one of respect towards his elders, towards religion, and towards 
building materials. Carpentry education was therefore moral as well as practical: 
 
“…Priority is given to instilling in the young apprentice a sense of respect and humility, not 
merely toward his superior, but more importantly toward the wood and the work. The first 
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tasks are deceptively simple: sweeping the shop floor, fetching tea, helping to lift heavy 
members. Yet even these seemingly mindless tasks have the potential to teach 
concentration, exactitude, and teamwork, all of which are absolutely essential for the more 
complicated work ahead.” (Brown, 1989: 32) 
 
Following the instillation of the ‘correct’ attitude, the process of construction and design was learnt by 
apprentices through imitation of actions and forms over a long period of time. This ensured that not only 
knowledge but also behaviour was passed down through generations through the apprenticeship 
system. This transmission was key to maintaining a coherent sense of cultural identity for the 
carpenters: as Shils wrote, “The idea of tradition as a handing down of attitudes, habits, and rules is 
integral to the definition and coherence of a culture.” (Shils, 1981: 19) As a result of this cultural 
transmission, carpenters possessed a keen sense of intuition concerning building: “Rarely is anything 
explained fully to the apprentice; he must draw his own conclusions and develop his own instincts.” 
(Brown, 1989: 32) 
 
For carpenters of the Edo period, learning about the past was not usually the result of conscious 
decisions because transmission of past practice was the cornerstone of education. Given that the focus 
of education was on respecting elders, there was very little scope for processes of constant innovation, 
for innovation in building meant going against the ways of elders, and as stated in Section 2.1, 
Neo-Confucianism, with its focus on respect to seniors (parents and lieges especially), was at its 
historical high point in the Edo period. Building practices did gradually change, for instance, in the 
standardisation of measurements during the Edo period. However change was slow and was never a 
primary concern to Edo carpenters or in client demands. Instead the past was learnt about through 
elders in the work group, generally following standard principles. It is also clear that in the late Edo 
period, carpenters had information on past architectural forms and had “a historicist awareness”. 
(Wendelken, 1996: 30) Carpenters kept previous designs, and utilised this knowledge: for instance the 
Nakai family rebuilt the emperor’s palace in 1855 based on designs from 1790 which was itself a 
historicist revival of Heian period (Jap. 平安時代, 794-1185) architecture. (Wendelken, 1996: 30) 
 
Beyond oral learning, by the Edo period (1600-1868) carpenters manuals were also developed which 
codified knowledge previously passed on by spoken tradition. These manuals are known as hinagata 
(Jap. 雛形, lit. template), which were written by master carpenters and sometimes written in secret 
languages. The hinagata had “two main types, hinagata-ban [Jap. 雛形版], which were pattern books 
similar to those which appeared in increasing quantities in Europe from the time of the Renaissance,' 
and hidensho [Jap. 秘伝書], or "secretly transmitted records." (Coaldrake, 2001: 49) Whereas before 
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the two knowledge sources were strictly separated, by the early seventeenth century the distinction 
between the two types became blurred, “with records surviving which contain both architectural 
drawings and written instructions about proportions to be used in designing buildings. From the early 
eighteenth century, in an intellectual climate of historicism, these records were to include complex 
genealogies and contorted histories of style which were intended to dignify the present rather than 
illuminate the past.” (Coaldrake, 2001: 49) By the early 1600s, these hinagata-ban became popularised 
and a part of urban culture. These books are important to note for a number of reasons. First, they 
allowed learning and improvement to occur across a range of practitioners. Each group of carpenters 
can be said to have formed a community of practice: an informal group that shares values, 
perspectives, and ways of doing things. Second, the existence of such books demonstrates than at 
least some carpenters were literate. Third, the secret manuals indicate competitive behaviour between 
families. Fourth, the later development of public records of style meant a widening of the profession 
and professional standards across families. (Coaldrake, 2001: 46)  
 
Whilst the above has detailed the education of carpenters, in terms of how they worked, I will now 
highlight four categories: materials, principles of orientation, sacred aspects, and construction 
principles. First, the choice of wood as a building material greatly affected the method of working. The 
Japanese carpentry system relied to a great extent on the character of the materials: although building 
design was not material led, the nuances of materials required great care and attention in choice of 
wood. Carpenters would use the most appropriate tree species from the most appropriate region of 
Japan growing at the most appropriate location. This counted even to the extent that trees grown on the 
southern face of a mountain were used on the southern side of the building. According to a 
contemporary master carpenter: 
 
“The strongest trees grow above the midpoint of a mountain, where they receive the best 
sunlight and air circulation… These trees should be used for columns. On the other hand, 
trees that stand below the midpoint, where they must compete for sunlight with trees above 
and thus send their trunks higher before branching, are a source of thinner logs that are 
relatively free of knots. These logs should be used for exposed members requiring a fine 
surface. Trees growing in valleys produce inferior lumber of high moisture content, but are 
nonetheless usable for ceiling boards and other parts requiring neither strength nor fine 
finish.” (Brown, 1989: 57) 
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Second, orientation was decided by hōgaku in Japanese buildings. These principles have many 
similarities with feng-shui (Chi. 風水) and appear to have derived from it.66 Hōgaku “loads [the] built 
environment with great symbolic significance and conveys information about social relations and 
worldviews." (Kalland, 1999: 17) Hōgaku did not only apply to the building itself but to how the building 
affected its environment. According to the master carpenter Nishioka, echoing the principles of 
feng-shui, “the ideal building site has a mountain to the north, a river to the east, a pond or lake to the 
south, and a straight road to the west… Carpenters extend the geomancy principles to human relations 
as well: a certain balance of personalities is required among crew members just as among pieces of 
timber if a project is to result in the creation of unity.” (Brown, 1989: 55) However, these principles were 
by no means rules; rather they were consequences that need to be taken account of. Indeed, at times 
buildings could even be placed in inauspicious areas for symbolic reasons. Nijō castle (Jap. 二条城) 
represents the great architectural example of the principles and symbolism of the Tokugawa rule, the 
message for which can be read in the syntax of hōgaku. The castle (actually a palace) was built in 1603 
in Kyoto (the emperor’s base), three years after the establishment of the Shogunate. The relationship 
between the buildings was designed to echo the relationship between the Shogunate and the emperor: 
“The Shogunal palace was set to the northeast of the lake and the imperial palace to the southwest, the 
most hostile and most benevolent directions respectively. The Tokugawa thereby protected the 
emperor from the flow of evil forces in the universe.” (Coaldrake, 1996: 144)  
 
Third, as can be surmised from the influence of hōgaku on buildings, there is also a ‘religious’ aspect to 
Japanese carpentry which is not present in modern architectural practice. Both Daoism and Shintoism 
were important considerations for carpenters. Both doctrines hold nature as sacred which makes the 
carpenter’s role potentially a morally ambiguous one: “A carpenter must put a tree to uses that assure 
its continued existence, preferably as a thing of beauty to be treasured for centuries. There is a prayer 
that [master carpenter] Nishioka recites before laying a saw to a standing tree. It goes in part, “I vow to 
commit no act that will extinguish the life of this tree.” Only by maintaining this pledge does the 
carpenter repay his debt to nature.” (Brown, 1989: 21) In connection with this, customary joinery in 
Japan does not use any nails or fittings in the wood as these would eventually rust and damage the 
wood. Instead, wooden parts are slotted together in subtle ways. Thus for carpenters, respect for 
religion, the environment and materials was a central part of building practice. 
 
Finally, prior to building, carpenters paid attention to the planning of construction. These plans were 
extremely complex and required great understanding of techniques, drawing, stress, mathematics and 
aesthetics. Hinagata records reveal the use of special systems of proportion based on modules known 
                                                   
66
 In comparison to feng shui, “little attention has been given to the Japanese counterpart hogaku (lit. directions and corners), which is mainly 
expressed through divination for orientation of houses (kaso) and the land (chiso).” (Kalland, 1996: 17) 
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as kiwari (Jap. 木割, lit. wood proportion), similar to the orders of classical Rome and Greece, which 
were popularised in the Renaissance by Palladio. Even after carpentry forms began to reflect European 
tastes, the principle of kiwari continued to survive after the Meiji Restoration in buildings such as the 
Sōgaku-dō (Jap. 奏楽堂, lit. Concert Hall), discussed in Section 3.6. 
 
These principles of construction were reflected in the buildings constructed, and were derived in a large 
part from the class system, influences from China, and the social dynamics within the carpentry 
profession itself. One such example of how socio-religious values were interpreted is that for buildings 
representing authority, height was very important. For instance, imperial buildings needed to be highest: 
in any social situation it was forbidden to look down up on the emperor, even to look from a window 
whilst the emperor went down a street could have severe repercussions. This implied that to be 
physically above the emperor was taboo, a social norm that continued into the Meiji period (see Section 
5.2). Using tall buildings to demonstrate authority was very common. For instance the largest building 
in Edo (former name of Tokyo) before the Meiji period was built by the new Shogunate; Edo Castle was 
the tallest building ever built in Japan until the mid-Meiji period at 58.4 metres. (Coaldrake, 1996: 132)  
 
The first great architectural epoch in Japanese history was the Nara period, in the 8th century AD. At 
this time, Japan was first introduced to Chinese culture and took it on wholeheartedly, assimilating the 
arts, religion (Buddhism) and even parts of the written language. Highly skilled carpenters built Japan’s 
first monumental architecture in Nara (Jap. 奈良) in the Kansai (Jap. 関西) region, where many 
buildings still stand (often rebuilt due to fires), including the largest extant wooden building in the world, 
the 8th century Tōdai-ji (Jap. 東大寺). This process of architectural assimilation and then development 
was not a swift process: “it took some two hundred years of experiment and refinement for Japanese to 
reshape borrowed Chinese aesthetic forms into configurations closer to their own ideals. Roof curves 
became more gentle, certain structural elements more delicate, and composition at times 
asymmetrical.” (Brown, 1989: 45)  
 
The temple architecture style was the most highly developed form of building up until the end of 15th 
century. This was the ‘Warring states’ period of the 1500s when, due to the uncertain political situation, 
castle architecture (also built by carpenters (Coaldrake, 2001: 49)) became more important. These 
buildings borrowed their decorative forms from temples but were built in a more impressive manner and 
made more use of stone. Castles became a reflection of a daimyo's power but also exhibited new 
sense of aesthetics that marked a clear departure from the sombre monotones favoured during the 
previous period. These authority buildings’ function was to rule over the surrounding area: 
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“First and foremost, the castle town was military headquarters for the daimyo, and it was 
from here he ruled his fief. He built his castle to be easily visible from the town and the 
surrounding area, a constant reminder to his subjects of his power and hold over them. 
Although the castle was designed for defense, it was accessible enough so that the 
townspeople could reach it when they came to conduct business at the governmental 
offices located on the grounds.” (Schmorleitz, 1974: 31) 
 
During the long period of civil war prior to the Edo period, the development and construction of castles 
was possibly one of the greatest building projects in the history of the world. However by the Edo period 
(1600-1868), new authority buildings were less frequently castles, some of which were even 
dismantled with the establishment of the Tokugawa Shogunate, and more frequently palaces. These 
were somewhat similar in spatial form to the Chinese yamen (the building which comprised the main 
administrative functions of the locality in China and Taiwan, explored in Section 5.2): a sprawling 
building complex over a wide area.  
 
Given this thesis’ aim to explore Japanese authority architecture, it is worthwhile to illustrate this 
transitional building type and its principles at greater length using the example of the largest building 
project of the Edo period: Edo Castle (see fig. 3.1). Edo Castle covered over 33,000 square metres, 
took over 30 years to complete, was funded by all daimyos of Japan and had three master carpenters 
at its head. The Shogun’s palace within the castle complex covered three main enclosures: “(1) the 
great outer palace or o-omotoe [Omote, Jap. 表], which contained reception rooms for public audience 
and apartments for guards and some officials; (2) middle interior or naka-oku [Jap. 中奥], where the 
shogun met with his relatives, more important lords, and carried on the affairs of state with his 
councillors; and (3) great interior or o-oku [Ōoku, Jap. 大奥], which contained the apartments of the 




At its fullest development, Edo Castle had 38 gates guarding it with each layer having a number of 
gates; in the Edo period, the number of gates was proportional to the importance of the building. 
(Schmorleitz, 1974: 108) According to a Dutch contemporary in the Edo period, Francois Caron 
(1600–1673)67 “noted that the gates were not placed in a straight line, but were staggered so a person 
seeking passage had to go in a half circle to find the next one.” (Schmorleitz, 1974: 105) Although the 
complex itself was highly impressive the tenshu (Jap. 天守, lit. the central tower of Japanese castle) is 
perhaps even more so given the evidence of its skilful and meticulous planning. The tenshu was 
designed by KORA Munehiro (Jap. 甲良宗広, 1574-1646) who was eminent in his time:  
 
“The building projects he supervised indicate a prolific creative personality. His active 
building career coincides with the primary period of Tokugawa architectural consolidation. 
Munehiro [Kōra] was engaged in the most important projects of the age, including the 
                                                   
67
 Francois Caron was a French Huguenot refugee to the Netherlands who served the Dutch East India Company for 30 years and is 
sometimes considered the first Frenchman to set foot in Japan. 
This image can be seen in the printed thesis at the 
University of Sheffield library. 
 
3.1. Section of a folding screen 
showing Edo Castle. Source from 
Coaldrake, 1996.  
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mausoleum of the founding Tokugawa shogun leyasu [Jap. 徳川家康, 1543-1616], the 
Tōshō-gū [Jap. 日光東照宮] at Nikko (from 1634-36), and the central keep (tenshu) of Edo 
Castle (1639), the focus of Tokugawa government and authority and the most visible 
official building in the entire metropolis of Edo.” (Coaldrake, 2001: 50) 
 
The evidence of planning by Kōra supports recent research which has shown that these master 
carpenters were not mere builders but conscious designers able to plan buildings with meticulous 
attention to detail that would rival contemporary Europeans. Not only were spatial dimensions 
calculated with great precision on each floor plan and section (fig. 3.2) but Kōra was able to create 
three dimensional projections of the building on paper (fig. 3.3). This had several advantages as it 
allowed the carpenter to imagine the feel and overall appearance of the building, and made it easy for 




3.2. Plan and section of 
the tenshu (keep) of 
Edo Castle. Entitled at 
top right 'Edo tenshu 
diagram 1:100'. 





Due to increased political stability these palaces were not primarily built for defense. This shift was 
“marked in building design by a shift from an age of vertical emphasis to an age of horizontal emphasis, 
from a period of preoccupation with the symbolism of towering castle tenshu and massive masonry 
walls, to an age of single-story palaces.” (Coaldrake, 1996: 141) Thus, as we shall see in Section 5.2, 
these buildings bore many similarities to the yamen in Taipei, with strict hierarchies of functions and 
spaces developed over centuries to create similar forms for authority buildings both sides of the East 
China Sea. In keeping with this trend for single story buildings, when the tenshu of Edo Castle burnt 
down in 1658 it was not rebuilt.  
 
Politically the fief system weakened daimyos through the obligation to reside in the capital for part of 
the year, which vastly altered the urban make-up of Edo. Around 60 percent of the city was occupied by 
3.3. Isometric projection of 
the tenshu (keep) of Edo 
Castle. Dated 1638. 
Entitled at top right 'Edo 
Castle Inner Citadel’. 
Diagram of the exterior of 
the tenshu (keep). 
(Courtesy of the Tokyo 
Central Library) 
 167 
the palaces and mansions of daimyo which invested the town with great national authority, and it 
centralised power by providing a de facto capital containing all important personages for part of the year. 
After the Meiji Restoration and the destruction of the old political order, this gave the government a 
large number of authoritative buildings over a large area to use as temporary government departments, 
schools and as land for development. The cityscape of Edo was characterised by low yet sprawling 
buildings up until the advent of the Meiji period, when the preference for a European building aesthetic 
translated to tall buildings able to easily tower over their Japanese counterparts. 
 
This brief overview of the history and character of carpentry in Japan has argued that carpenters were 
a profession with codified knowledge, that they planned and designed, had strict principles on the 
sacred, orientation and materials, pursued stylistic development, and were capable of building 
monumental architecture. A Western perspective of architectural style, which has traditionally focused 
upon the façade, is limited and hardly applicable to Japanese architecture development. For in Japan, 
style was not judged on exterior appearance but by interior structure: the joints between timber and the 
layers of roof are known as the style. These can even be seen as a hierarchy: viewing a section of the 
8th century Tōdai-ji in Nana (fig. 3.4) the layers of roofing indicate the building order and the most 
complex series of joints in the building structure. Whilst the roof looks almost cumbersome, this is 




This image can be seen in the printed thesis at the University of Sheffield library. 
 
3.4. Structural section 
of Great Buddha Hall, 
Tōdaiji, Nara, repair 
completed 1911; from 
Report on the repairs to 
the Great Buddha Hall 
at Tōdaiji. (The left was 
main entrance as it 
shows more layers of 
roof structure). Source 
from Wendelken, 1996. 
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As a result of their education, carpenters were well prepared to adapt to the changes in architectural 
taste of national elites, being literate, able to plan buildings, and having an excellent knowledge of 
materials. This echoes much of the rest of Japan, where the increase in schooling over the past century 
and half from 1700 had created a complex layered society with many highly talented people who were 
limited by the caste system in what they could achieve in their careers. During the Edo period, “there 
was an active dialogue among Japanese carpenters and a sense of competition which resulted in 
constant innovation and perceptible improvement in skills for the craft as a whole, all accomplished 
while struggling against a progressively diminishing quality of available wood. But at that time, wood 
construction represented the only technology available for building in Japan.” (Brown, 1989: 30) By the 
end of the Edo period, there was an increasing demand to build new types of structures with European 
appearance which carpentry education had not prepared them for. Yet many were able to adapt their 
skills to this new idiom. The reliance on wood did not change after the Meiji Restoration, for with the 
increasing fashion and desire from clients to have foreign looking buildings, carpenters (being the only 
organised residents in Japan who could design and build) were the first to try their hand at building 
European-style structures and continued building residential housing until today. These were the 
pioneers of kindai (modern) architecture in Japan, to be explored in the following section.  
 
 
3.2 Pioneers of ‘kindai (modern)’architecture: carpenters and surveyors 
There were two intertwined changes in the 1860s that significantly affected Japanese carpenters: first, 
there was a growing contact zone between the Japan and Seiyō, and; second, there was a growing 
market to build a new style of architecture, first through foreign clients and later through Japanese 
authorities. Both these factors were initially caused by the treaty ports, as foreigners in the ports 
required foreign styled buildings. According to David Stewart, a leading English-language expert on the 
architecture of this period, “the bitter experience of these [treaty] agreements had convinced the new 
Japanese leaders of the necessity to conform with outward standards and behaviour of the 
mid-Victorian age, initiative in which devolved upon the Meiji emperor and the court…. Within a short 
time de-Japanization had evolved as a norm of progress and a behavioural ethic.” (Stewart, 1987: 15) 
This trend extended to public buildings, as authorities would attempt to reinvent the image of Japan 
through its authority buildings. 
 
 
Ad hoc modernisation by Japanese carpenters  
New ideas of ‘civilisation’, explored in previous chapters, had entered Japan in the mid-19th century. 
Given the crucial 5th of the Five Charter Oaths which underpinned all other oaths (to ‘seek knowledge 
throughout the world’) there was great cachet in giving the appearance of internationalism to an area. 
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This process was elite-led: “As the Meiji government replaced the feudal domains with prefectures 
under central control, it appointed powerful local governors to enforce its programs. These men seem 
to have taken particular pride in producing Western buildings, apparently seeing them as a good way to 
advance their careers and civilization at the same time.” (Finn, 1995: 24) These local buildings were 
built by carpenters, adapting their knowledge to foreign-style architecture, using new materials such as 
glass for windows, and with new stylistic features such as Greek and Roman-style columns, balconies 
and hinged doors.  
 
Dallas Finn notes that the first government offices in Tokyo after its renaming used the former mansions 
of daimyo, but these were slowly replaced by ‘Western-style’ buildings. Tokyo’s earliest Seiyō styled 
buildings were not authority buildings but “private ones inspired by the treaty ports, where carpenters 
and contractors had flocked for work during the hard times of early Meiji.” (Finn, 1995: 17) This required 
carpenters in the zones of initial contact who learned through observation, copying, and reading 
imported books; informal rather than formal education. As shown in Section 2.2, in the Edo period, 
school-based education had been on the rise for a century before the advent of direct foreign influence. 
The number of private academies increased by 1760 percent between 1750 and 1868, yet these 
schools were rarely concerned with practical subjects – the most common subjects were Chinese 
studies and Calligraphy. In this sense, carpentry had remained independent of formal schooling 
throughout this period and carpenters continued their patterns of informal learning.  
 
But many carpenters were literate, using translated Dutch and English books and later incorporating 
them in the traditional practice of compiling hinagata-bon, or instruction manuals. As early as 1871 a 
shin-hinagata “was issued describing the techniques of brick construction, including methods of laying 
bricks as well as techniques for framing the structures.” (Coaldrake, 1994: 50) These books and 
knowledge sources were used by enterprising carpenters who went to the treaty ports and elsewhere 
where their clients demanded Seiyō buildings. In doing this, many were anticipating later demand for 
these building types in larger cities. This learning focused on how to make wooden buildings look like 
European masonry buildings. For Japanese government commissioners it was vital to transform the 
impression of Japanese architecture towards new forms valued by a government wishing to be viewed 
as modern by visitors from the Euro-American Great Powers. 
 
Responding to this demand, in the 1880s and 1890s there was a proliferation of wood-block printed 
Shin-hinagata explaining Seiyō systems of rigid triangulated roof trusses and the methods for inserting 
iron bolts into wall frames; the use of such hinagata eased the transition to building in foreign styles. 
Such manuals outlined the different styles of European architecture (such as Gothic, Renaissance and 
Baroque) and described the process of building in new materials such as brick. They had been created 
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by trained carpenters who educated themselves in foreign styles by visiting and sketching buildings in 
treaty ports such as Yokohama. Their forms were replicated by the carpenters who created new types 
of buildings which melded common native forms and techniques with Seiyō ones. This organic process 
of learning and dissemination was undertaken upon the initiative of individual carpenters and work 
teams rather than as a planned exercise. 
 
Therefore the first influence of kindai (modern) upon Japanese carpenters came with learning from 
contemporaneous buildings rather than historic buildings. The new types of public buildings and 
changing fashions after the treaty port system was established gave many carpenters the opportunity 
to adapt. This innovation meant carpenters were learning about the building forms of architecture 
without historical precedent: carpenters were not learning about the past of Seiyō but about forms 
extant in Japan. This learning about ‘the current’ led to new fashions being developed. Whilst these 
carpenters used past techniques, they also adopted forms not practised by their forbearers, creating a 
more ambivalent relationship with the past. This approach of altering the external form without 
fundamentally changing the approach or learning style of carpenters created a transcultural, hybrid 
style of building, especially popular in the 1870s. Of the early building work it was clear that 
“architecture and townscape in Meiji Japan reflected the vigor and optimism with which any new 
cultural age is undeniably infused.” (Stewart, 1987: 16)  
 
The outstanding exponent of this early style was SHIMIZU Kisuke II (Jap. 二代清水喜助, 1815-1881) 
who created several crucial authority buildings for the early Meiji state. Shimizu II practised carpentry 
for his father-in-law’s firm, later opening an office in Yokohama in the 1860s, seizing the opportunity 
presented by the treaty ports. Shimizu grew renowned in Yokohama as a skilled exponent of this Giyōfū 
(Jap. 擬洋風 lit. pseudo Western-style) style and was commissioned by the newly expanding shipping 
company Mitsui (Jap. 三井) to build a bank in Tokyo. The original First Mitsui Bank (1871-72) was built 
as a national bank under the auspices of Mitsui yet within a short time it was ceded to the Japanese 
government to be used as the First National Bank; together with the newly constructed mint, the bank 
was the most important of all national institutions built by 1872 in terms of portraying the stability of the 
government and keeping up its prestige abroad. In the early 1870s, the remnants of old Edo were still 
abundant, there were no areas of exclusively Seiyō architecture and foreign experts had not yet gained 
precedence of the domestic construction scene. The authorities had quickly recognised the importance 
of monuments to reflect their ideals of civilisation and the bank was a prime example of this monument, 






The First Mitsui Bank was faced with stone and had symmetrical front facades presided over by the 
kind of pagoda like cupola which came to be admired during the Edo period. The Mitsui bank 
“supported a closed octagonal lantern with a flagstaff at its pinnacle… The gallery contained five bays 
and, therefore, had ten columns, plus [a] pair of demicolumns…. Like the balustrade, these were also 
of bronze, a fact which accounts for their extreme attenuation and wide spacing. As there is barely any 
attempt to create an order as such, these columns behave proportionally more like rows of simple 
colonnettes.” (Stewart, 1987: 24) Motifs included auspicious dragons, pine boughs, and stylised 
Chinese cloud forms. 
 
Two years after the first Mitsui bank was completed, a second national bank for Mitsui at Suruhacho, 
Tokyo, was completed in 1874. Like its predecessor, it was a large, squarish building but with three 
main floors instead of two. The topmost of these was set back from the lower façade or, put another 
way, the massively unwieldy tower of the earlier building has been expanded into a third story of usable 
proportions. (Stewart, 1987: 31-32) The symbolism is obvious in fig. 3.6, with the Second Mitsui Bank in 
the centre, Mount Fuji (Jap. 富士山) in the top left and the First Mitsui bank on the top right.  
 
The influence of pragmatism was revealed very early on in the Meiji period by carpenters such as 
Shimizu who was trained in Japanese customary arts and signifiers. Shimizu’s buildings progressed 
towards increasing formal rationality by following clients’ wishes and showed an erosion of the use of 
traditional cultural and religious forms. Mitsui’s two banks were strong instances of this transculturation 
giving way to rationalisation. Scaled drawings of the two buildings are shown below in fig. 3.7. 
This image can be seen in the printed thesis at the University of Sheffield 
library. 
 
3.5. SHIMIZU Kisuke II (master 
carpenter): Print of First National Bank 











The many differences in space and form after only one year are quite startling given that the building’s 
functions were the same and the carpenter the same. The second bank was “the most interesting proof 
of the shift towards a certain rationalization process in architectural design.” (Stewart, 1987: 31) The 
materials of the banks were similar, though the second was not faced in stone. Other foreign elements 
were further articulated in the second bank: the portico was roofed in Italian style with a balcony atop. 
This image can be seen in the printed thesis at 
the University of Sheffield library. 
 
This image can be seen in the printed thesis at 
the University of Sheffield library. 
 
3.6. Japanese Colour Woodblock Print of the Second Mitsui bank titled ‘Picture of Mitsui Group's Western-style Three Story 
House at Surugacho, Tokyo, Utagawa Kuniteru II, 1873’ 
(Courtesy of the Lavenberg Collection of Japanese Prints) 
3.7. Comparison of the forms of SHIMIZU Kisuke II’s First Mitsui Bank (left) and Second Mitsui Bank (right). Source from Finn, 1996. 
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There was an additional porch too, but the most striking change was the total lack of traditional 
ornamentation. On the second bank “the historiated ornament of the first bank has disappeared for 
good, and the massive entablature was surmounted only by a tiled, hipped roof with a nominal cupola. 
This had no lantern but was topped instead by a huge finial, traditionally of dark fired porous 
earthenware tile and sometimes gilded, but here cast of bronze.” (Stewart, 1987: 32) This trend 
towards lack of ornamentation became a long term one. 
 
This roofing material was the only evidence that the second bank building was Japanese, “except for 
this feature, [it] would have been at home in the likes of mid-Victorian Salem or Portsmouth, New 
Hampshire... There… all the baffling modes of European historicism were being rung in something like 
an orderly succession. In Japan, this orderliness was less than apparent, although the intention in the 
years to come was that it should be reflected.” (Stewart, 1987: 32) The castle-style tower, instantly 
recognisable to native Japanese, was replaced by a functional working space less monumental and 
impressive, but spatially better suited to the building type.  
 
This idea of stylistic progression can begin to be seen in Japanese architecture from this period, but the 
progression had a different path from that in America as the cultural roots were completely alien. 
Shimizu’s First Mitsui bank, by directly combining pure Japanese forms atop a Seiyō-style base had 
great strength of conception, and was qualitatively unique; ultimately however, this bank did not meet 
the practical needs of the client effectively nor did it fit the archetypes of architecture seen in Europe 
and America by the returning oligarchs of the Iwakura Mission. However, the transition from the first to 
the second bank saw an early expression of the influence of rationality in Japanese architecture. The 
second bank was an example of the cultural values of the carpenter giving way to a client’s demand for 
a simpler aesthetic and a more practical spatial arrangement. This reduction in Japanese elements can 
also be understood in the cultural context of greater familiarity and desire for a Seiyō aesthetic following 
the return of the Iwakura Mission in 1873. 
 
As we can see from the buildings of Shimizu, “Meiji architecture was not just 'Western style' building in 
Japan. It was also the conventional architecture of Japan continuing in the new era.” (Coaldrake, 1994: 
23) Carpenters were forced into diverting their skills away from the traditional styles in public and 
commercial architecture in the Meiji period. Despite the lack of desire for transcultural buildings by the 
highest Meiji authorities, Giyōfū buildings proliferated in the capital, following Shimizu’s first bank, as 
did more explicit Seiyō style buildings. Evidence of the extent of this is in GOICHI Takeda’s (Jap. 五一
武田, 1872-1938) study of buildings within the populous area between Shinbashi (Jap. 新橋) and 
Kanda Suda-cho (Jap. 神田須田町) in central Tokyo. Takeda’s investigation of 1911 (42nd year of Meiji, 
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39 years after the First Mitsui Bank) found that there were a great number of wooden buildings in the 
area in a few specific styles: 
 
•  Fourteen Renaissance style buildings;68 
•  Four Renaissance and Vienna Secession style buildings;69 
•  Four Japanese and Renaissance style buildings,70 and; 
•  Four Unknown Style buildings.71 (Takeda, 1911 quoted in Tosaki, 2004: 12) 
 
All 26 of the above-listed buildings in this area were made by builders or carpenters, who were never 
formally trained in European styles, but proceeded by copying from illustrations from French, German, 
Dutch and English magazines. All these buildings were built from wood pillared plaster wall, and thus 
were quasi-Western style (Giyōfū). (Tosaki, 2004: 12) This conformity of styles within a narrow idiom, 
dominated by Renaissance style architecture, is a finding repeated throughout this thesis. 
 
The continuation of building practices is shown in that “in both public and private sectors during the first 
half of the Meiji period, the master carpenter and the architect were parallel and even rival 
professionals working in similar capacities but in different materials” (Wendelken, 1996: 28) though 
eventually public buildings would be overwhelmingly built by architects. In general, the built 
environment of Meiji Japan had “no abrupt break with the building practices of pre-modern Japan. 
Meiji-era construction was overwhelmingly executed by carpenters using methods and materials not 
unlike those used in the late Edo period (1600-1868).” (Wendelken, 1996: 28) However there was a 
sea change in the ideals of public architecture: “not since the eighth century had there been so 
concerted a national effort to redefine the image Japan displayed to the world.” (Coaldrake, 1996: 209) 
Arguably, given the scrutiny and ease of communication following the development of the telegraph, 
steamboat and newspaper, the architectural effort was far more likely to be noticed, communicated and 
to have an effect. 
 
Although buildings such as the first Mitsui bank were vigorously rendered and reflected the age of 
cultural adaptation, “this compromise style was scarcely adequate for the grand buildings of Meiji 
Japan. Foreign architects knew only Western modes and were naturally enthusiastic about their 
introduction.” (Checkland, 1989: 73) These great public buildings were first reserved for foreign 
                                                   
68
 Including the branch office of Yokohama Kasai Transportation Insurance Company, Yamazaki Western Style Clothes Shop, provisional 
building of Mitsukoshi Kimono Store. 
 
69
 Including Matsu-ya Kimono Shop, Kameya. 
 
70
 Including Yomiuri Newspaper Co, Tsumura Junten Do pharmacy, Hattori Watchmakers.  
 
71
 Including Jyuuji Ya, Imperial Commodity Museum (Teikoku Haku hin kan) 
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surveyors supported by Japanese workers. Throughout this period of adoption and innovation, 
carpenters building in Seiyō building styles used Japanese carpentry baselines. Therefore European 
architecture remained merely a style developed for masonry building transplanted atop wooden 
buildings. The lack of authentic brick/stone constructions built by carpenters was due to many factors: 
inappropriate training aimed mainly at skilful use of wood, lack of raw materials, lack of will by the state 
to use carpenters for this function, and the transfer of knowledge using manuals written by carpenters 
for carpenters. For the state this meant that the buildings produced demonstrated an unsatisfactory 
degree of authenticity, and the government searched for alternative providers. 
 
 
Ad hoc modernisation by foreign surveyors  
As argued in Chapter 2, in the early Meiji period, modernisation became synonymous with Seiyō 
civilisation and enlightenment. To this end various foreign (mainly European) architects, engineers and 
surveyors were appointed for service in Japan. Among these were the Frenchman Charles Alfred 
Chastel de Boinville, the Italian V. Cappellette; and the Englishmen T.J. Waters, A.N. Hansell and 
Josiah Conder. It was Josiah Conder who was destined to become a colossal influence, which will be 
discussed in Sections 3.3 and 3.4. Before Conder was hired though, a number of the most important 
state commissions were undertaken by foreign workers. 
 
As seen above, the first contact zone between foreigners and Japan in terms of architectural 
knowledge transfer was the treaty ports. The very first buildings put up by foreigners in these treaty 
ports, “were simplified structures with a modicum of what was reckoned to be correct detailing, and any 
flourishes were culled from some built source or possibly a pattern book. Early examples were 
invariably framed in timber.” (Stewart, 1987: 16) The designer of buildings in the foreign quarters would 
sometimes be an engineer but “more commonly a plain merchant, missionary or Catholic priest. A 
world apart from this display of Western architectural genius stood the Japanese town, but it should be 
kept in mind that here was also the source of materials and all labour.” (Stewart, 1987: 16) The dynamic 
of the political dominator as architect and native as labourer was repeated later in the first Japanese 
colony, Taiwan, but it was first experienced by the Japanese in the newly opened ports.  
 
The foreign builder who most represents this power dynamic between builder and natives, as well as 
the ad hoc nature of early Meiji commissioning practices was Thomas James Waters. Waters was a 
British surveyor who landed at Kagoshima (Jap. 鹿児島) in Kyushu (Jap. 九州), chief town of the 
powerful and pro-imperial Satsuma fief in 1862, sometime after the siege imposed by the Royal Navy, 
which contributed to the open-country policy of the late Edo period. Waters was recruited “to supervise 
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the construction of a new steam powered cotton mill housed in a simple gable-fronted building of stone. 
This was completed in 1867 after designs which accompanied the spinning machines from 
Manchester.” (Stewart, 1987: 18)  
 
Waters continued his work in Kyushu by working as an architect for local authorities and foreign 
residents. Walters also drew the designs for Glover’s Residence (an influential British merchant) in 
1863, which was then carried out by a native, without supervision from Waters. After making this 
connection with Glover, he was recommended by Glover to authorities in Tokyo. In 1871 in Tokyo 
Waters designed the Commercial Museum, said to have been to city’s first brick building.72 He is 
known to have first imported brick from Hong Kong and later set up a brick kiln around 1871, probably 
the first in the history of Japan. Here he made some of the bricks for the first national mint (1872), a 
greatly important symbol of authority, as well as those for the museum and other Tokyo buildings like 
the Takebashi Barracks (Jap. 竹橋軍營, 1870-74) and the British legation (1872). Waters used military 
design manuals from the United Kingdom to provide templates for much of his work, particularly 
Takeshi Barracks which was similar to Old Board of Ordinance at Woolwich 1718-20. Thus we can see 
that the first foreign builders in Japan, like the Japanese carpenters relied on manuals of style and 
composition. The carpenters used manuals due to working in a new idiom, Waters due to his being 
insufficiently trained. 
 
The later obsession with building in brick in Japan can be said to have begun with Waters’ urban design 
of the Ginza (Jap. 銀座) district in Tokyo, 1872. Until the early Meiji period, the new authorities had not 
begun any large scale town planning projects; in the treaty ports (besides Kobe (Jap. 神戸市) which 
was based at a pre-existing city) building was unregulated within the designated foreign encampments, 
and new buildings in Edo were built on an individual basis following the town plan from the feudal 
period. Waters used brick in his reconstruction of the Ginza in Tokyo after the fire of 1872. (fig. 3.8) In 
addition to the bricks “the street of shops known as Ginza Brick Street also had a covered way or 
colonnade supported by stone pillars. Contemporary pictures, which are all that remain, with trees and 
gas street lamps, suggest a European boulevard.” (Checkland, 1989: 207) (figs. 3.9 and 3.10) The 
houses were promoted as fireproof and 916 were built. In spite of this, “the new buildings, however, 
were not immediately favoured with occupancy on account of both dampness and fear of earthquakes.” 
(Stewart, 1987: 22) This fear was justified, as none of the buildings are still standing today due to 
seismic events. 
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 Whilst brick has been used in China since at least the 6th century AD (the Songyue (Jap. 嵩岳寺塔) Pagoda was built in brick in 523) there 










This image can be seen in the printed thesis at the University of 
Sheffield library. 
 
3.8. Ginza plans: the original street plan (left); the proposal by Waters 1872 (middle); the plan as executed (right). Source from Sha, Y., 2001. 
3.10. Ginza street view in the 1870s. Source from Sha, Y., 2001. 
3.9. Thomas James Waters: Ginza brick town. Source from Jinnai, 1998. 
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Waters’ work in Ginza had the most impact of any foreign architect up to that point. However, this 
experiment with town planning was short lived and highlights a poignant difference between Japan and 
cities under colonialism in the 19th century: 
 
“In Arabic-Islamic cities, the practice was to construct a new district based on Western 
principles outside the old district based on traditional principles. In the case of Tokyo, 
however, modernization took place as it was needed to meet new requirements, but was 
realized by projecting these changes on top of the old neighbourhoods. A section called 
Akashicho [Jap. 明石町], for example, was set aside for foreigners to live in and many 
Western-style houses sprang up there, but no change was made in the structure of the 
district. The city would widen old roads or construct new ones using the old road patterns. 
Rather than major surgery, Tokyo chose continuous and organic change to achieve growth 
and development.” (Jinnai, 1998: 30) 
 
Individual builders on individual commissions remained the norm for foreign architects in Japan, 
although taken as a whole they had a substantial and profound influence. Whilst Waters was an 
influential builder in Japan, others after him had a more lasting influence on building culture. As 
mentioned in Section 2.2, after 1868 foreign instructors were hired in large numbers to teach many 
subjects: the specialists were called oyatoi gaikokujin (Jap. 御雇い外国人 lit. honourable foreign 
employees). These foreigners came at great expense to the new state of Meiji Japan, still recovering 
from civil war and the effect of cheap imports. The oyatoi gaikokujin “brought expertise, enthusiasm and 
youth; but the princely salaries which they were paid became a great drain on Japanese resources. As 
one observer notes, ‘The salaries of the oyatoi gaikokujin employed by the University of Tokyo in 1877 
made up as much as one-third of the entire budget of the Ministry of Education, a financial burden that 
hastened the replacement of the oyatoi gaikokujin by Japanese in government institutions.’” 
(Checkland 1989: 73)  
 
Another surveyor, C.A. Chastel de Boinville, built a pathbreaking building in Tokyo, the College of 
Engineering in 1877, as part of the growth of mature educational institutions following the early Meiji 
period. Like Shimizu’s Banks and Waters’ Mint, the College was a new function for the Meiji state. The 
buildings were very successfully received by both natives and foreigners: the British journal Nature 
claimed that “the large and splendid buildings erected for the Engineering College” were “the finest pile 
of European edifices in Japan.” (Nature, 1886, quoted in Choi 2003: 18) According to Don Choi, “Here 
students learned to eat, dress, sit, and sleep in the Western manner. The laboratories, lecture halls, 
dormitories, and library inculcated patterns of movement and use.” (Choi, 2003: 45-46) This College 
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became a symbol of civilising in the early Meiji period as one of the only authentic Seiyō style buildings 
in the country. The hall “with its ‘handsomely decorated aula’ [was] much used by the government for 
their official functions.” (Checkland, 1989: 207) 
 
Until the completion of the College of Engineering, the architectural revolution in Japan had taken place 
on an ad-hoc basis. As we have seen in the case studies above, the decision-making process for the 
new national buildings went as follows: a new mint was needed and a foreign surveyor had just been 
introduced to the relevant authority, so he was given a commission. A national bank was required and 
Mitsui had built a bank for that purpose, so the state bought the building. There was a certain 
systematisation of style for authority buildings in that a pure European aesthetic was generally 
preferred, but there was little planning for the future architecture of Japan.  
 
This situation changed after the return of the Iwakura Mission. KIDO Takayochi, who was second in 
command of the Mission (mentioned in Section 2.2), instigated great changes to the education policy of 
the Meiji government, establishing a universal primary education system from 1872. Daikichi, 1985: 
55-56) Ad hoc learning by groups of carpenters did not fit this model of education and so the early Meiji 
government made no effort to input into carpenters’ education. Hiring foreign surveyors and architects 
would also not have suited Kido’s vision of true civilisation, which should be formed from education 
upwards. Instead, for some significant building types, the government decided that a new class of 
Japanese builders needed to be produced with a new education system focussed upon meeting “the 
modern requirements of the country.” (Dyer, 1904: 4) This shift was not in isolation and was an integral 
part of the three major shifts in education in Japan: 
 
1. From wide regional variation in the provision and quality of schooling to greater national 
standardisation; 
2. From officially sponsored schools that exhibited sharp class distinction to an integrated 
system that fostered mobility based on talent; and 
3. From a loose configuration of discontinuous and mostly private arrangements to a 
compulsory system having a clearly articulated structure controlled by public authority.” 
(Rubinger, 1986: 195) 
 
The remainder of this chapter will explore the impact of these three changes on architecture in depth, 
first through exploring the career of Josiah Conder, who laid the main foundation upon which kindai 
(modern) architecture development rested, connecting his life to the architectural context of his day, 
and then through an extensive analysis of the ideas and practices of his contemporaries and 
successors. 
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3.3 The education of the first Japanese ‘architects’ under Josiah Conder 
Following the national standardisation of education, integrated across classes and controlled by public 
authorities, an alternative education system to train architects was also established after 1873. With the 
building of the College of Engineering and the hiring of foreign staff, contingency based planning largely 
ceased to be and was replaced by systematic education of Japanese students into architects in the 
Seiyō mould. As Astrid Edlinger says in her chapter on the Japanese art of appropriation (2008) the 
reform of Japanese building culture took place at three closely related levels with learning being the 
central pillar:  
 
1. The institutionalisation of an architectural profession through establishing schools of 
engineering and universities to which were invited foreign experts as teachers, advisors 
and instructors; 
2. The implementation of architectural discourse through translation of architectural books, 
import of texts and journals from Europe, and establishment of Japanese language 
architectural journals and magazines; 
3. The introduction of European building styles and building functions without precedent in 
Japanese history, to communicate authority and strength to the Japanese people, stability 
and civilisation to foreign visitors. (Edlinger, 2008: 59-60) 
 
This formal, three pronged approach to the teaching of building construction was more radical for 
architecture than it was for other areas with established classroom teaching practices, such as Chinese 
studies and mathematics. The change was a result of a blanket approach to education taken 
subsequent to the Iwakura Mission. Whilst the College of Engineering building was still being 
constructed, the Meiji government’s tour of the UK during the Iwakura mission brought ITŌ Hirobumi 
(future four-time Prime Minister and Resident-General of Korea) into contact with 25 year old Henry 
Dyer in 1872, who was hired to head the new College of Engineering. Having only completed his 
undergraduate studies in 1873, Dyer left for Japan the same year, drafting the curriculum of all courses 
during the journey. Dyer wrote that: 
 
“It was [ITŌ Hirobumi’s] wish that a College should be organised which would train men 
who would be able to design and superintend the works which were necessary for Japan 
to carry on if she adopted Western methods. Fortunately, for some time previously I had 
made a special study of all the chief methods of scientific and engineering study in the 
different countries of the world and of the organisation of some of the most important 
institutions, with the intention of devoting myself to the advancement of engineering 
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education in Britain, so that I had fairly definite ideas both as to what was desirable and 
what was possible.” (Dyer, 1904: 1-2) 
 
Dyer’s qualification therefore then was partly as an expert in the current state of engineering education 
across the world: he was acutely aware of what was up-to-date in engineering and scientific teaching. 
Given this recognition of his expertise, in spite of only graduating himself the same year, Dyer’s College 
curriculum plans were accepted by the Ministry “without change of any kind.” (Dyer, 1904: 2) Dyer’s 
impact through the College of Engineering was immediate and enormous, as he was involved upon 
arrival in Japan in practical projects such as railway building. Dyer only left Japan nine years later in 
1882, and later wrote with some bravado that: 
 
“I was at the head of an institution which was to be the chief means of developing not only 
the railways and other means of communication, but also all the other industries of Japan. 
Students of the Imperial College of Engineering (Kobu Daigakko) are to be found in 
important positions in almost all the undertakings which have caused so great a change in 
the economic, industrial and political conditions of Japan.” (Dyer, 1904: 129) 
 
The post of architecture instructor appears to have been problematic, only being filled a year after all 
other posts. Josiah Conder was eventually chosen as the first permanent Professor of architecture at 
the College in 1877 and became the man widely known as the father of modern architecture in Japan, 
(Watanabe, 1993: 43) a title gained in a large part due to his implementation of a new architectural 
education system. Serving the Meiji government, he taught at the Industrial College of Engineering, 
worked for the Ministry of Engineering as an architect, and spent the rest of his life in Japan as a private 
architect after retiring from government service. Conder’s importance in shaping Meiji architecture 
came from his central role in developing architecture practice and his 43 years of contributing to 
Japanese kindai (modern) architecture. It is difficult to overestimate the importance of Conder in the 
establishment of European style architecture in Japan: Conder was told by a group of the leading 
Japanese architects in 1920 that the development of European architecture in Japan was largely down 
to him. (Conder, 1920: 55) The appreciation to him was shown by his ex-students in Collection of the 
posthumous works of Dr. Josiah Conder, F.R.I.B.A: this work contained the following tribute “He was 
the first man to give systematic instruction in Western architecture in a Japanese education institution 
and his pupils graduated from the college were indeed the pioneers of our new world of architecture… 
It is well said that he was a benefactor to our architectural world.” (Sone et al, 1931: I) 
 
Conder was appreciated by Meiji authorities in his own time, receiving the Fourth-class Order of the 
Rising Sun in 1884, and the Third Class Order of the Sacred Treasure and the Imperial rank of 
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Honorary chokunin [Jap. 勅任]73 in 1894. (The Builder, 1920: 274) In 1892, Tokyo University made 
Conder a Professor Emeritus and in 1915 he was awarded an honorary doctorate. (Stewart, 1987: 37) 
Beyond these awards, Conder introduced Japan to the world stage of architecture: Josiah Conder 
“changed the initial Japanese emphasis on utilitarian engineering to doctrinaire architectural style. With 
Conder, Japan entered the international forum of architectural ideology as well as design practice.” 
(Coaldrake, 1996: 217) He built important buildings, promoted Japan in both Europe and America 
Seiyō, instituted the foundations of architectural education, and educated the first generation of 
Japanese architects. Today, in front of the engineering department at Tokyo University, he is honoured 
by a life-sized statue; despite being made of bronze it survived the scrap metal drive during the Second 







This section will provide insight into how Conder created links between Japan and Great Britain, and 
how his role in architecture training and his Victorian background influenced the character of his notion 
of architecture, in order to explain how this marker provided a strong contact zone in the field of 
Japanese kindai (modern) architecture. 
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 Chokunin was one of the highest official positions under the Meiji Constitution. 
3.11. Statue of Josiah Conder in front of the department of 
architecture on the campus of University of Tokyo. 
(Photography by Author) 
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Conder’s background and ideals in architecture  
Some background is required to explain how this contact zone was established in relation to 
architecture. The notions of architecture in early Meiji Japan were transplanted from either carpenters 
with visual ideas of Seiyō architecture or by Seiyō surveyors. As discussed in Section 3.2, there was a 
lack of understanding by foreigners such as Waters and by the Ministry of Works about the different 
logic and concept of architecture in Japan, and they instead preferred to simply build in a masonry and 
brick style as soon as possible. These early surveyors were not hired to interpret Japanese 
architectural logic, however, only to commission and/or construct foreign-style monuments.  
 
The first man whose notions of architecture were integrated systematically into the instruction of 
architecture courses was Conder who carried with him his Victorian background. He was born in 
Kensington, London, in 1852 at the zenith of the battle of styles which was the environment of conflict 
between supporters of the Gothic style and the classical style in architecture in Victorian Britain. The 
debate on style occurred after Classicism had led the architectural field for centuries: “Classical 
columns and pediments, as used by Alberti and Sangallo, Michelangelo and Palladio during the 
Renaissance, enjoyed virtually unchallenged dominance as the international style of architecture until 
the middle decades of the ninetieth century when the grandeur of the Gothic style of the middle ages 
was rediscovered.” (Coaldrake, 1996: 211) Typical for the mid-Victorian era, Conder was an eclectic 
architect, who never built the same style twice, because he believed that an appropriate style should be 
found for each commission. This was a difficult message to pass on to his inheritors, none of whom had 
a similar Victorian background. 
 
Conder’s education had brought him into contact with two giants of the Victorian architecture world: T. 
Roger Smith and William Burges. Conder was educated from 1869 at the South Kensington School of 
Art (now the Royal College of Art) and the University of London which offered him practical training in 
architecture taught by T. Roger Smith. At the same time he worked in the office of T. Roger Smith 
1869-1873 who was an Associate of the Royal Institution of British Architects and a Fellow. After he 
graduated, Conder worked under William Burges on buildings for the Marquess of Bute from 1873. 
Combining theoretical, practical and work experience made Conder one of the first roundly trained 
architects in Britain. 
 
As professor of architecture and building construction at University College (now the London’s Bartlett 
School of Architecture) 1881-1903, T. Roger Smith was an influential teacher of Conder. Indeed, whilst 
“we know nothing of how Conder felt when he set out on his journey” (Fujimori, 2009: 13) and why he 
wanted to go to Japan, one possibility is that Smith told Conder about the Japanese government’s 
search for a British architect, for Smith was the editor of The Architect. (Watanabe, 1993: 45) Smith’s 
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training was in “the classical tradition: he was taught the Greek and Roman orders, and in the 
proportional harmonies of the Renaissance.” (Mordaunt Crook, 2009: 22) He used to tell his pupils to 
avoid Gothic; he found the nub of the Victorian dilemma was not in creating but in reviving an old style. 
(Mordaunt Crook, 2009: 22) The issue of art to architecture was again fermented in this Victorian 
architect, as Smith believed that architecture should be “not merely serviceable as structures, but 
impressive as monuments.” (Watanabe, 1993: 47) A similar idea was taught by Conder to his 
architecture students: “The utilitarian age in which we may be said to live is one in which there is a 
tendency to disparage the value of the Arts, so much are we absorbed in the progress of scientific 
investigations, and political and commercial enterprises.” (Conder, 1878: 1)  
 
Conder’s career followed a similar pattern to that of Smith, although in Tokyo rather than London. Smith 
was not only an architect but he held an important role for the architecture training; he not only showed 
commitment to professional education but also a determination to create a mixed system of office 
pupillage and university training which was validated by the Royal Institute for British Architects (RIBA). 
This gave Conder a good example when it came to setting up the integrated architecture training 
system in the College of Engineering.  
 
In a practical sense, Smith made his name in India, travelling to the sub-continent in 1864. Much as 
Conder would be in Japan, Smith “seems to have been regarded as an expert in Western-style 
architecture in India.” (Watanabe, 1993: 45) He was the first editor of The Architect which he founded in 
1869 and in which there were various articles related to India written by Smith until 1876. Importantly 
for Conder, Smith discussed how a British architect should build in non-European settings. As a 
Victorian architect Smith’s theoretical position for colonial building types and styles in his article to the 
RIBA74 was that the European primary elements be accompanied by secondary features of the 
‘tropical climate’ style, an influential idea to British architects. This provided Conder with the idea of 
searching for a suitable type for Japanese architecture on which to base some hybrid style. Conder 
was critical of what had been tried in Japan by other Europeans and Americans, even writing that “to 
design a civil building in masonry having all the characteristics of the classical styles of Europe, and to 
crown it with fantastic lanterns, roofs and turrets of timber in imitation of portions Japanese religious 
constructions, is not adapting the national style to modern purposes - it is to create a bizarre and hybrid 
ensemble as revolting to Japanese taste.” (Conder, 1893: 369) 
 
Although it was the period of the battle of styles, Smith stated that, when building in colonies, he 
supported the use of any European style, wherever the source. Smith discussed in detail the practical 
attitude to consider the local context and technical issues, but whilst he could be charged with 
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 Smith, T. Roger, ‘On Building for European Occupation in Tropical Climate, Especially Indian’, (London: RIBA, 1868), 197-208. 
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Euro-centricity, he stated that “as long as it is Southern European, it doesn’t matter whether the style is 
classical or Gothic” (Smith, quoted in Watanabe, 1993: 50) if so “it is acceptable to introduce oriental 
elements as part of architecture design” (Smith, quoted in Watanabe, 1993: 49). In Bombay, Smith 
combined Italian Renaissance and Gothic, and the result was a sort of ‘Ruskinian Rundbogenstil’. 
(Mordaunt Crook, 2009: 22) However Smith’s eulogy to Oriental art is much like other Victorian 
architects and Conder also had much the same tone when he said: “I was an enthusiast in the beauties 
of Japanese art”. (Conder, 1920: 63) This passion is also related to fervour for Oriental art evident in his 
other master: William Burges. 
 
After graduating in 1873, Conder became associated with the RIBA and an architectural assistant in the 
office of the famous Gothic revival architect William Burges for two years where he was influenced by a 
another set of assumptions about architectural style which conditioned his way of thinking. (Mordaunt 
Crook, 2009: 22) Judging by Conder’s winning design for the Soane prize (figs. 3.12 and 3.13), Conder 
had the capacity to be more ‘Burgessque’ than Burges himself. Burges was fascinated by the beauty of 
the Middle Ages and gradually expanded his interest to include India, China and Japan. Conder 
developed an interest in Japanese painting while he worked for Burges, who had collected Japanese 
prints since the 1850s. Burges reviewed the Japanese exhibits at the International Exhibition of 1862 in 
London. Suggesting they were products of ‘the real Middle ages’, he said: “Truly the Japanese Court is 




3.12. Josiah Conder: Design of a country house for the Soane Medalist Competition First Prize in 1876 was of an 
eccentric Gothic style. The Ground Plan. Source from Furuichi et al, 1931. 





Conder’s first task in Burges’s office was Trinity College (fig. 3.14), Hartford, Connecticut; the design 
was early French Gothic with touches of North Italian, which was later an object of emulation for 
Conder’s first large scale substantial design in Japan (Tokyo University, fig. 3.15). (Mordaunt Crook, 
2009: 24) Tokyo University was a building which had both Early English and eastern elements: “The 
style is Early Gothic, but the details have, where possible, without incongruity, been infused with a 
Japanese spirit, more especially in the international architecture and fittings.” (Conder, 1884: 790) but 
the main building (not designed by Conder) was criticised by Conder for some details in its style and 
the framework of building in ‘The Builder’ 1884. The method of constructing the building on a Tokyo 
marsh was one difficulty as ”the frequent and oftentimes severe earthquakes that occur there, [are] a 
difficulty that naturally makes an architect look to iron construction as one most likely to serve him; but 
the Japanese authorities have not as yet taken kindly to the idea.” (Conder, 1884: 786)  
 
 
3.14. William Burges: Plan of 
Trinity College, 1873-74. 
(Courtesy of Trinity College) 
3.13. Josiah Conder: Design 
of a country house for the 
Soane Medalist Competition 
First Prize in 1876 was of an 
eccentric Gothic style. The 
entrance front. Source from 
Furuichi et al, 1931. 
(Courtesy of the Department 
of Architecture, the 




The concerns for adaptation an improvement of materials were to preserve the building from natural 
damage but also shows the idea of how new modern critical reasoning moulded Conder’s thinking. Also 
functions such as Universities should be in a higher status of form and material, following a British 
architectural hierarchy. Conder’s plan for Tokyo University presented the University as if it were in the 
English countryside but with a Japanese pagoda and a courtyard beyond of a type which he had 
experienced in Burges’s Office. Following his direct employment with Burges, Conder worked for a 
further year for H. Walter Lonsdale, Burges’s chief artist who was responsible for many important 
projects including the Victorian mansion of Cardiff Castle (1868-1881, fig. 3.16), and Castel Coch 
(1871-1891, fig. 3.17). During the period that Conder worked with Lonsdale, he was working on Skelton 
Church, Yorkshire (1870-76) as the assistant producing stained glass and cartoons. This implies 
continued work in the Gothic idiom and also indicates Conder’s high level of artistic competence.  
 
     
3.15. Josiah Conder: Plan of 
Tokio University, 1877. Source 
from The Builder (1884). 
(Courtesy of the RIBA Library 
Collections) 
3.16 and 3.17. William Burges: (Left) Cardiff Castle and (Right) Castel Coch  
(Photography by Author) 
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This opinion on architecture influenced Conder, whose definition of architecture was somewhat looser: 
“I use the term architecture to designate any style of building irrespective of material.” (Conder, 
1886/1887: 104) At the same time, Conder saw the use of wood as due to lack of progress. This slow 
progress was because of infrequent contact with the outside world. He integrated Japanese buildings 
within the architectural idiom carefully: “The dwellings of the higher classes, which are called ‘Yashiki’ 
[Jap. 屋敷] or ‘Miya’ [Jap. 宮], are considerably large and more architectural.” (Conder, 1877/1878: 
181) When Conder researched the demonstration of knowledge and principles of Japanese traditions, 
he was obviously aware of the lack of progress by Japanese architects compared with standard 
European practices such as perspective: “Fore-shortening is frequent and well rendered; and though 
the Japanese artist does not seem to have understood the principles of perspective, which are often 
violated when dealing with representations of buildings and rectilinear forms, the perspective of all 
natural forms is carefully noticed and imitated.” (Conder, 1886/1887: 181) With his sliding scale of what 
type of buildings constituted ‘architecture’ and applying British measures of practice to Japanese 
construction, Conder remained inconsistent in his writing. This shows his ambiguous use of personal 
standards and his tacit Orientalism.  
 
Although Smith and Burges had exerted a large influence on Conder’s ideals in architecture by defining 
the traditions that he inherited, a former colleague at Burges’ office William Millard (Trinity University 
project) said after Conder’s death that “Conder was a student of architecture who wasted no energy in 
fancy-flights, but grimly stuck to whatever he had to do, soon proving himself a man who could be relied 
on to carry through whatever he had deliberately undertaken.” (The Builder, 1920: 474) Conder was a 
tenacious and hardworking architect, with a fully rounded education, yet he did not possess the 
brilliance of his teachers. He was by all accounts a very personable man, which combined with his work 
ethic and rigour, made him a very suitable candidate as teacher of architecture and a main conveyance 
of foreign learning for Meiji architecture: he certainly brought the Victorian problem of the Dilemma of 
Style to Japan. As we shall see in Section 3.4, Conder’s solution to Japan’s national style in his early 
career in Japan was the Indian Islamic style. He declared just before his death in 1920: “So far as my 
studies of the national styles went there were no decorative or ornamental forms, or forms of outline or 
contour, which lent themselves constructionally to an indigenous or wooden style, and it became 
necessary to seek in Indian or Saracenic architecture for forms which, having a logical treatment in 
brickwork or stonework, would impart an Eastern character to the building.” (Conder, 1920: 64) His 
attitude towards Japanese architecture combined with his Victorian idea of modern architecture was 
reflected in his practical works.  
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The primary reason for Conder gaining employment in Japan was his design skill rather than his 
teaching capacity: he had received the Award of Soane Medalist Competition First Prize, RIBA in 1876 
for the design of a country house. The prize of £50 was given to travel in Europe and research the 
grand buildings, a prize system that gave the winner a solid foundation of sketches and inspiration for 
their career. This institutionalised journey was also a clear indication of the veneration for past 
architecture and the importance of having a grasp of a number of styles. However since the Japanese 
government recruited Josiah Conder so shortly after his success in the Soane competition, Conder 
asked the RIBA Board whether instead of following the usual course he could use half the money to 
travel to Italy and the other half to make an architectural study of the ancient buildings of Japan; not 
only that, Conder wrote that “I should of course consider it my duty to transmit the drawings produced 
by me in Italy, and later in the series of Japanese studies as evidence of the use I hope to make such 
an opportunity of study.” (Conder, 1876/1878: letter) Conder made good on his promise, thereby 
becoming the first Euro-American architect to write a comprehensive account of traditional Japanese 
architecture.75  
 
This early dedication to the study of Japan translated into Conder’s working life. He served the Imperial 
Japanese Government as the first permanent Professor of Architecture at the College of Engineering 
from 1877 and then for two years as a part time lecturer in Tokyo University from 1884. At the same 
time, he worked for the Ministry of Engineering as an architect from 1877, participating in the design 
and construction of many public buildings. After 1888, he started being commissioned for private 
architectural works alongside his public commissions. Most notably he worked as an Architectural 
Consultant for the Mitsubishi group and led a private architectural practice from 1887-1901. Yet it was 




Conder’s role in architecture training 
In his first seven years as Professor of Architecture, Conder taught and trained 23 students, most of 
whom became very influential in Japan, particularly the first cohort which included TATSUNO Kingo 
(Jap. 辰野金吾, 1854-1919), KATAYAMA Tōkuma (Jap. 片山東熊, 1854-1917), and SONE Tatsuzō 
(Jap. 曽禰達蔵, 1853-1937). That group dominated the architectural scene of Japan for the next 40 
years, showing that Conder’s architectural training was a critical step for building Imperial Japan.  
 
                                                   
75
 These were: Josiah, C 1877, ‘Notes on Japanese architecture’, Transactions of Royal Institute of British Architects, 1st series, vol. 28, 
1877/1878, pp. 179-192, 209-212, plates li-lxv. And Josiah, C, 1885, ‘Further notes on Japanese architecture, Transactions of Royal Institute 
of British Architects, 2nd series, vol. 2, 1885/1886, pp. 185-214, plates li-lxv. 
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Conder’s time in Japan coincided with great changes in the Japanese state: four years after Conder’s 
arrival in 1881, the Japanese emperor promised to give the nation a constitution. Alongside this, a 
modern cabinet with ministries of war, local and foreign affairs, and finance were also being established. 
These ambitious programmes needed new arenas for their activities, which required architects capable 
of constructing appropriate buildings for the politicians, behind a newly nationalist background following 
the early Meiji period when new models and basic Seiyō institutions were bedding in. Japanese 
architects taught by Conder or Conder’s ‘apprentices’ were the main executors of these grand plans 
between 1886 and 1906, yet they first studied under Josiah Conder at the Engineering College thereby 
becoming the new building elite and the top architects of official Japan. (Finn, 1996: 93)  
 
Japanese authorities’ trust in foreign experts meant that the focus of education was decided early on by 
foreigners rather than Japanese, from Henry Dyer to Conder. This was important, as it meant that the 
worldview of the Japanese was superseded in architecture and replaced by whatever education was 
deemed to be civilised. Therefore the moral focus of education for carpenters was quietly ignored and 
replaced by an emphasis on developing the knowledge and skills of architecture students. Conder 
interpreted the aim of his job in the Imperial College of Engineering as training the Japanese students 
in the theory and skills necessary to produce European-style buildings. The application of these skills 
was in a quite different role from that of carpenters: Japanese architects were trained to be “executives” 
who could design projects in Seiyō style, separated from engineers and serving as intermediaries 
between patrons and builders, rather than participating in building themselves.  
 
As mentioned in Section 3.2, the Department of Architecture was initially under the tuition of William 
Anderson and Chastle De Boinville. Conder was employed to replace these two teachers whose tenure 
was widely viewed as having been unsuccessful. (Fujimori, 2009: 13) Although both were established 
architects, “neither of them had the necessary teaching skills. They concentrated wholly on instructing 
their students in draftsmanship and onsite skills, but failed to offer a systematic knowledge of 
architecture. In particular, Boinville spoke with a heavy French accent which made him difficult to 
understand and liked to ridicule the Japanese, which did little to endear him to his students.” (Fujimori, 
2009: 13) Conder, a bright young architect with a strong penchant for all things Japanese, heralded a 
new era in architecture in Japan, both in its instruction and as a leader in the field of building. 
 
 
Content of Conder’s Course 
As noted, the purpose of the Architecture degree course had been to facilitate the adaptation of foreign 
building technology and foreign architectural styles in Japan. This purpose was supported by the Meiji 
government itself which was a generous patron of Seiyō buildings and was the primary employer of the 
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early graduates, who were obliged to work for it for seven years after graduation in exchange for their 
training. (Choi, 2003: 28) Graduates of the course all therefore became government employees and 
architects building Meiji authority architecture.  
 
The architecture course was first developed by Henry Dyer and then adapted by Josiah Conder. 
According to Don Choi, “in Glasgow Dyer had investigated engineering education reforms, he was 
unprepared for one aspect of the Engineering College in Tokyo, namely the establishment of the 
architecture department. The “fine arts” component of architecture fell outside the purview of 
engineering as defined in Britain” (Choi, 2003: 9) Dyer’s architecture programme was pragmatic and 
made was no mention of architectural design or the fine arts, and only a brief reference to style. (Choi, 
2003: 9) Given that at this time, art was not even defined in Japanese dictionaries, this would not have 
been an issue which the Japanese authorities would have been aware of, and it took Josiah Conder’s 
initiative to include fine arts components in the course.  
 
The breadth of topics eventually covered by the architecture course at the College of Engineering was 
ultimately wider than was usual in the UK or France, with a focus on technical knowledge, practical 
experience and (after the recruitment of Conder) artistic skill. The syllabus demonstrates this 
comprehensiveness:  
 
“During their first two years in the general and scientific course, architecture students 
studied English, math, geography, mechanics, physics, chemistry, and drawing. In the 
third year, they spent most of their time in the architectural drawing studio, although they 
also took classes in geology, engineering, and math. Fourth-year instruction consisted 
exclusively of lectures on architecture and architectural drawing studio. Each academic 
year ended with examinations. The practical course of the fifth and sixth years provided 
students hands-on experience. Students spent most of their time at construction sites of 
European-style buildings, for instance Conder’s Prince Arisugawa Residence (1884). They 
returned to campus for the year-end examinations, and at the end of their sixth year, they 
demonstrated their knowledge through three academic exercises: a comprehensive written 
examination, a design project, and a graduating thesis… The examination covered the 
gamut of architectural subjects taught at the Engineering College, ranging from sanitation 
to structural calculations to building contracts.” (Choi, 2003: 47) 
 
Conder’s lectures focused upon the artistic and the practical: “The “History and Art” lectures covered 
architectural history from ancient Egypt to modern Europe, yet also included India, China, and Japan. 
The “Building Construction” lectures treated foundations, materials, construction methods, and 
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architectural specifications.” (Choi, 2003: 37) The examination questions (a sample of which are in the 
fig. 3. 18 below) were mostly taken from R.I.B.A. examinations, and as such were not much adapted to 
the national context of Japan. This is particularly the case for questions on ‘History and Design’, none 







3.18. Final Examination questions for Architecture Diploma at the University of Tokyo, 1881 (partial). Source from Choi, 2003. 
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The examination covered a great range of topics: structural calculations, construction, decoration, and 
professional practices such as estimating. It also included a sketch design project for a porter’s lodge 
and a gateway for a prince’s residence (probably a reference to Conder’s Prince Arisugawa Residence 
(1884) which his students worked on). In his curriculum at the Imperial College of Engineering, Conder 
covered a broader range of subjects than his peers in London, since architectural design was not 
taught at the English universities. (Choi, 2003: 47-48) The depth of instruction can be surmised by the 
exam questions: the material section covers not only expected categories such as Portland cement and 
glass, but also the causes of stone rot and experience of using oil paints and varnish in Japan.  
 
The purpose of modernising meant that architecture students had a much wider focus than their 
carpenter predecessors: Seiyō architectural materials, practices such as contracting, Seiyō 
architectural history, science and technology were all new. 
 
 
Teaching methods and materials 
Schooling in Britain for architects in Conder’s time was unintegrated and disorganised, as reflected in 
his own education: “at the time when Conder was in London, no British school offered a systematic, 
comprehensive architecture course.” (Choi, 2001: 36) Gathering together new innovative methods of 
architectural teaching, Conder and Dyer created a new system, by definition at the cutting edge of the 
‘modern’. Conder’s method of teaching was to start with basic essentials then move on to the history of 
European architecture, planning, construction and the installation of various facilities. Conder explored 
the state of current Japanese architecture, focusing in particular on the relationship between Japanese 
and Euro-American construction techniques. The methods of instruction for Conder’s course were 1) 
lecturing on architectural theory; 2) work on design composition; and, 3) site practice. 
 
Conder’s lecturing on theory was split into two distinct parts: history and the art of architecture, and the 
qualities of materials and principles of construction. It is worthwhile noting that the so-called theory in 
the architecture course and the College as a whole was in fact almost wholly practical: whilst “Dyer 
chose to emulate the Zurich Polytechnikum’s balance of practice and theory” (Choi, 2001: 40), this 
theory was not philosophical but rather engineering based. This focus on practical education was 
planned because, by appointing British educators rather than French, the School of Architecture was 
not influenced greatly by the Beaux Arts tradition of France which focused solely on composition. 
Conder did integrate design composition into his course, with years one and two including drawing 
instruction whilst years three and four concentrated upon work away from the lecture hall and in the 
design studio. Practical experience followed in years five and six, when students spent most of their 
time at European-style construction sites.  
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Conder provided comprehensive instruction in the class and drafting room, but he also involved his 
students in projects he was working on. The first project they were involved in was the Museum at Ueno 
(1881), which provided practical training in every facet from drafting and administration to site 
organisation. This third method, on-site practice, accidently meant that the education system designed 
by Conder was one suited to the Japanese experience of learning how to build because of its focus on 
practical training. A wholly academic syllabus, such as the one practiced in the Ecole des Beaux-Arts in 
Paris, would have been a complete break from Japanese carpenters’ training which was solely 
concerned with learning on the job, with master carpenters also making use of hiragata-bon. In this 
sense there was some continuity. This was not the purpose of Conder and Dyer; both were concerned 
with applying the most up-to-date training methods for architecture and engineering, but coincidently, 
this method of joining the practical with the theoretical made the transition for the Japanese somewhat 
more acceptable.  
 
If the method of learning on-site may have been broadly similar, the context was not. The first four 
years of architectural instruction were spent developing knowledge through reading, writing, listening, 
and drawing. Students were not taught by doing manual labour, and certainly not by sweeping up. They 
were taught through words far more than through actions. Whereas carpenters were educated through 
their work teams and knowledge was gained by imitation, the Japanese architects were encouraged to 
be original and were trained to be leaders, and given great investment by the state. These huge 
differences in methods of education meant that architectural education was revolutionised and had a 
different root to carpentry education. The methods of education were designed to promote autonomy in 
the first cohorts of Japanese architects, to create agents capable of acting independently, able to adapt 
to new fashions and to instigate change in the character and methods of construction in Japan. 
 
Given its short time of establishment, the College of Engineering drew on a surprisingly wide range of 
materials to aid teaching: 
 
“The circulation of architectural and pedagogical ideas was accompanied by the 
transportation of material objects. To support their endeavours, architects and educators 
brought with them books, plaster casts, photographs, and other tangible items. Dyer and 
his faculty established both a library and a museum at the Engineering College, the latter 
containing models, tools, drawings, and other artefacts. The architecture collection of the 
library expanded greatly after Conder’s arrival, and Conder also suggested that ‘casts of 
Architectural ornament… be placed in the Drawing office’ to serve as models for freehand 
drawing and shading.” (Choi, 2003: 40)  
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Conder’s students had few models of European-style architecture beyond these books. Although some 
Seiyō structures were extant in Japan in this period, Conder counselled against using them for 
sketching: “I must warn you against taking example, too much, from the buildings of the European 
settlements in your Country.” (Conder, 1878: 13) Indeed for the most part Conder appears to have 
used texts to give examples of buildings. There is evidence to suggest that in his lectures, Conder 
taught directly from the books A History of Architecture by James Fergusson and A Handbook of 
Architectural Styles by Alfred Rosengarten, both standard texts of the time. In comparing the notebooks 
of ITŌ Chūta (see Section 3.6 for a full discussion of Itō) in his student days with the textbooks Choi 
found that in structure and content, Conder follows the books in his teaching rather slavishly. (Choi, 
2003: 253) As Conder himself had only recently finished his formal education, these materials were 
likely to be an authoritative component of the student’s education. 
 
As for the content of Fergusson’s text, he was fascinated by world architecture and was a widely 
travelled architecture historian. Fergusson did not believe that European architecture, particularly 
Gothic architecture, was better than all other forms, and wished to educate his countrymen in this 
opinion. Yet he clearly held up ‘the West’ as highly civilised in comparison to all others (an opinion 
reflected strongly in Conder’s student’s writings, shown in Section 3.5). This superior attitude is 
particularly evident in the short section on Japan in A History of Architecture. A tone of condescension 
is evident in Fergusson’s writing in “A History of Architecture” volume three: 
 
“It is to be feared that, though quaint and curious in itself, and so far worthy of attention, 
[Japanese architecture] is of little interest beyond the shores of the islands themselves. On 
the other hand, it is be feared that the extent of our knowledge is sufficient to make it only 
too clear that the art, as practiced in Japan, has no title to rank with that already described 
in the preceding pages, and consequently no claim to a place in a general history of 
architectural art.“ (Fergusson, 1876: 710; quoted in full at the beginning of Chapter 3) 
 
Given this dismissive tone (to the point of excluding Japanese architecture from the history of world 
architecture, reflected in exclusion of Japan in the study of world architecture history) and the lack of a 
Japanese instructor knowledgeable in Japanese carpentry, Conder’s method of teaching was to 
deepen students’ understanding of ‘Western architecture’ through theory, practice and design rather 
than attempting to also cover Japanese traditional architecture. 
 
Contact with Britain was deemed a crucial part of the education of Japanese architects by Conder. 
Before him, there was no formal architectural contact between Japan and Britain and, prior to 1853, the 
main method of contact was one way information from Holland to Japan through books. As shown in 
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Section 3.2 this situation had changed by the early Meiji period, when carpenters were designing hybrid 
buildings and foreign surveyors and engineers were employed to build in Seiyō styles. After building the 
College of Engineering in 1873, an architecture teacher and leader was required who was close to the 
current practices in Seiyō architecture. Josiah Conder filled this gap and started establishing conditions 
similar to a contact zone between the authorised teacher of Seiyō, with Japanese students. Due to this 
situation, for the first time the architectural contact zone was two-way. 
 
Conder evidently felt the need to stay in touch with the RIBA from Japan; after sending the Institute his 
studies of Japanese architecture, he also sent an issue of reports of the College of Engineering 
(Conder, 1876/1878: letter), and later helped to establish the Architects Association (Zouka Gakkai). 
Conder even wrote to RIBA in 1887 asking them to “extend their recognition of this rising institute in a 
foreign country by making an exchange of printed proceedings and Transactions, regularly.” (Conder, 
1887: letter) Conder wrote as a member of RIBA himself, being an Associate from 1878 and a Fellow 
from 1884. (Stewart, 1987: 36) When writing to the RIBA requesting a formal link with the Architects 
Association, Conder claimed that the Association “contains among its members gentlemen well 
acquainted with the ancient arts of Japanese; as well as scientific and practical men full of experience 
with in [sic.] Europe and in their own country.” (Conder, 1887: letter) Conder successfully aided the set 
up the ‘Architecture Institute of Japan’ in 1888 and became the first honorary president. 
 
 
Conder’s attitude towards Japanese carpentry 
Conder’s attitude towards Japanese architecture, combined with his Victorian idea of modern 
architecture, was articulated through his practical works. Whilst his RIBA funded study trip was to Italy 
and Japan, the first part was put to practice in designing in Italian Gothic, but he never designed 
traditional Japanese buildings, instead Conder catered for the taste of the Japanese government.  
 
This lack of engagement in Japanese forms was not inappropriate for the period. As a result of the Meiji 
Restoration, Japanese intellectuals saw the past through a new conceptual lens: kindai (modern) was 
defined as a new era, and so the current times were distinguished more clearly from the past. The 
policy of bunmei kaika meant that new ideas from abroad were adopted, ideas that revolutionised 
customary practices. The influence of social Darwinism emphasised not only the survival of the fittest 
but also evolution, which implied a necessary improvement upon the past. These trends were all 
influential in eroding the customary respect towards what had come before.  
 
This is not to say that the past was henceforth ignored, only that the way it was looked at was 
transformed: Japanese architects learnt about the past to distinguish the past from the present. One of 
 197 
the main differences between the ad hoc education of the pioneer carpenters and the first Japanese 
architects was the latter’s contextualised learning: styles were not seen as static but as trends with a 
history that changed greatly until modern times. Styles, spaces and practices were understood as 
fashions to a much greater extent. For example, examination questions such as “Trace the historical 
changes in the art of window tracery which took place throughout the Gothic styles, and illustrate by 
sketches” (Choi, 2003: 261) required a deep understanding of the past in Europe.  
 
This focus on the past was because “like other British architects of the day, [Conder] believed that 
historical precedents served as the basis for modern design. To teach architecture, then, meant to 
inculcate the history of architecture into the Japanese students. In other words, architectural history 
entered Japan as part of the desire to modernize.” (Choi, 2008: 737) History and use of history was a 
great part of Conder’s philosophy as an architectural educator: “Fergusson's sweeping history of the 
architecture of the world was prescriptive - he hoped the lessons of history would lead to the 
improvement of contemporary practices. Conder himself exhorted his students to look to history as a 
guide to future design.” (Reynolds, 2002: 531) 
 
Yet what concerns me most here is the relationship Japanese architects had with their own country’s 
past and what they learnt of this past. One aspect of the teaching by Josiah Conder which is often 
forgotten is his attitude towards Japanese buildings. Whilst it seems that Japan was not alone in the 
‘civilised world’ in later having an architectural identity crisis, as was described in chapter 2, the 
Japanese faced much overt, if accepted, prejudice in the form of Orientalism and the belief in racial 
superiority. These attitudes filtered directly into the study of architecture, as was seen in the writings of 
Fergusson (cited below). In spite of this, there is little evidence that Conder himself displayed overt 
prejudice against Japanese architecture in his teaching, as he spent most of his life during his career in 
Japan engaged with Japanese architecture, and arranged for the contributions of Japanese architects 
to appear in the English-speaking world through the RIBA Transactions.  
 
Conder argues persuasively in his seminal lecture to his Japanese Architecture students “A few 
remarks on architecture” (1878b) that “it seems to me that there is little use in the changes in building in 
your country, if the chief aim is not solidity and strength.” (Conder, 1878: 4) Conder publically showed 
respect for Japanese architecture, apart from its endurance. For his students, Conder stated that 
changes in architecture are not due to cultural inferiority, only material inferiority as he said “without a 
certain necessary amount of substantial material we can produce only sheds and bungalows which 
cannot be dignified by the name of architecture.” (Conder, 1878: 3) This statement on the value of 
Japanese architecture has a corollary in that Conder did not teach that traditional forms of architecture 
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can be used with wood, and he was adamant on one issue: “Upon one thing I insist, and that is, that a 
building must be substantial.” (Conder, 1878: 3)  
 
Whilst praising past carpentry in Japan, Conder was somewhat scathing of the current practices of 
carpenters (almost certainly carpenters such as Shimizu): “the experience of your ancestors is entirely 
forgotten in these modern timber constructions of which I was speaking; which, in addition to their other 
faults, are high, and exposed to heat and wet, with the short eaves of Northern stone architecture… 
such buildings are generally covered with unsightly white paint.” (Conder, 1878: 4) This message is 
directed only at contemporaneous carpentry and there is no evidence that Conder criticised the ancient 
architecture of Japan to the Japanese; Conder told his students that “You have your monuments too, of 
a different type, to the appreciation of which I am for ever urging you” (Conder, 1878: 14) According to 
Choi, Conder wrote, ‘“great notice will be taken of the principles and beauties of the Architecture of the 
Country, with a view to encourage the retention of the best characteristics of the National Architecture 
in future building, so far as is consistent with stability and security of construction, and with all modern 
requirements.’ However, both the methodology and the specific buildings of the architectural history 
familiar to Conder were derived from the nineteenth-century European context and thus had little to do 
with the buildings of Japan.” (Choi, 2008: 738) Although Conder praised past wooden buildings highly, 
he nowhere suggested a return to using wooden architecture (although he clearly taught on the use of 
wood in buildings since two questions of the 1881 exam were on this).  
 
Whilst Conder’s attitude towards Japanese architecture cannot be discerned from his teachings, his 
predisposition to it must have affected his teachings. Indeed, when the audience changed he had a 
different attitude. When writing to the architects at RIBA “Further notes on Japanese architecture” 
(1885/1886) Conder displayed scepticism about the value of buildings in Japan, as with the earlier 
quote which discounted Japan from world architecture history. He wrote, on separate occasions that: 
 
“In all their works, overweening weight is often given to insignificant matters. [This] has 
robbed [Japanese buildings] of grander and more monumental results which the bolder 
enterprise and stronger faith of other eastern nations have obtained.” (Conder, 1885/1886: 
186) 
 
And the following year: 
 
“Whilst falling short of the lasting and monumental, they have attained the utmost delicacy 
and refinement, and their best domestic buildings can hardly better be described than as 
exquisite pieces of joinery and cabinet making.” (Conder, 1886/1887: 104) 
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There are a number of reasons that Conder held the opinion that Japan’s new architects should not 
continue the building traditions of Japanese carpenters. These reasons were: conflict of interest, 
prejudice, lack of knowledge, and lack of interest. These are discussed below.  
 
First, his commission to induct and educate the first generation of Japanese architects and build 
‘Western style’ buildings did not necessitate Conder to have great understanding or to place great value 
on Japanese traditional buildings. Indeed it would have been something of a conflict of interest from 
Conder’s point of view. 
 
Second, assumptions about the lowliness of architecture in pre-Meiji Japan are reflective of an 
overweening Orientalism of the Victorian period; Conder belonged to the paradigm of ‘Western 
supremacy’ as much as any other Englishman of the Victorian age. This ‘Western supremacist’ 
construction of architecture history was taught in the textbooks used to describe the progress of history. 
These histories generally saw modern styles as Western and also as superior to all previous styles. This 
hierarchical outlook was reflected in Bannister Fletcher’s tree of architecture (1921, fig. 3.19). 
 
Under this system, Japanese architecture was seen as having the same essence as Chinese 
architecture. Also, being on the very lowest branch, Japanese architecture was as far from modern 
architecture as it was possible to be. Given the prevalence of social Darwinism at the time, this position 
alongside Assyrian architecture, an empire which ended 2,500 years previously, shows that Japanese 
architecture was seen as static, reflecting cultural assumptions found in the unfashionable works of 
Buckle, fought against by Japanese intellectuals. Banister Fletcher posited that Oriental culture and 
architecture were stagnant and decadent (Choi, 2003: 61) whilst Fergusson (in a text used by Conder 
to teach his Japanese students) stated that: 
 
“They [The Japanese] have no poetry, properly so called, and no literature worthy of the 
name. Their painting never rose much above the scale of decoration, their sculpture is 
more carving than anything we know by the higher name, and their architecture stands on 
the same low level as their other arts.” (Fergusson, 1876: 710) 
 
During the late Victorian period, the main educational texts on non-European architecture were 
Orientalist: knowledge about the ‘East’ was not based on facts and knowledge but on preconceived 
archetypes that saw all ‘Eastern’ societies as broadly similar to each other and of a different type to 
‘Western’ societies. As Conder relied heavily on sources such as Fergusson and was himself educated 
using the same texts, the progress of history was seen in terms of Seiyō architectural history; given the 
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contempt Japanese architecture was held in, it would prove very difficult for a Britain to integrate 





3.19. Banister Fletcher’s ‘Tree of architecture’ (the earliest version). Source from Banister Fletcher, 1921. 
(Courtesy of the British Library Collections) 
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Third, whilst prejudice was rife, the audience at the RIBA Conder was writing to had little knowledge 
about Japanese architecture. Consider the response of one R. Phene Spiers to Conder’s first paper 
“Notes on Japanese architecture” his 1877/1878 paper presented to the RIBA: “I am afraid, with regard 
to the architecture of Japan, there is no architecture, as we understand it: that is, whatever there may 
be in decoration, in dress, in objects of art, and in other works of Japan, from the architecture of the 
country we shall learn scarcely anything.” In such a critical environment with a general lack of 
knowledge it is not unusual that Conder refrained from promoting the worth of Japanese architecture 
too strongly. 
 
Finally, Conder himself may not have been as fascinated with Japanese architecture as he was with 
other aspects of Japanese arts, such as painting, costume and landscape gardening on which he 
wrote more extensively for a British audience.76 Conder showed great appreciation in Japanese 
decorative art as in his first report to the RIBA states: “A striking quality of sculpture of this kind is the 
extremely careful imitation of nature, leaves and flowers being carved with a delicacy and truth to 
nature that is marvellous, and coloured with the same care and beauty.” (Conder, 1877/1878: 190)  
 
Therefore, in spite of encouraging words to his students, Conder’s attitude towards native architecture 
comprised of three aspects: first, treating traditional architecture as antiquated and of little relevance to 
modern building practice; second, disparaging current carpentry practices as tasteless, ad hoc and, 
therefore, unfashionable; third, he taught that it was not necessary to study Japanese ‘traditional’ 
architecture in the College course due to his strict Victorian thought on what is ‘architecture’ (that is, 
without a certain necessary amount of substantial material, it is ‘not architecture’). These attitudes were 
important in creating a historicised Orient in the minds of Japanese architects, which was quaint, 
beautiful and yet of limited utility in the ‘modern’ capitalist world which was in vogue in this period. This 
was a shared attitude amongst several of the teachers at the College of Engineering (such as the Dean, 
Henry Dyer) who had an ambiguous position of publicly teaching recently developed technology, yet 
privately being appreciative and often fascinated by the ‘historical’ Japan that was disappearing before 
their eyes.  
 
Yet it can be said that it was not Conder’s duty to think about the effect of his teaching native Japanese 
the way of the modern world, as he only came to provide a ‘door’ for Japan to Seiyō (especially Britain). 
Even so, his notions about Japanese ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ architecture gave an example to 
Japanese architects which they seem to have adopted. Conder’s syllabus did not include the teaching 
of Japanese carpentry, ensuring that until 1889 the architecture course was an instance of the ‘West’ in 
                                                   
76
 Conder’s interest in Japanese garden was influential to Edwardian Britain landscape before the First World War through his book in 1893, 
Landscape Gardening in Japan. (Tachibana, Daniels, and Watkins, 2004) 
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the ‘East’. His course covered design, mathematics, European architecture history, professional 
practice, contracting, and materials used in Western architecture. This meant that if a prospective 
Japanese student wished to learn about the past of Japanese carpentry, their only option was to 
become a carpenter’s apprentice or to pursue this privately.  
 
In this sense an important conclusion can be drawn about the European approach to architectural 
history in Japan as shown through Conder’s course. From a Western perspective, Japanese 
architecture was seen as being outside of history: historical revival meant only revival of European 
styles. This is seen strongly in the fourth edition (1901) of Banister Fletcher’s A History of Architecture 
which “was divided into two sections. The ‘Historical Styles’, which covered all the material from earlier 
editions, and The ‘Non-Historical Styles,’ which included Indian, Chinese, Japanese, Central American, 
and Saracenic architecture.” (Baydar, 1998: 8) Through being educated to design modern buildings, 
Japanese architects were re-educated in their worldview, where the only valid ‘modern architecture’ 
was European architecture. Conder’s buildings show how he and other foreign architects attempted to 
articulate models by which architecture in Japan could progress to encompass ‘Oriental’ roots. 
 
 
3.4 The formation of Victorian Japan under foreign architects  
Through Conder’s British-inspired architectural education, European architecture hierarchies were 
slowly embedded into public buildings in Japan in this period. Whilst the education of architects set up 
the potential for a type of modernity to arise in Japanese authority architecture, it was only in the 
practice and discourse of architects that this modernity was expressed to the Japanese public. As a 
prolific architect, Conder had a large part to play in this, participating in 134 projects whilst working in 
Japan, mostly in Tokyo. In the first part of this section I discuss the buildings which give a picture of the 
essence of Conder as an architect, before discussing later foreign architects. 
 
 
Conder’s government buildings  
Conder’s early architectural practice work was commissioned by the Japanese Government’s Ministry 
of Engineering: as an architect he produced his most important buildings from these commissions 
during his early career in 1877-1884. This is because his major works were executed before his 
students had attained sufficient experience to run the College and take on major commissions; before 
these students had graduated Conder was considered to be the pre-eminent architect in Japan. In his 
later career Conder worked as an Architectural Consultant for Mitsubishi group during 1887-1901 and 
led a private architectural practice.  
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Conder’s proposal for the contract for the Imperial Palace in Tokyo (1879-1888) was one of his first 
activities upon entering Japan and followed his studies on pre-Meiji palaces at Kyoto as presented in 
papers sent to the RIBA journal in 1886. He was one of the bidders for the ‘Western style’ reception hall, 
designed to be a separate pavilion from the palace itself. Conder’s reception hall was to be 
“symmetrical, with carefully designed facades that produced a monumental frontality. Their schemes 
displayed a comprehensive spatial geometry and subjected the program to an overall organizational 
logic.” (Wendelken, 1996: 31) (fig. 3.20) As mentioned the Japanese government wished to create 
Seiyō architecture for their public buildings but buildings such as temples and shrines with traditional 
functions kept their traditional forms. Therefore, although Conder entered Japan with a high reputation, 




Ultimately both the palace and the reception hall were constructed by the traditional master carpenter 
of the miyadaiku (Jap. 宮大工),77 KIGO Kiyoyoshi (Jap. 木子清敬, 1845-1907), as desired by the 
emperor himself who preferred to live in Japanese quarters. Kigo, although responsible for the main 
reception room, relied on the advice from Conder and other foreign engineers for the public rooms. As 
was often the case in Meiji Japan, the reception rooms, the most public part of the palace, were Seiyō 
style; yet Japanese and foreign methods overlapped in surprising ways. (fig. 3.21) Indeed the imperial 
palace was a watershed building in combining Japanese forms in modern architecture with full use of 
the traditional arts of wood carving, lacquer work and painting. However, although Japanese elements 
were incorporated, the fundamental principle of Meiji public buildings remained: the outward face 
should appear ‘Western’ whilst the private interior could remain traditional. 
                                                   
77
 Miyadaiku was a title for master carpenters who constructed Japanese shrines and temples, and were renowned for their use of elaborate 
wooden joints. 
This image can be seen in the printed thesis at the University of 
Sheffield library. 
 
3.20. Josiah Conder: Meiji Palace, Tokyo, 1886. 
Site plan showing Conder’s proposal for the 





Shortly after this submission, Conder’s Hokkaidō Sales Hall in Tokyo (1880-1881) was built, the first 
building in Japan which strongly drew on Burges’ work. The building “bore a close resemblance to 
Burges’ original design for building at Harrow, the British public school” (Finn, 1995: 53) with the 
features of truss-structure roofs secured by iron bolts, a chimney, and fireplaces being introduced in 
this building (fig. 3.22). However, the building had an eclectic touch: the roof is low-pitched, hipped 
rather than gabled, and with bracketed eaves like an Italianate Villa, in other words, not Gothic. This 
Venetian style building, built to show off products from newly conquered Hokkaidō, was delicate looking 
and showcased displays of canned salmon, edible seaweed, and coal: the beautiful form for a 
mundane function is another example of Meiji addiction to architectural display. The two-story 30m long 
brick building was constructed of bricks made in Japan, and was “the first building in Japan to use a 
Western invention for protecting a building against earthquakes.” (Lerski, 1979: 272)  
 
 
3.22 Josiah Conder: Hokkaidō Sales Hall in 
Tokyo, 1878-1881; Bank of Japan, 1882. Source 
from Furuichi et al, 1931. 
(Courtesy of the Department of Architecture, the 
University of Tokyo) 
3.21. KATŌ Heitarō: Plan of the Meiji 
Palace (Jap. 大日本帝国御造営之
図), the Kyūden (Jap. 宮殿, the 
Palace) completed in 1888. 
(Courtesy of Tokyo Metropolitan 
library) 
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It was one of rare survivors of the 1923 earthquake: just “burned on the inside, but standing erect with 
its walls uncracked.” (Lerski, 1979: 273) After the commissioning department collapsed (as noted in 
Section 4.1 on Japanese imperialism), the newly formed Bank of Japan (established in 1881) took over 
the building as an interim base in 1882 and it became a bank, which seemed a more appropriate 
function for the grand form, though if built in Britain at the time it would have been no more or less than 
a middle-class villa. This building demonstrates the Japanese Meiji government’s early fascination with 
architectural form: the building is really a hall for selling products from Hokkaidō, yet the spaces are full 
of rooms for a gentleman’s club including a billiard (snooker) room and a drawing room (shown in figs. 
3.23 and 3.24) with “much of the Oriental taste for the interior decoration” (Furuichi, 1931: 11) which 





3.23. Upper floor plan of the Hokkaidō Sales 
Hall. Adopted from Kawahigashi, 1980. 
(Courtesy of the Department of Architecture, 




















3.24. Interior Plan of the guest room in the 
Hokkaidō Sales Hall. Source from Suzuki et al, 
2009. 
(Courtesy of the Department of Architecture, 
the University of Tokyo) 
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In the same year 1881 (Meiji Year 14), Conder’s first Museum was built. This was the first concrete 
example of a long-trend trend, underlying the development of new building types for the general public. 
Alice Tseng believes this development was due to “the emergence of a new patronage and audience 
for art in the social and political transition from feudalism to a constitutional monarchy. The modern 
departure from traditional artistic praxis fundamentally involved a shift of physical and intellectual 
ownership. Many places, objects, and conventions hitherto limited to the purview of the elite were 
reassigned as the nation’s prerogative, to be maintained for national ends.” (Tseng, 2008: 3) The need 
for national art museums was directly linked to the need to use buildings to create a new national 
consciousness by Meiji elites, creating spaces for a shared experience of the arts. Given this, both the 
contents and the building itself are important to understand how the vision for kindai (modernity) was 
conceived.  
 
The Museum of Ueno was an interesting example to show how far some government clients’, 
enthusiasm for Seiyō style buildings outstripped Conder’s: this Museum’s design was not actually 
Seiyō enough for the Japanese, as Conder wanted to create a style between East and West whilst the 
Japanese only wanted a pure Seiyō style. This voluntary Westernisation is very different from the 
ordinary concept of Orientalism and colonial domination, and provides further evidence of the change 
in culture (or transculturation) of the Japanese elites. The two-story brick museum had an area of 
27,300 square feet and faced along “the central axis the fairground in Ueno Park, ultimately confronted 
by a monumental building.” (Tseng, 2004: 472) It was to function as an art gallery in the second national 
industrial exhibition in 1881 as in fig. 3.25. In style it was a Victorian Gothic building with Indian Islamic 
influence and Moorish features. For Conder it was another attempt to marry ‘Western’ architecture with 
‘Eastern’, particularly Mogul, elements. Conder wrote that: 
 
“Now, a foreign architect arriving in this country imbued with the idea of the continuity 
of a national style, generally first attempts to find some way by which he can 
perpetuate the national architecture, whilst giving it the modern improvement of 
arrangements, solidity, and scientific advantages. So far as my studies of the national 
styles went (and I was an enthusiast in the beauties of Japanese art) there were no 
decorative or ornamental forms, or forms of outline or contour, which lent themselves 
constructionally to an indigenous or wooden style, and it became necessary to seek 
in Indian or Saracenic architecture for forms which, having a logical treatment in 
brickwork or stonework, would impart an Eastern character to the building.” (Conder, 







Although some historians (for example Stewart, 1987) did not see Ueno Museum as a successful style 
for Japan, for Conder the building was an expression of his dedication to finding a suitable hybrid style 
of architecture for Japan, between East and West, that did not use Japanese ornamental forms as he 
deemed these as suitable only for wooden buildings. Both his eclecticism and his concept of a 
generalised ‘Orient’ can be highlighted here. For a British architect in the Victorian period it was not 
unusual for style to be chosen as representing the concept of the architect, or as a means to symbolise 
This image can be seen in the printed thesis at the University of Sheffield 
library. 
 
3.25. Map of the second National Industrial Exhibition, Tokyo, 1881. The map is drawn in a typical 
Japanese/Chinese manner as a bird’s eye view centred on a main axis with entrance at the bottom 
to indicate the progression of spaces, and with buildings projected sideways as well as upwards. 
The art gallery is indicated by the arrow. Source from Tseng, 2004. 
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what the building stood for; the fact that few understood what Conder was trying to do demonstrated a 
lack of embedded understanding about eclecticism, and how style could be used as a symbol. After the 
Museum had been completed, INOUE Kaoru (Jap. 井上馨, 1836 -1915), a highly influential Japanese 
statesman, succeeded in dissuading Conder from the pseudo-Saracenic style which the architect had 
thought appropriately Oriental, and propelled him instead toward what has been described as his 
“Renaissance villa” style. (Finn, 1995: 97) One of Conder’s purposes, as he saw it, was to generate a 
national style of public architecture for Japan, whilst using ‘modern’ materials, particularly brick and 
stone. In Ueno museum he used what he thought of as a generic ‘Eastern’ style, borrowing what he 
considered to be ‘Eastern’ architectural decorative features, such as Moorish arches (fig. 3.26), 





But in retrospect the choice of Moorish style shows Conder’s Orientalism. He believed that Japan, even 
with no historical connection or knowledge of the Islamic North African nations, would accept a Moorish 
style as a suitable example of the Orient, just as an American would have accepted Greek revival. This 
suggests an assumption on Conder’s part that all Oriental nations possessed an essential commonality, 
that there were general stylistic characteristics original to the ‘East’, perhaps of ‘lightness’ and 
‘exuberance’ (captured in the photograph in fig. 3.27), making any Oriental style more valid in Japan 
than the generic European style currently being practiced.  
3.26. Josiah Conder: Ueno Museum, 
1881. Front Elevation. Source from 
Suzuki et al, 2009. 
(Courtesy of the Department of 








After he was deterred from his Moorish style, Conder’s most important work in political and social terms 
was the Rokumeikan Palace (Jap. 鹿鳴館, lit. Deer Cry Pavilion), built in Tokyo 1883 (Meiji Year 16) 
immediately after the Museum at Ueno. The Rokumeikan was commissioned by the Foreign Minister 
INOUE Kaoru who believed that Japan needed to establish a new European-style Empire on the 
Eastern Sea, on the model of Britain. Inoue wished the Rokumeikan to be built so that the Japanese 
would meet Europeans and Americans face to face and realise their weakness compared to Seiyō:  
 
“The Japanese must achieve a system of self-government and a vigour of conduct 
sufficient to assure the creation of a strong people and a powerful and effective 
government. How can we impress upon the minds of our thirty-eight million people this 
daring spirit and attitude of independence and self-government? In my opinion, the only 
course is to have them clash with Europeans, so that they will personally feel 
inconvenienced, realize their disadvantage, and absorb an awareness of Western 
vigorousness. I consider that the way to do this is to provide for truly free intercourse 
between Japanese and foreigners…. Only thus can our Empire achieve a position equal to 
that of the Western countries with respect to treaties. Only thus can our Empire be 
independent, prosperous and powerful.” (Inoue Kaoru, 1879, quoted in Slade, 2009: 95) 
 
For Conder this was an important commission, and he decided again to follow the pattern of British 
eclecticism, this time borrowing a French Classical style and adding Indian Islamic influences. As a 
place for Japanese elites to practice the social skills needed for dealing with foreigners, this mixture of 
‘Western’ and ‘Oriental’ styles was likely to be seen as suitable by Conder. It was used as an 
entertainment hall for the foreign Ministry which was a major locus of social intercourse for elite 
Japanese learning from Seiyō, and particularly European, society. Through participating in the events 
3.27. Museum at Ueno Park, Tokyo, 1878-81. 
Source from Suzuki et al, 2009. 
(Courtesy of the Department of Architecture, the 
University of Tokyo) 
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held in the building, Japanese elites became well versed in Seiyō culture. Here Conder again 
demonstrated his versatility and desire for cultural equivalence.  
 
The two-story brick building (fig. 3.28) was described as “the scarlet woman of Meiji buildings. Its name 
Rokumeikan, literally “The hall of the cry of the Deer,” was “taken from a Chinese poem celebrating 
hospitality to strangers, a custom its architecture was intended to promote.” (Finn, 1995: 97) It was 
constructed at a cost of about 140,000 Yen, an enormous sum for the Japanese state to spend on a 
building to hold balls and other events. Whilst it was not the first building with this entertainment 
function,78 in its period the Rokumeikan was more than simply a building: it became a symbol of a way 





Its function as a socialisation space for Meiji and foreign elites is clear from the spatial functions, with 
billiard rooms, drawing rooms, numerous dining rooms, a common room and a newspaper room shown 
in fig.3.29. The upper floor map in fig. 3.30 shows the floor plan for the emperor’s birthday celebrations. 
Written in French, the menus and rooms were redesigned to replicate all the functions of a French party. 
Following this party, the Japan Weekly Mail praised the building, writing that “we imagine the hospitable 
people of Tokyo must often congratulate themselves on possessing a handsome and stable building so 
admirably adapted for the accommodation, distribution, and easy circulation of large assemblages of 
guests.” (Japan Mail, 1885, quoted in Smits, 2010: 12) 
 
                                                   
78
 Its precursor was the Hoheikan (1880), Sapporo’s hotel-guest house which also showed concern for a proper Western ambiance. 
3.28. Josiah Conder: Rokumeikan, 
1883. Source from Suzuki et al, 
2009. 
(Courtesy of the Department of 








The Rokumeikan provided an informal contact zone for Meiji authorities to mingle with European and 
Americans, held on Western cultural terms. Given this was a contact zone, it is unsurprising that some 
transculturation occurred, significantly in the role of women as a guest of their husbands or even as 
public figures raising funds: “Wives traditionally left [at] home, were encouraged to participate in the 
Western way. Shortly, under the patronage of Countess Itō, court and government wives, many in hats 
and dresses, put on Japans’ first, and highly successful charity bazaar.” (Finn, 1995: 97) This new 
female role, displayed in the bazaar scene in fig. 3.31, as an equivalent to the relatively independent 
women of Seiyō, was a source of pride for some Japanese. Following the emperor’s birthday in 1885, 
the Japan Weekly Mail wrote that “in the dancing last evening the Japanese ladies took a large share. 
Indeed, it has now become difficult to distinguish them from their sisters in the West, so thoroughly 
have they adopted European costumes, and so perfectly versed are they in the usages of Western 
Society.” (Japan Mail, 1885, quoted in Smits, 2010: 12)  
 
3.30. Top floor map for a 
dance party on the 
emperor’s birthday in 
1893. Source from Suzuki 
et al, 2009. 
(Courtesy of the 
Department of 
Architecture, the 
University of Tokyo) 
3.29. The ground floor plan of the 







Yet this obvious example of assimilating Seiyō culture was too overt to last. The picture in fig. 3.32 from 
1887 shows a large masquerade ball held in the Rokumeikan where Japanese and foreigners dressed 
as characters from European history and literature. This event was criticised by the Tokyo public as a 
terrible use of government funds: whilst the expense was decried, their anger was mainly towards the 
function of the building, the manners of the guests, and the priorities of the government. This scandal 
led to the Foreign Minister Inoue, the building’s commissioner, resigning, and the government sold the 
Rokumeikan for private use in 1889.  
 
This image can be seen in the printed thesis at the University of 
Sheffield library. 
 
3.31. Picture of the Ladies’ Charity Bazaar at the Rokumeikan by 
Yoshu. Source from Suzuki et al, 2009. 
(Courtesy of the Department of Architecture, the University of Tokyo) 
 
 
3.32. Masquerade ball in the 
Rokumeikan, 1887. Foreign 
Ministry’s Entertainment Hall. 
Source from Smits, 2010. 
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In addition to its unpopularity in late 1880s Japan, when nationalism and self-confidence was rising, the 
Rokumeikan did not even have the desired effect on foreigners: as noted in Section 2.2 many 
European commentators reacted critically to the Japanese copying European ways. Part of the 
complaint was that the copy was inferior to the original: some visitors such as the French writer Pierre 
Loti, who attended a ball in November 1886 in celebration of the emperor’s birthday, were unimpressed 
with the building itself, describing it as reminiscent of a second-rate French casino. (Finn, 1995: 98) 
Other foreign visitors believed that Japan should remain different and exotic. These events brought out 
feelings of cultural and racial superiority: Westerners believed that non-European people could not 
master European ways in any depth. For example, a French naval officer wrote following the emperor’s 
birthday celebration in 1885 that the Japanese women’s dresses were ‘brilliant disguises’ and on the 
dancing, "They dance quite properly, my Japanese in Parisian gowns. But one senses that it is 
something drilled into them, that they perform like automatons, without any personal initiative.” 
(Meech-Pekarik, 1986: 149) Contact between Japanese and Europeans appeared to have had little 
effect on European opinions of Japan’s modernisation being mere imitation and rather than prompting 
shame in Japanese as Inoe wished brought anger at Westernisation being a well funding part of the 
government strategy. 
 
The Rokumeikan became a symbol of government pandering to Seiyō, as being in conflict with private 
desire and social customs. The building represented the pinnacle of the early Meiji government’s 
architectural ideology to integrate Japan into Seiyō. Conder was important as the only permanent 
foreign architect working alongside this ideology. However he was also implicated by this position: he 
became marginalised by the Rokumeikan controversy since “within years of the Rokumeikan's 
completion, many intellectuals began voicing concern about the implications of making modernization 
synonymous with westernization.” (Guth, 1996: 17) 
 
The conclusion of Josiah Conder’s building activities for government authorities was in 1894 (his first 
commission from the government for four years) when he constructed the Navy Ministry building in 
Tokyo. It appears clear that Conder was chosen partly due to his nationality. Often, Japan chose model 
nations to follow in each area of government, so France was the model for imperial buildings and the 
police, Germany was chosen for expertise in military affairs and town planning, and Britain stood for 
industry, railways, and particularly the Navy. (Sorenson, 2002: 50; Finn, 1995: 115) Throughout the 
Meiji period the Japanese navy showed an almost undivided loyalty to Britain, purchasing battleships 
only from British shipyards and hiring foreign instructors from the Royal Navy.  
 
In spite of the likely desire for Britishness, in the façade, “there is a residue of Conder’s 
Hindu-Saracenic style of several years earlier in the alternating voussoirs of the windows.” (Stewart, 
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1987: 47) Yet this eclecticism was itself very British. In the parlance of 19th century, ‘style’ was a key 
issue for architects, who learnt about the meaning of forms in a prescriptive and normative way. The 
diversity of styles coincided with nationalism; the continuing trend of eclecticism, in a nationalist 
background, was a challenge for architects to determine the most suitable style for each modern 
country. Acting as a civilised ‘nation’ state through architecture therefore required national styles, and 
Conder was one of the main figures attempting to promote a Japanese national style, even setting the 
title for the dissertations of the first cohort of Japanese architects as ‘The Future Domestic architecture’ 
in 1879. 
 
As shown in the examples above, Conder himself attempted to provide a solution to the issue of 
national style, which he saw as his task as soon as he arrived in Japan. (Conder, 1920: 63) He believed 
that solving this issue was laudable, and often stated his objective “to perpetrate the national 
characteristics of style in modern works.” (Conder, 1893: 369) In spite of his enthusiasm he was not 
personally able to solve this issue and contributed mainly by his suggestion that Japanese traditional 
motifs and rooflines on modern masonry buildings created “a bizarre and hybrid ensemble… revolting 
to Japanese taste.” (Conder, 1893: 369) Hybrid buildings were designed only by foreign architects in 
Japan (rather than Japanese architects) such as Adolph Stegmueller, Ralph Adams Cram, Hermann 
Ende, Willhelm Böckmann and Franz Baltzer. 
 
Conder soon found that the majority of his clients disliked Oriental-inspired styles, and by 1890 he had 
been sufficiently discouraged to move completely away from them. The two story entrance hall and 
grand staircase of the Navy Ministry were a hallmark of Japanese Governmental buildings in this period, 
as was the symmetrical Renaissance style, and the red brick with white trimmings, also seen in Ende 
and Böckmann’s Ministry of Justice and in the British Consulate in Nagasaki. The Navy Ministry was 
particularly distinguished by its showy cavetto roofs, oculi, and elegant pilasters. The building remains 
interesting for the development of kindai (modern) architecture in Japan as “in this late work of the pupil 
of Burges, the overall aims of High Victorian Gothic and Renaissance derived idioms can be seen to 
merge.” (Stewart, 1987: 47) With the two German built government offices built nearby, Conder 
appears to have put particular effort into the design of the building, attempting to imbue it with a 
monumental character. In doing so he provided an appealing model for his students to inherit in Japan 
and their colonies. 
 
 
Contemporary Victorian Architects in the Mid-Meiji  
As part of governmental policy after 1894, all government building contracts were transferred to 
Japanese architects, the most productive and influential of who were Conder’s students. After a brief 
 215 
return visit to England, Conder remained in Japan and became a private architect with an office in 
Tokyo in 1888. The opening of this office corresponds with the end of his academic career, though he 
continued to be a government servant, not ceasing to “advise the Ministry of Home Affairs on topics 
related to building and construction.” (Stewart, 1987: 37)  
 
Yet Conder’s influence over the form of authority buildings inevitably waned after his move into the 
private sector, and other foreign architects and engineers built most of the iconic buildings of the 
mid-Meiji period. Contemporary with the Navy Ministry was the tallest building in the Eastern 
hemisphere, erected in 1890: the Ryōunkaku (Jap. 凌雲閣, lit. cloud-surpassing tower) in Asakusa (Jap. 
浅草), Tokyo, shown in fig. 3.33. Twelve stories high at 225ft (69 m), it was built by the Scottish 
engineer William Kinnimond Burton, who would later be responsible for the sewerage system in Taipei. 
The building was used to sell goods from around the world, to display art and to observe Tokyo from the 
top floors. The construction was brick over a wooden frame, it contained Japan’s first elevator, and it 
was only 70ft shorter than the world’s highest building in New York. The building is notable for its iconic 






The Japanese government employed other European and American architects who, unprompted, 
attempted to solve the problem of national style with their own ideas for Japan. Meiji urban 
development was mainly in Tokyo, formerly the central setting of the Shogunate, and gradually 
influenced other cities. The urban Europeanisation of Ginza planning of Brick Street (1872, discussed 
3.33. William Kinnimond 
Burton: Postcard of the 
Ryōunkaku, titled ‘The tower 
‘Jūnikai’ Asakusa Park, 
Tokyo’ 
(Courtesy of Kjeld Duits 
Collection) 
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in Section 3.2) and Hibiya centralised planning of Ministries (1886) were the main urban reforms during 
the Meiji era instigated by the government. 
 
After the Ministry of Technology was reformed in 1886, and reinvented as the Ministry of Works, public 
architecture in Japan moved for a brief but significant period towards German architecture, for the 
departmental head, MATSUZAKI Bancho, was an architect trained independently in Germany. (Stewart, 
1987: 38) An imitation of the European trend for creating a new urban plan of the government district in 
capital cities (such as in London) was proposed by ITŌ Hirobumi’s Cabinet in the Hibiya area, as a 
result of the same political reasoning as the Rokumeikan: to achieve a revision of the unequal treaties 
through demonstration of Japan’s level of civilisation. Ministries had been located separately around 
the Imperial palace during 1875-1887; the government required a government district.  
 
The Ministry of Works came up with a simple plan which was rejected. Conder was then approached 
and came up with two urban plans centred around his Rokumeikan and again near the emperor’s 
residence, both to the west of it. Conder interpreted the proposal in the first instance cautiously, 
planning only three major buildings composed of a series of hollow squares in a plain and unambitious 
manner. After the rejection of his first plan, Conder proposed another, (both shown in fig. 3.35) this time 
with a stronger sense of holistic planning, including ten buildings adjacent to one another surrounding a 
small park. Yet this plan was also rejected, perhaps again because it did not appear sufficiently 
monumental: the planned National Diet building, for instance, was surrounded and crowded by other 
buildings, not befitting its rank as the most important civic building in Japan. 
 
In 1886 two architects from Germany, Hermann Ende and Wilhelm Böckmann, were invited to design a 
plan to “construct a civic center comparable to those found in cities in Europe where all the ministries in 
the Hibiya [Jap.日比谷] area could be gathered together.” (Jinnai, 1998: 34) The Meiji Government 
preferred Ende and Böckmann’s plan as “they had originally intended a grandiose complex in the 
neo-baroque style with boulevards and a radial road pattern which will have had the effect of 
perspectives one finds in Paris and other European cities.” (Jinnai, 1998: 34) With the arrival of Ende 
and Böckmann the government opened a short-lived contact with Germany since “Ende and Brockman 
[sic.] later returned to Berlin with a contingent of more than 10 Japanese trainees”. (Stewart, 1987: 39) 
They produced a vision for urban redesign that included a new park, draining the castle moat, a space 
for expositions and a military parade ground as well as grouping many government functions. Whilst 
parts of the urban redesign were eventually achieved, such as the park and draining parts of the moat, 
the scheme as a whole was later dropped due to the expense.  
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This type of planning fitted strongly with the Meiji idea of presenting a coherent, pure view of the 
civilised nation of Japan: having a district where all buildings would be seen uncontroversially as 
‘architecture’ by foreign visitors would greatly aid impressing foreigners that Japan was not a hybrid 
country, where the pre-modern and the modern were alongside each other. This was clearly not the 
case in 1900, when Tokyo was still being described as follows: “as the city is in a transition state, it 
necessarily presents many strange anomalies. Side by side with lofty stone buildings stand rows of 
rude wooden houses. As with the buildings so with the people; while the mass still wear the native 
dress, numbers appear in European costume. The soldiers and police are dressed in uniform on the 
Western model.” (Wason, 1900: 24) The city was seen as a reflection of the people in it: whilst “the city 
has in many portions been thoroughly modernised” (Wason, 1900: 24) there were wide swaths where 
this was not true.  
3.35. Josiah Conder: The 1st 
and 2nd proposal for the 
Centralised planning of 
Ministries (area within the 
green square in fig. 3.33). 
Adapted from Sha, Y., 2001. 
3.34. Ende and Böckmann: 
Proposal for the 
Centralised planning of 
Ministries. Adapted from Sha, Y., 
2001. 
 
3.36. The Ministry of Public 
Works: Proposal for the 
Centralised planning of 
Ministries, public architecture 
(area to the east of the Imperial 
walled city). Adapted from Sha, 
Y., 2001. 
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The shift from towards creating a modern European inspired capital implied a move away from both 
Japanese and Chinese forms, This could be seen clearly in instances when foreign architects proposed 
‘traditional’ designs that were rejected; most obviously with the National Diet Building and Tokyo 
Station. Tokyo Station “was to become no less than a temple to progress and a monument to empire. It 
paid homage to the power of rail in the development of the state through its mastery of Western 
transportation technology and civil engineering.” (Coaldrake, 1996: 223) This was in keeping with the 
contemporaneous function of railway stations to display an international, aspirational and progressive 
image. Given this function, the original ‘traditional’ design by the German Franz Baltzer (fig. 3.37) was 
refused as it was out of keeping with the intention to represent its authority as “a modern, Westernised 









The final Tokyo Station was designed by one of Conder’s graduates and had no obvious ‘traditional’ 
features. The desire to discover a national style brought in by Conder stood at odds with the continued 
desire of the government to work within a Seiyō architectural vocabulary and grammar. As I shall 
discuss in the following section, this desire was shared by Conder’s students, who worked almost 
exclusively in Seiyō styles, with kindai (modern) sensibilities and mindsets.  
 
 
This image can be seen in the printed thesis at the University of Sheffield library. 
 
This image can be seen in the printed thesis at the University of Sheffield library. 
 
3.37. Franz Baltzer: Original elevations of Tokyo 
station, 1898-1899. (Top) Arrival building for 
long-distance trains and (Bottom) front of imperial 
equipment. Source from Shima, 1990. 
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3.5 Japanese inheritors of the modern mission 
When Josiah Conder’s seven year tenure as Professor of Architecture ended in 1884 he was replaced 
by his former student TATSUNO Kingo (even designing a new dormitory himself in 1888, fig. 3.38). 
Two years later, the government abolished the Department of Public Works, placed the College of 
Engineering under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education, and promptly incorporated the Imperial 
College of Engineering into the Imperial University. The course was substantially shortened from five 
years to three years. Under the original Architecture course 21 students graduated from the 
Engineering College architecture department, 19 under Conder79 and two more under Tatsuno: the 
first and second cohort went on to dominate the Japanese architecture scene for the following decades. 
(Choi, 2003: 65) The preceding text sections explored the form and content of the new education 
system and the buildings constructed by foreign experts during the mid-Meiji period. The following 
sections cover how this new system of education and design was received by Conder’s students, what 
effect these educational activities had on those educated on the Architecture course, and how a 
subsequent turn towards European architecture took place in Japan led by those students after Tatsuno 







Early Japanese architects’ absorption of Seiyō perspectives 
Upon beginning the architecture course, the first issue that the Japanese students had to confront was 
understanding English. This apparently simple linguistic problem was a thoroughly complex one as 
                                                   
79
 During the period when Conder was Professor of Architecture, the annual graduations were as follows: 1879, four graduates (including 
TATUSNO Kingo, KATAYAMA Tokuma, SONE Tatsuno and SATACHI Shichijiro); 1880, two graduates (including WATANABE Yuzuru); 1881, 
three graduates; 1882, five graduates; 1883, three graduates; and 1884, one graduate. 
This image can be seen in the printed thesis at the University of Sheffield library. 
 
3.38. TATSUNO Kingo: College of Engineering, 
dormitory across moat, Tokyo Imperial University, 
Hongo, 1888. Source from Stewart, 1987. 
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students were introduced to a great number of new concepts derived from the English language which 
had no counterpart in Japanese and which had not yet been adequately translated. When viewing the 
content of the first architectural courses, it is easy to come to the conclusion that the “Western 
architectural grammar would have been difficult for them to understand and incorporate in their 
thinking.” (Tosaki, 2004: 5) Given the characters in Japanese for architecture, which translate as 
‘house building’, there was a lot of confusion for students as to what architecture was and what the 
course was actually teaching, as shown by the following anecdote: “At the Kobu Imperial University 
[Jap. 工部大学校], there had been a Zoke gakka [Jap. 造形学科] (faculty of house building) founded in 
1877, but there was some misunderstanding of the term architecture even then, since many people 
thought the Faculty’s purpose was to turn out master carpenters.” (Tosaki, 2004: 5) Other concepts, 
just as fundamental to understanding the content of the course, needed to be translated or created, for 
example “art”, “tradition” and “history”. Struggling for an understanding of Occidental ideas so soon 
after their introduction to Japan, the first cohorts of students gained little critical distance and tended to 
assimilate the ideas of Conder’s course unquestioningly, especially as the teaching was in English. 
 
In the period of this study, 1853-1919, the English idea of ‘modern’ was not fully understood in the 
Japanese word kindai. As shown in Section 1.3, the modern was defined in Japanese as kindai, the 
current period, rather than as conforming to the latest fashions and technologies. From 1915 on, 
dictionaries began reflecting this full definition. However, due to the early contact zone established 
between Japan and Seiyō in the architectural field, the discourse about architecture among Conder’s 
students largely conformed to the English idea of modernity in the late 1870s. Japanese architects 
were early ‘modernisers’ before the concept had even reached the Japanese dictionary. This being so, 
students were taught an eclectic range of building styles, and learned to choose a suitable style for the 
new state building rather than robustly to engage in debates on the meaning of Classicism in relation to 
Gothic. Aesthetic concerns were initially prioritised over the underlying meaning of forms, though the 
necessity for stability overrode even this in a country beset by natural disasters. Evidence from the 
students’ dissertations shows that, “on pragmatic issues such as fire prevention, sanitation, and 
heating, students at the Imperial College of Engineering argued that European techniques should be 
adopted.” (Choi, 2003: 50)  
 
As a result of the students’ outward-looking tendencies, a sense of Japanese identity is not easily 
located in the early Japanese architects educated by Conder. Likewise indicators of their class and 
national identity were not easily found in the architecture student dissertations of the Meiji period. 
However, the students were well aware of the purpose of the architectural college and of their status 
within the wider ‘civilising process’: SONE Tatsuno, another of Conder’s first cohort of students, wrote 
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that “in quick advance of civilization no nation could be compared with the Japanese who are in a 
burning emotion to rank especially with the most civilized nations of the world." (Sone, 1879: 18 quoted 
in Manzano Visita, 2009: 37) This quote shows both concern and pride with the progress of native 
civilisation, and reveals the course as part of this process of catching up with the ‘most civilised nations’. 
The students saw their purpose to ‘scientifically’ learn the truth about European architecture (rather 
than the inauthentic practice of carpenters building in a foreign style): "The science of Architecture has 
been laid in our college as one of the main professional branches of study and the true principles of 
European Architecture is being here taught with the view of learning their true principles in our country." 
(Funakoshi, 1883: 9 quoted in Manzano Visita, 2009: 38)  
 
Of all of Conder’s students, TATSUNO Kingo became the most influential Japanese architect and 
teacher of the Meiji period. His influence even spread to the colonies in Taiwan and Manchuria. Tatsuno 
completed his formal studies in 1879 and was then sent to England to work under William Burges, 
benefiting from Conder’s connection to his old employer. Whilst in the UK, Tatsuno caught up with the 
latest London building fashions, including the Queen Anne revival style which strongly influenced his 
later stylistic choices. Whilst Tatsuno replaced Conder as Professor of Architecture he would later 
become the first Japanese graduate to set up his own architecture practice in 1903. Tatsuno went on to 
gain many of the most important commissions in Japanese architecture such as the headquarters for 
the Bank of Japan, the National Sumo Arena, and Tokyo Station and he became one of the founding 
members of Japan’s Architectural Association.  
 
Most of Tatsuno’s formative principles can be seen in his graduation dissertation; particularly his 
passion for brick, which he believed should even be used for decoration. Tatsuno wrote in his thesis 
that “I put, however, a greater credit on those solid buildings built with stone or bricks, if the employer 
be able to bestow a proper expense upon his buildings, owing to the following reasons: first we can 
help the interior of a building be cool in summer and warm in winter by its thick wall; secondly the 
suitability of the climate and changing customs might by procured by the due consideration of 
Architects.” (Tatsuno, 1879: 7-8) This first point echoes Conder’s call for the benefits of brick buildings 
in a hot climate yet the second is a clear indication by Tatsuno of the role of architects in both reflecting 
and promoting ‘modern’ customs. By suggesting the suitability of brick buildings for changing culture 
and customs in Japan, Tatsuno was placing value on the superiority of European building materials 
above and beyond Conder, who maintained to his students that the main benefit of brick and stone was 
solidity. As the first Japanese intimately familiar with Seiyō building theory and design, Tatsuno and his 
peers were of a generation enthused with a spirit of reform and authority, later to be reflected strongly in 
the buildings they made. 
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As demonstrated in Section 1.3, Japan underwent a change in political vocabulary through contact with 
Seiyō. This process saw words and concepts slowly being integrated into the Japanese vocabulary, 
with the definition of ‘modern’ in Japanese not identical to English in 1879 at the time of Tatsuno’s 
thesis: as noted above ‘modern’ [kindai] indicated the ‘present period’ (Satow: 1876). However, I found 
that the discourse in Tatsuno’s thesis supported the adoption of ‘the modern’ in Japanese architecture 
following the three primary characteristics analysed in Section 1.2 from the English definition: adopting 
new fashions, being up-to-date, and (to a limited extent) being against tradition. I argue below that 
whilst the vocabulary in Japan had not yet caught up, students left Conder’s course as agents of 
modernisation in a substantive sense.  
 
On adopting new fashions, Tatsuno’s thesis displayed evidence of reflecting three new fashions in 
architecture and Japan: the search for a national style, eclecticism/Queen Anne revival, and reverence 
for Seiyō. First, Tatsuno showed his interest in discovering a national style: “I conclude that if we design 
domestic buildings, with Gothic construction principles and classical outline, with some of the Eastern 
Architectural elements added, we would obtain the result approaching towards the suitability for a new 
style of domestic Architecture to be developed hereafter in Japan.” (Tatsuno, 1879: 31-32) This 
discourse was broadly in line with contemporary European debates as interpreted by Conder on finding 
a ‘national style’ of architecture: by engaging in this debate Tatsuno was self-consciously engaging in 
the talking points of the period.  
 
Second, as implied above, Tatsuno adhered to Conder’s eclecticism: he wrote “there is a large number 
of Architectural fields in the west and east as well, whence we might pick out ideas in order to develop a 
new style of architecture suitable for Japan; nevertheless we have much of the same in our temple and 
palatial buildings.” (Tatsuno, 1879: 31) This element of ‘choosing a style’ was strongly reflected in the 
current fashions of the times as described by Tatsuno: “The present age has no essentially 
characteristic Architectural Style, such as sometimes adopting the early best one, Classic or Gothic, 
and sometimes the Renaissance, and sometimes blending with those elements past.” (Tatsuno, 1879: 
3) In his first contact with the Occident through Conder and his teaching materials, the new fashion 
presenting itself was eclecticism, and Tatsuno was clearly an adherent of adapting style to function. 
Indeed, as the fashions in Britain changed, with eclecticism moving out of favour and Queen Anne 
revival becoming popular, Tatsuno adapted his favoured style and adjusted to the times. 
 
Third, the contemporaneous fascination with Seiyō in Japan and with the idea of bunmei kaika 
(civilisation and enlightenment) is strongly shown in the wording of the following passage of Tatsuno’s 
thesis: “The empire having been awakened lately, by the Western civilised people, has a wonderful 
progression in the civilisation, which produced a change to the original line of our wooden architecture 
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and accompanied the introduction of their solid and wooden styles. And now the change is going on 
with its initial velocity, which is, indeed, indispensable as our customs and ideas are changing.” 
(Tatsuno, 1879: 4) The use of the word ‘awakened’ implies that Japan was asleep or resting before, and 
such positive language shows that Tatsuno strongly agreed with the opening of Japan by Seiyō. 
Tatsuno also links civilisation to solid architecture, implying that one will follow the other. In Tatsuno’s 
thesis we see the impression that the concepts of Japan’s elites were changing which Tatsuno believed 
was pushing the changes in architectural taste.  
 
On the second aspect of the modern, to be (technologically) up-to-date, there is ample demonstration 
of Tatsuno’s fascination with stylistic and technical modernity (in addition to his demonstration of being 
up-to-date with architectural fashions) because more than half of his dissertation is spent describing the 
technologies and techniques of construction, all of which were foreign. It is unquestionable that Tatsuno 
was concerned with sturdiness and his dissertation covers much ground in discussing the most suitable 
Seiyō building technologies to apply in order to create solid structures.  
 
Evidence for the third aspect of the modern (to be against tradition) was more ambiguous in Tatsuno’s 
thesis, in part due to the era (anti-traditionalism was not a large component of ‘the modern’ until the turn 
of the 20th century) yet more likely because Tatsuno (as with most Japanese outside the People’s 
Friends school of thought) did not see the necessity of replacing tradition. Resisting Conder’s 
suggestions, Tatsuno did not rule out using wooden buildings: “Although some people say that the 
wooden buildings are perishable, yet some of ancient buildings still exist without ruin, such as Todaiji at 
Nara… all of which have been erected after the entrance of Buddhism (about 1300 years 
ago).…Though undoubtedly they [wooden buildings] would be less long-lasting than stone or brick 
buildings.” (Tatsuno: 1879: 7) Tatsuno looked upon wooden buildings with practical eye rather than a 
condescending eye.  
 
The idea of the modern in English was as much about belonging as innovation, and attempting to relate 
Japanese architecture to prestigious Seiyō architecture could easily be seen as an attempt to raise the 
status of native building methods. For Tatsuno, Japanese architecture could still include wooden 
buildings: 
 
“I have no objection to introduce a wooden style for the detached houses, even in the new 
prevalent style, if designed with the best principles and executed properly… especially 
when their cheapness is required.” (Tatsuno: 1879: 7) 
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Tatsuno was not necessarily against tradition: whereas Conder wanted all buildings to be solid and 
looked down on wooden buildings, Tatsuno constructed wooden architecture, although only for 
detached houses due to the fire risk. Tatsuno was more of a pragmatist than the doctrinaire Conder, 
who believed in adapting forms constantly based on their respective meanings. The national style that 
Tatsuno discussed is also above the contemporaneous architecture practices in Japan: Tatsuno found 
all building types acceptable yet whilst he preferred ‘traditional’ Japanese wooden architecture to the 
contemporary Giyōfū, (pseudo-Western style) style, both were subordinate to the genuine ‘modern’ 
architecture that Tatsuno had been taught. However in the passage above it is again the language used 
by Tatsuno that is particularly interesting (“I have no objection to introduce a wooden style for the 
detached houses, even in the new prevalent style”). Tatsuno assumed a blank slate for kindai (modern) 
Japanese architecture to build upon, showing his rational outlook. This is in keeping with his education 
into Conder’s eclectic tradition which gave the impression “first, that every nation must possess its own 
unique style, sustained by an orthodox lineage of orders and motifs, and second, that within the bounds 
defined by their lineages, appropriation of other national styles was in fact the order of the day.” (Sand, 
2003: 112) Using this approach, Tatsuno attempted to create a national style of architecture in his 
building practices, borrowing plans and decorations from other national styles, primarily Britain. 
 
The creation of an architectural discourse by Japanese architects such as Tatsuno was founded in the 
early period of elite transculturation in Japan, from 1853 until 1895, when the dominant culture in 
architecture was British. This meant that theses such as Tatsuno’s were written in English in Tokyo 
University and that their concerns and vocabulary reflected a colonialist discourse of opening up to 
Seiyō and ‘civilising’. This ‘burning emotion’ to ‘join the leading civilised nations’ was an attitude greatly 
suited to the late-Victorian mindset of Seiyō superiority, as imitation flattered countries such as Britain. 
Tatsuno’s writings reflected the dominance of foreign tastes and the lengths to which Japanese 
architects would go to raise their country’s reputation, and ultimately to pacify the perceived threat from 
Seiyō. 
 
After graduating, Conder’s students, such as Tatsuno, Katayama, Kawai, and Watanabe, went to 
Europe and observed Victorian Gothic, Renaissance and other traditional styles. After visiting, each of 
them “inevitably began to realize that Conder’s style was very limited and personalised, and not 
representative of European authentic style at all (however, this mixture of styles was quite popular at 
the time when Conder was an architecture student in London).” (Tosaki, 2004: 6) As we have seen, 
there were originally no purely specific European authentic styles in Meiji Japan, except for a small 
number of cases in which other foreign architects had visited Japan such as Ende and Böckmann who 
were both established German Gothic architects. (Tosaki, 2004: 12-13) Apart from by SONE Tatsuzo, 
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considered to be Conder’s protégé, his styles were seldom repeated by his students. There were 
several important points of departure from Conder: 
 
•  Tatsuno: design for the Nichi-gin (Japanese Imperial Bank) Headquarters (1896) and 
Tokyo Station (1914);  
•  Katayama: Akasaka Rikyu (Akasaka) off-site Imperial Palace (1910), and Nara (1894) and 
Kyoto (1895) museums;  
•  Soya: Kobe Mitsubishi Bank (1900) and Keio Library (1911); and  
•  Kawai: Design for Kobe Local Court (1904). 
 
The first departure from Conder was as early as Tatsuno’s first commission, the Bank of Japan (1896, 
fig. 3.39), which replaced Shimizu’s wooden bank building of 1873. Following a study trip to Europe of 
national banks, Tatsuno modelled the building on the Bank of Belgium. Unlike Shimizu’s predecessor, 
the building had little ornamentation. Although not a work of great artistic merit, the building was seen 
as proof that Japan could replace expensive, foreign architects with their own, although it was not 
complete until 1896, over thirty years after the Meiji Restoration. Stone was used in the building to 
symbolise unwavering security. Tatsuno’s research was used elsewhere following this: some architects 
even became experts in certain building types and of Tatsuno’s 140 buildings, two thirds were banks. 





This image can be seen in the printed thesis at the University of Sheffield library. 
 
3.39. TATSUNO 






This example was the first in a new direction for Japanese architecture, part of the process of imitation 
before autonomy (symbolised by trips abroad to search for fashionable examples of the building type). 
On one level studying for inspiration in Europe was a similar architectural exercise to the Sinification of 
Japan 1200 years earlier when Tang dynasty China was resurgent and dangerous yet the rigourous 
approach was new. It was the greatest cultural change and revolution in image that Japan displayed to 
the world, making it clear “that Japan had to [adopt]… the institutions and trappings of Western 
civilization if it were to survive.” (Coaldrake, 1996: 209) This was achieved architecturally by the 
expedient of making their cities look like ‘civilised’ Europe. Style was used as a form of impression 
management by Japanese authorities and their architects, in order that Japanese citizens and 
foreigners would consider the government apparatus to be civilising. 
 
In Japan, the stylistic challenge from Conder prompted a never ending debate, as had happened in 
Europe and America: “The array of historicist styles never evolved in Tokyo beyond a problematic 
efflorescence of manner; yet it furnished a requisite emblem of progress.” (Stewart, 1987: 33) Whilst 
the architecture students had been encouraged to engage with this issue from the late 1870s onwards, 
the first public debate on what the national style of Japan should be was as late as 1910 at the Society 
of Japanese Architects on the topic of “What Should Be the Future Architecture of Our Country?” (Sand, 
2003: 113).  
 
Yet before these arguments had been even partially resolved, the most obvious example of a national 
style for authority architecture in Meiji Japan was the red-brick Renaissance revival style with Classical 
white bands (Finn, 1995: 194) and domed roofs, to be known in the rest of this thesis as ‘Tatsuno style’. 
It was in many ways similar to Queen Anne Revival, which “was a nickname applied to a style which 
became enormously popular in the 1870s and survived into the early years of this [20th] century. 
‘Queen Anne’ came in red brick and white-painted sash windows, with curly pedimented gables and 
delicate brick panels of sunflowers, swags or cherubs, with small window panes, steep roofs, and 
curving bay windows” (Girouard, 1977: 1) Queen Anne was particularly suited to Japan as the 
formation of the style was influenced by Japan itself: the pioneers of this style “began to take an interest 
in the art and architecture of pagan Greece, of Muslim North Africa and above all of Japan, which had 
just been opened up to the West and had become a fashionable subject of speculation in both France 
and England.” (Giorouard, 1977: 12) Whilst for Japan, the style was appealing as a symbol of 
fashionable Seiyō, for architects in Britain and France Queen Anne style was attractive for its exotic, 








Whilst Tatsuno was the most prolific proponent of this style, before he had designed any buildings in 
this quasi-Queen Anne form, Conder’s Mitsubishi building No. 1 (1894), Ende and Böckmann’s Ministry 
of Justice building (1895) and Conder’s Ministry of Navy building (1895) had all been constructed using 
more or less the same stylistic principles (fig. 3.40). Whilst Tatsuno was “no literal-minded imitator” 
(Finn, 1995: 194-195) the presence of prominent buildings built earlier in the same style by foreigners 
Conder and Ende and Böckmann in Tokyo undoubtedly places a question mark over the 
This image can be seen in the printed thesis at the University of Sheffield library. 
 
This image can be seen in the printed thesis at the University of Sheffield library. 
 
3.40. The development of 
Tatsuno Style in mainland 
Japan. From top bottom: 
TATSUNO Kingo: 1914, 
Tokyo Station. Source 
from Suzuki et al, 2009; 
Josiah Conder: 1895, 
Naval Ministry. Source 
from Stewart. 1987; Ende 
& Böckmann: 1895, 
Ministry of Justice. Source 
from Stewart, 1987. 
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‘Japaneseness’ of this style. Despite the questionable native authenticity, having a recognisable 
‘Japanese’ architectural form from the early architects of Japanese modernisation “would serve partly 
as crystallized diplomacy, an argument towards accomplishing the principal goal of the first generation 
of Meiji politicians: revision of the hated Unequal Treaties.” (Clancey, 2006: 17) Meiji Japanese 
authorities propagated the style, first seen by Japanese architects visiting London, through giving 
various commissions to TATSUNO Kingo’s firm throughout the fledgling Japanese Empire, particularly 
in Manchuria (Sewell, 2004: 222) and Taiwan. Using this form in both mainland Japan and her colonies 
strengthened this quasi-national style so that it can be considered a genuinely influential and politically 
useful form. The underpinnings and rationale of this style, also adopted in the Taiwan 
Governor-General’s Office, are explored at greater length in Section 5.4. 
 
The style was first used in Japan by Conder and Sone in their designs for commercial buildings with 
Mitsubishi. SONE Tatsuzo was Conder’s protégé, who worked extensively for Mitsubishi. IWASAKI 
Yanosuke (Jap. 岩崎彌之, 1851-1908), the Mitsubishi commissioner, was so determined that the 
buildings in this district should reflect a proper British air that he sent Sone on an architectural tour of 
Britain. (Finn, 1995: 130) Sone was charged with completing the Mitsubishi buildings project in the 
Marunouchi (Jap. 丸の内) area of Tokyo after Conder had designed Building No. 1 (fig. 3.41). Of 
Conder’s students, Sone was the most similar to Conder in his preference for solidity and dignified 
façades, and he worked more closely with Conder after graduating than any other pupil. The overall 
planning of the Marunouchi district in Tokyo from 1895 was one of his most important commissions. It 
was known as ‘Little London’, (possibly inspired by central London’s Lombard Street), and Sone had 
responsibility for Buildings 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7. (fig. 3.42) 
 
 
3.41. Josiah Conder: Mitsubishi No. 1 
building, Tokyo, 1894. Source from 
Suzuki et al, 2009. 
 (Courtesy of the Department of 





The initiative of the private sector in Japan was apparent in this case, with the first building of the future 
‘national style’ sponsored by the conglomerate Mitsubishi (Jap. 三菱).80 This was a landmark piece of 
architecture. Although not unusual in style, it signified the beginning of a new type of economic and 
architectural development in Japan: the Marunouchi area became not just the site of Mitsubishi 
headquarters but Japan’s first, and highly successful, commercial rental district. (Finn, 1995: 188) 
Mitsubishi built a broadly based corporation; it played a central role in the modernisation of Japanese 
industry, and was close enough to government that they were able to undertake this huge town 
planning project in the centre of Tokyo. Mitsubishi developed the area around the turn of the century 
after buying the land from the government in 1890 for 1,280,000 Yen. It had been a military parade 
ground and army barracks next to the imperial palace, yet it became Tokyo’s premier office district after 
the opening of Tokyo Station in 1914. (Cybriwsky, 2005: 228) Mitsubishi conceived the area as its 
centre for business and prohibited wooden buildings unlike the other famous brick-town, Ginza, where 
wooden buildings continued to be built. Mitsubishi “also set up standards to regulate the appearance 
and scale of the development.” (Fletcher and Cruickshank, 1996: 1240) 
 
The exterior and interior design of these buildings reflected London at the height of the British Empire. 
Building No. 2 (fig. 3.43) was the second built and used a red brick, Renaissance style with mansard 
roofs and sheet lead covering the roof flat. As with many buildings of the time, the area was designed 
with European dignity in mind, as four-story, red-brick buildings, with wide streets in a systematic grid 
pattern. (Cybriwsky, 2005: 228)  
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 Mitsubishi was first established as a shipping firm by IWASAKI Yotaro (Jap. 岩崎弥太郎, 1834-85) in 1870. In 1881, it entered into 
coal-mining to gain the coal needed for ships. Mitsubishi diversified their business into other branches related to its core business of shipping, 
such as founding an iron mill to supply iron to the shipping yard and starting a marine insurance business to cater for its shipping business. It 
later even expanded into manufacture of aircraft and equipment, also a trading business. 
3.42. Street of Mitsubishi 
buildings, Tokyo. Source 
from Suzuki et al, 2009. 
(Courtesy of the 
Department of 
Architecture, the 






The first building was designed by Conder, and his proposal was a received model expression of street 
architecture, adopting the terrace form with which he had been familiar with from living and working in 
London, using exposed red brick for the exterior walls with the familiar white stone banding around the 
windows. After his experience at Ueno, the Orientalised elements such as dome tracing in the 
doorways were absent from the design, replaced by symmetrical and unpretentious English 
Renaissance styling.  
 
This was a suitable style for much of the brick architecture constructed in the Meiji period, because the 
material was easily produced after Waters’ efforts in producing bricks decades earlier. Beyond 
practicality though, this style of architecture was one deemed to be modern by Conder’s apprentices, 
given that both Tatsuno and Sone had surveyed London and found it to be a conspicuous new style. 
Sone described the urban plan for the area in the following way: 
 
“With a view to fulfil the requirements occasioned by the development of commercial 
business in the city, as well as to supply the gradually increasing demand on the part of the 
citizens for residences of a better class, and at the same time with the object of enhancing 
the metropolis, the Mitsu Bishi Company are proposing to cover the land with solid and 
substantial buildings of various sorts, in the modern style, making all private roads, 
foot-paths, squares, drainage, &c.” (Sone, 1895: 2 [emphasis added, original written in 
English]) 
 
3.43. SONE Tatsuzo: Mitsubishi No. 
2 building, Tokyo, 1895. Source from 
Suzuki et al, 2009.  
(Courtesy of the Department of 
Architecture, the University of Tokyo) 
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Whilst Tatsuno had championed fashionable, up to date architecture, this passage was the first explicit 
evidence that the Japanese architects of this period were attempting to follow ‘the modern’ in their 
architecture; given the totally British appearance of the buildings, similar to London (Finn, 1995: 188), it 
is easy to interpret that ‘modern’ meant in line with Seiyō fashions of the day fitting with the 
Euro-centricity of modernity as explained in Section 1.2. It is interesting that Sone described Queen 
Anne style as ‘modern’ but perhaps more interesting was the use of the definite article: there was a 
single authentic type of modernity in Japan (in line with what Mitsubishi required). It was this style and 
type of architecture, associated with material progress for Sone, which was copied and propagated 
across the Japanese empire in the following years.  
 
This style had a number of attributes which made this a logical national style: it had a strong benefactor 
in Tatsuno, it was masonry rather than wood, and it was Renaissance rather than Gothic and was 
relatively cheap. To take the first point first, Tatsuno was himself a strong agent for nationalism, and 
built close to 200 buildings before his death in 1919. (Finn, 1995: 194) Unlike Conder who built the 
great majority of his buildings in Tokyo, Tatsuno built throughout mainland Japan and the Japanese 
Empire. The elevation of Tatsuno to Professor of Architecture in 1884 to replace Conder was a key 
development in the propagation of this style, as it made Tatsuno, rather than Conder, the pre-eminent 
architect of Meiji Japan.  
 
The style was by necessity a masonry style due to the education Tatsuno received from Conder. For a 
British instructor: “even American examples of modern architecture in wood would likely have seemed 
exotic” (Clancey, 2006: 19) as masonry was almost exclusively used for construction in Britain at the 
time. Masonry was core to the very identity of British architecture in the 1870s (which had been growing 
since the Great Fire of London in 1666), and in the 19th century it was believed in architectural circles 
that masonry had replaced wood “wherever civilization had occurred.” (Clancey, 2006: 15) Given that 
Japan wished to civilise along Seiyō lines, a brick or stone style was necessary, and as stone was a 
rare resource in Japan, brick made more sense economically and logistically, at least before the spread 
of concrete. Given the prejudice against Chinese and Japanese wooden architecture in the text books 
of Banister Fletcher and James Fergusson81 it is unsurprising that Japanese architects sought their 
national style in masonry form. 
 
The Japanese national style for this period embodied an aspiration to belong to a milieu beyond its 
Japanese roots whilst simultaneously demonstrating that Japan was a sophisticated and powerful 
nation. Whilst developing a national style was not an explicitly modern trend, it was interpreted as such 
                                                   
81
 For Fergusson, the use of wood meant that Chinese architecture history barely existed: “it is still doubtful whether the materials exist in 
China for any extended history of the art. Such facts as have some to light are not encouraging. Wood has been far too extensively used 
throughout for any very permanent style of architecture ever having been employed” (Fergusson, 1876: 709) 
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in Meiji Japan. By contrast, in post-Ottoman Serbia of the late 19th century, “The Serbs strove to 
establish a link with the Middle Ages rather than seek inspiration in modern cultural achievements… 
Serbian architecture was historicist not by choice but by necessity; it was not a fashionable trend, but a 
product of the inherently conservative cultural milieu.” (Pantelić, 1999: 36) Serbia, Greece, Germany 
and Russia were proponents of romantic nationalism in architecture, reviving past forms in a 
romanticised fashion; these were all countries that felt that they had been victimised by the hegemony 
of other European powers in the early 19th century, by Austro-Hungary, the Ottomans and by 
revolutionary France. So Japan, instead of being inspired by its own history, sought nationalism in the 
modern, the current and up to date, in order to build a vision of itself that appeared civilised both to 
outsiders and to themselves. If in Serbia, past forms were seen as civilised, in Japan they were not, as 






Alongside Sone and Tatsuno, KATAYAMA Tōkuma (Jap. 片山東熊, 1854-1917) was another talented 
and influential early Japanese architect. Of the group, he built the most magnificent buildings after 
becoming the imperial court architect. He often built in the French tradition, famously with his (former) 
Imperial Museum of Kyoto. For his most high-profile project, Akasaka Palace (Jap. 迎賓館, built from 
1899-1909), he researched European palaces, just as Tatsuno was sent to study banks. Through this 
process of sending prospective architects on study trips concerning particular building types, according 
to Markus, commissioners prescribed styles due to the ideological power of the forms. (Markus, 1993: 
37)  
3.44. A newspaper illustration around 1870s (the 
caption reads, left to right: ‘enlightened person, half 
enlightened person, unenlightened person’ (Kaika 
no hito, Hankai no hito, Mikai no hito). The biggest 
differences between them were the Western-style 
hat, shoes, umbrellas and pocket watches. These 
were the major outward signs of ‘civilisation and 
enlightenment’ amongst them. The cartoon mocks 
the simplified modern transformation in Meiji times 
which was understood in terms of civilisation and 
enlightenment. 
(Courtesy of MIT Visualising Cultures Collection) 
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Inspired by the palaces of Versailles and the Louvre, the Akasaka Palace was possibly the greatest 
architectural monument of the Meiji era. The interior contained Japanese armour motifs and frescos by 
Japanese artists, trained in European painting styles. The palace’s spatial composition was 
inspirational to many later authority buildings in Japan and her colonies, with large square courtyards to 
either side of the central axis, the main advantage being that it allowed both natural light throughout the 










Once built, Akasaka Palace was arguably the pinnacle of earthquake-proofing in the world at that point. 
(Coaldrake, 1996: 220) This was not only due to the brilliance of Katayama: one of the most impressive 
indigenous innovations by Japanese architects was the application of scientific knowledge on buildings 
and construction techniques. This was a pragmatic initiative as scientific endeavour was used to make 
the buildings fulfil their functions more effectively. In fact, this was Tatsuno’s main innovation upon 
becoming Professor of Architecture. After several foreign-style buildings were destroyed in the 
3.45. KATAYAMA Tōkuma: (Top right) The site plan of the Akasaka Palace; (Top right) Exterior of the 
Akasaka Palace; (Bottom right) The main plan of Akasaka Palace. Source from Watanabe, 1980. 
(Courtesy of the Department of Architecture, the University of Tokyo) 
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earthquakes of 1891 and 1894, the approach was further strengthened: as Clancey (2006) has 
explained, Japanese architects responded to this earthquake with numerous surveys, meetings, and 
experiments, and the list of their subsequent achievements is impressive. Tatsuno helped design and 
build an earthquake-proof house with parabolic walls around 1893, finding a potential solution to 
earthquake-proofing through science and the Japanese building tradition (which made frequent use of 
such walls) to correct the masonry of Seiyō. (Clancey, 2006: 181)  
 
Whilst keeping the trend for brick buildings, Japanese architects improvised with wooden frames so 
that the bricks were not load-bearing and became much stronger during earthquakes. (Coaldrake, 
1996: 238) SONE Tatsuzo was sent to the United States in 1893 to study iron construction, but iron 
remained impractical for Japan until the economic boom during the Great War, as the material had to 
be imported. (Clancey, 2006: ft285) Despite this, a series of research papers and experiments led 
Japan to become world leaders in seismic-proofing buildings in a short period of time; Japan had 
appointed the world’s first Chair of Seismology at the Imperial University in 1886. (Clancey, 2006: 98)  
 
This development of seismology should be seen as corrective to the opinions of Josiah Conder, who 
cautioned against the use of wood in building because of their perceived lack of seismic properties. 
Conder believed Japanese carpentry was unsuited for the kindai (modern) age: “As early as 1882 
Dresser [a British Japanophile architect] brought the attention of western audiences to the 
earthquake-resistance of five-story pagoda, a contention bitterly contested by a Japanese-resident 
expatriate architect, Josiah Conder.” (Clancy, 2006: 92) Conder continued the British dichotomy of brick 
and stone being seen as civilised and wood and other perishable materials being primitive. As a whole, 
Japanese architects, trained and familiar with masonry, continued to create non-wooden buildings, and 
as they were the main agents of building the national image of Japan in the late-Meiji period, the most 
important government commissions continued to be built of brick and stone, although adapted for 
seismic purposes. 
 
Some trained architects (as well as all carpenters) continued to build in wood, despite the danger of fire. 
Tatsuno built in wood on occasion, though in a generic Seiyō style rather than following Japanese 
carpentry, since he was never trained in those arts. His most famous work in the medium was for 
MATSUMOTO Kenjirō (Jap. 松本健次郎, 1870-1963), another prominent Meiji industrialist. Mirroring 
work done by Conder with the Mitsubishi family, Matsumoto “had procured a Western style house 
(Yokan), designed by Tatsuno [fig. 3.46], to be used mainly for the reception of foreign guests... Soon 
after the Yokan was built, Matsumoto had a Japanese style house built, and took up residence in it 
himself. It was typical to have both Western style and Japanese style on the same property. This 
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parallel style was an inevitable result of the conflict between Westernization and traditional Japanese 
lifestyle according to which this parallelism emerged.” (Tosaki, 2004: 7) With the growth of contact 
between Japan and Seiyō, many industrialists had foreign business partners and would have felt 
ashamed to entertain them at their Japanese residence. To save face these Occidental residences 
were built, but were rarely used except to entertain. Instead, in one of the great paradoxes of the Meiji 






Industrialists such as Mitsubishi and Matsumoto were both procurers of Wayo-heiyo, parallel style 
architecture and Conder and Kingo were their respective designers. This created an uncomfortable 
dichotomy between public life and private comfort. It was this nebulous discomfort that prompted the 
first Japanese architects to retread ground broken by Shimazu decades earlier and to ‘re-invent’ the 
Wayo-secchu (Giyōfū, psedo-Western) style. Rather than perpetuating this dichotomy, in using 
“Wayo-secchu (hybrid) style, architects were aware of the discrepancy, and sought a new direction for 
architecture which would amalgamate Western and Eastern styles within a single architectural 
expression.” (Tosaki, 2004: 7) Tatsuno showed that Japan, though adaptable, was not prepared to lose 
its identity, and attempted to express this through the ‘national style’ movement and ambivalence 
towards Conder’s dislike of wooden architecture. In spite of this, Japan’s kindai (modern) architecture 
was initially founded upon Seiyō ways of understanding the world. These ideas continued to filter 
through to the next generations of Japanese architects, though less obviously as Japan’s architects 
grew more confident in their sense of modernity. 
 
 
This image can be seen in the printed thesis at the University of Sheffield library. 
 
3.46. TATSUNO Kingo: Former 
Matsumoto‘s residence, 1912. 
Source from Tosaki, 2004. 
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The Second Generation of Japanese Architects 
As mentioned, TATSUNO Kingo returned from working England in 1884 to the post of Professor in the 
College of Engineering and “in the subsequent transfer of architectural education to the Imperial 
University his influence succeeded Josiah Conder’s, especially after Tatsuno became departmental 
head.” (Stewart, 1987: 48) Conder’s forced retirement from government work occurred in 1888 when 
the Head of the Japanese Ministry of Education, MORI Arinori, began his educational reforms at Tokyo 
University in 1886, intentionally reducing the numbers of foreign professors and ensuring all 
department heads were Japanese.  
 
Tatsuno gradually revised the focus of the course in two main ways. First, and most significantly for the 
development of seismology in architecture, there was an increased focus upon science and technology. 
Whilst the standard dissertation questions of Conder’s tenure had usually concerned architectural style 
(for instance TATSUNO Kingo, KATAYAMA Tokuma, SONE Tatsuno and SATACHI Shichijiro were all 
given the topic “The Future Domestic Architecture of Japan”), under Tatsuno’s stewardship the topics 
became much more focused upon scientific and technological issues. For instance, the title of 
MORIYAMA Matsunosuke’s thesis (the primary architect for the Governor-General’s Office in Taiwan) 
was “A few considerations on stress in roof trusses and methods of dimensioning”. As a consequence 
of the new technical focus, very few theses after 1884 concerned the style and direction of Japanese 
architecture.  
 
The second change in focus was that a separate course on Japanese architecture was created. In 
1889 Tatsuno hired the Master carpenter KIGO Kiyoyoshi to teach architecture students at Tokyo 
University. He was a master carpenter who won the contract for the Meiji palace in Tokyo (above Josiah 
Conder). He was from a family of carpenters with Imperial connections: “The Kigo were responsible for 
repair, maintenance, and minor construction at the Imperial Palace.” (Wendelken, 1996: 30) In 1889 he 
started to teach Japanese architecture at the Imperial University. His approach to teaching was a 
practical one. “He taught kiwariho [Jap. 木割法], the traditional timber construction technique which 
was an expression of a living tradition rather than an abstracted science. However, he also initiated his 
students into conducting detailed field surveys, gauging important temples of the Kyoto and Nara 
region as well as Shinto shrines.” (Edlinger, 2008: 61) Indeed, Kigo “was not trained as an historian, 
and although little is known of the content of his lectures, it is clear from his surviving notes and the 
work of his students that he taught not a distant past history but a living tradition of design and 
construction.” (Weldelken, 1996: 32)  
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This was the first course of its sort and the first time that native architecture was thoroughly covered by 
the architecture course, 16 years after the College of Engineering had been established. That the 
education provided by Kigo was in carpentry techniques rather than architectural history may have 
been of benefit to students in hearing about a topic far from Conder’s paradigm: “Kigo's lectures have 
been devalued by some scholars as dealing not with Japanese architectural history at all…. But 
perhaps Kigo was influential precisely because he taught kiwariho.” (Wendelken, 1996: 32) This 
revision of focus led to an increased depth of knowledge on technological and scientific issues and 
increased breadth of knowledge on construction and traditional Japanese architecture which was 
reflected in the attitudes of architects educated after 1889.  
 
Tatsuno’s attitude towards teaching architecture was therefore not as clear cut as Conder’s, who taught 
only Seiyō topics and styles whilst paying lip service to traditional Japanese architecture. Yet Tatsuno’s 
relationship with traditional carpentry was certainly ambiguous. Whilst this move was bold given the 
previous curriculum, it had taken five years for him to appoint Kigo to teach Japanese architecture. This 
slow decision speaks of Tatsuno’s reluctance to introduce teaching of Japan’s architectural past. One 
important story on why Tatsuno started allowing Japanese architectural history to be taught at Tokyo 
University stated: 
 
“During Tatsuno's stay in England his mentor, architect William Burges, asked him about 
the ancient architectural monuments of Japan. Tatsuno, ashamed that he was unable to 
answer, decided to institute courses on the history of Japanese architecture upon his 
return to Japan. Architectural historian Inaba Nobuko has recently pointed out, however, 
that Tatsuno's meeting with Burges took place almost four years before Kigo began 
teaching at the university, and that Kigo's appointment was more likely owing to his triumph 
in the Meiji Palace project. The final design of the palace signals the beginning of the 
movement to educate architects in the history and practice of Japanese construction. The 
crediting of Burges for this change in the intellectual climate constitutes yet another myth of 
origins in the reevaluation of Japanese tradition.” (Stewart, 1987: 31) 
 
Whether or not the story is true, the narrative about Burges was used by Tatsuno to explain why he 
instituted a class on carpentry. This fact is revealing for three reasons: First, Tatsuno knew almost 
nothing about Japanese architecture if he could not talk about the monuments of Japan. Second, this 
story distances Tatsuno from the decision, showing the motivation as being external to himself and 
viewed as not altogether necessary but beneficial to the students. That credit for reversing the lack of 
Japanese Architecture history was given to Burges, can be interpreted as a sign of respecting Seiyō 
authority. Finally, as shown in Section 3.3, Burges was a collector of Japanese art, a fashionable 
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activity at that time, and so was interested in Japanese architecture. Tatsuno’s preferred architecture 
style, Queen Anne revival, had also been influenced strongly by Japanese art and architecture, 
showing the esteem in which Japanese aesthetics were held in Britain at the time when he was living in 
London. Tatsuno took this esteem into account, perhaps partly because British architectural fashions 
were an essential requirement in the formation of kindai (modern) Japan. Indeed, Tatsuno’s later 
adoption of the Queen Anne style of architecture was a further demonstration of this sensitivity to 
fashion. 
 
This act of appointing Kigo as Professor of Japanese architecture legitimised the study of Japanese 
architecture in Japan and led to a more equitable standing for Japanese architecture in university 
education. This gave the architects a stronger self-identity: they were no longer attempting a ‘pure 
Westernisation’ but began to allow their ‘Oriental’ aspects more public exposure. 
 
 
3.6 Transmission of binaries and creation of hybridity in Japanese architecture 
The second generation of Japanese architects (under Tatsuno’s professorship) grew more confident in 
their understanding of their native architecture. Spurred on by the teachings of Kigo, this group of 
architects began cataloguing Japanese architectural history, generating a much more comprehensive 
knowledge. Their education led them to be familiar with Japanese forms, carpentry techniques, space, 
and to some extent architectural history. Lack of Japanese forms in authority buildings by the second 
generation could not therefore be put down to unfamiliarity with ‘traditional’ architecture,. 
 
Yet whilst the architectural past of Japan was included in their education, Japanese architecture was 
peripheral to this education, additional rather than central: the core education remained Seiyō 
architecture, and Japanese architecture was a separate module. As a result Japanese architects were 
first ‘kindai’ (modern) and second ‘Japanese’. The key period in producing this dynamic was that of 
Conder’s tenure when the further educators graduated, taught only to be ‘modern’, following the policy 
of Meiji authorities. This created a binary situation, a foundational divide between carpenters and 
architects replicated among the whole of Meiji society to a lesser degree where public rather than 
private spaces underwent the furthest reforms. After 1889, the education system was altered to attempt 
to create architects who were both ‘modern’ and ‘Japanese’, essentially hybrid. Yet this hybridity was 
shallow since the core of the education remained a foreign transplantation: the teaching of Japanese 
architecture was simply assimilated into this system. As a result, it was left to Japanese architects 
themselves to resolve this dynamic. 
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The architect and theorist ITŌ Chuta was the most important figure in making sense of early ‘modern 
Japanese architecture’ and is recognised as the leading architect and architectural theorist of early 
twentieth-century Imperial Japan. (Watanabe, 2006: 240). Itō first studied architecture as an 
undergraduate at the Imperial University of Tokyo from 1889 to 1892 under the professorship of 
Tatsuno. Upon finishing, rather than beginning to practise architecture, he entered graduate studies in 
architectural history at the Imperial University and prepared a survey of the buildings of Japan’s oldest 
Temple, Horyuji at Nara. In 1901 Itō received his doctorate and joined academia (the School of 
Engineering) becoming a Full Professor in 1905, a position he held until retiring in 1928. Itō became a 
very distinguished and influential architectural theorist and conservationist. As a member of Japan’s 
Society for the Preservation of Ancient Shrines and Temples founded in 1896, he also received the 
Cultural Medal of Japan in 1943. The formation of the profession of architecture took a long time to 
develop due to three separate strands needing to be established: construction workers, professional 
architects and academic architects. Whilst Conder was the father of kindai (modern) architecture in 
Japan, Itō is known as the first Japanese architectural historian and theorist of the architecture of Japan, 
leading the development of a class of genuine academic architects. 
 
The contact between young architects and master builders in the Imperial University from the late 
1880s expanded the focus of architectural education beyond modern construction technology and 
Seiyō-style design. Being among the first students of KIGO Kiyoyoshi, the students of this period were 
much more knowledgeable about the principles of design and construction of ancient buildings of 
Japan previously ignored by the curriculum. So they became the first academically trained experts 
trained in a modern fashion. After receiving his doctorate, Itō became the de facto intellectual leader of 
Japanese architecture.  Through his intellectual and practical works, Itō exerted three main influences 
on Japanese architecture in his time: 
 
1. Creating a deeper connection to Seiyō; 
2. Reconnecting with Tōyō; and, 
3. The creation of hybridity as the basis of a dual modernity. 
 








Creating a deeper connection to Seiyō   
Whilst Itō was affected by studying under a master carpenter, he was also influenced strongly by 
Tatsuno and Herbert Spencer, in particular by the view that the world tended towards progress and the 
malleability of culture: “the translation of Spencer’s works on sociology standardized the new and 
abstract conception of ‘society,’ which, as a reified, organic thing amenable to scientific law and political 
praxis, enabled Japanese intellectuals to rethink Japanese society on a new scientific basis and to 
produce new interpretations of Japan’s past, present, and future.” (Howland, 2000: 68) This aspirational 
element from Spencer was hugely influential for Japanese architects who took it upon themselves to 
use scientific reason constantly to improve the architecture built, making it more usable, scientific and 
monumental, as well as flexible to changes in society. Architects saw themselves as social forces who 
themselves had a role in shaping society and Itō took on this task.  
 
Itō had a clear vision and a forceful personality, and he resolved some of the long standing issues of 
kindai (modern) architecture in Japan. During the transition between the first foreign surveyors entering 
Japan in the 1850s and the first generation of Japanese architects, architectural forms were copied 
without much understanding of what they meant or even how to talk about questions of meaning, as the 
Seiyō concepts of ‘art’ and ‘architecture’ were still undergoing translation into Japanese. The term for 
art (Jap. 美術, bijutsu) was first used “in a modern context… in relation to the 1873 Viennese 
International Exhibition. Professor Ernest Fenollosa [of the University of Tokyo] famous lecture bijutsu 
shin-setsu (The true meaning of art), published in 1882, was the first serious debate on the concept of 
art in Japan.” (Watanabe, 1996: 26-27) Yet Japanese art students who were educated in Seiyō art had 
been following the products of foreign artistic developments for a number of years before this debate 
occurred.  
 
As for architecture, from the founding of the architecture course in the College of Engineering, 
‘architecture’ was generally known as Zō-ka (Jap. 造家, meaning ‘house building’). Since the 1860s 
translations of Dutch and English books had also used the word kenchiku (Jap. 建築, meaning ‘to 
construct firmly and lay a solid foundation’) to translate ‘architecture’, as the practice was in some ways 
different to construction in Japan. There was no analogous word for ‘architect’, and translators decided 
that the terms traditionally used for the building profession, daiku and toryo, were too old-fashioned to 
apply to the architecture of the kindai (modern) age.82 As a result, there was confusion amongst 
students about the discipline of architecture, about what distinguished architects from master 
carpenters, and their Institutes, such as the Society of Japanese Architects, had names that jarred with 
their purposes. 
                                                   
82
 Ironically daiku, now normally translated as 'carpenter,' uses the characters for 'great' and 'carpenter/builder'. It is therefore similar in 
meaning to the etymology of the term 'architect' (in Greek, archos, or chief, and tekton, or carpenter").” (Coaldrake, 2001: 48) 
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Understanding the definition of the architect was necessary to understand the identity (and roots of 
identification) of the profession. The concept of the architect was debated and the term for ‘Architect’ in 
the Society of Japanese Architects was changed from Zō-ka to a new word, kenchikuka, in 1897 after 
three years of lobbying by Itō. The circumstances of this development are of interest. Whilst 1897 was 
only four years after Ito’s graduation, he had a crucial role in moving the discourse of architecture away 
from it being seen as a field of construction towards being considered an applied art, in line with 
Conder’s preferred definition, a sign of Conder’s influence and his desire for solid architecture. (Conder, 
1878: 2) At the annual Society of Japanese Architects in 1897 Itō gave: 
 
“an aggressive polemic calling for a unification of terminology[.] Itō observed that the real 
nature of “architecture” (aakitekuchūru) was the “manifestation of true beauty in an 
appeal to line and form,” and that the word zō-ka failed to encompass the tombs, 
memorials, and triumphal gates that “architects” (aakitekuto) planned and the pagodas 
and temple halls whose construction they managed. The new name thus made it clear 
that the society’s business was the art of design rather than the mere construction of 
shelter.” (Sand, 2003: 113) 
 
Itō prompted a dual change in the definition that both broadened and narrowed the scope of 
architectural practice: architecture was broadened from mere house-building to encompass all types of 
buildings, and narrowed to formally split off the function of construction, leaving the role of designer. 
The word kenichiku (architecture) did not exist until modernity began to settle and kenichikuka 
(architect) was only coined by Itō in 1897. Yet beyond this dating: “what is at stake is that the whole 
notion of architecture was imported from the West alongside the notion of 'history' and the discourse of 
'art'… Surely, the practice of building construction had long been established, but never the role of 
architects as academically trained designers, nor the discipline of architecture for that matter” 
(Terakawa, 2001: 13) By positioning architecture in Seiyō’s terms (as an ‘art’, itself a concept previously 
unknown in Japan) Itō was tacitly suggesting that Japanese architecture should no longer belong in an 
Asian historical continuum (as implied by his use of the phonetic katagana alphabet to translate 
‘architecture’ for the word ‘aakitekuchūru’). This is a crucial point because, in distancing the practice 
and profession of construction from its historical roots, Itō laid the groundwork for the Japanese to 
further invent new traditions for themselves, which were Orientalist towards their past architecture and 
towards other Asian countries, including their future colonies.  
 
Before this intervention, Itō had shown a tendency to reinterpret Japan’s past: he “published a 
graduation thesis on Horyuji, (“Horyuji kenchikuron”, an architectural theory of Horyuji) one of the oldest 
Buddhist temples in Japan (7th century), in Kenchiku Zasshi in 1893.” (Edlinger, 2008: 61) This work 
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was an important first step in moving architecture back towards Seiyō after the blossoming of 
nationalism of the 1880s, and re-evaluating the roots of Japanese architecture. Itō’s thesis attempted to 
create a link between historical Japan and historical European architecture, as Tatsuno had tentatively 
attempted to do. As mentioned, Tatsuno’s relationship to Japanese traditional architecture was closer 
than Conder’s, and Tatsuno was the first architect, Japanese or otherwise, to imagine a shared 
approach between traditional European and Japanese architecture. Tatsuno wrote in his graduation 
thesis that “These [Edo period kiwari building] rules have some affinity with those in the Roman 
Renaissance:- thus in the former all the scantlings of the building timbers entirely depend on and 
partake from that of a comment shafter [common shaft], whereas in the latter every part of a building 
has certain proportion to the diameter of a column.” (Tatsuno, 1879: 4)  
 
In beginning to make the case that traditional Japanese and Roman architectural principles were not 
vastly different, Tatsuno led the way for later more theoretically-minded architects such as Itō to deepen 
this imagined connection further. If this connection between Seiyō and Japanese architecture was 
believed to be true, it also meant that when Seiyō buildings were constructed in Japan they were in 
some small way traditional. By historically connecting Seiyō architecture with traditional Japanese 
architecture, Tatsuno attempted to raise the prestige of the latter (by supposing common architectural 
roots) and the prestige of architects who built in styles with roots in Seiyō (who would be seen as more 
legitimate if this connection was imagined valid).  
 
In his seven volume thesis ‘Architectural philosophy (Jap. 建築哲學)’, Itō posited that Alexander the 
Great’s conquests influenced Japan through China and India so that Europe and Asia shared a 
common Greek architectural root as shown in fig. 3.47. This underlay the tendency to associate the 
history of Europe with Japan, as he concluded that “the entasis (graceful bulge) of the Horyuiji's pillars 
was evidence of a Hellenistic influence on classical Japanese architecture. In basing his appreciation of 
an indigenous structure on this point, Itō was in essence claiming that Japanese architecture was 
important because it was not really Japanese.” (Dorsey, 2001: 352) Regardless, Itō believed that 
Japanese architecture needed to reclaim and express this Seiyō aspect of its history “in order to 
achieve what he called the next stage of development. He described this as ‘Eastern architecture 





Because of his intention to use history to connect Japan with Seiyō in both the past and the future (by 
driving the name change of the Society of Japanese Architects), to take Itō as an anti-Western ‘hero’ is 
unrealistic. Although he attempted to prove that Japan belonged to the same historical continuum as 
Seiyō, this was not a popular view in Japan; if it had been, then it is likely that Japanese and Seiyō 
architects would be have been allowed to build in a conscious ‘Japanese’ style like Baltzer’s design in 
Section 3.4 above, as these would be considered as civilised as Greek revival. The majority of scholars 
disagreed with this notion of equivalence, and Itō was seen as an eccentric by some. However, he was 
searching for roots of belonging to the Great Powers: whilst most architects in the early 1900s would 
not have agreed with a view of overlapping architectural histories between Japan and Seiyō, the 
majority were happy to believe that Japan had taken its place among the Great Powers who were 
shaping the world. 
 
 
Reconnecting with Tōyō  
As related in Section 2.4, intellectuals in the late Meiji period created the Seiyō (Jap. 西洋, Occident) 
and Tōyō (Jap. 東洋, Orient) binary to which they related themselves. This was partly in reaction 
against foreign intellectuals such as Buckle, who wrote dismissively that progression of civilisation in 
Asia was impossible due to the climate and other unchangeable factors. By the late Meiji period, this 
was manifestly untrue, as Japan had modernised on a number of levels; in cultural, political, social and 
technological terms, Japan was becoming more like ‘Seiyō’ and less like ‘Tōyō’. The fashion of 
Darwinian perspectives at that time meant that theories such as Herbert Spenser’s social Darwinism 
3.47. ITŌ Chūta: Comparison of the proportions of an 
Etruscan temple with the middle gate at Hōryū-ji (Jap. 法隆
寺, lit. temple of the flourishing law). Source from Itō, 1893. 
 (Courtesy of the AIJ Library) 
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gained much traction in civil society to explain Japanese successes in comparison with its Asian 
neighbours: within this paradigm, Japan’s architects could tell themselves that their architecture had 
evolved and that Japan had become a superior nation. 
 
Itō’s role was to emphasise the value of the Japanese past and, from this, to theorise on its direction. In 
1897, Itō was part of a group which drafted the first the Ancient Temples and Shrines Preservation Law 
of 1897, an early measure to protect the Cultural Properties of Japan. (Wendelken, 2000: 821) 
Following these early triumphs, in 1902 Itō set off on what would be a three-year journey across Asia 
and Europe. Along this trip for the study of historical building, Itō took in China, Burma, India (where he 
stayed one year), Egypt, Greece, and Turkey. Along the way he sketched and wrote travel diaries 
describing ancient sites which were then published in the architectural journal Kenchiku Zasshi. (Finn, 
1996: 167) He eventually visited Western Europe and the United States, returning to Japan in 1905, 
just after the Russo-Japanese War. (Wendelken, 2000: 820)  
 
Travel broadened Ito’s horizons beyond Japan and he began a Darwinistic movement in architecture 
partly as a reaction against James Fergusson’s critical outlook on Japanese (and Oriental) architecture. 
Fergusson had stated that the Japanese are not a race of builders, and (recalling Section 2.1 when 
visitors from Western Europe to 16th century Japan had held Japanese buildings in high esteem) that 
their buildings should no longer even regarded as ‘architecture’ or as part of global architecture history. 
This Seiyō denigration of Japanese architectural forms during the late Edo period (which at the time 
were affected by the declining economic power of authorities (Coaldrake, 1996: 207)) meant that a 
move away from customary forms would be advantageous if Japan wished to move towards a new 
image of what it meant to be civilised. Japanese arts had already made only a poor first impression at 
the Philadelphia exhibition in 1876 where Euro-American commentators held that “Japanese 
achievements in the decorative arts demonstrated that they were only on 'the first stage of progress' in 
the arts.” (Jackson, 1992: 248) Japanese architects wished to avoid being labelled as barbarous in the 
same way, so they imitated Seiyō forms, symbols, functions, spaces and discourse.  
 
Itō wished to go beyond the conception of Japanese as imitators and formulated his ‘Evolution theory of 
architecture’ (based on a lecture of 1908 and published on the AIJ in 1909) which aimed to explain why 
Japanese architecture had recently fulfilled its aims of modernising along Seiyō criteria. Itō was 
concerned with creating a view of history in which it was possible to depart from tradition and evolve to 
a new level of architecture. This theorised Japan’s recent departure from customary practice showing 
the planned innovation by the Japanese government towards Westernise architectural development as 
progress. Itō’s conception of Tōyō and Seiyō were signified in a diagram representing the development 






The first thing to note is the obvious social Darwinian perspective in the diagram, with arrows indicating 
evolution and improvement (another indication of the importance of the idea of progress in Meiji Japan). 
The only arrow in the Tōyō sphere is from Japan and is evolving to move away from Chinese (and 
Japanese) culture. This also suggests that Japanese architecture was improving upon traditional forms 
rather than destroying them. The dynamics shown by the Seiyō sphere indicate the reflected 
supremacy of ‘the West’, yet Itō puts Japan on the same evolutionary path as America and Art Nouveau, 
moving away from their larger domain. The transient nature of modernity is highlighted with Japan, 
America and Art Nouveau moving away from the past and into historically unprecedented spheres.  
 3.48. ITŌ Chūtai: Evolution Theory of 
Architecture. Source from Itō, 1909. 


























3.49. ITŌ Chūta: Evolution theory of 




This fits well with Enlightenment discourse on the use of critical reason to reach the Truth, rather than 
staying attached to unquestioned assumptions. Itō and his successors had not only been influenced by 
Orientalism but had also been transformed by the scientific Enlightenment movement and the 
rationalist impulse to separate out discreet phenomenon into hard categories. For Said (1978) 
“preparing the way for modern Orientalist structures was the whole impulse to classify nature and man 
into types.” (Said, 1978: 119) In Ito’s conception categorisation reached down to many levels: Japan 
was not only a part of the East, but a part of the Chinese cultural sphere, which interacted with the 
Indian sphere, and not with the neighbouring Islamic sphere.  
 
Since Japan was a part of the East and had progressed, Itō did not discount the possibility of change 
for other Asian countries. In 1908 though, Japan was the only Eastern nation to make progress and 
was consequently becoming the Other in Asia. Japan’s Asian heritage was split off in early Meiji, 
and later re-attached in a deliberate fashion through the education system in architecture. However, 
this heritage was interpreted anew with a Seiyō conceptual lens.  
 
Although this evolutionary theory of architecture, attempting to display Japan’s uniqueness within Asia, 
could be seen as simple nationalist bigotry, it is clear that later in his career Itō did not seek to overly 
inflate Japan using history but saw it as a historically minor influence within Asia, only having a direct 
impact upon the art and architecture of Okinawa (Jap. 琉球 ) a startling admission in the 
hyper-nationalist time of 1937. This can be seen in Ito’s system of Tōyō art development in fig. 3.50 
below. Japan was only influenced directly by China and Korea ) and the centre of Asia in art is Central 
Asia minor. Itō’s extensive research into Eastern art history is shown in his understanding of the 
transmission of art from culture to culture. In categorising it so, Itō endeavoured to draw a new map of 
world architecture by removing Europe from the centre and redefining Eurasia. 
 
 
3.50. ITŌ Chūtai: System diagram of Oriental 
art development. Adapted from Itō, 1937. 
(Courtesy of the National Diet Library) 
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As with his theory on the evolution of architecture, Itō’s system of Tōyō art development emphasised 
commonalities between Eastern civilisations, showing all of Tōyō within a single coherent framework in 
both models. Itō’s Tōyō system responded to Banister Fletcher’s tree of architecture, which saw the 
‘Orient’ as static: instead Itō saw and represented the cultural shifts in Asian history, belying this 
Orientalist outlook. Yet in other ways, this system was a product of fashions of the times, for instance, 
seeing countries as discreet civilisations rather than smaller nations. By essentialising the states east 
of Europe, Itō used a similar methodological framework to his Seiyō contemporaries.  
 
Ito’s concept is a sophisticated reimagining of Japanese identity in the face of both Seiyō and Tōyō: 
Japan was recreated as the only progressive nation in Tōyō. This exercise in reimagining national 
identity was not unique to Japan: as David Lowenthal wrote in The Past is a Foreign Country, “by 
changing relics and records of former times, we change ourselves as well; the revised past in turn 
alters our own identity. The nature of the impact depends on the purpose and power of those who 
instigate the changes.” (Lowenthal, 1985: 411) Until this point architectural reform had focused on the 
image of Japan. With Itō’s “System of Tōyō Art Development” and “Evolutionary Theory of Architecture” 
this reform stretched to the history of Japan. In terms of self-understanding, ITŌ Chūta was the 
architect most influential in late-Meiji era architectural theoretical discourse. 
 
By conceiving Japan as simultaneously similar in its evolutionary trajectory to Seiyō and as the most 
advanced nation of Tōyō, Itō was reinventing both the past and the present. This was an underlying 
theme for much of the architecture produced in the Meiji period: Alice Tseng’s excellent study of the 
architecture of the Meiji museums found that these buildings reflect, first and foremost, the trend for 
change following “the new relationship, of entwined political, economic, and cultural interests, that 
Japan entered into with the nations of the West in the 1850s, after centuries of having nearly no 
diplomatic ties. The abruptly renewed relations with powerful, encroaching forces prompted the 
imagining of a categorical indigenous self (a national Japanese homogeneity) in contrast to the foreign 
other.” (Tseng, 2008: 3) This new relationship changed the way that architects wished to represent 
themselves and their new nation to the world, and Itō offered a happy compromise between respect for 
Seiyō alongside recognition of Japan’s roots in Tōyō, a compromise that was only possible after 
adopting the terminology of Orientalism. 
 
What differentiated Japan from the rest of Asia was that Japan had managed to evolve and improve in 
order to avoid Seiyō domination. Whilst recognising this, Itō was not only concerned with Japan: “Itō 
reached out to China and India, partly searching for Japan’s cultural roots, but also in the thrall, like 
European artists and scholars of this era, of Asia. He too rode on donkeys through mountains and 
deserts, sketched and wrote travel diaries (duly published in the architectural journal Kenchiku Zasshi 
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[Jap. 建築雑誌]) describing ancient sites from Peking to Pagan, Orissa to Istanbul. He was, in short, 
Japan’s first Orientalist.” (Finn: 1995: 167) As an Orientalist, Itō looked upon other ‘Oriental’ countries 
with curious and yet foreign eyes. This result was somewhat inevitable as architecture students were 
inducted into Seiyō architecture and were expected to build Seiyō constructions upon graduation under 
the policies of Meiji Japan. Connecting Japan to Seiyō and creating a new understanding of Japan’s 
architectural evolution within and away from Asia acted as a validation of the approach of using kindai 
(modern) methods of construction. 
 
Itō can be related to two strong, somewhat contradictory, currents in the late Meiji period: first, a 
renewed interest in the history and identity of Japan and Asia; second, an increasing identification with 
the ‘civilised’ nations of Euro-America. The work of Ernest Fenellosa (1853-1908) and OKAKURA 
Kakuzo (Jap. 岡倉覚三, 1862-1913 a.k.a. Tenshin,) reinforced the national trend to emphasise Japan's 
links with Seiyō while underscoring its Asian roots. Kawamitchi and Hashitera (1999) have found that 
Itō’s theories of architecture were influenced by the art historian Okakura who argued that: 
 
“Asia is one. The Himalayas divide, only to accentuate, two mighty civilizations, the 
Chinese with its communism of Confucius, and the Indian with its individualism of the 
Vedas. But not even the snowy barriers can interrupt for one moment the broad expanse of 
love for the Ultimate and Universal, which is the common thought-inheritance of every 
Asiatic race, enabling them to produce all the great religions of the world, and 
distinguishing them from those maritime peoples of the Mediterranean and the Baltic, who 
love to dwell on the Particular, and to search out the means, not the end, of life.” (Okakura: 
1905: 1) 
 
This passage shows Okakura taking on the task of locating the essence of Asia and categorising it with 
respect to ‘the West’. This was one of the earliest expressions of Pan-Asianism, an exercise taken on 
by Itō in his theory of Oriental art development. Whilst establishing a common root and positing a 
common race, Okakura also believed Asia was ‘one’ in its humiliation by Seiyō: they had collectively 
fallen behind in achieving modernisation, and thus were together colonised by the Great Powers. Later 
Okakura felt compelled to protest against Japan for trying to catch up with the Seiyō powers by 
sacrificing other Asian countries in the Russo-Japanese War.  
 
In both of his diagrams, Itō underlies Okakura’s position that ‘Asia is one’. Yet in spite of this inspiration, 
Itō was supportive of Japan’s imperialism (demonstrated by his central involvement in designing the 
Taiwan Shinto Shrine and place in the jury for the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office) described in  
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Chapter 5. Given that Itō was conventionally educated in the 1890s (unlike Okakura who was raised by 
American missionaries), a time of growing nationalism, this support is unsurprising but is a 
demonstration of Itō’s central part in the project of making Japan kindai (modern), rather than resisting 
modernity by going back to traditional architecture and traditional relationships with China and Tōyō. 
 
 
The creation of hybridity and the basis of dual modernity 
In effect, whilst engaging in the logic and history of Seiyō and re-affirming Japan’s connection to Tōyō, 
Itō was aiming for hybridity: Homi Bhabha’s notion of ‘hybridity’ developed Said’s analysis of a binary 
system of dominators and dominated into a ‘third space’ stressing interactions rather than structures. 
(Kikuchi, 2004: xvi) The idea of hybridity allows for the idea of marginal practices: practices which lie at 
the edge of accepted paradigms and are not dominated by them. Itō saw Japan’s architecture as 
neither Asian nor Seiyō but a syncretic architecture which blended the two to create something new.  
Through this syncretic approach, Itō was one of the architects responsible for the first kindai (modern) 
national style, the shajiyō based on the study of ancient Japanese shrines and temples. (Wendelken, 
2000: 821) Ito’s theories and the growth of nationalism in Japan eventually resulted in a renaissance in 
the ‘Shrine and Temple’ style architecture (a style mentioned in Section 3.1), although it was executed 
quite differently to pre-Meiji Shrine and Temple style. Ito’s work includes Okura Shukokan Museum 
(1927); Memorial Hall for the Earthquake of 1923 (1930); and the Main Hall of the Temple Tsukiji 
Honganji (1934), all located in Tokyo. Along with Itō, SEKINO Tadashi (1869-1938), OE Shintaro 
(1879-1935), and TAKEDA Goichi (1872-1938) are also considered to be a part of the Shrine and 
Temple Style movement. (Stewart, 1987: 30)  
 
Whilst Itō did not often build for the state, the hybrid architecture he produced during the war years can 
in complementary ways be seen as supporting the goals of the empire. (Wendelken, 2000: 827) Ito’s 
work represented the perceived spiritual and cultural attributes of Japan, and their connections with 
other parts of both Tōyō and Seiyō. Ito’s largest religious commission was the Tsukiji Honganji, a 
Buddhist temple of the Shin (Amita Buddha) sect, shown in the fig. 3.51 below. This group were heavily 
connected to the state at the time and offered the closest equivalent to a State religion that Japanese 
Buddhism produced at the time. This government relationship was a comfortable fit for the religion, 
since the Buddhists had pan-Asian and universalistic aspirations, considering themselves to be a 
‘world’ religion, rather than a ‘Japanese’ one. (Wendelken, 2000: 823) The temple was built in Tokyo, in 
1934 to replace a traditional wooden temple destroyed in the Kanto earthquake of 1923. Itō designed a 
structure of reinforced concrete with arched, leaded windows. The symmetrical design is a “mix of 
forms that suggest the influence of the Buddhist architecture at Ajanta in India; other features seem to 
be Southeast Asian or even Hindu in character.” (Wendelken, 2000: 822) Given that this building 
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preceded Itō’s theory of Oriental art development by three years, it is an example of Itō reifying the 
inter-Asian connections which he held to be true. 
 
 
The interior was differed from the façade, with an aesthetic far less antique, employing  painted 
coffered ceilings and concrete walls cast to look like the inside of a building constructed in timber. This 
recalled wooden temples with a rough and natural look. It also allowed Itō to “treat the building surfaces 
as a plastic medium, and the interior iconography is completely divorced from the formal themes of the 
exterior. The temple also incorporated such Christian influences as stained glass, fluted columns, and a 
large pipe organ to the rear of a large congregation hall furnished with wooden pews.” (Wendelken, 
2000: 822) Given the period of colonial expansion in which it was built, this means that this 
pan-Asianism should be treated with some suspicion, but themes can be found which appear later in 
the thesis. The main point of interest is the attempt to create hybridity with materials recalling stone 
edifices in South-West Asia: the use of reinforced concrete was simultaneously ‘modern’ and an 
attempt to create a new connection to the past and to neighbours.  
 
The genesis of using materials derived in Seiyō but developed in Japan, was a theme which permeates 
the history of kindai (modern) architecture in Japan. To a large extent this was due to the figure of 
Conder as the founder of modern architecture: his negative opinions towards wooden buildings filtered 
with great strength to his students. This can even be called his most significant legacy, and this bias 
against wood is notable when the Japanese architects’ opinions are contrasted with those of ordinary 
Japanese citizens: in early Japanese modernity, there was a wide gap in opinions between citizens and 
elites on what was ‘civilised architecture’. Brick buildings did not evoke broad public approval; 
subsequent to the Mino-Owari earthquake (Jap. 美濃尾張地震) in 1891, Itō wrote that “my opinion is not 
3.51. Itō Chuta: Tsukiji Honganji, 
1934. Source from Sha, Y., 2001. 
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that brick is superior to wood, but I can’t stand to hear those people who speak ill of brick too much. The 
masses clamor against brick.” (Quoted in Clancey, 2006: 180) This is an instance of the ‘rational’ 
educated architect feeling an emotional attachment to the material.  
 
Whilst science and rationality played a very significant role in the development of architecture and other 
institutions, Japanese modernity was not a straight application of rationality and reason. Rather than 
using the customary matter, wood, which itself had earthquake-proof qualities, Japanese architects 
innovated with the chosen material of brick (and later concrete), preferred by both clients and architects 
from the beginning of the Meiji period. The choice of material was in part a reflection of belonging for 
Japanese elites and architects: what the first two generations of architecture graduates from the 
Imperial University wished for most was “to share the identity “architect” with Europeans, while 
developing their own national style (itself, of course, a European concern)”. (Clancey, 2006: 212) 
Moving on from simple imitation to the aspiration of creating a national style was partly due to Japanese 
architects’ desire to be a profession equivalent to architects in Europe. Therefore whilst the use of 
reason was an important factor in the adoption of pragmatism, science and kindai (modern) materials, 
the architects’ own convictions and values were also in line with these developments. 
Being an ‘architect’ did not imply being culturally ‘Western’: although there were obvious crossovers, 
many Japanese architects wished to go a third way. Creating hybridity, with Japan as an intellectually 
essentialised synthesis of ‘Seiyō progression’ and ‘Tōyō culture’, was an important development for 
architecture in Japan. Yet the execution of hybridity looked very different depending on whether the 
architects were educated pre- or post-Conder.  
 
Previously, architects such as YAMAGUCHI Hanroku (Jap. 山口半六, 1858-1900) had managed to 
combine kindai (modern) and ‘traditional’ construction techniques without creating this essentialistion of 
Seiyō and Tōyō. Wood was used most particularly for buildings by the Ministry of Education and by 
architects such as KURU Madamichi and Yamaguchi who was sent to study architecture abroad in 
France before Conder had arrived in Japan in 1877. The Sōgaku-dō (Jap. 奏楽堂, lit. Odeon) was a 
rare example from the group of first generation architects, such as Yamaguchi, who made the 
intentional Japanese Wayo-secchu (hybrid) style architecture in later years following the earlier 
example of Shimizu.  
 
The Sōgaku-dō was built from 1889 to 1890 (before Tatsuno’s first building was completed) as the Hall 
for Instrumental Music, and thus the main building of what was to become the Tokyo University of Fine 
Arts. It also functioned as the National Theatre for Seiyō music until after World War II. This wooden 
building was curious for two reasons: first, in its mix of traditional carpentry techniques for the structure 
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and second, because it exemplifies that wood had become a lower material of construction (though still 
a valid one). As with most timber frame buildings of the early Meiji, the Sōgaku-dō was “built using 
traditional Japanese joinery and carpenters’ tools, the roof trussing and interior space – particularly in 
the concert hall – is based on Western engineering techniques.” (Coaldrake, 1996: 242) In this 
mid-Meiji period, wood was a material used for a great many buildings, but only for those of middling 
importance to the state: schools, shops and concert halls such as the Sōgaku-dō were usually built in 
wood, probably for budgetary reasons as well as lack of expertise in working well in brick and stone. 
 
The building, shown in fig. 3.52, conforms to the tastes of the times: well-proportioned in an Italian 
manner, deemed suitable for a Seiyō concert hall. However there are several crucial features which are 
artefacts of the rapid process of transculturation (introduced in Section 1.1) in carpentry, as discovered 
during a recent restoration project. First, the roof is covered with traditional composite pantiles 
(sangawara), like the second Mitsui bank. Second, several carpenters' tools from the original 
construction project of 1889-90 were discovered, all of which are conventional Japanese tools. Third, 
the restoration also uncovered the existence of sumi-ink numbering using the traditional bansuke 
system on the wooden components framing the building. The numbering “is definitive evidence that the 
construction of the building followed the procedures of traditional building practice, with the parts 
prefabricated and labelled in the carpenters' workshop prior to assembly at the building site according 
to the ezu-ita or plan-board system.” (Coaldrake, 1994: 31) Fourth, the master carpenter used 
traditional joinery to hold the wooden construction together as well as iron bolts and fittings. The 
building would have stood without the bolts but not without the fittings, so this building represents one 
of the first examples of using Seiyō technology to enhance traditional building techniques. 
 
 
This image can be seen in the printed thesis at the University of 
Sheffield library. 
 
3.52. Sōgaku-dō (Odeon). 
Front oblique view after 
1983-97 restoration.Source 
from Coaldrake, 1996. 
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Finally and most interestingly, given the theme of historically connecting Western and Japanese 
architecture, the building also applied both modular proportions from the Japanese building tradition 
and proportions based on modules aligned with the classical orders of Europe. Using a base of the 
Japanese modular proportions meant that the Palladian principles were transplanted onto the structure. 
This was only possible because the ‘grammar’ of the two systems was inherently similar, as both were 
systems based on proportions (as noted by Tatsuno in his thesis).  
 
This congruence between systems was a muted theme in the architecture of Conder’s and Tatsuno’s 
students, as very few attempted to reconnect their practice with the national historical architecture. This 
left carpenters marginalised, as they were practising architecture with principles and tools which 
became progressively side-lined. Although in their early years carpenters were obliged to go through 
the compulsory schooling system, they remained outside specialist education while architects were 
trained as a new type of technician. Architects such as Yamaguchi were an exception to the rule: 
generally there was split between carpentry and architects, a development of parallel professions of 
master carpenters and ‘Western style’ architects such as Tatsuno which effectively sabotaged any 
attempt at genuine hybridity.  
 
Because the first generation of architects had no teaching at all by carpenters, the second and 
subsequent generations had to relearn carpentry after it had first been categorised as historical, not 
modern. This meant that Japanese architects became excellent agents for the state’s policy for ‘surface 
Westernisation’ but were poorly equipped to implement an authentic Japanese national architectural 
style. For these students the contact with Seiyō architecture was of such intensity that they only 
developed skills in Seiyō arts, and existed in an environment closed off from native influences. This 
situation altered after the introduction of Kigo as a teacher at the College of Engineering because 
students were subsequently no longer cocooned from their architectural roots and could begin to 
conceive their own architectural history in a deeper way (though still using Seiyō’s analytical methods). 
Architecture graduates thereafter became conversant in different building techniques to those derived 
from the ‘Occident’.  
 
 
Consequences of early modernising for Japanese architecture 
In the ideal of programmatic modernity, described in Section 1.2, as opposed to (closed) Edo Japan, 
knowledge and practices were shared across cultures with actors using reason to determine which 
methods and approaches were useful in reaching a target. As Japan came later than Europe to such 
progressive practices, this cherry-picking exercise was far more intense and so a whole system of 
architecture was imported into which architecture students were inducted. Building rituals, which had 
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strong foundations in cultural values such as prayers before the use of wood, were no longer practised. 
In the professional life of architects, customary values had become diluted due to rationalisation and 
were understood only in a general way; ‘religion’ moved out of the realm of workplace practice and into 
private beliefs. 
 
Japanese architecture education methods and approaches both created a gulf between kindai (modern) 
practices and ‘traditional’ practices. For instance both the focus on theory and the act of theorising 
separated architects from the past: carpenters neither learnt theory nor theorised on their practice for 
their education. As with wider society, the new education system meant that architects became a totally 
different category of worker from carpenters. The education of architects created new divisions of 
labour between designers and builders. 
 
This division was compounded by the differing views that Japanese architects held of past building 
practices of Japan due to frameworks of understanding departing from a nativist approach. Instead it 
was an Englishman, Josiah Conder, who created the formalisation of Japanese architectural education 
and was later known as ‘the Father of modern Japanese architecture’, (Watanabe, 1993: 43). His 
framework with its subtle bias towards Japanese and ‘Oriental’ architecture was telling. By definition, 
then, modern Japanese architecture had its roots in Seiyō; the conceptual frameworks were developed 
in Seiyō, the style of teaching was derived from Seiyō, and even the founder of the profession was 
British.  
 
This produced a split between the past and present. In turn this split created an issue of belonging for 
Japanese architects after learning European and American architectural history: Japanese architects 
were not the same as Japanese carpenters, and did not want to be. These architects would go on to 
build with prejudices (first conceived in Europe) of Japanese carpentry in mind; the foundations of the 
education system actively pushed Japanese architects away from their native past and towards the 
aspiration to be modern. Yet the initial ‘Westernisation’ approach from Meiji authorities left the 
consequence of a confused identity of both what it meant to be kindai (modern) and to be Japanese, 
which had to be dealt with by ‘modern’ architects such as Ito. Through theory and production of 
architecture, Itō provided some clarity on where Japan should stand in relation to Seiyō and Tōyō, 
though only by recreating the underlying binaries of Orientalism.  
 
According to Octavio Paz, in the West the modern was “the knife which splits time in two: before and 
now.” (Paz, 1991: 4) This split was greater in Japan in some respects, when this splitting of time 
occurred with even greater violence. In this chapter the temporal split has been particularly shown in 
terms of how Japanese architects learnt about the past. Yet the schism between traditional carpentry 
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and architecture was due to the shift towards learning about Seiyō architecture history. Whilst the use 
of reason was a central condition in the development of Japanese authority architecture, critical reason 
was in the first place promoted to a great extent in authority architecture due to another condition: the 
desire of Meiji elites to appear civilised to Seiyō. In sum, borrowing the notion of ‘modern’, and 
embedding it in institution-building created a new framework of hierarchies, in which Seiyō, and 
particularly critical reason, became the new hallmarks for a superior civilisation. This dynamic was 
































Civilising the Qing: Urban development under Imperial Japan 
 
 
“During the past seventy years, Japan has been doing her best to import the civilization of 
far advanced Western nations, and thereby elevate herself to the same level as any 
civilized nation of the Occident. Her efforts in this direction have turned out successful, and 
she finds herself ranked among the most civilized and most powerful nations of the world. 
There is now nothing which she can learn from any other nation. Japan is no longer a 
[child]; she is an adult. Years ago, she was dependent in many ways upon the civilization 
of the Western nations. Today, she is quite independent in that respect, and, therefore, is 
required to form her own civilization.” (Naito, 1938: 53)  
 
The promotional text above on Japan’s colony in Taiwan implies that the modern transformation from 
Seiyō was intended by the Meiji authorities, particularly IWAKURA Tomomi and YANAGIHARA 
Sakimitsu, to demonstrate that Japan was capable of transitioning alone to a high stage of 
development and becoming civilised on Seiyō terms. Yet implicit in the quote is that Japan’s 
requirement to form her own civilisation demanded the capability to reify progress through domination; 
this became the only acceptable evidence to prove Japan had completed the modern transformation 
and attained Great Power status. Yet, the reason that Japanese modernisation retains such an acute 
interest is that the modern influence in architecture in Japanese history was not essentially a ‘Western’ 
process but a Japanese initiative formed in the contact zone as discussed. These rapid transformations 
came about under conditions of unequal power relations, where the native wooden architecture was 
demeaned and became split off from conventional authority architecture, creating a primary schism in 
kindai (modern) architecture. These schisms continued during Japan’s expansion and became clearer 
as her past architecture was hidden in her colonies and so Japanese ‘tradition’ was not shown in 
tandem with its modernity. In the course of this process, Japan’s kindai (modernity) became a duality 
with Seiyō modernity, existing alongside Euro American modernity with interactions between the two, 
but becoming culturally independent. 
 
Analysis of Japanese modernity without reference to Japan’s imperialism is limited and cannot grasp 
the cultural context that prefaced the rise in confidence in Japan’s modern architects. The Shrine and 
Temple style architecture became popular at the beginning of the 20th century with the growth in 
national confidence. This confidence was in no small part due to Japan’s success in its aggressive 
foreign policy towards its neighbours at the end of the 19th century. The creation of new relationships 
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between past and present, between Japan and Tōyō and finally, between Japan and Seiyō, were 
planned and implemented through colonial policies to reach everyday life within the urban setting.  
 
The authorities in colonial Taiwan practised three principles. First was an efficient organisation and 
carefully planned policies. Second was persuasion, taking on the British colonial style of impressing the 
native, mainly through uniforms and architecture. Finally, and underpinning the first two policies, was 
social Darwinism, with colonial authorities seeing all nations as being in a struggle of ‘survival of the 
fittest.’ Japan needed to obtain colonies to survive and to put Taiwan on the path to progression through 
scientific methods. All these principles functioned to distinguish the Japanese from the ‘pre-modern’ 
Taiwanese natives, therefore reifying their superiority. 
 
Yet even before Taiwan was taken as war indemnity from China in 1895, Japanese leaders had been 
projecting Japan as a proto-imperialist power since the Meiji Restoration. For Japan, a country keen to 
establish itself as one of the civilised nations of the world, imperialistic83 expansion became a 
preoccupation. Colonialism led Japan to move their civilised nation forward as they digested Seiyō 
modern learning. In doing so Japan could reify their superiority over lesser countries and truly join the 
Great Powers of the time. This chapter explores how and why Japan became an imperial power and 
the consequences of this, how Japanese authorities expressed themselves in Taiwan as her first colony, 
how the city of Taipei developed in the Qing dynasty (and was treated as ‘un-modern’), and how Japan 
attempted to demonstrate their modernity on the cityscape with their new kindai (modern) institutions. 
 
 
4.1 Illumination of ‘modern Japan’ through imperialism 
As argued in Chapter 2, in the first instance Japan's motivation for acquiring colonies was based on the 
need for survival and self-protection in a geo-political context where even China had been humbled by 
a small number of militarily advanced forces of Britain and France. Japan’s economy and military were 
relatively undeveloped and Japan's leaders believed the acquisition of colonies would supplement their 
own slender resource base. Additional resources would give them the necessary bargaining power to 
exist in a world of intense international rivalry. (Chang and Myers, 1963: 433) For Japan, colonialism 
would be a form of pre-emptive protection in the event of war, a buffer against the powers of Seiyō and 
a boost to the economy of the home islands. This third factor was particularly important for Japan, as 
colonising was an effective method of jumping ahead economically, a necessity given that Japan had 
only been chasing modernity for a matter of decades. (Chang and Myers, 1963: 436) 
 
                                                   
83
 I define imperialism here conventionally as “the policy of extending the rule or authority of an empire or nation over foreign countries, or of 
acquiring and holding colonies and dependencies.” (Collins English Dictionary, 2009) 
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Yet Japanese colonialism was in a new category to European colonialism. As Nicholas Thomas put it at 
the beginning of his book Colonialism’s Culture: “Colonialism: the word’s immediate associations are 
with intrusions, conquest, economic exploitation and the domination of indigenous peoples by 
European men.” (Thomas, 1994: 1) The case of Japan’s colonial activities was different in two respects: 
they were not European and their imperialism was over an area of which they were a part. Rather than 
treating Japanese imperialism as part of an overarching category, in this chapter I will follow Tani 
Barlow’s suggestion that terms such as colonialism and modernity must be carefully examined for their 
specific local meaning. (Barlow, 1997: 4) 
 
Given that the remainder of this thesis looks at kindai (modern) in the colonies of Japan it must be 
asked: Why does this thesis look at colonialism to understand the modern? The answer lies in the 
definition of the modern explored in Chapter 1. Engagement with the modern requires engagement in 
the process of distinguishing from the non-modern (as befits a concept that has its roots in 
differentiating different times and the fashionable from the unfashionable). Adoption of the modern 
requires constant distinction from others to prove superiority or at least equality with them. This 
necessitates constructing a hierarchical relationship through discourse, policies and foreign relations. 
Colonialism has been and remains the perfect tool to demonstrate superiority over an Other: it creates 
a parent/child, leader/follower, master/slave relationship between the coloniser and the colonised. The 
Other’s power is taken away, the dominated appear childlike and malleable, thus giving them the 
appearance of being pre-modern and requiring a superior presence to guide them.  
 
Before examining both the context and instances of Japan’s imperialism between 1868 and 1895 it is 
important to clarify two related conceptual issues: first, that Japanese imperialism only begins before 
Taiwan was ceded to Japan in 1895; and second, that the drivers of Japanese imperialism should be 
seen in relation to theories of imperialism in spite of the differences with European colonisation.  
 
Several major studies of Japanese imperialism share the general assumption that Japanese 
imperialism began in 1895 with the colonisation of Taiwan, such as the Japanologist W.G. Beasley in 
Japanese Imperialism 1894-1945 (1987). This assumption has led to colonialism and kindai 
(modernisation) often being conceptually split in studies on Meiji Japan, yet this is a historically 
inaccurate split. Although studies of Japanese imperialism often begin in 1895 with the colonisation of 
Taiwan, Japanese colonialism did not start in Taiwan, but with Hokkaidō, the Ryūkyū Islands, and with 
Japan’s aggressive foreign policies towards Korea and China which indisputably followed the example 
of Seiyō countries in favouring gunboat diplomacy and unequal treaties over the previous Sakoku (Jap. 
鎖国, lit. locked country) policy. Although Japanese rule in Taiwan set the tone for her later colonial 
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developments (Tsai, 2009: 10) the colonisation of Hokkaidō and the Ryūkyūs also set the tone for the 
colonisation of Taiwan. Japanese imperialism thus had two stages: an initial stage where it was an 
important albeit secondary concern (from 1868 to 1895) and a later stage that underpinned the asserted 
modernity of Japan (from 1895 to 1945). 
 
In agreement with this position, Robert Eskildsen wrote that Japan’s imperialism began before 1895: 
“The establishment of Japan’s formal colonial empire has served as an influential historical guidepost, 
but it also encourages the view that Japanese colonialism happened after Japan had accomplished its 
own modernization, rather than that colonialism and modernization happened concurrently, and this 
has created a historiographical blind spot about the colonial dimension of the Taiwan expedition.” 
(Eskildsen, 2002: 2) Given that Meiji Japan’s bellicose foreign policy was concurrent with the initial 
‘modernising’ efforts, it is important see how the new concepts, centralisation and binary boundaries 
that were being established in fields from education to architecture were reflected in Japan’s early 
imperialist actions, rather than imagining that these only began after the first Sino-Japanese war. 
 
 
Meiji Japan’s imperialist approach 
Given that Japanese imperialism was a part of the overall policy of the Meiji state rather than a late 
adaptation, it is important first to understand which theories of imperialism best fit the early foreign 
activities of Meiji Japan. The four most influential theories of imperialism I examine here are J.A. 
Hobson’s theory of under-consumption leading to imperialism, Lenin’s theory of imperialism as the 
monopoly stage of capitalism, Joseph Schumpeter’s theory that imperialism was an atavism of an earlier, 
more aggressive stage of development, and nationalism which stresses national security and national 
sentiment as the driver for imperialism. Whilst each of these theories are likely to hold some truth for 
some regimes, I concentrate here on how they applied to Japan’s early colonial activities given that the 
conditions faced by Japan were quite different to Europe. 
 
Given Japan’s undeveloped capitalism in the late nineteenth century, it appears that imperialistic 
expansion was based more on ideology than capital. This is unsurprising given that the power and 
control of the state was a defining feature of the Meiji period. Hobson’s theory suggests that the 
existence of excess capital leads to seeking profits overseas. However, during this period Japan had no 
excess capital, had a significant trade deficit, and, following the annexation of Taiwan, even had to 
borrow large amounts from Britain and the United States to finance its rapid industrial expansion. 
(Gordon, 2003: 4) Lenin’s theory of imperialism (Lenin (1917)) advocated a theory of monopoly capital 
where capitalists wanted to employ surplus capital abroad to achieve higher profits than in the domestic 
market. This does not appear to apply to imperial Japan. For instance, most of the funds from foreign 
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debt following the acquisition of Taiwan went on military expenditure, and only three percent of the funds 
went to development of Japan's colonies. (Lockwood, 1954: 35)  
 
Schumpeter’s theory appears to have more validity. He wrote that imperialism represented the survival 
of older social structures, such as a warrior class, within a capitalist economy. This theory seems to 
partially explain the attitudes of Japan's leaders toward imperialistic expansion. There were some 
continuations, such as the strong desire for the country to be respected, which underlay treaty revision. 
Calman (1992) attempted to revise the idea that the West had a framing impact on Japan and that 
Japanese pre-Perry history had a defining impact upon Japan: “Japanese imperialism was not simply a 
response to external conditions; its well-springs are to be found within Japanese history.” (Calman, 
1992: xxi) Calman sees continuation of political dynamics from the Edo period as being the key to 
understand all developments. Given that Japan continued to gather territories following the reversal of 
the unequal treaties, Japanese imperialism can clearly be explained not only by a reaction to the low 
international position of Japan, but as something internal to their own culture.  
 
However, rather than simply a continuation, the transition from the Edo to Meiji represented a great and 
obvious break from Japan’s past, and the recent past of Japan had been peaceful and isolated. Breaks 
with the past were dramatic: the first declaration of the Meiji period in the Five Charter Oath abolished 
the class system which took away all samurai privileges. Arguments that suggest imperialism in Japan 
was due to the samurai spirit often forget that samurai had changed their role fundamentally in the 
Tokugawa period; without wars for 250 years they had become well educated administrators, as shown 
in Chapter 2. The samurai who disagreed with these decisions were also swiftly put down; one of the first 
major disagreements in the Meiji period was the Satsuma rebellion (Jap. 西南戦争, lit. Southwestern 
War) which defeated the Meiji forces who wished to attack Korea, as this policy did not fit with the 
government vision of foreign relations which preferred the Seiyō strategy of gunboat diplomacy. 
Although the idea of the martial samurai was later revived in the lead up to World War Two, this was in 
essence a (re)invented tradition, given that the army since 1868 was composed of all classes; by the 
turn of the 20th century, the notion of samurai as a warrior class had become a useful anachronism. 
 
Ultimately, Meiji Japan’s imperialistic objectives were more to do with burgeoning nationalism than any 
other factor. (Gordon, 2003: 6) The following points support nationalism as the best theory to understand 
Japan's wars and colonial acquisitions: 1) Japan's deep concerns for national security, 2) its emulation of 
the imperialistic behaviours of Western powers, and 3) Japanese national ideals and personal 
characteristics. The concept of social Darwinism, which saw the ultimate domination of the world by the 
strongest nations, fitted well with the belief of many Japanese that they were the chosen people of Asia 
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and a divinely favoured race. FUKUZAWA Yukichi, one of Japan's educational leaders and founder of 
one of Japan's most influential newspapers, expressed Japan's early imperialistic desires in 1882, "We 
shall someday raise the national power of Japan so that not only shall we control the natives of China 
and India as the English do today, but we shall also possess in our hands the power to rebuke the 
English and to rule Asia ourselves." (Nester, 1996: 63) The Japanese people also had certain personal 
characteristics that supported the country's rapid economic growth and imperialistic expansion. Allen 
(1981) explains, "Throughout their history they have shown a gift for rapidly assimilating new ideas and 
practices, a boldness in executing large projects and, above all, a trained and frequently exercised 
capacity for organization." (Allen, 1981: 15) This means that the theory which best explains the drivers 
for Japanese imperialism in the Meiji period is nationalism. It was the internalisation of the narrative of 
joining the progressive civilised nation-states of Seiyō to avoid the fate of China that provided the 
strongest argument in favour of becoming an imperial power. 
 
 
Conditions shaping Japan’s early imperialism 
After the Black Ships of Commodore Matthew Perry made their belligerent entrance into Edo Bay in 
1853, thrusting Japan towards participation in what was already a highly inequitable system of world 
trade, the “Japanese were keenly aware of their tenuous position in relation to the West.” (Mason, 2012: 
14) Japan’s decision to expand her territory was not made in a vacuum: the late nineteenth-century 
international scene was dominated by large states competing with one another for the control of 
resource areas. As argued in Section 2.1 this was a tonal change from the early nineteenth century 
when increased competition between states and a hardening of the idea of Western superiority within 
the Great Powers meant that all uncolonised areas outside of Europe and North America were under 
increased danger of imperialist actions. This was the context for Japan’s initial colonial expansion: from 
the mid 1880’s to World War One, a surge of aggression from Britain, France and new aspiring imperial 
powers had almost entirely divided and partitioned the African continent and had occupied the remaining 
unclaimed portions of Asia and the Pacific except for China, Japan, and Siam. (Peattie, 1984: 3) This 
late-nineteenth-century burst of imperial activity by the industrial West became known as the ‘New 
Imperialism’ and “created modern colonial systems notable for the rapidity with which they were 
assembled and the degree to which they were similar in arrangement, structure and evolution.” (Peattie, 
1984: 3)  
 
By the beginning of the Meiji Restoration, Japanese leaders displayed a degree of paranoia, seeing 
enemies on all sides, perceiving a threat from others. Reacting to this indirect threat, Japan acted 
strategically to counter it. This attitude is clear from reports about and words from IWAKURA Tomomi, 
leader of the Iwakura Mission. Sir Harry Parkes, the British Envoy to Japan, was “much impressed by 
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the skill and ability of Iwakura, who consulted him closely on the policies which Japan should adopt in its’ 
attempt to become strong and respected”. (Daniels, 1996: 92) Although Iwakura was friendly, it was 
without naivety as to the threat that Parkes and other ambassadors might one day pose to Japan. 
Iwakura noted in a memorandum to SANJO Sanetomi, the Minister of the Right, in 1869: 
 
“Although we have no choice in having intercourse with the countries beyond the seas, in 
the final analysis those countries are our enemies. Why are they our enemies? Day by day 
these countries develop their arts and technology with a view to growing in wealth and 
power. Even a little country like Holland remains independent among the powers and 
submits itself to no other power. That is because the people’s hearts, high and low, are 
united in revering their monarch and loving their state. Thus, every foreign country tries to 
place itself over other countries. Country A directs its efforts at country B, country B at 
country C – they are all the same. That is why I say, all countries beyond the seas are our 
enemies. Therefore, henceforth, in dealing with foreign countries our great objective must 
be neither to sully the emperor’s glory nor to impair our national rights.” (Iwakura, 1869, 
Quoted in Duus, 1995: 16) 
 
This was in no way an isolated opinion: Iwakura’s suggestions on how Japan’s foreign relations should 
be conducted only became hardened and more concerned with competition over time, particularly 
following the partition of Africa. Foreign minister INOUE Kaoru, commissioner of the Rokumeikan, 
summed up this consensus in a long memorandum in 1887: 
 
“The [European] countries are all devoting their power more and more to the colonization 
and development of overseas territories… In India, Cambodia, Cochin-China, and 
elsewhere, the weak become prey for the strong… During the past three or four years the 
European countries have expanded their power into Asia and Africa more than ever before, 
and they are brandishing their power in the Far East as well. Ah, the continents of Africa and 
Asia are about to become the cockpit of conflict among the Europeans.” (Kaoru, 1887, 
quoted in Duus, 1995: 17) 
 
The discourse in Meiji Japan concerning the foreign policies of Seiyō was that all areas of the world were 
becoming colonised more rapidly than ever before, and that Asia was soon to become a central zone of 





Reversing the Unequal Treaties 
Japan did not react in blind panic to these concerns but with thoughtful and ruthless planning to ensure 
they would remain strong and independent. As shown throughout this thesis, the first priority from the 
time of the Restoration in 1868 was revising the unequal treaties and, specifically, abolishing 
extraterritoriality. This priority was strengthened after the Iwakura Mission failed in 1873 on this point. 
Japanese elites followed the suggestion of the British foreign minister Granville, who stated “Britain 
would only be prepared to make concessions on the subject of the treaties, such as might put British 
citizens under the jurisdiction of the Japanese, ‘in precise proportion to their advancement in 
enlightenment and civilization’.” (Beasley, 1995: 165) The most direct correction for Japan to reverse 
extraterritoriality was to have a legal system that Seiyō residents in Japan could trust. Having European 
law models allowed Europeans to be confident that they would be treated similarly to at home. This was 
achieved methodically through Meiji legal codification and reform, expanded upon in Section 5.2. The 
success of this approach was acknowledged by the English Orientalist Robert P. Porter in his 1918 book 
Japan, the Rise of a Modern Power, who described how Japan had shaken off “her tariff and juristic 
shackles” and that Japan “had already codified much of her law and organized her law courts after 
European models.” (Porter, 1918: 120-121) Peter Duus claims that for every domestic policy “Whatever 
benefits or harm a particular policy might entail on other grounds, its effects on Japan’s international 
standing always figured in the debate.” (Duus, 1995: 15) At least to some extent, domestic Meiji policy 
was designed to function and fit with broader foreign policy agendas.  
 
However, ‘civilised’ legal reform was insufficient to reverse the treaties, given that the benefits given by 
these agreements to European states and the USA were not only legal but financial in nature. Quite 
apart from her domestic policies, Japan would also need to follow the foreign relations policies of the 
Seiyō Great Powers in order to be seen as a serious potential ally or enemy. Therefore Japan adopted 
imperialist practices “in much the same way that they imported, assimilated, and transformed other 
cultural and institutional structures.” (Duus, 1995: 11-12)  
 
This approach to imperialism is important to highlight in the case of Japan because it represented a 
new manner of relating to foreign states and, therefore, required to be rapidly learned from the Great 
Powers. It is important to understand that Japan’s approach and justification for dominating depends on 
the dominant power believing itself superior to the dominated. In colonial governance, these ‘civilised’ 
characteristics are purposefully accentuated since: “the differences from one culture to another help 
illuminate each culture’s particular characteristics.” (Davis, 2006: 25) Social differences in a colonial 
context are constructed and managed by the way the colonial power decides to represent itself. As 
Japan was a newly powerful state from the perspective of Europeans and Americans, these initial 
representations were important to display a coherent image on the world stage. Japanese officials 
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wished to show themselves different from neighbouring countries, even China: “Japanese aggression 
in China constitutes a puzzle for observers, who argue that “it seems… freak[ish] that a country barely 
out of danger of being ‘colonised’ should think of colonies herself.” (Blanken, 2012: 104)  
 
Whilst the architectural project of ITŌ Chūta promoted a deeper connection with Seiyō and 
reconnecting with neighbours, I suggest that Japan’s imperialism, 1868 to 1895, was treading a 
different yet complementary course, focused on two objectives: striving for superiority over Tōyō and 
striving for equality with Seiyō. Both of these aims would incentivise becoming an imperialist power 
within East Asia. This section looks first at two case studies that illuminate Japan’s pre-1895 colonial 
activities: the colonisation of Hokkaidō and Japan’s shifting relationship with China. These examples 
are used to discern what Japan achieved through these policies, what underlay Japan’s imperial 
approach, and, later, how this approach shifted and expanded with the colonisation of Taiwan. 
 
 
Striving for superiority over Tōyō 
The process of gaining formal legal equality with Seiyō was understood unquestionably as part of 
increasing the imperial power of Japan. Because of the necessity to grow their imperial power in order to 
appear civilised and gain treaty revision, colonialism went largely unquestioned in Meiji Japan. Apart 
from a few dissidents such as KOTOKU Shusui, hardly a voice was raised in protest against a 
programme of expansion: in the Meiji period doubt about imperialism is notable by its absence. (Duus, 
1995: 12) Imperialism was accepted as a way of being in Japan, the main disputes “revolved around the 
speed, direction, and management of expansion, not its legitimacy, which was no more questioned than 
was the legitimacy of steam-driven machinery or constitutional systems. In this sense, the pursuit of an 
expansionist agenda was part and parcel of the larger mimetic project of the Meiji elites.” (Duus, 1995: 
12)  
 
Japan’s mimicking international behavior was tempered by its status as an East Asian nation with deep 
historical relationships to its neighbours. Indeed, if Japan was purely mimicking Seiyō, they would have 
colonised geographically distant states rather than areas governed by states with a similar cultural 
background. These more geographically immediate relationships and the activities which formed these 
would become the areas of greatest foreign activity between 1868 and 1895, rather than relationships 
with Seiyō. How these relationships shaped Japan’s foreign policy is explored below in examining 





Early imperialism: Hokkaidō  
To the north of Japan’s largest island, Honshū, the southern-most peninsula of Hokkaidō (formerly 
known as Ezo (Jap. 蝦夷)) had been only loosely part of Japan prior to the Meiji Restoration. It was 
inhabited by around 20,000 indigenous Ainu people, ethnically and culturally distinct from the Yamato 
people. The programme of expansion began almost from the commencement of Meiji rule with the 
colonisation of Hokkaidō, Japan’s first experiment in colonial administration. After being defeated on the 
Japanese mainland by restoration forces, the outgoing remnants of the Shogun attempted to set up a 
breakaway Republic of Ezo on Hokkaidō. However, the navy loyal to the emperor ended this attempt in 
May 1869 with the Battle of Hakodate on the southern tip of Hokkaidō. Thereafter the island of Hokkaidō 
was slowly and deliberately integrated into the administration of the mainland; a Development 
Commission (Jap. 開開開 , kaitakushi) was established in 1869 by the new Meiji government following 
the final act of the war with the Shogunate. The colonisation of the island enacted “Japan’s desire to 
avoid being colonized by Western powers as a central motivating factor of Japan’s vigorous pursuit of 
colonial domination in the region. This posturing began as early as 1869 when Japanese ideologues 
asserted in the Iwakura Proposal that the colonization of Ezo would be instrumental in negotiating 
respect and influence with the West, in general, and Russia, in particular.” (Mason, 2012: 14-15) 
 
In 1882 the Development Commission was abolished and Hokkaidō was made into three prefectures. 
These were abolished four years later in 1886 and the Hokkaidō Agency (Jap. 北海道庁, Hokkaidō-chō) 
was established. These incremental developments were a sign that Hokkaidō was being “gradually 
incorporated into the modern nation-state of Japan,” (Kleeman, 2003: 12) yet Hokkaidō remained 
peripheral and only became an equal prefecture in 1947. Hokkaidō was not run as part of the other 
islands of Japan, nor as an internal colony, but as something in between these states, “internalized by 
the colonization process that took place during the Meiji era.” (Mason, 2012: 13)  
 
The example of Hokkaidō is particularly relevant to understand how kindai (modern) became adopted in 
Japan and later in Taiwan because the three ingredients identified through my analyses as part of the 
modernisation of Japan/Taiwan could all also be seen in the colonisation of Hokkaidō. These were: first, 
the adaptation of new concepts and behavior in the international sphere; second, the deployment of 
centralisation in creating a more programmatically driven process of change in Hokkaidō; and third, the 
erection of binary boundaries, particularly between the natives of Hokkaidō and Japanese on the main 
three islands. These three aspects will be explored in turn. 
 
On the first point, even in 1868, a year after the Meiji Restoration, the basic concerns and language of 
Seiyō upon establishing colonies (the ideas of imperial power and of spreading civilisation) were already 
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present in the rhetoric used by Meiji elites, such as IWAKURA Tomomi, to justify and rationalise the 
colonisation of Hokkaidō. Iwakura wrote to the first governor of the Hokkaidō Development Commission: 
 
“We entrust the governor to perform admirable service to this development enterprise and 
to spread civilization widely, making Ezo [former name of Hokkaidō] into a small Japan. In 
this way, in addition to generating unprecedented profits, we will stop the Russians from 
watering at the mouth. We must do our all to enhance the Empire’s power abroad. Whether 
we open Ezo or not will determine the future of the Empire, and gentlemen serving the 
imperial court should devote every effort to this project.” (Iwakaura, 1869, quoted in Mason, 
2012: 1) 
 
The idea of spreading civilisation (which Japanese elites assumed they possessed even prior to 
undergoing the modernisation project) was an important reason for acquiring Hokkaidō. The natives of 
Hokkaidō had been seen by Japanese elites as uncivilised for centuries, and would have been so 
regarded by Euro-Americans too. We can therefore see a merging of the ideas of civilisation, where 
using either the native, Japanese version based on Confucian ethics, or the English definition based on 
progress, Hokkaidō could be seen as uncivilised.  
 
In Iwakura’s quote we can also see the two main notions of imperialism present in the justification for 
colonising Hokkaidō: imperialism as a policy of extending a country's power and influence through 
colonisation, and imperialism as rule by the emperor. Given this, we can see that in the early Meiji period 
Japan was concerned with international competition and saw strengthening the imperial power (in both 
senses) as a cornerstone policy to surviving this competition. The Japanese argument for expansion for 
geo-political purposes is reflected specifically in Iwakura’s statement that ‘opening’ Hokkaidō will 
prevent a future Russian incursion. (Mason, 2012: 1) It is clear that Hokkaidō can be seen as a 
beginning of the notion of ‘Imperial Japan’, and that the emperor Meiji and the creation of imperialism 
were roughly contiguous.  
 
The outlook of the fledgling central government was in turn adopted by the Hokkaidō Development 
Agency (kaitakichi), which itself officially exhorted the first governor to expand the imperial power of 
Japan:  
 
“The flourishing condition of the Imperial Power is dependent upon the colonization and 
exploitation of Hokkaidō. At present there is urgent need of action. We realise the great 
difficulties of governing this area which lies several hundred li in the Arctic North. On your 
official tour of duty do your best to exploit the area and to open the lock on the Northern 
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Gate [Hokkaidō’s literal meaning] so that the people may prosper and these may be a firm 
base for the expansion of the Imperial Power.” (Kaitakichi, 1869, quoted in Mason, 2012: 
25) 
 
This use of terms which were becoming central to European foreign policy such as civilisation and 
imperialism, shows that from the very beginning, the cultural outlook of foreign office officials in Japan 
was strongly informed by contemporaneous European theories on how states should act to secure their 
borders against foreign incursion, which was justified by the higher level of civilisation that the imperial 
power possessed. In addition, even in 1869, Hokkaidō was seen as a base for imperial expansion rather 
than the end. Theories which suggest that Japan did not have a long-term intention to colonise territories, 
and that these only came about by an accident of war, do not appear to be supported by this evidence 
about the intentions of early colonial authorities in Hokkaidō.  
 
On the second point, Japan’s centralisation and absorption of Hokkaidō marks a pertinent break with the 
Tokugawa period. Whereas prior to the Meiji Restoration Hokkaidō was controlled very loosely with the 
southern peninsula of the island being part of a daimyo’s han, after the Meiji Restoration they had a 
Commission established to promote the integration of the island into the mainland and to exploit the 
resources of the island. Central authorities modelled their administration after California and the U.S.A’s 
expansion. In 1880 the director of the Hokkaidō Development Agency, KURODA Kiyotaka (Jap. 黑田清
隆, 1840-1900) stated that the achievement of Hokkaidō so far “pales in comparison to California, 
frequently referenced benchmark for colonial ambitions in Hokkaidō, which boasts more people, 
reclaimed land, revenues, sheep and pigs, but he is confident that efforts of the agency will yield greater 
success in the coming years.” (Mason, 2012: 27)  
 
With California as the model, the colonisation of Hokkaidō was a central government initiative which 
pushed the colonial endeavor forward in a programmatic way. Hokkaidō was “at once formally Japanese 
territory (in contrast to colonies such as Taiwan and Korea) and peripheral and secondary in status. This 
is confirmed [OE Shinobu] observes, by the custom in Hokkaidō and Okinawa, still in currency today, of 
referring to the metropolitan center as the mainland (naichi and hondo respectively).” (Mason, 2012: 20) 
Yet as it was closer to the main island geographically and politically, as well as being more vital 
strategically, Hokkaidō was incorporated into the Japanese state in the mid-Meiji period (and has 
remained a part of the Japanese polity ever since). Establishing Hokkaidō as a colonised part of Japan 
proper was achieved through Japanese leaders using historical arguments to suggest that Hokkaidō 
had been part of Japan for centuries: these officials “attempted to authenticate their national boundaries, 
authority, and identity through colonial expansion, first in Ezo/Hokkaidō and then beyond, amid 
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pervasive Western depictions of Japan as an emasculated, uncivilized, childlike country.” (Mason, 2012: 
14) Early colonisation showed that Japan was skilful, familiar with arguments justifying territorial 
acquisition, and competitive in the international sphere, particularly with respect to Russian aspirations. 
 
This centralisation was problematic for the Ainu natives of Hokkaidō, as the Japanese government 
designated all land on the island as officially ownerless, following the lead of Seiyō powers. (Mason, 
2012: 8-9) The Ainu were made Japanese citizens and the colonisation effectively disregarded any 
notion of Ainu sovereignty. (Mason, 2012: 9) Whilst making the island a part of Japan, the elites 
“presupposed that the Ainu were a primitive people who utterly lacked civilization.” (Mason, 2012: 10) 
Similar arguments and policies were made by the European colonists in North America and Australasia 
against natives, although Japan’s authorities did not even sign an agreement with Ainu elders 
recognising at least a nominal transfer of authority. 
 
On the final point, given their disregard of the peoples on the periphery, Hokkaidō was the first example 
of Meiji Japan reifying binary boundaries between ethnic Japanese and Hokkaidō natives, between the 
civilised and uncivilised. Michele M. Mason believed these boundaries were created in the collective 
consciousness of the Japanese in order to give meaning to notions of ethnicity and nationality, which 
was “accomplished through the construction of difference (e.g., nature/culture and barbarian/civilised) 
and the disavowal of Ainu history.” (Mason, 2012: 6) The history of the Ainu, if conceptualised at all, was 
seen as static and frozen in a period of pre-modern history; possibly the first instance of Oriental 
Orientalism by Japan. Mason writes that: 
 
“Defined as the “denial of contemporaneity” of an Other, this conceptual operation in the 
Meiji context insisted that Ainu, despite their simultaneous physical existence with 
Japanese, occupied a distinct, fixed, and unquestionably premodern time frame on an 
universal historical chronology. On this timeline of enlightenment, Japanese society was 
located irrefutably in the modern period, albeit behind the even more advanced Western 
civilization.” (Mason, 2012: 10-11)  
 
This boundary-making was a defining feature of colonial administration in Hokkaidō. Unsurprisingly 
given the role of architecture in mainland Japan, colonial architecture played a role in this self- and 
other-identification: these boundaries would be partially enacted through architecture. Engineering and 
architecture were used by the colonial authorities to demonstrate their modernity: some of the earliest 
Giyōfū buildings were constructed in Hokkaidō or by the Hokkaidō Colonisation Commission on the 
mainland. The first dome built by a Japanese person was the ribbed dome on the central tower of the 
Hokkaidō Development Commission headquarters in Hokkaidō’s capital, Sapporo (completed in 1888). 
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It was the tallest building in the city, and a “spectacular symbol of authority with its copper roof gleaming 
in the sun”. (Coaldrake, 1996: 236) Modern engineering was also used; railway lines were set up by the 
Hokkaidō Colliery and Railroad Company; in another echo of the opening of California, the trains used 
American designs. (Finn, 1995: 139) 
 
Presaging how the colonial capital of Taiwan would later be used, Hokkaidō’s towns were used as a 
symbol of the central government’s drive to show itself to be civilised. Given Hokkaidō’s sparse 
population of around 20,000 native Ainu, and the few permanent settlements that existed on the island, 
the architecture built by the Hokkaidō Colonisation Commission would have had a greater impact on the 
landscape than new buildings in highly populated cities such as Tokyo. In a first for Japan, the Hokkaidō 
Colonisation Commission agreed that “all its new buildings would be Western”; because of this, 
“Western architecture developed more rapidly here than in any other part of Japan.” (Finn, 1995: 52) 
Such decisions, as well as Conder’s elegant Hokkaidō Sales Hall in Tokyo covered in the previous 
chapter, would help create an impression associating colonisation with modernity and distinguish the 
Japanese as more developed than the natives.  
 
 
Early imperialism: China 
Whilst Hokkaidō served as a colonial laboratory, the example of China provided Japanese officials with 
ground to form their foreign policy principles towards non-Seiyō countries allowing officials to project an 
identity towards both their neighbours and to Seiyō, an identity of a strong and culturally independent 
country which was in the process of becoming the self-proclaimed centre of civilisation in Tōyō. 
Hokkaidō was depopulated and uncontested by other powers; acquiring other territories would require 
dealing with other states and the Meiji government was in no position to embark on an expansionist 
policy against established and powerful states in the 1870s and 1880s due to Japan’s low financial, 
political and military resources. But by gradually altering its relationship with China, Japan laid the 
groundwork for its imperialist credentials. 
 
As introduced in Section 2.1, the relationship between Japan and China was complex and long, 
beginning in the first century AD. Before the Meiji Restoration, the Tokugawa Shogunate did not take 
Chinese culture as the cultural meridian point; however aspects of Chinese culture were defining 
influences of the period. In Edo Japan, educators and elites embraced and respected Chinese culture, 
particularly neo-Confucianism. However they had a less positive outlook on China as a country, given 
that the Qing dynasty was ruled by ethnic Manchus rather than Han Chinese. (Keene, 1998: 247) 
Japan’s status in relation to China was similarly complex. Japan had sent tribute to China as recently as 
the late Ming Dynasty in 1547, but although Japan had often sent tribute to China and taken part in the 
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tally system, forming embassies to China had always been sporadic. In addition, the decision on 
whether or not to send tribute to China was usually dependent on the Japanese view of China, rather 
than vice versa, understandable since there was no history of China invading Japan after refusal of 
tribute. According to some Japanese scholars Japan had been one of the countries most reluctant to 
participate in the Sinocentric world order: “Japan did not identify itself as a vassal state of China during 
most of its history, no matter how China saw it.” (Mizuno, 2004: 109) However, it remains ambiguous in 
scholarship whether the Tokugawa’s contacts with Ming and Qing China were as tribute to a superior or 
as two equal powers. (Mizuno, 2004: 129) 
 
Following the Meiji Restoration, Japanese foreign office officials assumed a much more explicit position 
in relation to China: having embarked on a reform programme, Japanese officials believed they had 
climbed one or two rungs higher than the Chinese on the ladder toward “civilisation”. Unlike the 
Tokugawa period when direct relations between the states were very rare, the Meiji government pursued 
a more direct relationship with China. In 1870 while attempting to reestablish relations, Japanese 
officials tried to extract an “Unequal Treaty” from the Qing government modeled on Seiyō treaties with 
China. (Duus, 1995: 14) The Chinese did not share the assumption of Japan being more civilised than 
themselves and rebuffed Japan’s attempt. The Japanese ambassador was however successful in 
opening a proto-consulate in the International Settlement shared the benefits reaped by France and 
Britain following the Second Opium War. (Bickers, 2011: 254) For China, this encounter was a shock; 
Japan firmly positioned herself as being far from a tributary state, but a competitive peer, modelled on 
Seiyō: indeed, maybe “the most compelling evidence of the perverted order of things from the point of 
view of the Qing, was the role of Japan.” (Bickers, 2011: 252) At Japan’s initiative a commercial treaty 
was signed in 1871, the Sino-Japanese Friendship and Trade Treaty (Jap. 日清修好条規), a concession 
made in part so as not to antagonise a near neighbour. (Bickers, 2011: 254) 
 
Following this agreement, relations between Japan and China were focused on resolving questions 
related to ‘the South’, and Korea. The idea of ‘the South’ requires some introduction. Between Japan’s 
first interest in Taiwan and its colonisation there was the relatively long period of gestation of over 20 
years. Taiwan was a part of what Japan conceived as ‘the South’ (the lands to the south of Japan) which 
were “the focus of much interest in the decades following the Meiji Restoration and during the 
establishment of the Japanese colonial empire.” (Kleeman, 2003: 11) In the late 19th century Japanese 
intellectuals, from journalists to architects, had created the idea of Tōyō (Orient), of the Orient which they 
were a part. Yet they were a distinct part of Tōyō, the only civilised country within the sphere from their 
perspective. Given the desire to expand, and their Orientalist conception, the South became the ideal 
area to expand into: “the South was a land of untouched, natural beauty and untamed savages, an area 
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where the Japanese imagination could be given free rein, a region into which the burgeoning population 
of Japan could expand in an Asian version of colonial empires then maintained by all the major 
European powers.” (Kleeman, 2003: 11) Southern expansion became a common refrain in the late 
nineteenth century; naval commander SATŌ Tetsutarō (Jap. 佐藤鉄太郎, 1866-1942) said: "Our future 
lies not in the north, but in the south, not on the continent but on the ocean”. (Peattie, 1984: 179) The 
open geographic space below Japan was seen as a challenge by some, with the journalist, TAKEKOSHI 
Yosaburō (Jap. 竹越与三郎, 1865-1950) insisting “it is our great task as a nation to turn the Pacific 
Ocean into a Japanese lake.” (Peattie, 1984: 179)  
 
To the immediate south, Satsuma province’s long dominance over the Ryūkyū Islands transformed into 
a Japanese possession when the islands were claimed by the Meiji government in 1872. Following this, 
“Japan demanded that Okinawa sever all ties with China and reform its government.” (Kleeman, 2003: 
13) This incorporation of the Ryūkyūs could not be taken unilaterally however, as China had also 
received tribute from the Ryūkyū Kingdom from 1655. An incident occurred in 1871 (one year before the 
Ryūkyū Islands were claimed by Japan) which gave a pretext for assertion of Japanese sovereignty over 
the Islands and to explore China’s sovereignty over other islands to Japan’s south, when fifty-four 
shipwrecked Ryūkyūn sailors were killed by Paiwan aboriginal people on Taiwan’s south-eastern coast. 
This allowed the next meeting between Japanese and Chinese representatives to be taken as an 
opportunity to start a conversation about Qing assumptions underpinning relations with the Ryūkyū 
Islands, and the nature and extent of its sovereignty in Taiwan. (Bickers, 2011: 253) 
 
This conversation happened on 29th June 1873, as the Iwakura Mission was drawing to an end, when 
the Japanese Foreign Minister, SOEJIMA Taneoni (Jap. 副島種臣, 1828-1905), went to China for a 
diplomatic audience with the Qing emperor to begin a more formal dialogue with China. Whilst previous 
Qing emperors had not allowed direct contact between themselves and foreign envoys, the Tongzhi 
emperor (who reigned from 1861 to 1875, mostly as an adolescent) was interested in modernising 
China and openness to Seiyō following the Taiping rebellion and the second Opium War. In his first 
audience with foreign envoys, Soejima had intelligently used his understanding of international law to 
ensure that he entered first and alone as the most senior Ambassador present, dressed in formal 
Western-style diplomatic uniform. (Bickers, 2011: 253)  
 
Soejima had several objectives for this diplomacy. First, to assume the position of teacher over his 
cultural mentors: Soejima pointed out to the new Qing emperor that his Western clothes were useful and 
how his navy escort was entirely Japanese-crewed. Soejima showed a new opportunity for China, to 
assume the trappings of Seiyō and to foster a spirit of nationalism in order to fend off the threat of Britain, 
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France and others. Second, Japan’s ambassador used the shipwreck and murders in Taiwan as an 
opportunity for Japan to assert its sovereignty over the Ryūkyūs. Soejima pressed claims for reparation 
and punishment in the European manner with the Qing, and questioned Qing preparedness to assert its 
control over all of Taiwan and its peoples. Soejima believed he had secured statements from the Zongli 
Yamen (Chi. 總理衙門, which functioned as the Chinese foreign office) that the aboriginal population of 
Taiwan was not wholly under Qing control. These statements underpinned Japan’s 1874 mission to 
‘punish’ people in southeastern Taiwan for the murders, and, more covertly, to establish a colonial 
bridgehead. (Bickers, 2011: 253) In the end, a Japanese army landed in Taiwan in 1874 and stayed in 
Taiwan for several months until they received a large compensation package from China. Just two years 
later, in 1876, Japan mimicked Perry even more closely by using gunboat diplomacy to open Korea, 
another tributary state of the Qing, just as the United States had done to Japan 20 years earlier. As 
Soejima had noted to the Tongzhi emperor, Japan was eager to show the Koreans how easy it was to 
assimilate the benefits of “civilisation.” (Duus, 1995: 14-15) 
 
This diplomatic wrangling, the ensuing punitive mission in Taiwan, and the opening of Korea, were 
chastising to China in a way that the aggression of Seiyō had not been. After 1876 and the increased 
number of treaty ports it has been obliged to open, the Qing found itself forced to revise or remodel its 
notions of relations with states that had previously accepted it as overlord, such as the Ryūkyūs. China 
“had to attempt to strengthen its frontiers, accelerating processes of conquest and consolidation already 
long under way”. (Bickers, 2011: 265) One method of doing this was to familiarise themselves with 
international law, which China’s would-be mentors were happy to aid: “textbooks on international law, 
which stressed the need for control to be substantive and effective, were presented to the Zongli Yamen 
by the Japanese as justifications for the 1874 venture, challenging Qing practices in Taiwan, and 
implicitly on all its borders.” (Bickers, 2011: 265) 
 
For Japan, these early experiences showed that Japanese diplomacy had already absorbed the lessons 
of Admiral Perry and Seiyō imperialism, including the threat of force to gain concessions rather than 
direct force itself. Blanken finds that “Early efforts at territorial control by Japan focussed on aggressive 
diplomatic efforts for joint jurisdiction of Qing tributary states, such as Korea and Ryūkyū. The forcing 
open of Korea in 1876 through the treaty of Kangwha, and the acquisition of the Ryūkyū Islands 
(re-designated Okinawa Prefecture), was achieved in 1879 without force.” (Blanken, 2012: 104) As a 
result of these actions, “the formal designation of Okinawa as a prefecture in 1879 marked the beginning 
of Japanese cultural assimilation and direct administration of the South.” (Kleeman, 2003: 13)  
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These actions abroad had a large impact on how China was viewed in Japan, even though the lasting 
impression of China in Japan as culturally sophisticated was difficult to shake. Linguistically, many loan 
words for English and German terms used Chinese characters following the tradition of Chinese 
learning; the Meiji philologist, ŌTSUKI Fumihiko (Jap. 大槻文彦, 1847-1928), had the impression that 
many young government officials and teachers were former samurai who were proud of their intellectual 
traditions and their familiarity with literary Chinese. (Howland, 2002: 85) Following events with China 
including the Taiwan Incident of 1873, the beginning of conflict with China over Korea in 1882 the 
Sino-French war of 1884, as well as Fukuzawa’s anti-China rhetoric, a debate began in 1880s Japan on 
the future of Chinese learning given the geopolitical conditions in East Asia. The primary argument 
against Chinese learning was that there was a connection between China’s language, the content of 
Chinese learning, and the type of civilisation that China produced. (Howland, 2002: 51) For some 
Japanese modernisers, because Japan wished to master Seiyō civilisation, Chinese learning was no 
longer relevant. The secondary argument held that Chinese literary culture was limited when compared 
with the cultures that had produced modern science: for these scholars, who leant on European 
Orientalist scholars, Chinese language and culture struggled to articulate the abstract, lacked detail and 
precision, and so was unscientific. (Howland, 2002: 51-52)  
 
This second point relates to wider trends in Meiji thought and the assumed need for categorisation and 
understanding in Meiji Japan. For the Meiji linguist ARIGA Nagao, Chinese language emphasised the 
individual and the particular. These aspects tainted the totality of the Chinese language by concern with 
the individual thing, in its concrete and idiosyncratic manifestation, at the expense of categories of things. 
(Howland, 2002: 52) For Ariga, as for Fukuzawa and Inoue, Confucianism praised unique acts of kings 
rather than promoting a unified principle like freedom or systems of governance such as 
constitutionalism. (Howland, 2002: 52) Edward Said believed this whole impulse to classify nature and 
man into types prepared the way for modern Orientalist structures. The emergence of scientific 
measurement and taxonomy began “the intellectual process by which bodily (and soon moral, 
intellectual, and spiritual) extension – the typical materiality of an object – could be transformed from 
mere spectacle to the precise measurement of characteristic elements was very widespread… These 
types and characters belonged to a system, a network of related generalizations.” (Said, 1978: 119)  
 
By engaging in this process of categorisation, Japanese scholars and politicians engaged in a system of 
thought where generalisations were easily generated, and thought systems which could not generalise, 
such as Chinese learning, were disparaged. This led credence to the trend in Japan to treat China as the 
Other and to Orientalise China and the rest of Tōyō as culturally stagnant and unable to civilise without 
deep reform. The impulse to classify led to ambitious works such as ITŌ Chūta’s Evolutionary theory of 
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history to arise as great works of Orientalist scholarship. For such scholarship to flourish in Japan, the 
Chinese first had to be made the ‘Other’. They had to be studied, disassociated with, moved away from 
in education, culture and politics before supremacy could be claimed. This was something of an irony, as 
the Japanese culture had many roots in Chinese culture; Japan would need to move away from its 
source culture in order to look down on it. 
 
This trend of disparaging Chinese learning and Othering China fitted well with, and validated, the foreign 
policies of the Meiji state. The spirit of nationalism was further entrenched at the turn of the century by 
successful wars and colonisation: “There is nothing quite so effective for developing the nationalist spirit 
as war and Japan emerged on the winning side in four wars: China in 1894-1895 and in 1900; Russia in 
1904-5; and in the First World War.” (Nish, 2000: 84) This outward spirit of expansion was mainly against 
neighbours who were previously considered cultural relatives, such as China, Korea and Taiwan, 
reifying the new cultural superiority of Japan.  
The first of such conflicts, the first Sino-Japanese war (1894-95) is especially important, resulting as it 
did in the formal acquisition of Taiwan, the Pescadores Islands, and the Liaotung Peninsula. (Blanken, 
2012: 104) The war was waged over growing friction about whether Korea should remain within the 
Chinese sphere of influence or whether it should become de jure independent. Yet the war was justified 
in Japan as a conflict over civilisation. By 1894 on the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war, the Japanese 
Christian, UCHIMURA Kanzo, “issued a call to the nations of the world “to see and understand the cause 
we fight for.” (Keene, 1998: 251) Uchimura stated that “Japan is the champion of Progress in the East, 
and who except her deadly foe, - China the corrigible hater of Progress, - wishes not victory to Japan!”. 
(Keene, 1998: 251) The war was brutal and brief: “The Chinese armies were smashed in Korea, the 
Liaodong peninsular, and Manchuria. By March 1895, Peking lay at [Japan’s] feet, the roads open from 
the east and south, no prospect of a successful defence in sight. (Bickers, 2011: 324) This ‘Progress’ 
appeared to be real and Uchimura’s point was echoed by contemporaries in Europe who equated 
military prowess with ‘progression’: the Japanologist Robert Porter stated that “Her victory over China 
forcibly demonstrated that she was a progressive State, entitled fully to regulate her own fiscal affairs.” 
(Porter, 1918: 120-121) 
 
For China, as with the initial strong arm tactics over Taiwan and the Ryūkyūs, the defeat by Japan was a 
humiliation too far. Bickers states why this war was a specific source of shame: 
 
“The European powers had had the advantages of technology in 1842, in 1858 and 1860. 
The French had too, in 1884-5, though it was a harder fought war. Those defeats made a 
sad sort of sense. But Japan was an Asian neighbour, a former tributary state, itself still 
formally subject to the same style of sovereign-serving treaty system as China’s. It had only 
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recently been as unprepared to deal with foreign aggression as the Qing… But now, the 
‘dwarf pirates’… had smashed China’s forces, and shattered its pride.” (Bickers, 2011: 324) 
 
Scholars focus on the Sino-Japanese war above other foreign policy developments in the Meiji era 
(such as reversing the unequal treaties) yet how aggressive and unusual the Japanese were in their 
relations with China remains an arguable point. Some scholars see Japan as having calculated designs 
on Chinese territory (for example Calman, 1992), others see a Japan as a natural responder to 
opportunities (for example Gillard, 1977: 161) just as Britain and France had been in East Asia since the 
1830s. For Gillard, Japan assumed that Korea would become modernised without colonialism, relying 
on the linear notion of progress on Western grounds. Under this viewpoint, Japan is seen as passive, not 
ruthlessly maneuvering to control Korea. On the other hand, Calman points out that Korea had been a 
target for decades: even the Satsuma Rebellion was caused by a split in the Meiji governance about 
whether to attack Korea immediately or to strengthen first before attacking.  
 
Whilst it will never be completely clear to what degree Japanese diplomats had intended to start the first 
Sino-Japanese War, it is clear that Japan had a consistent policy in expanding South into Chinese 
tributary states and was keen for Korea to be within the Japanese sphere of influence. It is however also 
clear that once the war had ended, rather than using war to punish China and seek new bargains (as the 
British had done in 1856-60, and France had done in 1884-85), Japan instead attempted to “take 
maximum advantage of the victory by expanding the war goals to include the annexation of Chinese 
territories.” (Blanken, 2012: 105) This accomplished, by the end of the war it was clear that Japan, not 
China, was the pre-eminent power in Tōyō. 
 
 
Consequences of Japanese imperialism (1868-1905) 
The colonisation of Hokkaidō and altering the relationship with China had a number of consequences 
which provide insights into answering my research questions.84 First, looking at the phenomenon of 
imperialism in early- to mid-Meiji Japan further demonstrates the point that the concepts that 
underpinned contemporaneous foreign policy in Seiyō had been quickly assimilated into Japan’s foreign 
policies. As early as 1868, Meiji leaders such as Iwakura had called for the colonisation of Hokkaidō to 
strengthen the imperial might of Japan and to bring civilisation to the natives of the islands. Whilst 
Japanese had previously pursued an idea of civilisation based on Confucian ideals it had never before 
been so central to foreign relations This period contained an about turn in Japan’s approach to foreign 
relations, all underpinned by a change in the notion of civilisation: what it meant to be civilised, the 
                                                   
84
 ‘How did contact with the West in the mid-19th century create a new notion of the modern in Japan and colonial Taiwan?’ 
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means to become civilised, and where civilisation lay. At that time of ‘civilising’, leading Western 
countries, known in Japan as Seiyō, were Imperialist.  
 
Japan did not have a history of colonialism apart from the short and disastrous Japanese invasions of 
Korea (1592–98). Like China, Japanese authorities had preferred to use foreign relations to garner 
respect and tribute from neighbours, but not to expand. In contrast to the sakoku policy, Seiyō nations 
promoted expansion abroad, setting up official offices in their colonies, desiring domination as well as 
respect. The most notable early example of this attitude being embedded into Japan’s foreign policy was 
the Ryūkyū islands. Prior to the Meiji Restoration, in 1609, Satsuma han had invaded the Ryūkyūs and 
made them vassals of the han; the islands also gave tribute to Qing China. After the Meiji Restoration 
the Japan state mimicked Seiyō nations by directly controlling the kingdom first through the central 
Foreign Office and later by the Home Office. By 1879 the islands were formally annexed by Japan to 
become a part of the ‘nation’ in much the same way as Hawai’i was to the U.S.A.. Engaging in these 
concepts served to strengthen the central authority, as there had been a shift in how a state gained 
legitimacy after opening to Seiyō in 1853: tribute was not the currency for recognition any longer, instead 
imperialism was. Just as tribute had once strengthened the central authority of the Shogunate, so 
imperial expansion strengthened the legitimacy of the Meiji state. Thus imperialism was another 
example of a method to bolster the nation and to define it using imperial actions. 
 
The key to this transition from desiring to be considered civilised by Seiyō to becoming the 
self-appointed centre of Tōyō was Japan’s colonial experiences in the East. These experiences created 
a positive self-identity, as a member of the elite nations of the world, capable of defeating China and 
Russia, one of the ‘Great Powers’, in war. From this position, Japanese intellectuals and public figures 
such as Itō, Okakura and Soseki began to reassess the roots of their cultural identity and to feel kindred 
to ‘civilisations’ currently dominated by Seiyō powers. Whilst decades earlier Japan attempted to 
escape Asia, politically, culturally and architecturally; the threat of colonisation made any previous 
benign relationship with its neighbours politically dangerous. By the early 20th century Japan was 
politically, economically and militarily strong enough to be less concerned with existential threats.  
 
 
Redrawing boundaries  
These developments were crucial in order to create foundations of equality with Seiyō. However it 
required martial demonstration to change what modernity actually meant to civil society in Seiyō 
countries, and for Japan to accrue benefits from its changed status. In terms of pivotal moments, “the 
Sino-Japanese War undoubtedly produced a change of opinion about Japan in the West. Few experts 
predicted that Japan would win the war against the mighty continental power, and when the initial 
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victories proved not to be flashes in the pan, it was grudgingly admitted that the much-decried 
‘superficial modernization’ was in fact genuine.” (Keene, 1998: 278) This led to re-evaluations of Japan’s 
relation to both Seiyō and Tōyō: Japan was easier to understand to Westerners if conceptually 
separated from the rest of Asia. Porter, writing in 1918, emphasised the large distances between Japan 
and China, stating that Japan has been “a laboratory in which a unique type of human being and a 
unique type of culture have been produced.” (Porter, 1918: x) For those such as Porter, Japan became a 
moral peer: “We can measure our moral, aesthetic, and intellectual progress by the standard of Japan 
before she adopted Western manners and methods, and benefit greatly by observing the attitude in 
recent times of this highly intelligent and progressive nation towards Western civilization.” (Porter, 1918: 
x-xi) In short, Japan’s victory over China gave clear evidence, for the first time following the 
establishment of Euro-centric notions of civilisation, that the Japanese could reasonably be considered 
equals, as early as 1895. 
 
Following the criteria of Seiyō in demonstrating their level of civilisation through legal reform and 
conducting aggressive international relations, Japan became seen as sufficiently ‘progressive’ to revise 
the unequal treaties. Extraterritoriality was abolished in Japan, starting in 1894 with Britain (one month 
before the first Sino-Japanese war began) and ending in 1897 with Portugal as shown in Table 4.1. 
According to Turkish scholar Turan Kayaoglu, there were three reasons why Japanese extraterritoriality 
was striking as compared with Chinese and Ottoman extraterritoriality. (Kayaoglu, 2010: 66-68) First, it 
was short-lived: in Japan it lasted 41 years (with the average treaty length around 33 years), compared 
to China’s 100 years and the Ottoman Empire’s 106 years. This supports the argument that Japan best 
understood how to react to Seiyō imperialism in a manner that would prevent the long-term political 
influence of the Great Powers in Japan’s internal affairs. 
 




Treaties Ending Extraterritoriality 
on July 17, 1899 
Years extant 
Britain 26/8/1858 6 16/7/1894 36 
United States 31/3/1854 6 22/11/1894 40 
Russia 7/2/1855 5 28/7/1895 40 
Germany 24/1/1861 5 4/4/1896 35 
France 9/10/1858 4 4/8/1896 38 
Denmark 12/1/1867 3 19/10/1895 28 
Italy 25/8/1866 3 1/12/1894 28 
Netherlands 30/1/1856 3 8/9/1896 40 
Austria-Hungary 18/10/1869 2 5/12/1896 27 
Switzerland 6/2/1864 2 10/11/1896 32 
Portugal 3/8/1860 1 26/1/1897 37 
Sweden-Norway 11/11/1868 0 1/5/1896 28 
Belgium 1/8/1866 0 22/6/1896 30 
Hawaii 19/8/1871 0 4/4/1894 23 
Spain 12/11/1868 0 2/1/1897 29 
Total 
 




Table 4.1. Extraterritoriality in Japan. Adapted from Kayaoglu, 2010. 
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Second, Japanese extraterritoriality was not associated with high numbers of Europeans and North 
Americans remaining in Japan. Comparatively few missionaries and merchants entered and resided 
there, with some treaty ports having fewer than one hundred foreign residents; even large thriving treaty 
ports such as Osaka, with a population close to 500,000 in 1895 only had a foreign (non-Chinese) 
population of 121. (Wason, 1900: 30) Foreign civil servants ran no services, were hired and later fired, 
as evidence that Japan’s modernisation was internally led. 
 
Third, the abolition of Japanese extraterritoriality influenced other cases. This influence occurred in two 
ways: first Seiyō states used the Japanese reforms as an example that countries like China and the 
Ottoman Empire should emulate, whilst Chinese and Ottoman diplomats used the Japanese example to 
accuse Seiyō of hypocrisy. (Kayaoglu, 2010: 68) Both countries who were subjects to extraterritoriality 
and Seiyō saw in Japan the chance that things could be different, an example of throwing off the 
dominance of the Great Powers and an example of heathens emulating the civilisation found in Europe 
and North America. 
 
Japan became an example used by European and American writers who were interested in arguing that 
culture rather than race was the main determinant for success in modernisation. Although the 
‘development’ of Japan did not alter the fundamental discourse on the degree of civilisation across the 
world (Japan largely took on, accepted and attained the European idea of ‘civilisation’) the Japanese 
example did alter the idea of potential progress, so it became empirically possible for non-European 
races. At the same time this progress had an ambiguous impact on the role of imperialism in this process. 
Japan was never colonised by European powers, who often tried to bring civilisation to their colonies. 
Yet no colony of Europe became counted as civilised to the extent that Japan became recognised; in the 
early 20th century only Japan among the uncolonised became ‘civilised’.  
 
Beyond avoiding Seiyō dominance, Japan aimed for Great Power status: as ITŌ Hirobumi, twice Prime 
Minister of Japan, noted in 1899, “the hope of competing with the Powers for leadership” lay behind the 
post-Restoration development of the country. (Duus, 1995: 15) A sign of the partial fulfillment of these 
intentions (and acceptance of Japan as a modern Power) was Britain ending 30 years of geo-political 
neutrality (known as ‘Splendid Isolation’) with the 1902 Anglo-Japanese Alliance. After Japan had been 
diplomatically coerced into surrendering their claim to the Liaodong Peninsula by Russia, Germany and 
France in the Triple Intervention (Jap. 三国干渉) it was clear that Japan was not taken seriously by all of 
the major Powers of Seiyō , particularly after Russia had swiftly acted to take the Peninsula themselves. 
However, following their 1905 victory over Russia, Japan was clearly a force to be reckoned with and a 
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source of fear for paternalistic men of influence such as Bishop William Awdry (1905), who detested the 
idea that heathens could become players on the global stage: 
 
“The sudden revulsion of feeling has come when those who, not a generation ago, were 
thought of as pretty, interesting, artistic, little dolls or children, fantastic and whimsical, 
unsettled in purpose and loose in morals, dishonest in business, and cruel if you scratched 
through the skin, “great in little things and little in great things,” have come out on the broad 
stage of the world.” (Awdry, 1905, quoted in Mason, 2012: 14) 
 
Whilst Japan had won victories over China and Russia in quick succession, the Japanese were still not 
treated as peers and, due to the paradigm of Orientalism, could not be: “Although written in 1905, such 
racist sentiment was not limited to that specific point in time but represents a culmination of many 
decades of prejudicial foreign views about Japan that assumed its political, military, cultural, and moral 
inferiority.” (Mason, 2012: 14) In spite of deep-seated prejudice, Japan was only truly deemed civilised 
by some after it became a genuine imperial power, defeating China and Russia and annexing Taiwan, 
Korea and south Sakhalin. Thus imperialism was an implicit requirement for a modern, civilised nation in 
the early 20th century. This was acknowledged at the time by OKAKURA Kakuzo who wryly commented 
that “as long as Japan indulged in the gentle arts of peace she had been regarded as barbarous, but 
victory in war had induced the foreigners to call Japan civilized.” (Keene, 1998: 278) This opinion was 
repeated by critics in Britain also, who held that it was shameful that the label of ‘civilised’ was only given 
to Japan following war rather than peaceful development; the founder of the College of Engineering in 
Tokyo, Henry Dyer, quoted a British military advisor to Meiji Japan, Francis Brinkley, who stated that: 
 
“No one who should tell the Japanese to-day that the consideration they have won from the 
West is due solely to their progress in peaceful arts would find serious listeners. They 
themselves held that belief as a working incentive twenty years ago, but experience his 
dissipated it, and they now know that the world took no respectful notice of them until they 
showed themselves capable of winning battles. At first they imagined that they might efface 
the Oriental stigma by living up to civilised standards. But the success they attained was 
scarcely perceptible when suddenly their victorious war with China seemed to win them 
more esteem in half a year than their peaceful industry had won them in half a century. The 
perception of that fact upset their estimate of the qualifications necessary for a place in the 
‘foremost files of time,’ and had much to so with the desire they henceforth developed for 
expanded armaments.” (Dyer, 1904: 126-127) 
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Ultimately, without victory over China (and in 1905 over Russia), Japan would not have been 
diplomatically accepted as a Great Power, and imperial expansion and war were therefore of central 
importance to be considered civilised at the turn of the twentieth century. This served the purposes of 
Seiyō at the same time as it tied dominance and colonisation to advancement, and thus justified the 
imperial possessions of Europe and the expansion of the U.S.A. With intellectuals such as J.S. Mill 
arguing that colonialism was justified if done to raise the development of the colonised as Great Britain 
was nominally doing in India, Japan’s colonisation of Hokkaidō, the Ryūkyūs, and Taiwan, placed Japan 
in a position to prove themselves an enlightened (kaika) and modern (kindai) power concerned with the 
universal trend for ‘progress’. Japanese politicians learnt that imperialism and military dominance were 
indicators for civilisation, whilst peace and closure denoted semi-civilised societies.  
 
On the other hand, Japan’s military and diplomatic victories were a demonstration to themselves and 
other non-Seiyō leaders that other ‘races’ could become civilised, undermining chauvinistic theories 
such as Buckle’s that biology was more important than culture and society in producing ‘civilisation’. 
Residing in Asia, Japan managed to craft an image of a modern Power without sharing a European 
culture. That this was possible seems unsurprising today but it cast reverberations widely across the 
world at the time: the Indian Mahatma Gandhi wrote in 1905 that “so far and wide have the roots of 
Japanese victory spread that we cannot now visualize all the fruit it will put forth” whilst the Chinese 
nationalist leader SUN Yat-sen (Chi. 孫逸仙, 1866-1925) was “similarly exultant. Returning by ship to 
China in late 1905, Sun was congratulated by Arab port workers at the Suez Canal who thought that he 
was Japanese.” (Mishra, 2012: 1)  
 
As for the Japanese themselves, government officials attempted to retain an identity as different and 
unique yet equal to Seiyō in socio-political terms. This required great cultural sacrifices that other 
countries such as China, India and Egypt had not been willing to take. In rebuke to authors such as 
Donald Calman, who hold that the Meiji period was marked more by continuations than departures, this 
identity-building appears to have sat alongside the nation-building project which, as established in the 
Introduction, was an exclusively modern development. Nation-building required “an extraordinary 
overhaul of the country at every level… to transform from the semi feudal polity of the Tokugawa period 
to a nation-state that could contend with aggressive Western capital and colonial encroachment. This 
was at once a process of demolishing, abolishing, revamping, refurbishing, and constructing.” (Mason, 
2012: 13) To do this required a transformation, a transformation which had become established in 
Japan following strenuous reform in the 1880s. The policies developed in the late 19th century were 
made uniquely in Japan in response to failures in other countries and would be re-interpreted and 
applied with renewed vigour in the first modern colony of a non-Seiyō power: Taiwan.  
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4.2 Japanese colonial policies in Taiwan 
Hokkaidō’s assimilation into Japan was the only expansion the Meiji authorities took to their north. 
Instead, the South became increasingly important to Japan as both a target and a subject of discourse 
towards the end of the nineteenth century, particularly after the colonisation of Taiwan and the mandate 
given by the League of Nations over a group of South Pacific islands by the League of Nations. 
(Kleeman, 2003: 13) The very character of this expansion had altered with the acquisition of Taiwan: 
before 1895, colonial expansion consisted primarily of private citizens migrating to specific places in 
Taiwan, the Philippines, Singapore, and other parts of Southeast Asia (as well as South America) to 
pursue opportunities unavailable in Japan due to the poor economic situation. (Kleeman, 2003: 15) The 
incorporation of Taiwan was path-breaking in moving Japan from being a nascent imperial power to a 
fully-fledged one. Taiwan heralded Japan’s first formal colony, governed separately by a 
Governor-General along Seiyō lines, rather than having a local representative of the island involved in 
mainland Japan’s government.  
 
Whilst Taiwan was a Qing province at the time of the Japanese takeover, it had only been a formal part of 
the Chinese empire for just over two centuries, from 1681 to 1895. Under the pressure of Seiyō and 
Japanese imperialism in the mid-19th century, Taiwan became more vulnerable and grew in strategic 
importance. (Winkler and Wu, 2005: 43) From the start of the Qing period the Qing governance was 
uncomfortable with the colonialism of Taiwan however, and careful to enforce rules and limits on ship 
sizes for fear that trade and full colonisation would “lead to the dissemination of secret information about 
China’s defences to foreign powers, cause a drain of precious silver from the country, and encourage 
piracy and other forms of crimes.” (Cheng, Lestz and Spence, 1999: 57) So although the possibilities of 
making large profits in China through Taiwan from foreign trade were huge, the Qing state was 
suspicious of any foreign trade.  
 
The official Qing presence in Taiwan was light until near the end of their sovereignty: “Beyond setting up 
four maritime customs offices… and trying to enforce an across-the-board tariff of 20 percent on foreign 
imports, the Qing state failed to develop the necessary mechanisms, preferring instead to work through 
systems of kickbacks or purchased monopolies. With the arrival of more powerful Western traders in the 
eighteenth century, this decision was to be a fateful one.” (Cheng, Lestz and Spence, 1999: 57-8) Qing 
policy had left Taiwan politically isolated until the decades leading up to the Sino-Japanese war of 
1894-1895. By 1895, the Chinese state had weakened to the extent that the resurgent Japanese were 
able to defeat China and, finding that the Chinese were willing to cede territory to Japan, the Japanese 




Japan in Taiwan 
Japanese policies in Taiwan were by no means uniform during the 50 years of occupation. The first 
period of colonial rule was from 1898 to 1918 (and most relevant to this thesis). It has been called the 
Gradualism Policy, and was best articulated by the most effective Civil Administrator of Colonial Taiwan, 
GOTŌ Shinpei in post from 1898-1906. This gradualism was based on empirical study and assessment: 
Gotō stated that “In governing Taiwan, first of all we must investigate scientifically the local customs and 
institutions, and not adopt any policy that provokes the locals.” (Gotō, quoted in Yao, J., 2006: 46) As 
part of this, an enormous land survey was produced over a seven year period which involved more than 
one and a half million personnel, and gave the Japanese a comprehensive review of both the land and 
people so that “nothing would escape the colonial government”. (Yao, J., 2006: 48) This concern with 
control was reflected in the elevated role of the police from this point of Japanese rule onwards: from the 
beginning the status and numbers of police were very high, and in emergencies the police chief was 
empowered to direct the prefectural heads in his area. (Ts’ai, H., 2006: 100) 
 
After 1919, in the middle of the reign of emperor Taishō (Jap. 大正天皇, 1879-1926) which was known 
for its stability and democracy in mainland Japan, the Japanese administrators reduced segregation 
between Japanese and Taiwanese in education, Taiwanese were encouraged to participate in local 
politics, and marriages between Japanese and Taiwanese were made legal. In 1935 Taiwanese were 
allowed to vote for the first time (though not many: only 0.7 percent of the population voted and only half 
the parliament was elected). However, for Catherine Shu-Fen (Yu) Fewings, the differential treatment of 
Taiwanese continued and genuine assimilation remained shallow. (Fewings, 2004: 20-21) 
 
 Prior to World War II the approach of the colonial administration changed again towards full 
assimilation: the teaching of classical Chinese in common schools was repressed, as were Chinese 
newspapers and Taiwanese style clothes, while Japan aimed to build a Shintō shrine in every village. 
The Taiwanese were even encouraged to change their names to Japanese names. (Takeshi, 2001: 211) 
During the assimilation phase, the De-Sinicization campaigns were accelerated to de-emphasise the 
cultural and historical roots of Taiwan in China. The purpose of this policy was instrumental for Japan’s 
new notion of a Japanese modernity: Japan’s administrators wished “to turn Taiwan into a strategic 
bastion against southern China and Southeast Asia…. Nevertheless, so long as modernity was both 
subsumed in total war and entangled with culture and race, it was reduced into a tool. As a tool, 
modernity could beget more desires for cultural and racial constructs targeted at full recognition of 
eventual autonomy.” (Ts’ai, H., 2009: 209) In this sense, the socio-political conditions in Japan and their 
shifting attitudes towards modernity were strongly reflected in colonial policies in Taiwan: from the 
chaotic enthusiasm and ambition of the Meiji period, to the democratic and more peaceable tendencies 
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of the Taishō period, until the final explosion of ultra-nationalism and militarism of Japan in the 1930s 
and early 1940s. 
 
This section will concentrate on the first twenty four years of colonial rule (from 1895 to 1919), the period 
when Taiwan’s colonial masters found creative and ambitious solutions to the initial paradox of how a 
non-Seiyō country could administer a Seiyō-style colony, beginning the process of internal Othering. 
This was the period when the Japanese administrators explored and sought to understand their role as 
imperialists, resolving some of the central tensions as they ‘became modern’. Whilst the period up to 
1895 was a period of unbalance, with Japan as a clearly unequal partner in global affairs, through 
Japan’s acquisition of colonies they became more associated with the ‘civilised’ world of Great Powers. 
Yet the issues of cultural hybridity and Oriental Orientalism became starker during this period of 
gradualism than they were in the later integration and assimilation policies, for foreign practices were 
more prominent than under the later nationalism which swept up Japan and much of the rest of the world 
up to World War II. In addition, the major authority buildings were built during this first 24 years, including 
the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office, the main case study of this thesis, which was completed in 1919. 
In that year Japan’s first urban planning system became legalised and the focus thereafter moved from 
government buildings to the regulation of the private sector. (Sorensen, 2002: 83) Therefore colonial 
Taiwan up to 1919 is the most fruitful era to explore Japan’s nascent imperialism through political and 
cultural policies, authority buildings, and the notions of modernity so entailed. 
 
 
Early years of Japanese colonial policies in Taiwan 
The colonisation of Taiwan in 1895 was symbolically important for Japan because less than thirty years 
earlier Japan had seen itself in danger of being colonised. This turnaround was remarkable and almost 
uncomfortable for some Japanese. The discomfort was shown by colonial officials asking advice from 
foreign consuls soon after Taiwan’s incorporation into the Japanese empire. (Townsend, 2000: 102) 
Japan’s style of government in Taiwan was first debated in 1895 when it was decided to follow a French 
advisor’s suggestion of integrating Taiwan into the Japanese empire by following Japan’s laws and 
eventually eliminating dissimilarities between the countries. However, the British suggestion of 
emphasising prestige was also followed, though to a lesser degree, by the colonial administrators, 
particularly in the early stages of the colonial project when the government officials wore splendid Seiyō 
uniforms (see fig. 4.1) and commissioned “imposing classical architecture for its official buildings.” 
(Townsend, 2000: 102) This followed the trend of having civic buildings designed in grand Seiyō styles 





Between 1895 and 1898, when Japan crushed the short-lived Republic of Formosa and other rebellions, 
aimless drifting and chaos characterised the administration of Taiwan. The Governor-Generals were 
rotated quickly which bred instability. One early conception of the administration of Taiwan by the 
relatively successful second Governor-General, KATSURA Tarō (Jap. 桂太郎, 1848-1913) linked the 
acquisition of Taiwan to southern expansion when he declared: 
 
“If we want to frame a policy for managing Taiwan, we must formulate a policy toward China. 
This requires devising policy for managing south China, and to accomplish that, we must 
manage the harbor of Amoy and Fukien. If we intend to do these things, we must ultimately 
consider a policy that relates to South-East Asia.” (Katsura, 1896, quoted in Chang and 
Myers, 1963: 434) 
 
Though his plan was never realised, “Katsura proposed, as a beginning, that the police force in Taiwan 
be increased, public health be improved, transport and communications between Taiwan and Japan be 
expanded, a trans-island railroad be built, and new harbors constructed. Internal and external 
(Taiwan-Japan) transport improvements were given top priority as all-important for the future penetration 
of south China." (Chang and Myers, 1963: 434) According to a government sponsored book during the 
second Sino-Japanese war, in the second Governor General’s time in office Katsura’s achievements 
included “the establishment of the regulations for the handling of opium, opening of subsidized routes, 
establishment of the judicial system, government hospitals, the law and regulations concerning weights 
and measures.” (Naito, 1938: 44)  
 
In spite of the speed of setting up this framework, Katsura was recalled to Japan to become War Minister 
four months after his appointment, which showed a lack of coherent policy-making by central authorities 
4.1. Japanese Officials within the 
rock garden at the Old Taiwan 
Governor-General’s Office, 
formerly the Taiwan Provincial 
Administration Yamen. Source 
from Shue and Huang, 2003. 
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in Japan. But Katsura’s initial blueprint remained influential, coming as it did from the culture of Meiji 
Japan. Of particular importance in Meiji Japan from the overthrow of the Shogunate was an emphasis on 
control, probably as a corollary to the liberalisation of the class system. Colonial control in Taiwan should 
be seen in this context, as Ts’ai explains: 
 
"Pre [Second World] war Japan's colonial rule relied on three major categories of supporting 
staff: technical support, administrative assistance, and the police force. The police system 
in prewar Japan was backed by a powerful state. The system was a unified national 
organization, with its chiefs directly appointed by the government. At the summit of the 
centralized hierarchy was the Home Minister, who personified police power. Virtually no 
other nation-state in the world - the West included - had developed such a strong arm in the 
person of the state as prewar Japan. The Japanese police system was first modeled after 
the system in England, but later after the French and German systems. Whereas England 
adopted self-rule as its principle, both France and Germany selectively applied only part of 
that principle. Thus Japan was... unique in constructing a thoroughly centralized police 
system." (Ts’ai, H., 2009: 72) 
 
Government control, particularly through the police beginning at local neighbourhood level, would 
remain the unchallenged cornerstone of Japanese colonial administration in Taiwan. 
 
 
Japanese colonial policies in Taiwan under Gotō and Kodama 
The three years of colonial rule up until 1898 were ultimately to be of little consequence; it was not until 
the arrival of KODAMA Gentarō (Jap. 児玉源太郎, 1852-1906), fourth Governor-General between 
1898-1906, and his Civil Administrator GOTŌ Shinpei in Taiwan on March 28, 1898 that a recognisable 
set of colonial policies were put in place. Both men were known for their use of kindai (modern) methods. 
During the Satsuma Rebellion, Kodama had served with distinction on the general staff, and in the 
1880's he had achieved recognition for his attempts to introduce German military organisation to the 
Japanese ground force, before touring Europe in 1891 to observe German military training. His death in 
1906 was deemed a national tragedy in Japan. Kodama’s counterpart, Gotō, studied ‘Western learning’ 
in Japan and then medicine in Germany in his twenties before working with the army, heading various 
field institutes. Both Kodama and Gotō had gained their experience in the early Meiji period, a time 
characterised by change and uncertainty. Both men “displayed outstanding qualities of leadership which 
impressed their superiors and brought quick promotion to more demanding and responsible positions. 
They attempted to introduce new Western ideas in their respective fields.” (Chang and Myers, 1963:435) 
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Their period of governing Taiwan from 1898 to 1906 was the formative one for Taiwan when Japanese 
rule was gradually implemented and the general approach and method used to govern the natives was 
established. 
 
These achievements were possible due to the large measure of independence enjoyed by colonial 
governors. This autonomy was instituted first in Taiwan and then replicated in Korea and Manchukuo. 
According to Beasley, the governors in all three colonies were selected by the highest authorities in 
Japan: 
 
Governor-Generals were “chosen after consultation between the premier, the elder 
statesmen, and senior army leaders. Partly this reflected the very high prestige attaching to 
these posts, which were often held by men of great political influence. Kodama Gentaro, for 
example, who was Governor-General of Taiwan from 1896 to 1906, served simultaneously 
as War Minister, later as Home Minister, during his term of office, then became Chief of 
Staff…. Such subordinates would have been difficult for any minister to control.” (Beasley, 
1987: 144-145) 
 
Kodama was a bold governor, administrator and general. As Governor-General he was holder of a 
highly prestigious office and famous in Japan following his experience of being Vice-minister of War 
during the Sino-Japanese war. Yet it was Gotō who was to have a larger impact on Japan and to become 
one of the foremost figures of Meiji Japan and beyond (largely due to Kodama dying unexpectedly in 
1906 whilst still Governor-General). After leaving his post as Civil Administrator in 1906, Gotō was the 
first director of the South Manchuria Railway, after the 1923 earthquake he became mayor of Tokyo 
unseeing the city’s revival. He also served as Home Minister twice and as Foreign Minister for Japan. 
Gotō’s efficient and scientific mind was key to his promotions. During his time as head of civilian affairs in 
Taiwan, three principles of action seemed to shape Gotō’s policies: efficient organisation, persuasion, 
and biological politics. These will be explored in turn as these principles, once established, guided the 




Gotō believed in centralised bureaucratic organisation, with policy shaped by a top coordinating unit. As 
in Japan after the Meiji Restoration, reorganising the governing apparatus was one of his first and most 
important tasks. Arriving after the chaotic early years of Japanese rule, “Gotō was outspoken in 
attributing the dismal showing in Taiwan to prior administrative errors which… seemed like ad hoc 
decision-making rather than carefully planned policy.” (Chang and Myers, 1963: 437) Gotō’s tenure saw 
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the colonial administration systematically take control of what he saw to be the proper roles of imperial 
governance: all aspects of taxation, communications, public health, education, economic development, 
legislation, and law enforcement.  
 
This wide scope was matched with depth of control, which was only possible through the utilisation of 
past governmental practices from the Qing era: “At the local level use was made of institutions of control 
inherited from the pre-colonial period: landlords, village headmen, household groups…. It was highly 
trained and tightly organized.” (Beasley, 1987: 145) Ts’ai found that the baojia system (Chi. 保甲制度, lit. 
protective armour system, but essentially regular military service) was key to first ensuring safety 
through conscription and in maintaining political and social control: “The Japanese government 
attempted to regulate Taiwanese social and religious practices through the hook/baojia system. The 
baojia system had been employed as a tool for political control and social organization over the past one 
thousand years in China. In Taiwan the system was revived by the Japanese in 1898, and remained 
fundamental to Japanese control and consolidation over rural Taiwan.” (Ts’ai, 2010: 83ft) 
 
Parallel to this, one of the first actions of the Japanese colonialists was to organise a domestic law and 
order system, and to separate law courts from the main governance buildings. Gotō also created “a 
much more economic infrastructure by building roads, railways, communications systems, factories, 
and harbours to facilitate export to Japan.” (Ho and Park, 2004: 4) These widespread actions taken to 
reorganise the social, political, legal and economic infrastructure of Taiwan implied a great deal of 
freedom for the administrators. This was not granted automatically on receiving the colony in 1895, but 
was worked through with some difficulty: 
 
“The law which spelt out the nature of Japanese administration of Taiwan in 1896 evaded 
some… issues by asserting the principle of Japanese political unity, while denying that the 
Japanese constitution applied within the colony. The Diet’s legislative powers were 
delegated to the Governor-General in order to make this feasible. In due course similar 
provisions were made concerning Karafuto (1907) and Korea (1911). The effect was to give 
their governors immense authority, combining legislative and executive powers. They were 
also unusually free from ministerial supervision, exercised from the capital. A Colonial 
Ministry was formed in 1896 to administer Taiwan and Hokkaidō, but was abolished after 
little more than a year. From 1897 to 1910 there was no central office responsible for 
overseas territories: Taiwan and Karafuto came under the Home Ministry, Kwantung in most 
respects under the Foreign Ministry.” (Beasley, 1987: 144) 
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Whilst in 1897 this freedom was not taken advantage of, Gotō during his tenure created a sustained 




The second principle that Gotō practised was persuasion. Whilst efficiency and organisation were 
important, for Gotō this organisation would be for naught if “the people were not convinced of the 
soundness of Japanese rule and the need for compliance. Gotō urged Kodama to take action which 
would distinguish the present colonial authority from the past authority in Taiwan.” (Chang and Myers, 
1963: 438) As mentioned earlier, the British colonial style of impressing the natives was adopted in 
colonial Taiwan, mostly on Gotō’s initiative, especially in city planning. As a British visitor to Taipei 
remarked “Many of the modern aspects of the metropolis are due to the genius of the first (1897 [sic.] to 
1906) civil government, Baron Shinpei Gotō” (Terry, 1914: 777) Gotō’s recommended building 
impressive public architecture offset by large streets and park because:  
 
“This would be a symbol of power and leadership, impressing on the minds of all that Japan 
intended to remain in Taiwan and rule. He also suggested that all civilian officials wear 
uniforms and live in a designated compound under proper health supervision. The 
separation of officials from the populace would enhance the former's status and authority.” 
(Chang and Myers, 1963: 438)  
 
Clearly one of the main methods of persuasion was through architecture; this persuasive facet of 
colonial policy, itself a beneficiary of Gotō’s reorganisation of administration, is explored further in 
Sections 4.3, 4.4 and in Chapter 5. 
 
 Another part of this persuasion was to encourage wealthy Taiwanese to study in Japan. This was a 
subtle attempt by the Japanese to encourage the Taiwanese gentry to identify with Japan whilst allowing 
them to see the superiority of the mainland first hand. The intention was clear and was linked to 
assimilating natives into the modernisation project: “The experience in Japan was never what it was 
expected to be for Taiwanese elites, but in some ways it was much more. The original expectation was 
that through living in Japan, they would somehow acquire the knowledge that would make their culture 
modern. Having this knowledge they would be able to return to Taiwan and begin their own process of 
modernization.” (Heylen, 2010: 160)  
 
There were important unintended consequences to this prolonged direct contact for the Taiwanese 
however, as familiarity with Japan would also show many colonial subjects that Japanese culture was 
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little different from Chinese, and the Japanese did not appear to be inherently superior. For some 
Taiwanese who studied in Japan, the sense of heightened respect for Japan was gradually “replaced 
with a belief that Taiwanese culture was in no sense inferior to Japanese culture, and likewise, the idea 
that Taiwanese were colonial subjects because the their culture was inferior became ridiculous. They 
came to see that Taiwanese were colonial subjects because Japan had colonized Taiwan and only for 
that reason. While many Japanese were warm and open people, Japan as a society remained closed 
and unwilling to accept them.” (Heylen, 2010: 160-161) Many of Japan’s attempts to impress natives 
appear to hide the insecurity that the Japanese would be seen as imitators who were basically the same 
as Chinese people. In particular, this sense of underlying sameness justifies why building monuments 
was so important to Japan: they were a mask that gave evidence of Japan’s cultural superiority, proving 




The final principle, which was the overarching principle for the Gotō rule, was ‘biological politics’ (Jap. 生
物学の原則, lit. principles of biology). This was a new configuration for understanding civilisation, 
progress and modernity, as seen through the eyes of a trained and practicing doctor. In his clearest 
extrapolation of this concept, Gotō sent the following passage in a memorandum to Kodama:  
 
“Any scheme of colonial administration, given the present advances in science, should be 
based on principles of Biology. What are these principles? They are to promote science and 
develop agriculture, industry, sanitation, education, communications, and police force. If 
these are satisfactorily accomplished, we will be able to persevere in the struggle for 
survival and win the struggle of the "survival of the fittest." Animals survive by overcoming 
heat and cold, and by enduring thirst and hunger. This is possible for them because they 
adapt to their environment. Thus depending upon time and place, we too should adopt 
suitable measures and try to overcome the various difficulties that confront us. In our 
administration of Taiwan we will then be assured of a future of brilliance and glory.” (Gotō 
quoted in Chang and Myers, 1963: 438) 
 
The language used by Gotō is almost transplanted from that of Herbert Spencer, with influence too from 
Darwin on evolution. Gotō saw colonial policy as serving a broader purpose, performing the function of 
forced evolution on the part of the colonised, in order to move them from their lower state of being 
towards a higher state. Gotō, like many of his contemporaries, had a linear view of history and a 
programmatic notion of modernity: that modernity was a project of steady improvement. This 
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improvement should be seen in the widest sense to mean both material improvement and cultural 
development. For Gotō cultural followed material progress: Gotō “came to consider progress the result 
of laying the necessary material foundations which would make it possible for a higher civilization to 
emerge. Cultural development was an integral part of this early development in his view, and 
establishing institutions such as technical and medical schools and public health agencies fostered 
human progress.” (Chang and Myers, 1963: 436) This powerful idea of civilisation, only translated into 
Japanese for 40 years (Hori, 1862: 129) became the main rationale given by colonial officials who saw 
themselves as bringing civilisation to the moribund Chinese: “In Taiwan, Gotō emphasised building 
these institutions, and later, as first president of the South Manchurian Railroad Company, he advocated 
that the new company must acquire a broad vision of purpose and invest to establish appropriate 
"cultural foundations" in south Manchuria. The conception of Japan as a civilizing force in East Asia was 
an important objective of Gotō's policies as a colonial official.” (Chang and Myers, 1963: 436-437) 
 
This biological understanding underlay Japan’s assimilation policy: the colonies of Japan would become 
a part of the main body only after first adapting (that is, being made to adapt) to the main body of Japan. 
This was one of the widely held assumptions that underpinned Japan’s rule in East Asia. Another related 
supposition  
 
“was the desirability of their being ultimately integrated with Japan, both culturally and 
politically. Another was that Japan had a civilizing – or perhaps one should say, 
modernizing – mission, which applied as much to promoting education and public health 
and economic development as it did to political behaviour. With the passing of time there 
was a tendency to put such ideas into a traditionalist framework of Japanese political 
thought, that is, to relate colonies to the ‘national polity’ (kokutai), implying a special 
relationship with a divinely descended emperor.” (Beasley, 1987: 143-144) 
 
To become genuinely Japanese, to adapt and survive, Taiwan would have to progress on both material 





In terms of material progression, the primary focus was always economic and viewed in terms of the 
Japanese empire as a whole rather than Taiwan alone. Although in 1895 Taiwan was an economically 
poor Chinese island on the periphery of the Chinese empire, it had irretrievably changed into a 
prosperous part of the Japanese Empire by 1945: 
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“Taiwan was supplying Japan with great amounts of industrial products, from wood pulp and 
chemicals to copper and food stuffs. Its already impressive network of airfields was being 
expanded, as were the docking facilities at Keelung and Kaohsiung, and the entire railroad 
network… The economy of Taiwan was prospering in the dependency alliance with Japan.” 
(Cheng, Lestz and Spence, 1999: 429) 
 
This growth accelerated following Gotō’s arrival until the end of World War I when “Taiwan sustained 
economic growth, due mainly to strong demand from abroad. The Government-General of Taiwan 
initiated new irrigation projects, improved and expanded roads and harbors, added new banks, and built 
technical and commercial schools.” (Ts’ai, 2010: 84) This demand-driven economic growth continued 
into the 1920s, and by the end of the Japanese occupation, Taiwan was the only colony of Japan which 
was both self-sufficient and paying for its own modernisation efforts. 
 
Given my aim to examine both the impact and the process of kindai (modern) upon Japan, the question 
of how and why Japan laid the foundations for these material improvements is my concern here. For 
Kodama, improving the economic usefulness of Taiwan as a colony was foremost in his mind. 
Colonising and thereafter ‘modernising’ Taiwan was a protective action for Japan, whose authorities 
were still mindful of the Seiyō threat and required economic resources at the turn of the 19th century in 
order to counter it. Kodama extrapolated his plan at length in 1900, which is worth quoting to understand 
the full rationale of the governors of Taiwan: 
 
“In recent years, the European powers have expanded their influence in Asia. How should 
we meet this threat? The military strength of the West is derived from their science and 
knowledge. Asian countries cannot match them in this area.... For this reason the Western 
powers have been able to oppress the peoples of the Far East. In order for us to acquire the 
power to oppose them so that we can continue to dominate in the Far East and preserve the 
peace, there is no other recourse open to us but to acquire more knowledge and increase 
our wealth… 
 
“When Western countries war with one another, they invariably utilize their power and 
resources. They do so in order to win special interests and political advantages. This is 
called economic warfare. When they wage war, only those countries which are materially 
strong and can sustain a heavy military burden for a long period of time will win. A country 
will surely suffer defeat if this is not so. We may speak of economic warfare today as being 
war waged from the standpoint of economic power… 
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“Today's most urgent task is to develop the resources of Taiwan. Taiwan cannot ignore the 
challenge of economic warfare, the trend so prevalent in the world today. As the island's 
production will soon double, this will enable us to keep pace with the progress of other 
countries in the world. Japan and her territories will then be on an equal footing with the 
European powers in the event of economic warfare.” (Kodama, 1900 quoted in Chang and 
Myers, 1963: 436) 
 
A number of points can be made from this speech. First, that rather than feeling assimilated as a fellow 
Great Power and identifying with the West, Seiyō was still clearly seen as comprising a (potentially) 
hostile group of nations who are alert to weaknesses. Japan’s policy of strengthening Taiwan and Japan 
economically was still seen as a protective action. Second, the basis of Seiyō’s strength was seen to be 
founded on science and knowledge. This drive for knowledge framed much of the colonial policy of 
Taiwan, where evidence and surveys were the basis of deciding guiding principles. This was also a large 
influence on education policy in the colony which was as enthusiastically pursued in Taiwan as it had 
been in early Meiji Japan. Finally, Taiwan was clearly viewed unsentimentally as a resource to be 
expanded rather than as a nation of people related in culture and customs to the colonisers. They were 
viewed at a strategic distance. Improving the lives of the natives was seen as a byproduct of protective 
modernisation rather than as the primary aim. 
 
Japanese colonial policies were therefore designed primarily to exploit the full economic potential of 
Taiwan to strengthen Japan in the event of ‘economic warfare’. Methods for the economic improvement 
of Taiwan were established early in Kodama’s rule as Governor-General: whilst peace was beginning to 
be established in Taiwan, the administration promoted a number of measures to protect and open new 
financial markets whilst expanding the tax base. There were three related initiatives to do this: 
 
1. First, a land survey and land tax reform were instituted to guaranteed the protection of 
private property and provide incentives to increase production for the market;  
2. Second, a unified system of weights and measures was introduced to integrate local 
markets internally as well as with Japan;  
3. Third, a central bank was established to issue credit, systematise issue of notes, and 
promote new businesses, in Taiwan and beyond. (Chang and Myers, 1963: 440)  
 
The enthusiasm for imperialism and its potential interests also played a role in the tone of such financial 
ventures. The goal of founding Taiwan Bank stated the purpose clearly in 1899: “to regulate the financial 
situation, explore Taiwan's resources, stimulate economic development and furthermore to expand 
business territory to South China and Southeast Asia.” (Yanaihara, 1988:61)  
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Closer ties between Taiwan and Japan were achieved through improving island transport and reducing 
shipping costs. Within Taiwan, “by 1904 one good road extended the length of the island and the total 
length of public roads, of which at least half were over six-feet wide, was 5,922 miles. The length of 
telegraph lines was increased from 87I to 2,700 miles, and the number of post offices increased nine 
fold.” (Chang and Myers, 1963: 442) These improvements in transport and communication infrastructure 
were founded on the basis that they would facilitate the production and export of Taiwan’s farming 
industry, and also had an impact on urban life, as will be shown in Section 4.4. These steps had begun 
early in Kodama’s tenure: “In 1899 the agricultural department set up an experiment station and 
imported cane, Rose Bamboo and Lahaina, from the Hawaiian Islands for experimental planting. Yield 
from the imported cane was far greater than from the native variety. On the basis of research findings, 
the administration decided to encourage some company to build a modern sugar mill in southern 
Taiwan.” (Chang and Myers, 1963: 443) This focus on agriculture over industry and manufacturing 
underlies the point that modernisation did not equal industrialisation Taiwan’s industrial capacity was 
mostly left untouched, exporting raw foodstuffs its main ‘industry’, yet it was still modernising.85 This 
could be seen in that Kodama’s administration built upon the Qing’s focus on camphor production in 
north-west Taiwan (an early plastic that was in demand throughout the world as a crucial element in 
making film). During the years 1891-1895 Taiwan exported thirty percent more camphor than all the rest 
of the world. (Friedman, 2010: 22)  
 
Such evidence suggests that after the Japanese colonial period Taiwan was still not an industrial nation. 
With only nine percent of employees in industry and nearly two thirds in agriculture in 1953, (Cheng, 
Lestz and Spence, 1999: 633) Japan had only partly industrialised Taiwan prior to World War II with their 
economic focus mirroring that of other imperialist countries: the export of raw materials to the coloniser 
where these were then manufactured. The notion of the centre and periphery was easily seen in 
Taiwan’s early material development when Taiwan was used instrumentally to bolster Japan: “Kodama 
insisted that Taiwan's agriculture, particularly the export of food and raw materials to Japan, be 
developed to augment Japan's power for economic warfare… Subsequent colonial administrators only 
imitated Kodama's economic program.” (Chang and Myers, 1963: 449) Taking a pragmatic approach, 
                                                   
85
 As in the table below adapted from Cheng, Lestz and Spence, 1999: 633, which shows that it was not until the arrival of the Kuomintang 
(KMT, the Chinese Nationalist Party) after World War II that Taiwan’s industrial capacity received serious investment: 
 
Aspect 1953 1962 
Percent of employment 
  
Agriculture 61% 55% 
Industry 9% 12% 
Percent of gross domestic production 
  
Agriculture 38% 29% 
Industry 18% 26% 
Percent of export   
Agricultural goods and products 93% 49% 
Industrial products 7% 51% 
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Taiwan's traditional economy was not destroyed completely, but restructured in such a way that land and 




In spite of the later economic success of Taiwan, for the first decade the colony was a great economic 
burden on Japan due to the necessary investment in infrastructure, and the colonial government faced 
severe criticism at home for what was deemed an unnecessary luxury. Yet, Taiwan’s importance was 
also symbolic: “As the only non-Western imperialist power… the possession by Japan of its first 
overseas colony became an exercise beyond purely economic considerations.” (Ching, L., 2001: 16-17) 
As well as economic progress Japan’s role as coloniser also lay in culturally developing the island in 
order to support Japan’s desired position as leader of Tōyō. The importance to Japan of successfully 
colonising Taiwan was not overstated by Gotō who said “our nation’s history as a Colonial Power 
commences with the story of our administration in Formosa [Taiwan], and our failure or success there 
must exercise a marked influence on all our future undertakings.” (Takekoshi, 1907: V) As mentioned 
earlier, the financial institutions also had a cultural and symbolic purpose: the Bank of Taiwan stated 
upon its foundation that “This bank is different from other banks, it has special duty. It can not only think 
about profits and loss, but will also have to strive for national future and national glory, even though it has 
to sacrifice itself.” (Yanaihara, 1988:64) This path to national glory lay in reforming the civilisation that it 
found in Taiwan and, later, throughout Asia. 
 
Clearly for Japan to be able to claim that they should develop Chinese customs in Taiwan there had 
been a revolution in Japan’s self-perception. After the colonisation the discourse of ‘civilising Japan’ 
was no longer appropriate, as Japan was a Great Power in their own right. In the parlance of the times, 
being a colonial master implied a duty to civilise the natives. Japan effected a separation from the 
natives of Taiwan through new political rhetoric, on the premise that the Japanese were superior to their 
Asian neighbours: “With the sinocentric worldview of the Middle Kingdom as their model, the Japanese 
developed their own cosmology that placed Japan at the center of the civilized universe and adopted 
Chinese terms like ‘fan’ or ‘yi’ that characterized ethnic others on the margins as barbaric.” (Kleeman, 
2003: 12) This appropriation of terms and Othering of Asia can be seen as a part of the Escaping Asia 
movement, began by FUKUZAWA Yukichi whose discourses reflected “ an attempt to resist the West 
by hybridizing Japanese identity, which resulted in the construction of the image of 'Asia' as being 
inferior to the 'hybrid' Japan.” (Sakamoto, 1996: 114) As was shown in the writings of ITŌ Chūta, a new 
idea of what it meant to be kindai (modern) for architects was derived from this hybridisation. 
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A partial explanation for this attitude can be seen in the way civilisation was defined in Japanese. At first 
civilisation was mostly seen as an objective to be reached, yet one which was vaguely defined. When 
this objective had been achieved, the Japanese changed their understanding of what it meant to be 
civilised, as was explored in Section 1.3: socio-political betterment; to teach; civilise away. This change 
in tone towards associating civilisation with the English notions of ‘progress’ and ‘the modern’ was 
effected by a new self-understanding by the Japanese to view themselves as belonging with the 
‘civilised nations’ and as superior to their neighbours. Taking on board the common Occident/Orient 
split of the day, Japan engaged with Asia as a superior (yet kindred) power, which was a key aspect of 
Japan’s early modernity as it reified the ‘progress’ that Japan had made, demonstrating that Japan was 
indeed a part of the group of civilised nations. As part of this membership, Japan was to ‘civilise away’ 
the customs of the past in Taiwan, such as foot-binding, and encourage the natives to take on the 
customs of Japan and join the wider genus of Japan, albeit as lower branches on the family tree. The 
effect on Japan was to expand the definition of Japanese-ness, as explained by Ann Heylen:  
 
“Using the grand discourse of a ‘civilizing mission,’ the Taiwanese colonial subjects were 
trapped into the locus of Japanese modernity. “Becoming Japanese” entailed a process that 
destined them to be linguistically subdued and culturally incorporated over a period of 
time…. [This] served the purpose of liberating the native population from their 
backwardness and prepare them to participate in the modern world that Japan promised.” 
(Heylen, 2010: 149)  
 
Japan’s perceived path to glory lay in expansion southward, in liberating and taming the exotic and 
uncivilised. Whilst it was a difficult rhetorical jump to fully conceive of the Chinese on Taiwan as 
uncivilised, given the cultural foundations of Japan and the lingering respect of Confucianism and 
Chinese cultural products, it was a much easier notion to accept a civilising mission with regard to the 
Taiwanese aborigines. The process began after the murder of Okinawan fishermen in 1871 by Paiwan 
(Jap. 排灣族) aborigines of Taiwan: subsequently the ‘barbarians’ became a talking point in Japan. In 
the opening passages to the ‘Document of the Essentials of Managing the Barbarians’ (Jap. 処藩趣旨
書) published by the bureau of Indigenous Peoples Management in 1875, the author wrote: “Alas, the 
Taiwanese barbarians are vicious, violent, and cruel. It is indeed appropriate that all the nations of the 
world have since antiquity considered them a country of cannibals. This is a pitfall of the world; we must 
get rid of them all”. (Kleeman, 2003: 19) Twenty years after this publication the notion of the barbarians 
was still a powerful one: “the first governor general, Kabayama, remarked not long after his arrival in 
Taiwan: “In order to colonize this island, we must first conquer the barbarians.” (Kleeman, 2003: 20)  
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This ‘conquest’ began through careful study of the natives when anthropology was used for colonial 
purposes as it had been by Europeans in Africa: “As early as 1895, the year the Japanese military took 
over the island, the ethnographer Ino Kanori ([INŌ, Kanori, Jap. 伊能嘉矩] 1867-1925) was hired by the 
colonial government to explore Taiwan.” (Kleeman, 2003: 20) Thereafter the Japanese colonists used a 
combination of military power and (re-)education to deal with the ‘barbarians’. The method of civilising 
depended on the category which the Japanese and Chinese fitted them into: “Following the Chinese 
lead, the tribal people, though culturally and linguistically diverse, were lumped into two groups: 
‘untamed barbarians’ (literally raw, uncooked barbarians, seiban [Jap. 生蕃]) and ‘tamed barbarians’ 
(literally ripe, cooked barbarians, jukuban [Jap. 熟藩 ]) in accordance with the degree of their 
civilization.” (Kleeman, 2003: 21) The terminology was highly significant as it fulfilled an “important 
function in the Japanese colonial ideology of the day. Terms like ‘primitive,’ ‘trivial,’ ‘undeveloped,’ and 
‘exotic’ all take imperial Japan as the norm and define the rest as inferior, different, deviant, subordinate, 
and subordinateable.” (Torgovnik, 1990: 21) Through this hierarchy of terminology, “all Japanese 
colonial subjects… were used by the empire to establish its own superiority as a ‘civilized’ culture shining 
above the darkness of primitive culture.” (Kleeman, 2003: 31) 
 
Just as the USA had attempted to ‘civilise’ the Native Americans and claim their lands, a similar process 
went on in Taiwan from 1874 to 1945. Unlike the Qing, Japan’s civilising activities drew inspiration from 
the nation-state (as befitting an imperial power which was founded on the principle of learning from 
abroad), not traditional philosophies such as Confucianism: “Whereas in the case of the U.S.A. these 
‘civilized ways’ were defined in terms of Protestant ideology and an agricultural lifestyle, during the late 
Qing dynasty Confucianism and wet paddy rice farming served a similar purpose. The civilizing mission 
was no less central during Japanese rule, although loyalty to the Emperor replaced Confucianism.” 
(Friedman, 2010: 19) Japanese rule laid emphasis on control of the population through the use of 
symbols of nationalism, displaying the centrality of the nation-state to Japan.  
 
Whilst GOTŌ Shinpei emphasised a gradual assimilation approach to controlling the aborigines, these 
policies did not last and “just five years after Gotō’s departure, his gradualist policies were overturned in 
favour of a more aggressive military intervention that would allow for state and private companies to 
profit from the exploitation of both the forests (for camphor) and possible mineral wealth in the Aborigine 
territory.” (Friedman, 2010: 25) By 1915, resistance in all but 122 aborigine villages had been crushed. 
(Friedman, 2010: 25) The long war had won the subjugation of the aboriginal people and, therefore 
gained easy access to economic resources and labour, but it had cost the Japanese colonial forces 
nearly 10,000 lives, while an untold number of aborigine lives were lost through warfare and starvation.  
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The approach that Japan took to the Chinese populace was far softer and utilised local hoko societies 
(part of the baojia system in Chinese) for conforming customs. The Japanese attempt to reform Chinese 
and aboriginal customs was intrinsically linked with the modernisation project of Meiji Japan, a point 
extrapolated by Hui-Yu Caroline Ts’ai: custom reforms “reflected a conscious political decision by the 
colonial government to promote its own interests in political control and cultural assimilation. On the 
whole, it also reflected the trend towards modernization that was underway in colonial Taiwan.” (Ts’ai, 
2010: 92-93) These societies encouraged the prohibition of practices such as burning “spirit money” for 
the deceased, which were deemed superstitious by the colonial authorities. As part of this “Efforts were 
made to simplify ceremonies, such as weddings and funerals, and thus cut down on expenses incurred.” 
(Ts’ai, 2010: 91) The target was not simply efficiency and cleanliness of the Chinese in Taiwan but the 
erosion of Chinese cultural identity. Ts’ai gives the example of the use of the lunar calendar to illustrate 
this point: “The Japanese government soon realized that the continued use of the lunar calendar by the 
Taiwanese was symbolic of Chinese identity.” (Ts’ai, 2010: 91) However, whilst local societies agreed to 
do this, the changes were not as fundamental as in Japan, (Tsai, 2010: 91-92) where the lunar calendar 
was completely scrapped.  
 
Hoko societies were used alongside education which was the crucial element in creating Japaneseness 
in Taiwan. Japanese elementary schooling in Taiwan was highly attended by Taiwanese school children, 
and was compulsory, just as the US had established it in the Philippines, and in contrast to the harder 
colonial regimes of the European powers. This basis meant that the path of secondary and higher 
education was much clearer in Taiwan, whilst Koreans struggled and continued with private Confucian 
education. Education in Taiwan was also in contrast to Korea, long a cultural rival to Japan where 
“nationalism proved a more powerful attraction than modernity in a society in which a Korean’s 
opportunities were limited, whatever his skills.” (Beasley, 1987: 149)  
 
In Taiwan, the Chinese were placed on a similar level of civilisation to the Japanese when compared to 
the aborigines. One example of this is the use of the tale of WU Feng (Chi. 吳鳳, 1699-1769). WU Feng 
was purportedly an ethnic Han Chinese resident of Taiwan who had befriended the aborigines and 
attempted to persuade them to give up their practice of headhunting. The story, which first appeared in 
the seventeenth century in Taiwan, ends with WU Feng sacrificing himself, dying in order to prove his 
point about the evils of the practice. The Japanese government translated this tale into Japanese and 
taught it to Taiwanese school children and in Primary schools in Japan. According to Faye Yuan 
Kleeman, this story was useful to both the colonial administrators and in mainland Japan itself, though 
serving different purposes: “In the colony, it reaffirmed the prejudices of the Taiwanese of Chinese 
descent against the aborigines and left them grateful for the empire’s protection. In Japan, it justified the 
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colonial civilizing mission and portrayed the majority of the colonized populace as willing partners in this 
project.” (Kleeman, 2003: 27)  
 
Whilst education was highly taken up in comparison to the Koreans, the education system as a whole 
was designed to keep the Formosans as a race of labourers. The contemporaneous attitude of the 
superiority of Japan over shina (China) underlay the reluctance to grant equal educational opportunities 
to natives. According to an independent and confidential report by the British Consul in Taiwan in 1933, 
the format of Japan’s education system in Taiwan meant it was “not surprising that the native sees little 
attraction in what his rulers offer him.” (Wyndham, 1933: pamphlet) Further, the report states that “it will 
be seen from the foregoing remarks that whilst Japan can justly claim to have instituted a real 
educational system for the island, and to have given Formosans benefits never previously enjoyed by 
them, critics may observe that obstacles to full facilities are deliberately maintained. Assimilation by 
education has, up to date, failed, and must necessarily fail so long as there is discrimination in higher 
education and in the filling of administrative posts.” (Wyndham, 1933: pamphlet) This discrimination 
could be seen in the low numbers of Formosan students in education beyond elementary level as shown 
in the table below (even if these numbers were far higher than would be seen in the British colonies, for 
the British were reporting on Japan in order to learn from a colonial peer).  
 
Number of students Class of Institution Number of Institutions 
Japanese Formosans 
Primary schools 133 34,850 1,894 
Public Elementary schools 761 37 281,662* 
Secondary schools 24 7,505 3,694 
Vocational schools 37 1,762 3,430 
Technical colleges 4 577 247 




The tension between instituting a comprehensive education system, keeping the natives appeased yet 
inferior, and Japanese-ising the Taiwanese was never resolved during the colonial period, particularly 
not in the first 24 years. Japanese travellers to Taiwan ISHIKAWA Tatsuzo and SATO Haruo both 
“perceived the basic flaw in colonial education. Bound by an ideology requiring them to ‘civilize’ the 
barbarians, the colonial power drilled the natives in all the imperial and militarist myths. But this 
intellectual framework, determined in the metropolis thousands of miles away, was meaningless and 
irrelevant to the lives of children living in small, destitute villages far from the realm of modern urban life.” 
(Kleeman, 2003: 38) Textbooks encouraged Taiwanese to be honest, obedient and harmonious whilst 
Japanese primary school text books encouraged an enterprising spirit; this was even the case when 
Table 4.2. Student numbers in Taiwan, 1933 * including ‘a few’ aborigines. Source from 
Wyndham, 1933. 
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using the same educational materials. Japan did not encourage upward mobility or political skills in their 
colonial subjects. (Ts’ai, H., 2009: 6) 
 
Given the educational materials of the Meiji period, which increasingly emphasised racial differences 
and the superiority of Japan, attitudes towards the Chinese natives did tend towards racism at times: as 
a Japanese journalist touring Taiwan wrote: “We, Japanese, usually look down on the Chinese and 
despise them on account of their dirty habits, but in the Chinese houses which I saw in Formosa, I was 
surprised to find the floors raised more than four feet from the ground, fully two feet higher than in 
Japanese residences and official buildings. This is done for sanitary reasons.” (Takekoshi, 1907: 317) 
This Japanese colonial stereotype of the Chinese as dirty was common and was supported by the 
Japanese belief in their own cleanliness and the advances in science and medicine during the Meiji 
period.  
 
Inevitably and necessarily there remained a significant gap between the Chinese and Japanese in 
Taiwan: Japanese colonials “intended to distance themselves from their colonial subjects, and this 
imposed distance was reciprocated by the hontojin [Jap. 本都人, lit. Chinese natives] towards the 
Japanese.” (Shimazu, 2007: 28) This reciprocal distancing implies a lack of full control of the native 
Chinese, and that understanding of Japan’s history of cultural equivalence with China played a part in 
how the colonial masters were perceived. Japanese travellers “were aware in varying degrees that 
Japanese colonization of Taiwan was not based on the notion of absolute superiority of the colonizer, but 
on a relative one based on the notion of modernization.” (Shimazu, 2007: 34) Yet absolute superiority 
was understood as existing between the Japanese and the aborigines: “it was only in their encounter 
with the banjin [Jap. 蛮人, lit. aborigines], who did not share the sinic culture, that they felt acutely a 
sense of racial difference and, consequently, of superiority.” (Shimazu, 2007: 34-35) 
 
Notions of Japanese modernity as a fixed and inflexible programme do not seem to suit Japanese 
colonial policies in Taiwan; as on the main islands of Japan, policies continued to change depending on 
need, appearing to be more contingent on resources than on an overarching vision. Rather than 
envisaging the ruling of the society and then going on to frame policies accordingly, Japanese rule in 
Taiwan was more inductive: utilising and integrating "native" social forces to ensure cooperation. What 
was consistent was the notion that the role of Japan was to promote economic and cultural progress in 
Taiwan. This resulted in Taiwan being partially assimilated whilst becoming “an internal other” (Ts’ai, H., 
2009: 209) that was productive of Japanese cultural identity as kindai (modern) and creator of a new and 
appealing type of civilisation in Tōyō.  
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In spite of this rhetorical purpose, the Japanese authorities were pragmatic in general and sought to 
assimilate the Taiwanese only to a degree suitable for their perceived level of development. Japanese 
language was a prerequisite for Japanese administration and one of the most obvious targets for 
Japan’s social reform. (Ts’ai, H., 2009: 143) The Japanese language was used as an effective measure 
to promote Japanese ideas and to breed a loyal Taiwanese population, whilst ensuring that their 
education would be limited in comparison with their Japanese superiors. After 1895, the Japanese had 
attempted to build a kindai (modern) system in Taiwan out of the traditional system, yet in terms of 
reforming traditional practices the colonial government “did not score well.”86 (Ts’ai, H., 2009: 143) This 
was due to the inevitable split in any modern colony between the rulers and the ruled: genuine 
assimilation could only have occurred if traditions were forcibly destroyed or if equal citizenship rights 
were given to the ruled.  
 
Maintaining a genuine barrier between the colonialists and the colonised continued to be a difficult, 
nebulous, yet vital task for the Japanese. Japan needed to practically demonstrate a pre-eminence over 
the subject population and did so by building grand civic buildings which required advanced Seiyō (and 
later Japanese) technologies. The capital city, Taihoku (Taipei), symbolised this attempt to distinguish 
the colonisers from their subjects more starkly than any other colonial activity. Through analysing the 
built traditions embodied in the city and its buildings, it is possible to observe the extent to which the 
Japanese were able to promote kindai (modern), and how this idea resulted in changes between the 
Qing period and the middle of the Japanese colonial period. 
 
 
4.3 Government-planned ‘modern’ spaces atop a ‘primitive’ past in the capital Taipei 
Since Taipei was initially designated a provincial capital following the Sino-French War in 1885, the city 
developed from a small town with a low technological focus, strong traditional principles and little 
evidence of Seiyō culture, becoming a city which pioneered modern technologies and efficient town 
planning following the Sino-Japanese War (1895). Yet Taipei first became capital for 
protective/defensive reasons, and these reasons did not disappear following Japanese aggression; the 
occupation of Taiwan was during the time of the formation of kindai (modern) in mainland Japan. By the 
time of Japan’s defeat at the end of World War II (1945), Taipei had little use of traditional principles, but 
Western-style (Yōfū) buildings were prevalent in all important official architecture. The process 
responsible for these changes has retrospectively been called ‘modernisation’ which first occurred in 
Taiwan in 1887 before Japan’s occupation, when Qing Taiwan was governed by LIU Ming-Chuan (Chi. 
                                                   
86
 Ts’ai notes accurately that “The Chinese calendar continues to be used in present-day Taiwan, as do “spirit money” and the still elaborated 
ceremonial preparations. However, the practice of foot binding disappeared, as did queues. Sanitation improvement in Taiwan was 
remarkable, the literacy rate rose, and the hoko system was in the process of becoming the base for social mobilization.” (Ts’ai, 2010: 93) 
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劉銘傳, 1836-1896),87 Taiwan’s provincial governor who supported the Self-Strengthening Movement 
(Chi. 自強運動, 1861-1895).88 This modernisation process continued under Japanese colonial rule 
(1895-1945).  
 
As a case study on modernisation, Taipei is illuminating because, due to its serial governance by two of 
Asia’s and the world’s leading powers, the capital Taipei “is a city unique in East Asia, if not the world”. 
(Allen, 2000: 1) However protective modernisation itself was an issue common to many cities throughout 
the world, becoming a global issue particularly in the Middle and Far East. The reason so many 
modernisation projects began under this pressure was not due to the equal threat from outside but 
rather due to the imagination of how global politics felt in the late nineteenth century: “The global is not 
just a geographic construct that can be simply contrasted with the regional or local. The global is also a 
function of the human imagination…local histories images the world.” (Ching, Jarzombek and Prakash, 
2006: xi) From this point of view, to analyse global trends through Taipei is valid because “the global 
does not really begin in the east or the west but can indeed be started and ended anywhere.” (Ching, 
Jarzombek and Prakash, 2006: xiv) The colonial projects of Seiyō had been unfolding and flooding 
Europe with great wealth since the 18th century and this had global implications in terms of the search for 
new markets, resulting in treaty ports in northern Taiwanese cities such as Keelung. Given this context, 
the modernisation of Taipei began as a consequence of European colonial projects and continued as a 
colonial project of Japan. These colonial projects had a fundamental and nebulous effect: imperial 
projects were underpinned by Enlightenment thinking which emerged as a challenge of the arbitrariness 
of colonial power but ultimately also supported this power. (Ching, Jarzombek and Prakash, 2010: 555) 
This was shown in Section 2.1 by the way China was able to be defeated not due to advanced ships and 
weaponry but due to efficiency and reason in Seiyō military which allowed these technologies to 
emerge. 
 
In the case of 19th century China, the story was different to those of Africa or India, for through ‘colonial 
arrogance’ China was forced to open her ports. (Ching, Jarzombek and Prakash, 2010: 555) As 
established in Sections 2.1 and 4.1, Japan was well aware of what was happening to China, that there 
were more risks than benefits from this opening. The result of this pressure was that both China and 
                                                   
87
 LIU Ming-Chuan was a Chinese official during the Qing dynasty. Liu became involved in the suppression of the Taiping rebellion at an early 
age, and worked closely with ZENG Guo-Fan (Chi. 曾國藩, 1811-1872) and LI Hong-Zhang (Chi. 李鴻章, 1823-1901) as he emerged as an 
important Huai Army (Chi. 淮軍) officer. In the aftermath of the Sino-French War (1884-5), he was appointed the first governor of the 
newly-established province of Taiwan.  
 
88
 The Self-Strengthening Movement was a period of institutional reforms initiated during the late Qing Dynasty following the series of military 
defeats and concessions to foreign powers. Huang explains the origin and meaning of this movement at length: “The term "Self-Strengthening 
Movement" comes from a sentence in the Book of Changes: "Heaven moves on strongly; the gentlemen therefore incessantly strengthen 
themselves."…As the promoters of this movement never felt completely assured that they were beyond criticism, they quoted the classics to 
stress that there was a change of time and circumstances that justified their following the foreign lead. Another argument that they made 
defensively was that they borrowed Western learning for its utility; for the fundamentals they never deviated from China's cultural tradition.” 
(Huang, 1988: 209-210) 
 302 
Japan underwent an intense period of modernisation either reluctantly by incremental force as in China, 
or more enthusiastically following national humiliation.89 These changes were intended to circumvent 
actual colonisation by Seiyō imperialists, successfully in Japan’s case. By looking at both the Qing Taipei 
urban planning principles and government-built buildings (from the Self-Strengthening Movement as the 
model capital of a modern Chinese province), to Japan’s changes under the Gradualism period (when 
Taipei became a modern capital for Asia’s first imperial Power), it is possible to discuss the emergence 
of a spatial and temporal colonial ‘modernity’ in the urban environment of Taipei. Studying the 
transformation in social aesthetics and materials/technologies that Japan made through colonial policies 
allows a deeper understanding of the expansion of the kindai (modern) architecture movement and of 
how Japan itself adopted ‘colonial arrogance’ in practice. 
 
 
The foundation of a colonial kindai (modern) state: the Chinese built capital  
The development of Taipei provides insights into the differences within East Asian modernisation. Yet 
whilst Taipei shares some characteristics with other Chinese capitals, it is significant not only compared 
to China but also to other cities in Taiwan. In 1875 whilst Taiwan was still a part of Fujian province, the 
Qing government decided to create a northern prefecture after seeing that it was vulnerable to attacks 
from foreign powers, particularly after Japan had attacked in the same year as revenge against the 
killing of 54 Okinawa fishermen by Taiwanese natives, as discussed in Section 4.1. The priority of the 
Qing was to develop the north of Taiwan to gain more protection throughout the island. Further to this in 
1885 Taiwan became a full province of China and the administrative capital of the island was moved 
north to Taipei,90 partly to encourage the development of the area following the Sino-French War. As an 
island on a busy shipping route and off the coast of China, Taiwan was subject to foreign avarice for 
much of the 19th century; the most serious incident occurred in 1884 when a French army attacked the 
north of the island and temporarily occupied the port of Keelung. LIU Ming-Chuan arrived in Taiwan in 
1884 and repelled the attack. Before this point, the whole of the north had been sparsely populated 
compared with south Taiwan and with southern China in general. Taipei was to be the new capital, 
despite being a small market town situated between two much larger towns which can seen in the map 
of fig. 4.2: Mengjia (Chi. 艋舺), south west of Taipei, (inhabited by the Quanchou clan) and Dadaocheng 
                                                   
89
 The main purpose of this research is not to find out the original perpetrator of the threat but to see what really occurred during this process 
of modernisation and why. Rather than attempt the impossible task of allocating blame for a complex social process, I focus on the modern’s 
influence on the ‘semi-civilised’ culture in East Asia and particularly on Taiwan which was the only location where two interpretations of the 
modern movement of the two main countries in East Asia, China and Japan, occurred one after the other. Modernisation remains a 
fundamental issue in the 21st century in East Asia, unlike in Europe and America, particularly in the field of architecture since 19th century as 
discussed in the introduction: Theories of kindai (modern) upon architecture. There are many scholars (from Hamaguchi (1947) to today) still 
trying to find the way to accept this modern history as part of the past and to continue with this tainted yet valuable modern history in order to 
move on. Without coming to terms with this past it will not be possible to improve the future of architectural development in Taiwan, for it to be 
integrated and for it to be in harmony the East Asia with the rest of the world.  
 
90
 Taipei was a temporarily provincial capital until 1894, the city of Taichung in central Taiwan was to be the capital once the government 
yamen were built. However, given the lack of resources this did not happen and Taipei became the permanent capital in 1894. 
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(Chi. 大稻埕), north of Taipei, (inhabited by the Changchou group) which together had a population of 
100,000. These two towns were occupied by rival factions and had staged small wars with each other in 
the past. The Taipei administrative area was placed between the rival towns, perhaps partly to reduce 




Taipei’s initial state of underdevelopment allowed the political leaders a blank canvas on which to draw. 
At the time all dominant authorities in Chinese culture were contained exclusively within city walls; the 
wall was the integral part of what it meant to be a city because the character for both city and wall (Chi. 
城, Chéng) was the same. A Chéng (Chi. 城, city) without a Chéng (Chi. 城, wall) is not a city; in 
Chinese dictionaries, ‘walled-city’ is a synonym of ‘city-wall’. The physical city wall was amongst the first 
government-built constructions when Taipei became a prefecture in 1875: it was constructed between 
1879 and 1884. (Wei and Gao, 2005: 29) According to the different ranks of cities, the walled-cities can 
be divided into capitals, prefectures, counties and forts. In general, the higher the rank of the city, the 
greater the size of wall; different wall configurations and official buildings within these walls display the 
differences in status. In addition, the material used in a wall affected its status: city walls were to be built 
in brick, stone or soil; without these materials it would not be a genuine walled town.  
 
Taipei’s wall was by far the largest construction in Taipei before 1895, possessing five gates and a 
circumference of five thousand meters. It took a rectangular pattern, with grid-like roads and regularly 
4.2. December 1895 Taipei map. 
Adapted from Yang, C., 1996 
Dadaocheng 
Taipei City Wall 
Mengjia 
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spaced gates. The wall was built with local lime, brick and andesite stone from slightly north of Taipei, 
Jiandaoshi Mountain (Chi. 剪刀山). This shape and these high-status materials marked the transition 
from the rank of prefecture city (1875) to provincial capital (1885). During the design process, the 
orientation of Taipei’s walls changed, partly due to conflicting geographical signs, and partly because the 
prestige of the city was important. Normally Chinese city walls followed a north-south orientation 
because of respect for the Great Northern Emperor (Chi. 天皇大帝, Eng. Polaris) and the principles of 
feng-shui: climatic condition rules also stated that all buildings should be on a north-south axis and 
facing to the south, as with Japanese Hogaku. But in Taipei there was a stronger influence on the city 
than straight north-south orientation, namely the natural environment, arguably the most important 
factor in feng-shui, which was largely overlooked in the first design draft. Feng-shui mainly uses the Lo 
Shu Square (Chi. 河圖洛書 , the magic square), established in the earliest Chinese literature. 91 
Following this rule, the capital Taipei consisted of the basic ancient elements: both rivers and mountains 





                                                   
91
 The first example was from the ancient Chinese capital city, Loyang, in the Han Dynasty of China. 
4.3. Taipei city wall orientation, 
facing the largest mountain, 1895. 
Adapted from Chou, Y., 2003. 
 305 
In order to follow feng-shui, the builders considered that the mountains surrounding the Taipei basin 
were dominated by Shi-Si Mountain (Chi. 七星山, also the direction of the Big Dipper) and the best 
feng-shui should be surrounded with large mountains behind, extending right and left, and moving water 
in front.92 In order to do this, the leader of the design process changed the grid direction to have Shi-Si 
Mountain directly behind (fig. 4.4). This follows the theory in feng-shui that city walls or buildings need to 
rely on mountains which will stand at the back to retain its qi (Chi. 氣) the medium of energy regarded as 
connecting mankind, earth, and heaven. Although feng-shui was important spiritually, it also had a 
strong political role and could symbolise what was important in a construction. Although records of the 
reasons for the change in orientation have not been found, perhaps the change in city walls from relying 
upon the Great Northern Emperor to relying on the tallest mountain symbolised mistrust in central 
government of the Qing then based to the north in Beijing, and a move away from the importance of 





                                                   
92
 There is normally one of the figurative guardians of the four winds from the Chinese zodiac in each direction: the snake and tortoise in the 
north. To the east there is the green dragon, and the white tiger in the West. Finally in the south is the red bird. 
4.4. Taipei city wall orientation. Note that the roads were 
orientated north-south whilst the walls faced the largest 
mountain and the Big Dipper. Adapted from Schinz, 1996. 
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Building upon the classical model of Chinese city planning,93  the late-Qing style of capital was 
developed on the principle that cities are divided between an administrative centre and residential or 
business districts. This split represented one of the key principles of Chinese city planning which was the 
struggle between a military aristocracy and educated advisers. City planning in the Late-Qing continued 
the ancient principle of capital cities as ‘portable’ and represented long-standing diagrams of political 
power. Taipei contained the essential elements of a Chinese city of authority: spatial images of the 
control and hierarchy applied within the institutional establishment which consisted of one or several 
walled enclosures, axiality, north-south orientation and the courtyard. It can be said that due to following 
this formula, “The town and cities are all of the same kind and appearance which differ only in size and in 
the wealth. They appeared early in the tradition and were applied very widely, whether to the plan of a 
little homestead, the layout of a temple, a palace or a city ensemble.” (Boyd, 1962: 49) As Taipei was of 
a far lower rank than the Forbidden City in Beijing, Taipei walled-city (the capital of Taiwan province) was 
enclosed by a single wall, the town plan (namely the buildings and roads) was orientated on a 
north-south axis94 (although the walls were orientated to Shi-Shi mountain), and all the official buildings 
contained courtyards: all of these principles were evident in Taipei, even at the end of the 19th century 
during the height of the Self-Strengthening Movement. In essence then, “Taipei was an attempt at 
nostalgic signification of local space.” (Allen, 2000: 5)  
 
This argument is strengthened when observing the city’s shape. Whilst the principles of city walls have 
been discussed above as ‘Chinese’, in fact significant geographical distinctions can be made between 
different types of wall based on the shape. The box shape in Taipei followed the imperial northern 
Chinese style seen in capitals such as Beijing which itself followed the ancient capital walled-city Loyang 
(Chi. 洛陽, founded in the 11th century BCE) .95 Following this ancient example meant that “Taipei was 
the final walled-city planned in ‘square shape’ accordance with feng-shui in the Chinese history.” (Wei 
and Gao, 2005: 19) This is in contrast with other walls built in this period, particularly in southern China: 
“late imperial Chinese city walls, including all those theretofore in Taiwan, were constructed around 
already occupied areas, accommodating their organic, usually circular shape.” (Allen, 2005: 4) Since at 
least the Northern Song dynasty (960–1127), square city walls represented “the power of the ruler; a 
                                                   
93
 The classical model for a capital derived from the ancient city-states was given to the chief carpenter (Chi. 匠人). This role had three duties: 
locating and planning, designing institutions and roads, and ancillary works. Kao Grong Ji (Chi. 考工記, the Record of Trades), the earliest 
record of Chinese city planning, was an independent work complied in the Warring States Period and was attached to the Zhou li (Chi. 周禮, lit. 
the Rites of Zhou) in place of the missing section on the Offices of Winter. The Record of Trades achieved prominence within the Confucian 
textual canon, in its description of the city according to the precepts for the capital. The Record of Trades details the Chinese official craftsman 
techniques, the national norms, and the principles of imperial standard for a capital. In brief, these are: a square plan of nine li (a li to 300 
foot-steps to 500 meters) split into nine squares, with three gates on each wall; nine criss-crossed roads (each road to have a width of nine 
tracks – a track was eight chi, around 2.67 meters); the central palace should have an ancestral temple on the left, altar of the earth on the 
right, the imperial government (royal court hall) in the front, and palace in the north. Since Taipei was a provincial rather than state capital, 
these rules were only followed in using the division into nine squares. 
 
94
 That the city faced south can seen from the building orientation in fig. 4.6 where all the roofs and buildings face south on the map. 
 
95
 Loyang was considered the centre of China in the Central Plain, an important site for Chinese civilisation. 
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Southern style, [represents] freedom from government interference.” (Erdberg, 1973: 73) This ancient 
style had not been implemented for many years and the Qing government’s choice to design the walls in 
a square shape was a sign of Taiwan’s new political and cultural importance after the attacks by foreign 
powers. It also distinguished Taipei from other towns in Taiwan, including the much larger city Tainan, 
the old capital, to show that regardless of size, Taipei was now the pre-eminent city in Taiwan, for the first 
time since 1683.  
 
Taipei walled-city was first displayed in a topographical map in 1888 (fig. 4.5) which was drawn using the 
Chinese cartographical framework: it does not provide strictly accurate measurements but does provide 
a demonstration of the perspective of Chinese culture and principles. The walls on the map were 
represented as a square rather than an accurate lopsided rectangular wall and are shown surrounded 
by mountains and the main river tributaries in the topographical map: the city is shown as set away from 
the rugged terrain and in a river valley for easy transportation. The names of rivers and mountains are all 
marked, and are in some ways the main focus of the map; this allows the cartographer to present the 
contextual feng-shui. The route of the drainage basin shows a hinterland of natural resources and a 
healthy economic situation. The mountain range is shown within the vertical and horizontal lines 
indicating the scale of nature that surrounded the towns of northern Taiwan, with roads and 




map of Taipei 
prefecture in 1888. 
Adapted from 
Zhuang, Y., 1991. 
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That the walled area was the most important part of the city (in spite of the majority of the population 
living outside the wall) is indicated from the perspective of a Japanese map of 1896 in which all five 
gates point inwards (fig. 4.6). The configuration of the city can be interpreted as a reflection of the 
worldview of the Qing administrators which had strong roots in the past, with less concern for efficiency 
in civilian life than allowing the authority to control the city more easily as a unit. Nowhere was this more 
evident than in representations of the five gates which were the most detailed buildings on the map, 
particularly the barbican of the north gate. These gates were vital as the only exits to the city which was 
closed at night to control the population. The wall’s main functional purpose was for ‘law and order’ 
rather than military defence. The gate structures were in two main parts: the base of the gate and the 
walls were made from stone, while the tops of the gates were brick and mortar structures. The dovetail 
shapes on the roofs’ spines, with upturned eaves, were the highest designation for a city wall, according 
to the ancient Chinese concept. The northern gate had a killing ground attached to the front, and slightly 
beyond was an official guest gate outside the city wall. The north gate was the key gate to protect the city 
which was shown by this phrase written above the door of a Secondary wall (Chi. 巖疆鎖鑰, lit. the key 
of the territory) 96  as a warning after northern Taiwan had been under fierce fighting during the 
Sino-French War. 
 
                                                   
96
 Fittingly given the phrase, this was also the gate that the Japanese entered Taipei through upon their first entrance to the city. 
4.6. 
Japanese 
map of Taipei 
walled-city in 
1896. The 
map is up 
side down in 




Wei and Gao, 
2005. 
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The walled area surrounded the imperial government’s network of administrative institutions. The extent 
of Taipei’s importance can be seen, in that it contained five levels of administration with all civil buildings 
inside the city wall, from the governor down to the local magistrate. The most important part of this 
governing apparatus was the Taiwan Provincial Administration Yamen (lit. bureaucrat’s gate, although 
actually a walled cluster of government buildings). Its importance was indicated by the complexity of 
functions, with the granary, stables, temples and pleasure gardens all enclosed within its courtyards and 
gates. The cluster of yamen symbolises “the power and might of the central Imperial government” 
because “the yamen was the regional administrative center”. (Lee, C. 1999: 35) Before the walls were 
built in 1884 Taipei had no administrative buildings so “the increase in the number of yashu [Chi. 衙署] 
administrative buildings reflected the increasing complexity of society and the growing importance of 
Taiwan as a region within the Chinese imperial sphere.” (Lee, C., 1949: 35) Enhancing the status of 
Taipei through these buildings was thereby both elevating it above other cities in Taiwan and elevating 
Taiwan within the Qing Empire.  
 
The main gate in the north was used by officials, shown by its additional reception gate outside the wall. 
The yamen were the first planned and most complete of all the buildings, in the most densely populated 
part of the walled city, as indicated by the fact that three of the four artesian wells were located nearby. 
The finest houses were to be found in the northern part of the city nearest the yamen; the poorest people 
lived in the crowded streets near the market places and main gates. Given the short time between the 
construction of the walled city and the Japanese occupation, these distinctions might not be very clear, 
but the richest people lived on the north gate street, the largest number of households was in front of the 
Taipei Prefecture City Yamen, and the oldest commercial street was in the back of it. (Wei and Gao, 
2005: 29)  
 
After the yamen, the most notable buildings were the highly represented religious buildings: temples to 
the City God, County God, Confucius, Martial Arts, Mazu (a water God common to the coastal regions of 
China) and Empress of Heaven.97 As the island’s capital, Taipei was the highest status city in Taiwan 
and therefore had the most important temples for officials, the City God Temple and County God Temple. 
The latter was for the God which protected Taipei city and neighbouring Tamsha county. The local 
government officers were required to sacrifice every month on the first day and fifteenth day in order to 
make the province prosperous and to allow the people to live in it safely. Because of this function, some 
of the temples were located alongside other yashu (government office). In such ways the Chinese city 
planners maintained traditional life styles in the context of the forces of modernisation. 
                                                   
97
 The Confucian Temple (Chi. 文廟) and Martial Arts Temple (Chi. 武廟) were separated for praying respectively to Confucius and to the 
warrior god. The Empress of Heaven Temple (Chi. 天后宮, the Tian Hau Temple, lit. God of heaven) was used to pray to Tian Hau for 
successful maritime navigation. This was a specialist deity for Taiwan; the temple faced the ocean and stood by the north gate with the main 
yamen close by for convenience of government ceremonies and to help administer and protect the city. 
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Whilst these traditions remained evident and prominent, the Self-Strengthening Movement was also 
strongly present in Qing Taiwan, in perhaps a more concentrated form than anywhere else: the efforts to 
modernise in Taiwan were more successful than in China as a whole, perhaps in part due to the small 
size of the island. LIU Ming-Chuan was key to this success; he “promoted needed and widely heralded 
innovation,” (Copoer, 2000: 121) particularly in his new capital city, Taipei. The Self-Strengthening 
Movement in Taiwan had a similar purpose and period to the stated purpose of the Meiji Restoration, but 
took a different approach which only allowed for very limited cultural change. This movement involved a 
wide range of constructions, architectural activities and urban planning, most of which was focused on 
the new capital. In Taipei, there were many new institutions such as the Arsenal Bureau (1885), the 
Firearms Bureau (1885), the Torpedo Bureau (1885), the Bureau of Pacification and Land Cultivation 
(1886), the Astronomical Telegrams Bureau (1886), the Official Medical Bureau (1886), the Camphor 
Affairs Bureau (1887), the Mining and Kerosene Bureau (1887), the Railway Bureau (1887), the 
Western Learning Bureau (1887), and the Postal Bureau (1888). These were all completed before 
Japan’s arrival and during Liu’s tenure. The ‘modern’ engineering activities and constructions were also 
extensive, such as the Railway Tunnel (1888) and Iron Railway Bridge (1889) built successively during 
the railway construction, which was most notable among Liu’s innovation given his understanding of the 
benefit of railways for the interoperability of troops and transportation. This was even reported to the 
imperial throne in 1880.98  
 
These new institutions were integrated simultaneously, and were built with an urban planning vision as 
foundation. The first integration was the new city road planning in the half-empty Taipei walled-city, 
improving the flood defences of Dadaocheng, and road repair of three main areas of Taipei: Taipei 
walled-city, Dadaocheng, and Mengjia. Liu cooperated with the new municipal administration, 
constructing roads with willows (a lucky tree in Chinese tradition) and used pitching intervals with 
pebbles for the tracks of the newly introduced transport in 1887: the public rickshaw. These urban 
streets often used steam-powered rolling machines for road renovation, and Liu set up a road cleaning 
bureau (1887) to maintain the newly laid roads. The roads utilised electric lights with a power station 
constructed in 1888 by a Danish electrical technician. By the side of the city roads new style wells were 
also excavated and a water storage tank was built which separated drinking and washing water (1888) 
by a Japanese former vassal of the Shogun, NAGURA Matsumado (Jap. 名倉松窓, 1822-1901). These 
urban plans were started before Japan’s imperial expansion into Taiwan, although there was not enough 
time to compete everything or for any great advances to occur. 
                                                   
98
 This was the ‘Memorial to Constructing Railways to Self-Strengthen’ (Chi. 籌造鐵路以圖自強摺) sent on the 3rd December 1880 according 
to Mó yì lüè (Chi. 謨議略). This memorial was a literary type of memorial (Chi. 奏議, zouyi) which is a sub-category to the literary category of 
historiography known as shibu (Chi. 史部) in the Complete books of the ‘Four Storehouses’ (Chi. 四庫全書). Memorials were reports on 
regular or irregular administrative affairs or even suggestions on policies submitted by ministers of other state officials to the throne. 
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In spite of the Self-Strengthening Movement and Liu’s rapid innovations, the buildings in Taipei from 
1884-1895 largely kept to traditional planning and architectural principles with high recognition of the 
past, enhancing the status of Taipei but lacking centralised planning: the vision for the development of 
Taipei appears to have resided with Liu, for as soon as he was replaced (reportedly partly due to locals 
on the island being angry with raised taxes to pay for these government projects) the active 
self-strengthening ended. In addition, Liu had limited time and lacked trained Chinese technical 
personnel: Taipei’s government projects “were plagued by incompetent managers, by nepotism and 
corruption.” (Schirokauer, 1989: 457) Given these limitations, his achievements were remarkable. Liu 
and others in the Qing Self-Strengthening movement integrated new institutions with rapid innovations 
within traditional urban planning and carpentry principles, even though they lacked systematic and 
centralised guidelines and time and freedom to experiment. In Taipei Liu’s source of freedom lay in its 
emptiness: Taipei’s wall was built in an over-large square shape which meant that in 1891 when it had 
been the capital for six years, over fifty percent of the walled space was still in rice paddies. (Allen, 2000: 
4) Filling this space with a mixture of ancient and new institutions underlined Liu’s purpose to restore the 
authority of the Qing state after Taipei had become the provincial capital, when railroads, electrification, 
and schools of Western learning, rickshaws, and other material changes were introduced to the city. In 
spite of its empty space, these new developments were the sign of what would happen when Japan 
colonised Taiwan: these institutions were to become the basic foundations of a modern colonial state.  
 
 
Modern planning altering a static past: the Japanese built capital  
Although the policy changes were not universally popular under Liu’s governorship, both economic and 
political conditions improved in Taiwan. Yet these changes were insufficient and too localised to allow 
China to ward off foreign aggression: from the 1870s Japan had retained an interest in Taiwan and “soon 
found an opportunity to acquire the island.” (Cooper, 2000: 12) As shown in Section 4.2, Meiji Japan’s 
active modernisation was a scheme which was continued and brought to Taiwan. Instead of reverting to 
the previous capital and largest city in Taiwan, Tainan, when they colonised Taiwan, The Japanese 
retained Taipei as the capital99 and from this base the Japanese administrators oversaw a plethora of 
improvements in science and technology, as well as other general elements of material progress.  
 
One of the first priorities was interconnecting the urban areas and harbours. Japan concentrated on 
establishing “a much more economic infrastructure by building roads, railways, communications 
systems, factories, and harbours to facilitate export to Japan.” (Ho and Park, 2004: 4) By 1905, Taiwan 
had 300 miles of railroad, ten times the amount in 1895, and work was in progress to double even that. 
                                                   
99
 Taipei was renamed Taihoku for the duration of Japanese rule but to avoid confusion Taipei will be referred as Taipei for the duration of this 
thesis.  
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Whilst Liu had previously made an abortive effort to introduce electric street lighting to Taipei, “in 1903, 
Taiwan was electrified, making it the first area outside Japan proper [in East Asia] to take this step into 
modernity.” (Cooper, 2000: 13) In addition to these technological improvements, scientific thinking also 
had an effect on Taiwan, where “many diseases were eradicated… making Taiwan the most 
disease-free area outside Japan.” (Cooper, 2000: 13) These advances in science and technology even 
filtered through to social logic and habits, developing greater technological and cultural sophistication. 
 
These changes were initially slow outside the capital city: for whilst the rest of the rebellion following the 
native declaration of the Republic of Formosa took months and years to fully occupy, Taipei was taken 
by the Japanese in a few days after they were invited in by the local leaders. At first the Japanese were 
undecided about what to do with Taipei. The ‘Taipei District Planning Committee’ was established in 
1897 which was to initiate the trend for ambitious urban planning in Taipei. After the arrival of GOTŌ 
Shinpei as the head of civilian affairs in 1898, the direction the city was taking was much clearer, 
although the planning remained experimental. This reflected Gotō’s belief that ‘Taiwan was Japan’s 
colonial university. (Takekoshi, 1907: v) Taipei evidently represented an ideal city to display the might of 
Japan: it had been a provincial capital for only ten years, and the wide tracts of empty land within Taipei’s 
built environment were far from the situation in Tōkyō, already densely built when the emperor was 
restored in 1868, and believed to have been the most populated city in the world in 1720. (Morris, 2010: 
483) In Taipei, the new Japanese authorities could experiment, they had open space to use as they 
wished, and were continuing to master and adapt modern town planning and architectural techniques 
imported from mainland Japan. Gotō brought Japanese and Japanese filtered European culture into 
Taipei city, which became the first prototype for cultural transformation of the island.  
 
After only five years of colonial rule in 1900, Taipei city wall had begun its slow but inevitable process of 
deconstruction, which was in keeping with the plan to integrate the Japanese centre with the Chinese 
periphery. First nine more gates were opened in each end of street at the wall to connect the city centre 
with the outside. In the 1900 Taipei initial plan (fig. 4.7) the Chinese grid-like road layout was kept and 
reconfigured with a series of new streets. Beyond the new gates, the map is striking in its stark omission 
of the river and other natural features, which suggests that the feng-shui tradition was no longer seen as 
an important or a necessary component of planning maps. This initial plan did not include either “the 
extramural settlements of Mengjia and Dadaocheng where the large majority of the Chinese lived and 
worked—these were included in the 1895 and 1897 maps.” (Allen, 2005: 73) Gotō’s administration saw 





A year later, the 1901 planning map was enlarged but mainly extended into the newly planned southern 
suburbs for the Japanese residential area: a city plan was produced for the entire walled area and left no 
empty spaces. Within the intramural area all Chinese religious buildings were removed. This adds 
evidence to the Japanese mission to eliminate superstitions and those buildings without practical 
functions which were no longer required. Whilst the planning appears to be informed by rationality, an 
important exception (covered further in Section 4.4) was the construction of the ‘Taiwan Shinto Shrine’ 
(1901). Although it was a government priority, the shrine was built far away from the centre, which 
indicates that the religious and secular were purposefully separated in government planning, underlining 
a main theme of this thesis: that there was a binary in how the kindai (modern) was exhibited in the 
public areas while traditions were separated, often into the private sphere. Japanese officials’ 
residences were built exclusively in Japanese style, mostly to the east and south-east of the city walls 
(Allen, 2007: 17), and planned as peripheral. Whilst religion was still core in Japanese society and in 
many ways even more so after the restoration of the emperor, the early years of colonial rule 
purposefully separated religion from the civic centre in the urban planning. The exception to this was 
State Shinto: several Shinto shrines were built throughout Taipei in what appears to some extent to have 
been a nationalist ploy. Japanese shrines were spread throughout the suburbs of both the Chinese and 
Japanese areas, intended to supersede Chinese temples. By the end of Japanese occupation there 
were over 200 Shinto shrines in Taiwan. 
4.7.1900 Taipei intramural 
urban planning map.  






By 1904 the Japanese administrators decided that the city wall had to be destroyed in order to expand to 
the outside and improve the efficiency of the city. Where the walls had once been, three-laned tree-lined 
boulevards were made, that altered and dominated the old circulation of the city. Following this, the 
centre of authority was no longer totally within a walled box. This was a first big indication of the 
Japanese translation of modern as kindai: to be open was a definition of both civilisation and progress in 
Japanese dictionaries at the time, and therefore the removal of the city walls was a clear sign of 
progress to assist in urban expansion, even though the walls had been in place for only just over 20 
years. The substantial amount of brick was recycled into the city to build modern edifices and offices. In 
1904, the Qing administration buildings “were either destroyed altogether or [temporarily] transformed 
into schools or other types of public buildings.” (Lee, C., 1999: 35)  
 
Removing the city walls was a significant move, as without walls, the boundaries of control had shifted 
and became associated with different institutions. In colonial Taipei under nationalist Japan, the old 
boundary of city gates controlling the movements of the people were deemed old fashioned and new 
boundaries were made to allow open movement whilst the police force applied authoritarian control: the 
walls were unnecessary, representing what Japanese scholars such as Fukuzawa saw as the “static 
traditions” of Japan’s East Asian neighbours. According to Allen, this trend to destroy city walls was an 
innovation “borrowed from European examples of medieval walls transformed into roadways and 
4.8. 1901 Taipei urban 
correction map. 




promenades, changed the internal composition and symbolic value of the city: a traditional bureaucratic 
center, walled and imperial, is transformed into a site of colonial modernism.” (Allen, 2005: 73) 
Removing walls removed the traditional ritual at gates, but the importance of gates as sites of transition 
and culture was recognised by Gotō, who successfully petitioned to keep the city gates and saved all but 
the Western gate which was demolished to make way for a railway line. These gates remained as 
architectural marks of the past: by the end of the colonial period, there were no other existing Chinese 
(or traditional Japanese) buildings besides these four gates within the now-invisible walled city. 
 
In 1905 the integration of the inner walled city with the Chinese Mengjia (south west of Taipei, Quanchou 
group) and Dadaocheng areas (north of Taipei, Changchou group) (known as the three towns of Taipei 
(Jap. 三市街, Taihoku sanshigai)) became more clearly the reason for the destruction of the wall. This 
integration was clearly articulated by GOTŌ Shinpei’s progressive and expansive urban policy: creating 
a single entity out of three towns was the starting point of modern colonial urban planning, shown in the 
1905 plan (fig. 4.9). In his town plan Gotō’s department chose to integrate the Japanese (the southern 
east area) and Chinese sections of the city and thus began the process of Japanisation of the Chinese, 
bringing them closer together. In line with the terrain, future plans looked east away from the river and 
beyond the Japanese residential area where the centre of Taipei is today. The gradual shift of the city 
from west to east was enabled by a series of typhoons from 1898 which destroyed many Chinese 
residential buildings in Taipei’s Mengjia and Dadaocheng suburbs, further reducing the stock of Chinese 
buildings in the city. (Allen, 2000: 11) Moreover in 1911 typhoons destroyed many buildings within the 
old Taipei walled-city itself. (Wei and Gao, 2005: 35-36) This gave the Japanese authorities a chance to 
remake the city in their image of a site of modern urbanity, the Japanese colonial capital.  
 
4.9. Taipei Wall Urban 
Planning in1905. 




The examples of Japanese urban developments demonstrated Japan’s capacity to forward plan, which 
was only possible through systematic thinking. This was established from the experience of developing 
a viable nation-state in mainland Japan after the Iwakura mission (1871-1873), but it was only in Taipei 
that the motives, capacity, maturity and resources were utilised to integrate Taiwan into this vision. The 
Iwakura mission led government authorities to respect the cities of Seiyō, where “Paris in particular 
impressed the Japanese with its magnificent boulevards and public structures, recently renovated by 
Napoleon III and Baron Haussmann, and thereafter Paris long represented the urban ideal for many 
Japanese planners.” (Sorenson, 2002: 81) The aspiration towards a Parisian aesthetic was not only 
clear to see in Tokyo (as discussed in Chapter 3) but also in Taipei, where it was articulated more 
obviously, from its wide laned, tree lined boulevards (fig. 4.10) which replaced the city walls with grand 
parks in expensive central real estate. The Parisian model was a fashionable example of modernity 
which became a blueprint for Japanese planners on how a ‘modern’ city should look: Taipei was highly 





During the Japanese colonial period the authorities put in place six city plans: at first known as ‘Urban 
corrections’ (Jap. 市區改正) these plans were renamed ‘Urban plan’ after 1930. The corrections began 
in an urgent manner and were initiated by William Kinnimond Burton (1856-1899), a British engineer 
appointed to Taiwan from mainland Japan to undertake sanitation investigations. Due to these 
progressive plans the old intramural area of Taipei had changed significantly by 1920, but essentially it 
followed the key 1905 plan.  According fig. 4.11, by 1920, almost all of the main civil building projects 
which were extant in the walled city area of 1945 were completed. All of these developments and 
changes in approach led European contemporaries to proclaim that Taipei was a “modern capital.” 
(Rutter, 1923: 145) Yet given that there were a plethora of unprecedented changes to Taipei in a period 
of great change, it is probable that no one set of principles prevailed when planning Taipei. A more 
4.10. Taihoku (Taipei) 
in1920. Source from 
Matsumoto and Hiseh, 
1990. 




inductive, rather than deductive, approach is necessary as Japan was not following planning customs 
handed down by many generations, as with Chinese city planning. Analysing Qing Taipei, the blend of 
traditional principles alongside new urban functions was apparent; Qing town planners were interpreting 
traditional town planning principles and it was easy to interpret deviations and the meaning of these 
deviations as there were so few. However, when traditional cultural forms became so difficult to see, 
when they were repressed in the formal city-scape, these principles can be found only through induction. 
Indeed, Japan did not have formal planning principles, as the first town planning legal regulations were 





Whilst these were the initial foundations of modern planning, embedded in the city was one of the most 
fundamental changes to life in Taipei. The change to the measurement and control of time was implicit in 
the urban planning, which fundamentally rearranged the circulation of the city. This approach to time 
was one of the main hooks of the Japanese modern movement as a planned and programmatic 
approach. The city walls had controlled the flow of the populace through curfews and checks in the Qing 
period. Time was measured by the gate guards who marked the passing hours by gongs. After the city 
wall was demolished in 1904, there were no curfews, no period to open and close the gates, and no gate 
4.11. Taihoku (Taipei) in 1920.  
(Courtesy of the National Central Library) 
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gongs. The gates previously functioned as a systematic mechanism to make the city and its populace 
ordered as the gates combined a time-controlling system with prevention of criminal activities forbidding 
illegal activities such as smuggling. The curfew had been a central part of daily routines for all citizens 
who visited or worked in walled cities. Instead of being localised and controlled, time became seen as 
subjective under the Japanese, as a result of the changing logic when the European time measurement 
system filtered through to Taiwan. The disbanding of the curfew and the gate system was part of the 
wider movement to make the city consistent with the overall systems and spaces present in Seiyō cities. 
 
From the perspective of Meiji Japan, Seiyō urban planning demanded the operation of Seiyō standard 
time measurements: these were first noted in Taiwan from 1860 when treaty ports were opened, but 
were never systematically implemented. Other landmarks arrived under Liu’s proto-modern policy of the 
Self-Strengthening Movement: time boundaries were reduced with the introduction of the postal system 
in 1888, the cablegram in 1888, and the railway system in 1893. Yet Greenwich Mean Time was 
introduced to Taiwan only under Japanese rule and from the earliest opportunity on 1st January 1896. 
The Japanese also introduced 24 hour days, replacing the ancient 12 double-hour system and 
implemented the 7 day week; prior to the Meiji period, Japan had used the same measurement system 
as China.100 Japan was the only Asian country at the ‘International Meridian Conference’ in 1884 and 
applied the international time standards in 1888. Yet Japan had already changed its time system to the 
‘Gregorian Calendar’ in 1872 (Lu, S., 1998: 27-28), four years after the Meiji Restoration, at a speed 
which demonstrated the desire to match Seiyō and assimilate Seiyō ways of thinking about time as a 
part of matching the stride of Seiyō through altering the flow of daily life.  
 
With the modern defined as ‘the current time’ following the European ideal of the modern to adopt 
Greenwich Mean Time, and conforming to a standardised time across the world was profoundly modern. 
Within Imperial Japan, this standardisation was assimilated mainly through the administration and 
education systems. Some vestiges of central management of time remained: rather than having gate 
gongs, the “noonday Gun” was fired at 11am (noon is 11am in Chinese) everyday from 27th June 1895 
until 1922 in order to assert the correct time, a technique used in mainland Japan since Meiji Year 2 
(1869). From 1906 accurate time was spread through wireless telegraphy at Taipei weather station 
(1897, fig 4.12) from Tokyo Observatory, and a complete timekeeping system was established through 
                                                   
100
 In ancient Chinese culture, marking time to order life rhythms conformed closely to religion and was mostly used for religious practices; 
after the Song dynasty (960-1279) lives became increasingly tied to time due to business activities and the centralised government. (Lu, S., 
1998: 6) The Chinese system of reckoning time was double-hours (two hours were a single unit) varying with the seasons. Each day started 
from 11pm until the Qing dynasty. Each double-hour was announced in towns using drums and (often elaborate) ceremonies. (Bedini, 1994: 
17) There was no standard time, as places had different times for sunset depending on geographical location. “The day was divided into 100 
quarters or k’o [Chi. 刻], each equivalent to 14 minutes and 24 seconds of Western time…with the adopting of western timekeeping in China 
in the seventeenth century, the k’o was established as the Western quarter-hour, or 15 minutes, and the minute as a fen.” (Bedini, 1994:14-15) 
There was no concept of a week in the Chinese traditional almanac but a xun (Chi. 旬) (10 days) was used as a unit comprising months, 
seasons and years. The working week was a concept that did not exist in Taiwan, officers would sometimes get time off at the end of three xun 
and feast days; there was no designated day of rest. In the Edo period, Japan also used the Chinese system of double-hours varying with 
seasons, and also designated hours by the Chinese signs of the Twelve Terrestrial Branches. (Bedini, 1994: 19) 
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weather stations, railway stations and post-telecommunications stations across the whole island in 1915. 
(Lu, S., 1998: 54) Time is used to place events in sequence one after the other, and we use time to 
compare how long events last: therefore changing solely to single hours and introducing the ‘week’ must 
have had a profound impact on daily lives in Taiwan, allowing, amongst other things, a new organisation 
of work timetables, strict times for schooling, and a well-functioning railway network which linked Taipei 
capital the rest of the island. Standard time was a key change for all the modern urban planning and 
nation-building. It altered the notion of China and the East as being somehow static and rooted in the 
past. Standardising time with the ‘civilised world’ was an essential foundation to help the modern mission 





This systematic character of urban planning led to the rapid development of Taipei, and Taipei 
developed very quickly with the population even doubling from 1905 to 1945. Taipei would follow a path 
later trodden by the colonialists in North East China: Japan “sought to lead Manchurian society in new 
directions through alterations to the built environment.” (Sewell, 2004: 235) Japan imposed modernity in 
their characteristic way in Taipei: efficiency and forward planning with traditions hidden, a colonial image 
with a Seiyō planning aesthetic for persuasion and impressing the natives, and the constant 
improvement and expansion of the capital. All these characteristics functioned to distinguish the 
Japanese from the ‘pre-modern’ Taiwanese native, reifying their superiority. However, whilst this 
overview of the city is helpful in uncovering general principles it is less helpful in understanding the 
meaning of the symbols used and the details of forms, spaces and functions that made up the city at the 
micro level which were urban uniforms: instituting kindai (modern) architecture. The following section 
looks at a range of architecture from Taipei to further analyse the meaning of the ‘modern’ in colonial 
Meiji Japan. 
4.12. Taipei Weather 
Station in 1905, 1897.  
(Courtesy of the Digital 
Archives of the National 
Central Library of Taiwan) 
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4.4 Emergence of modern institutions in the colonial capital 
Taipei was a colonial capital; a deliberately planned city built expressly to house the seat of Japanese 
imperial power. Power has ultimately to do with resources, and as scholars of architecture it is important 
to understand how and why an authority divides up its resources to create buildings within the city in 
order to understand how that power is articulated. (Markus, 1993: 23) In Qing Taipei, the organisation 
and commission of buildings within the enclosure of Taipei walled-city showed which types of buildings 
were more valuable, which building was given the highest status, and how the buildings can be 
understood as a group of Chinese building types. The system of administration expanded after Taipei 
became the provincial capital and included a Chinese walled-city’s essential functions: religious 
observance, education, administration and relief institutions (fig. 4.13) displaying the customary 
focus on the government yamen and integrated religious buildings within a walled compound. Besides 
the wall, the institutions within Taipei City constituted a large group of buildings, built close together as 








4.13. The development of authority buildings in Taiwan, 1897(Left: Japanese map) and 1945 (Right: American map). Redrawn from 
Li, Q., 2004 [1996] and from the U.S. Army Map service in 1945.  
(Courtesy of the National Taiwan Library) 
KEY 
Administrative institutions (Red); 
 Education institutions (Blue);  
Financial institutions (Light Green);  
Public Facilities (Orange); 
Religious institutions (Dark Green); 
Commercial Institutions (Purple). 
 321 
Under Japan, Taipei developed from possessing only four essential institutions in the Qing period to 
seven public institutions in the colonial capital: education, public, military, administration, commerce, 
finance and religious institutions (fig. 4.13). The drive to be ‘open’ to change, a definition of civilised in 
Japanese, was present within the urban planning activities, particularly for those public buildings built 
before the citizens understood how to perform within them. Yet, it is important to understand the ways of 
behaviour within the urban setting, and how individual feats of architecture and engineering linked the 
city together. This will aid understanding of the reasons and effects of Japan establishing new building 
types, in order to comprehend the character of the imperial power which gave the kindai (modern) 
flavour of Japan’s new territory. 
 
 
Establishing new building types 
An enormous number of new types of buildings were built in Taipei during the colonial period, including 
hospitals, market halls, theatres, assembly halls, museums, parks, hotels, monopoly buildings, business 
offices, post offices, banks, elementary schools, universities, research stations, a Governor-General’s 
Office and official residences, courts, prisons, and police offices. This use of new building types was a 
continuation of a long trend begun at the start of the Meiji period. At this point, the Japanese sought 
immediate changes in the use of urban space, as explained by Toshio Watanabe (1996):  
 
“The new government urgently needed new types of buildings for both practical and 
ideological reasons. From a practical point of view, some buildings were needed to house 
completely new activities, such as a university in which students would be taught subjects 
including modern technology and social sciences. Others were needed for institutions that 
were now understood and organized differently, such as the mint in which a new national 
currency was produced to supersede the old regional currencies.” (Watanabe, 1996: 22)  
 
In addition to the need for new forms and functions, the scale of public buildings in Seiyō was also 
important: “large, imposing modern edifices would impress upon the Japanese people the power and 
stability of the new regime. To build a modern nation, modern buildings were needed.” (Watanabe, 1996: 
22) By 1895 Japanese authorities had nearly 30 years of experience commissioning and constructing 
these types of buildings, even though TATSUNO Kingo’s first major building, the Bank of Japan, had 
only been built that year. As was typical for Meiji Japan, the prestige of Seiyō building forms is extremely 
significant: first, as it demonstrated the elevation of foreign forms above Japanese styles for important 
government-built buildings, and second, because the Japanese used their buildings to raise their own 
status in world affairs, particularly for the purpose of renegotiating unequal trade treaties. (Sorenson, 
2002: 63) This search for international prestige and equality with Seiyō was behind Japan’s colonisation 
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of Taiwan itself. In Taiwan, as in other Japanese imperial possessions, the urban form was not only 
intended to raise Japan to the level of the Great Powers of the day, it was also used to raise Japan above 
the status of the natives.  
 
According to the Kodama, the joint founder of Taiwan’s modern development under Japanese rule, one 
of the most important construction targets was to establish a ‘Taiwan Shrine’. Kodama “believed the 
purpose of the ‘Taiwan Shrine’ was to unify the people’s consciousness.” (Sogawa, 1936: 337) The 
influence on consciousness through religion connotes the relationship between the mind of subjects and 
God, which since Meiji Japan had been Amaterasu, a major deity of the Shinto religion (rather than 
Buddhist deities). The prioritisation of a Taiwan Shrine by Kodama was an indication of how religion 
quickly became a public as well as a private concern with the nationalism in the early Meiji period. In a 
sign of the link between religion and the Japanese nation, the first Shrine in the capital Taipei101 was the 
Taiwan (Shinto) Shrine (Jap. 台湾神社, fig. 4.14) which was built to commemorate and deify Prince 
Kitashirakawa Yoshihisa (Jap. 北白川宮能久親王, 1847-1895) the first member of the Imperial family to 
die abroad, of malaria during the invasion of Taiwan in 1895. This was an Imperial shrine (Jap. 官幣大
社) venerated by the imperial family, the highest level on the hierarchy of Shinto Shrines. The structure 




The construction was built by the traditional craftsmen of the Miyadaiku (shrine and temple carpenters) 
led by KIGO Kiyoyoshi who worked for the Imperial Household as well as teaching at the Imperial 
University. ITŌ Chūta, whose work in Japan was to become a foundation for defining kindai architecture 
discussed in Section 3.6, was hired for the design following his formulation of the Ancient Temples and 
                                                   
101
 The first Shrine in Taiwan was Kanshan Shrine in Tainan (1897) which was adapted from the Qing Kaishan Temple. 
4.14. Taiwan Shrine, 
1901. Source from 
Matsumoto and Hiseh, 
1990. 
(Courtesy of the National 
Central Library) 
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Shrines Preservation Law of 1897 in Japan. Compared to the new Office and Official Residence of the 
Taiwan Governor-General (explored in Chapter 5), building the Taiwan Shrine was a more familiar 
exercise for the Japanese, taking only seven months rather than seven years to build (Feb 1901 to Sep 
1901) in spite of Itō’s inexperience. The construction of the Taiwan Shrine, the Taiwan 
Governor-General’s Official Residence and his Office were to play the most significant roles in the 
reorganisation of Taipei as a Japanese colonial city: the priority of modern constructions was instituted 
with class and power in both religious and secular buildings.  
 
In 1896, the site for the Taiwan Shrine was chosen, designated to be near the Chintan Chinese Temple 
(fig. 4.15) which had been on the site of the northern suburb beyond Taipei city wall. According to data in 
Section 4.3, Japanese city planning in Taipei operated under the principle that only kindai (modern) 
institutions should exhibited in the public and central area: as it represented tradition, the shrine was 
split off from the government centre in the northern suburb, closer to the natural environment. 
Additionally, according to Aoi, “The site for the shrine was kept away out of thought and raised halfway 
up Mt. Chintan because the shrine required both pure natural landscape and correspondence with the 
urban area.” (Aoi, 1999: 237) Whilst many national religious monuments such as the Tokugawa Shogun 
tomb in Nikko were often built in natural surroundings, it had also been common to have Buddhist 
temples and Shinto shrines within urban areas; what is telling is that this isolated shrine was the only 
major temple or shrine built in Taipei, and it was built outside the centre, out of thought and functioning 




The Shrine was also located close to a new public and open institution, as the first park (Maruyama Park 
1897) in Taipei was established immediately to the south of it across the river. (fig. 4.16) This park was 
later followed by three other parks over the next 25 years: an oval-shaped Park (1904) which replaced 
the West Gate, Taipei New Park (1908) in the central inter-mural area, and a Botanical Garden (1921) 
4.15. Chintan Chinese Temple.  
(Courtesy of the Digital 
Archives of the National 
Central Library of Taiwan) 
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outside the southern east city wall near the Japanese residential area. After the Taiwan Shrine was 
finished in 1901, another feast day was added to the calendar: the Taiwan Shrine Festival on the 28th 
October. In this way the Japanese administrators linked architecture with festivals, which were one of 
the main expressions of cultural belonging in Taiwan, thus skillfully integrating the Japanese policies 
within Taiwan. Every year on this feast day the Taiwan Governor-General and his staff took a ceremonial 
route together, past the site reserved for the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office, Taipei New Park, and 
the Taiwan Governor-General’s Official Residence, along the eastern wall, north through the city to the 
Shrine. This route linked the highest level of kindai (modern) institutions which were exhibited in the 
public and central area to the highest traditional institution in Taiwan, hidden in the north. (fig. 4.17) The 
road constructed for the pilgrimage to the Taiwan shrine was named Chokushi Street (Jap. 勅使街道, lit. 
Imperial envoy) and was nearly fifteen meters in width with acacias planted to the sides. Given its grand 
name, it was the first gravel style road and a symbol of the modern; it was extended later to connect to 
the east side of Taipei city after the wall was demolished in 1904. This road built on innovations by Liu in 
Qing period, who paved most of Taipei’s roads and made sure that all at least had smooth lines of stone 
paving to ease transportation. 
 
4.17. (Right) The route to the 
Taiwan Shrine passing by: A) the 
reserved area for the Taiwan 
Governor-General’s Office, B) the 
reserved area for the Residence 
of the District Executive, C) the 
reserved area for Taipei New 
Park, and D) the reserved area for 
the Official Residence of the 
4.16. (Left) The Plan 
of the Taiwan Shrine 
in 1896. Adapted 
from Aoi, 1999. 
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‘In another incremental improvement from Liu, in order to connect the Chokushi Street with the site, Liu’s 
first Railway Bridge (1889) in Taipei was improved upon and an iron bridge was constructed by a 
technician of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office: SOGAWA Katarō (Jap. 十川嘉太郎). Named the 
‘Meiji bridge’, the bridge had an iron truss structure with wooden decking; it was decorated with a 
fan-shaped hollow-carved decorative railing (fig. 4.18). After the bridge the road connected with the 
sandō (Jap. 参道) which was the road approaching the Shrine after the first tori (Jap. 鳥鳥, gate). This 
route was planned to fit in with an important element of ‘modern’ transport as it continued Liu’s railway 
line from Taipei city, a rail line which ran alongside it to a station (Marayama) which lay nearby. Thus the 
symbolically important sites, secular and religious, were all accounted for by the route to the primary 




Yet before the Taiwan Shrine was completed to ‘unify the people’s consciousness’ the most urgent 
institution was more practical: a place of punishment, vital given the strong initial resistance to Japanese 
rule. Taipei prison represented the beginning of the colonial period of social control and was the first 
kindai prison in Taiwan. It was built in the early stages of 1899 with a large site of around 16,800m2 
located just off the Eastern gate behind the quarters of the Artillery and Infantry Regiments. The prison 
had a similar size but more advanced equipment than Sugamo Prison in the mainland capital Tokyo 
(Taiwan Daily News, 1904). This modern prison was exhibited in the public and in a central area of 
Taipei. The development of prisons represented a lasting trend in the transition from Qing administration 
to Meiji Japanese: modernising by spreading old functions into new buildings. A similar prison function 
had been held within a small section of the Chinese government yamen. However this area was not 
known as a ‘prison’ but functioned as a temporary area before sentencing (with the main punishments 
being the death penalty or exile as jails did not exist).  
4.18. The Meiji Bridge in 1901. 
Source from Matsumoto and 
Hiseh, 1990. 




Prisons were strongly related to modernisation in Japan from the Meiji Restoration onwards. A prison 
system had begun following the writing of Kangokusoku (Jap. 監獄則, lit Prison regulations, written in 
1872) by OHARA Shigeya. The timing of this meant that when Prison Regulations were promulgated, 
Thomas Waters’s plans for the Ginza ‘bricktown’ had just been made public and from this point onwards, 
stone or brick was preferred for the construction of prisons. (Maeda, 2004: 32) Taipei prison was built 
using recycled building materials from Taipei city wall and was established with advanced kindai 
(modern) facilities, particularly sanitary equipment which had running tap water (fig. 4.19). These 
functions were uncommon in Taiwan at that time to the extent that it can be said that the prison’s high 
level facilities, including flush toilets, were more advanced than could be found in the city itself. (Chen, 
Q., 2005: 159) Moreover, the prison had a further connection with later architecture as the services of 
the criminal prisoners were engaged in the production in the brickyard located in the East of prison; 
prisoners made a contribution to the construction industry to make a ‘kindai city’ at that time, the 
brickworks being a vital function to allow the city to grow rather than only be altered from within using 
existing materials.  
 
 
This two-level brick and stone building, surrounded by three metres high walls, was built using material 
from the walls of the many Taipei yamens and echoed the controlled enclosure of a Chinese walled-city, 
but in fact was fundamentally representing modernity to the colonial administrators. In contrast with the 
previous yamen-based system, this Seiyō-style prison was made into a separate building and was 
modelled on the Pennsylvania system, which itself used the ideas of the British Utilitarian, Jeremy 
Bentham. The prison design used the principles of Bentham’s Panopticon, as seen in the plan below (fig. 
4.20), intended to allow perfect control of the prisoners. This prison type was also popular in Europe and 
was a new model at the time. Although according to Maeda it is not possible to know whether Ohara 
4.19. Interior of the Taipei 
Prison, 1906. Source from 
Chen, Q., 2005. 
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knew of Bentham’s existence when he wrote the Prison Regulations, “it is precisely the principle of the 
Panopticon that is here put into play.” (Maeda, 2004: 35) Maeda claimed that the prison’s principle 
underlay the whole centralisation of government in Japan following the Meiji Restoration: “This method 
of grasping space, appropriately captured by the translation phrase “seeing everything at a glance” 
[ichimoku doshi], does not stop only at the organizing principle of the prison but shapes a hidden context 





In order to establish Taipei alongside similar colonial capitals across Asia, Japan revolutionised the 
functions in Taipei, inventing public, commercial and financial functions, and greatly reducing the 
number of sacred spaces during the colonial period. Unlike Edo palaces, administrative functions were 
split across multiple sites. Whilst under Chinese rule the main yamen accommodated all functions to 
govern the area of responsibility as well as including a residence for the top official, the Japanese 
authorities split functions such as law courts and residence from the old administrative building. In 
addition to other changes, such as the creation of new types of buildings, the reduction in religious 
spaces was a great difference between the two plans, from three out of 13 buildings in 1895 to one out of 
48 buildings in 1945. Sacred spaces were few in the planned ‘kindai spaces (although many were 
located in suburbs) and generally they were limited to a small shrine or portrait of the emperor in offices 
and schools (see Section 5.2).  
 
Modernity lay in a rational approach to architecture and planning; foreign visitors such as Owen Rutter 
(1923) presumably proclaimed Taipei to be a ‘modern capital’ because it possessed the functions a 
European city would be expected to have at the time. This borrowing of Seiyō bureaucratic functions 
echoes Otto Wagner’s notion of Modern Architecture. Wagner stated in 1902 that ‘Reason’ should 
4.20. The Plan of Taipei 
Prison 1899-1906. 
Adapted from U.S. Army 
Map service, 1945.  




influence architecture to bring it into line with scientific trends, with new materials and functions, to join 
architecture with the wider programme of modernisation, that is, to fit construction with the demands of 
the present (whatever these were perceived to be). Looking to European cities and replicating their 
functions served the purpose of fitting the demands of the present for the Japanese colonial authority. 
 
In a trend that harked back to nation building in Japan, the colonial administrators ensured that official 
institutions were first established and contained in the centre of the capital, yet as befitting the subject of 
imperialism, these buildings can also be seen as a reification of progress through domination: 
institutions of colonial expansion. According to their early experience of Seiyō superiority through the 
‘contact zone’ established by Perry’s Black Ships, from the Bakumatsu era to the Meiji, colonial modern 
institutions were not merely authority buildings, but were active ingredients in transculturation and 
identity formation: buildings that housed new functions, that were aesthetically new for Taiwanese, that 
were made using new technology and with new materials. Not only this, but the buildings were the result 
of a social scientific approach by GOTŌ Shinpei, which was instrumental in ensuring gradual control of 
Japan’s colonial subjects.  
 
In order to give meaning to these new functions, the Japanese made fundamental changes to their 
Taiwanese subjects’ lives with adoption of modern time measurement in order to utilise these new 
functions properly as outlined above. A working week timetable formulated by the Taiwan 
Governor-General’s Office for officers ran from 8am to noon and 2pm to 4pm everyday apart from 
Sunday afternoon, which was allowed off.102 Yet these time routines were effective only for officials not 
labourers (mainly Taiwanese) who were rarely given weekends in their working schedules. There were 
ten days of public holidays (described as Japanese feast days) per year and one additional day after the 
Meiji emperor died in 1912. The colonial government focused not only on administration but also saw 
educational institutions as a main priority and inevitably this revolution of time and control reached 
beyond bureaucratic routinisation, also infiltrating in the school system. Most obviously there were 
summer holidays for students as in Seiyō educational tradition as well as strict daily timetables. Prior to 
Japan’s arrival, Taipei had several educational buildings for officials preparing for imperial exams,103 
these buildings were retained by the Japanese, and the Foreign Language School was prominently 
                                                   
102
 Due to the tropical hot weather in Taiwan, the time routine changed several times, for there was no air conditioning. The time routine was 
very complicated until Gotō simplified it in 1899: working time from May to September was 8am to noon and from October to April was 9am to 
4pm. (Lu, S., 1998: 58) 
 
103
 There were three different types of educational institutions in Qing Taipei: Academy Halls (Chi. 學宮), Classical learning institutes (Chi.書
院) and new style learning institutes (Chi. 新式學堂). The Confucius temple always contained an education institution and was used by the 
governors to demonstrate their high grasp of classical Chinese culture. The government education buildings’ functions were mainly for 
examinations, not for teaching; therefore study halls (Chi. 明道書院) were located nearby to support the examination halls (Chi. 考棚). In 
addition to these traditional types there was the first of a new style of study hall in Taiwan: the native learning institution (Chi. 番學堂) where 
officials learnt about the local customs and etiquette, and the foreign language study hall (Chi. 西學堂) where officials learnt mathematics, 
measuring and manufacture. 
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shown on Japanese maps, but the educational buildings built after 1895 went far beyond what was 
previously extant. Indeed, all the buildings that are educational or aimed at expanding knowledge make 
up a staggering amount for the centre of a capital city.104 
 
The commitment to (and perceived achievement of) progress in masonry architecture was a key aspect 
of how the Japanese authority viewed time and modernity during this period: it constituted an existential 
realignment with Seiyō, and a temporal split with Tōyō. Reform of time measurement pushed Japan 
towards universal linear time along Seiyō lines. The strong influence of social Darwinism on Japanese 
government officials and intellectuals was embodied in the biological politics of GOTŌ Shinpei, with his 
strong belief in progress made real in setting up appropriate government functions. This was another 
instance of the conceptual framework of Seiyō states being adopted and then readjusted when 
implemented in Taiwan to make it acceptably ‘Japanese’. 
 
With such governmentality, alongside the restructuring of working time, Taipei city saw a revolution in 
new building functions. During the Meiji period, the link between form and function became increasingly 
explicit and resulted in the idea of a building type for government buildings often being utilised following 
Seiyō traditions. Building types had long been common in the Europe where design guides had been 
used since the Renaissance to describe how to construct a type of building. (Markus, 1993: 19) In the 
early decades of Meiji rule, these types were not closely adhered to: according to the design guides, a 
bank would not look like a large temple like the First Mitsui bank in the Section 3.2; a villa form would not 
be used for a merchandise hall or a national bank like Hokkaidō Sales Hall in Section 3.4. This situation 
was unsuitable for the elite ideology in Japan to appear civilised; for creating their progressive functions 
the new national institutions required corresponding forms. Eventually, proficiency in modelling this new 
tradition improved after the first Japanese architects began constructing large buildings after 1890, and 
began the spread of authentic-looking Seiyō buildings throughout the cityscape. 
 
As with early Meiji carpenters, in Qing Taipei, buildings with new functions (such as the railway) were 
built in a generalised ‘Foreign’ style, but the Japanese architects who built colonial Taipei were more 
sensitive and adept in their use of building types than Qing carpenters. The range of functions increased 
as shown in Section 4.3, and the forms used were usually suitable for their respective function, for 
instance the Taiwan Governor-General's Museum, modeled on the British Museum, and Taipei prison 
modeled on Pennsylvania State. As symbols of the nation in Victorian Britain (such as the Houses of 
Parliament) were often built in Gothic Revival style, buildings which were national symbols were 
constructed in ‘Tatsuno style’. For instance, most Taipei University buildings were also constructed in 
                                                   
104
 The value placed on education is further shown in official documents: reporting on the ratio of schools to houses in Taiwan, there was only 
one school per 2000 houses in 1910 but this increased to one school per 700 houses by 1920. (Lu, S., 1998: 82-83) 
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Renaissance style of red brick and stone “celebrating their [Japan’s] colonial aspirations.” (Allen, 2000: 
15). This style was seen throughout Taipei to a remarkable extent: in the Taipei Train Station (1901), 
Taipei Municipal Offices (1915), the Monopoly Bureau (1913-1922), and the Taiwan Governor-General’s 
Official Residence (1901), as well as minor buildings such as the official newspaper office (1908), the 
Taiwan Railway hotel (1908); and most famously in the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office (1919) which 
was the largest and tallest building built by the Japanese in Taiwan.  
 
 
The emergence of unprecedented open public spaces 
Through adopting time routines in work and education, the idea of leisure was created: if there was a 
clear and allocated working week, the remaining time would be free time, especially for officials. The 
possibility for leisure activities was represented in urban planning and the land utilised for the Taipei 
Park (1908), the Taiwan Governor’s library (1908), the west gate market (1908), and a theatre at the 
west gate (1911) of Taipei city for the public’s use during their leisure time. In addition, a sports ground 
(1923) and a department store (1932) were the foremost present in Taipei; the Japanese authorities 
created many parks (23 in total), gardens and zoos, often grand in scale, creating a new concept of 
public space to be used by citizens. Furthermore, national parks (made official in 1937) occupied 13 
percent of Taiwan and were promoted as leisure destinations. The Japanese government intended to 
create a leisure environment very carefully to show the positive aspects of their colony; in order to 
celebrate Taiwan being under Japanese rule for 20 years, the Governor-General decided to have the 
first industrial fair ‘Taiwan Industrial Mutual-Progress Fair’ in 1916 at the Taiwan Governor-General’s 
Office to promote and reward industry, attract mainland Japanese to Taiwan as tourists and as migrants, 
and to project Taiwan as a rich property of the Great Japanese Empire, and thus to consolidate 
Japanese colonial policy. This exhibition was well attended by both colonial masters and subjects, and is 
examined in Chapter 5.3.  
 
Leisure spaces were extended to become part of the tourist industry which was developed after the 
railway system was established in 1898, linking the north of Taiwan with the south; this cut down the 
travel time to a half a day instead of 11 days of walking as in the Qing period. (Lu, S., 1998: 94) The 
railway system was needed when travelling to those leisure places which were also the outcome of the 
standard time routine. The Taiwan railway was begun by Liu; the first line was finished in 1891 with 28.6 
km from Dadaocheng (north of Taipei city wall) to Keelung (North Taiwan). In 1893 the railway 
connected Dadaocheng to Hsinchu with a 78.1km line, giving 106.8 km of continuous railway line in total, 
which crossed 74 bridges and 568 tunnels. This was the first passenger railway in the whole of China. 
Yet these new technologies introduced by the Chinese were seen as of poor quality by the Japanese 
colonialists, whose country had opened their first railway line twenty years earlier between Tokyo 
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(Shinbashi) and Yokohama in 1872. (Shibata, 2008: 9) Therefore the Japanese spent ten years 
reconstructing a North-South longitudinal railway based on the Qing railway from south to north along 
the whole of the west of the island; the line was 404.2km long when complete, finished in 1908 (fig. 4.21) 





Japan focused much energy on creating leisure spaces, one of the most important being parks. In what 
were the vast open spaces of 1895 Taipei, many parks, gardens and a zoo were subsequently built, 
often grand in scale. In the Chinese and Japanese customs, there had never been ‘parks’ as a public 
space (though ‘gardens’ as a private space were common). (Chen, Q., 2005: 154) Traditionally, the only 
public spaces in an urban area were normally in the temple plaza: temple grounds were a considerably 
more public space than others around Chinese cities, and the construction of a temple in that open area 
was an invitation for Taiwanese to engage in public activities. (Allen, 2007: 163) It was not only the case 
in colonial Taipei that religious spaces were converted into secular ones: most Seiyō style parks in 
Japan and Taiwan had previously been temple areas.  
 
In Japan, the earliest parks were all transformed from temple spaces, for instance the first park in Japan 
was Ueno Park which used to be Kanei Temple (Jap. 寛永寺); Asakusa park used to be Asakusa temple 
(Jap. 浅草寺). In Taipei, the largest park was also one of the first foreign style parks in East Asia outside 
Japan: Taipei New Park (1908) occupied about 10 percent of the intra-mural space of Taipei which 
followed the spatial plan and function of Tokyo Hibiya Park (1903) near Tokyo’s government district. 
Taipei New Park was a relatively open space with an open-air performance stage, fountain, and pavilion 
with a Western garden which was adjacent to a Japanese garden, hidden in the north-western area. Two 
typical life-size bronze statues stood in the park of KODAMA Gentarō (1906, fig. 4.22) and GOTŌ 
Shinpei (1911). This was a Seiyō idea, as statues of real people did not exist in customary Chinese or 
Japanese culture. (Chen, Q., 2005: 146)  




Unlike urban parks designed in Europe and America, which were purposefully attempting to recreate a 
natural environment, the central park in Taipei, in common with most parks built in East Asia, was 
pacifistically designed for the city environment. (Allen, 2007: 160) The area of Taipei New Park was 
71,520 square meters at its initial completion in 1908 (fig. 4. 23), and was later extended to include the 
Gotō and Kodama Memorial Hall, later known as the Taiwan Governor-General's Museum (now 
National Taiwan museum, fig. 4.24) with a sports ground in 1915 and an open-air performance stage 
(figs. 4.25 and 4.26). Yet whilst these public spaces were created, few citizens had sufficient exposure to 
Seiyō cities to understand how parks should be used. 
 
     
4.23. (Left) Detail of 
Taipei Park in 1911 









4.24. (Right) Detail of 
Taipei Park in 1918 
map. Source from 
Wei and Gao, 2005. 
4.22. Kodama’s stone statue in 
the Taipei Park, 1908. 
(Courtesy of the Digital 
Archives of the National 








Monumental persuasion in the new territory 
As was common during the same period in Europe and America, the Taiwan Governor-General's 
Museum (fig. 4.27) was designed in the prevalent Grecian/Roman revival style. This museum was built 
to commemorate the completion of the first north-south longitudinal railway in 1908 and housed over 
10,000 artifacts on Taiwan. The museum was relocated to the new building in Taipei Park in 1915. For 
Joseph Allen, “The building represents, in both form and content, an early example of a mock-European 
built space in the public sphere, and it helps configure the park as one of the most important sites for the 
display of colonization and colonial power.” (Allen, 2007: 187) Compared to the British museum (fig. 
4.28), as well as many other museums built in Europe in this period, it is obvious that the museum was 
purposefully classical in its façade. The cultural meaning is that museums often have ancient artifacts 
and therefore the architecture harks back to antiquity. Given that Japan does not have a shared Greek 
and Roman historical background, the architect was therefore copying cultural traditions with an 
invented relevance to Meiji Japan. In content, the Taiwan Governor-General's Museum focused on the 
culture and nature of Taiwan rather than the Japanese ‘motherland’. (Terry, 1923: 779) In such ways, 
Japan subtlety demonstrated her tolerance and recognition of the Chinese origins of the populace. This 
attitude was designed to mollify the colonial subjects and can therefore be seen as another persuasive 
tactic of the authorities. 
4.26. Sports Ground. 




(Courtesy of the Digital 
Archives of the 
National Central 





The Japanese planning in this period was characterised by the distinctive ‘Japanese’ motivations behind 
deciding which buildings to construct and which functions were prioritised. Whilst banks, museums and 
markets were of demarked Seiyō origin, buildings which had a foundation in Japanese culture, such as 
the value of education and learning, were overly represented, hence the disproportionate number of 
educational and research buildings in and around the inter-mural area. (Sorenson, 2002: 71) In addition, 
almost all building projects were centrally planned and, therefore, government built, continuing the Meiji 
attribute of the overwhelming power of the central government. (Sorenson, 2002: 81) Pyle (1998) 
suggests that Japan’s modernisation did not assimilate Euro-American values, but further enhanced 
some existing values (education and science, as seen above) and paid little attention to values in the 
Euro-American liberal tradition. Whilst this might be overstated given the early cultural adoption of 
institutions and policies in the Meiji era, Pyle’s argument is compelling for challenging the customary 
assumption that modernisation is a linear, uniform process rather than a more complex iterative process 
with its base in Western values.  
 
Gotō’s principle of persuasion was also clear in the city of early Taipei. Being Japan’s first major colonial 
property, Japan took advice from existing colonial powers, and in the cityscape of Taipei, the prestige 
component is clear. There were therefore a great number of large, impressive buildings, such as the 
This image can be seen in the printed thesis at the University of Sheffield library. 
 
4.27. NOMURA Ichirou: 
The Taiwan 
Governor-General’s 
Museum, 1915. Source 















4.28. The British 
Museum (1753). 




largest hospital in East Asia and the Taiwan Governor-General's Museum, which was shown in 
postcards and posters across the island. This policy of creating monuments was underlined by the 
Japanese opinion that “our Chinese and Formosan subjects are very materialistic, seeing nothing great 
save in the glitter of gold.” (Takekoshi, 1907: 34) Such monumental buildings enhanced the image of the 
Japanese authority in Taiwan which became a principal attribute of government-built buildings in Taipei.  
 
Whilst new functions and spaces were developed in Taipei, the Chinese heritage was crystallised in time, 
though stripped of former ceremonies and meanings. Important Chinese buildings were not demolished 
until it was necessary: as shown in Section 5.2 the final Chinese yamen fell out of use in 1919 with the 
building of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office, yet it was not demolished until 1932, and even then 
parts of the yamen were moved and conserved in the Taipei botanical gardens to this day. (Allen, 2000: 
12) As for the gates, preserved without function, these became incorporated into the city plan, with 
boulevards running alongside where the walls had been which once structured the lives and time 
routines of the populace. In this, “we have the standard pattern of modernization.” (Allen, 2000: 11)  
 
This crystalising of traditions was in complete contrast to the city planning of Qing Taipei, where forms, 
aesthetics, functions and spaces had continued to use customary notions of the sacred, particularly in 
regard to government officials. The building types largely reflected the Chinese idiom, as natives and 
mainland officials continued in their customary ways of life even after the Opium Wars and treaty ports 
were established. Chinese modernity then was largely self-reflective: piecemeal attempts were made to 
reform, but as a long term contact zone was not established with requisite elite for transculturation, the 
self-strengthening movement was much vaguer in terms of what needed to be done to face the threat of 
the Great Powers of Seiyō. Whilst traditional planning was systematically applied in the Qing period, no 
future city plans were produced, only maps of the existing city. From the evidence of the attempts and 
groundwork in modernisation presented above, it would be disingenuous to say that in Taipei, actual 
development began after the Japanese began to govern Taiwan in 1895. However the modernisation 
before Japan’s arrival had been limited by the restraints of Chinese culture. 
 
The purpose of endowing the capital with a distinctive façade to display the goals and values of the state 
could be seen in Taipei. The façade was one of modernity, of a populace which engaged in modern 
leisure activities, and where sacred spaces could not be found easily within the city. With the scrapping 
of the curfew and institutionalising of time and calendars, routinisation of daily life occurred through new 
measurements of time. This was done with the pragmatic fervor of early Meiji Japan still present in spirit, 
using the safer approach of adoption of Seiyō institutions: “In order to create national wealth and 
establish a modern army in the shortest period of time, there were not many options available to new 
leaders other than importing Western technologies and incubating modern industries.” (Shibata, 2008: 
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5) As a result, ideas and practices were not clearly separated, which had a large impact on the 
cityscape; Taipei contained numerous parks and leisure facilities and all the spaces that constituted a 
modern capital from what Japanese planners understood to be Seiyō criteria. Yet given the history of 
public spaces in Japan and China, few people knew how to use such spaces, and parallel concepts for 
areas such as parks developed. The building revolution in Taihoku came from the conviction of the 
Japanese authorities to create a modern city, rather than a city that matched the lives and practices of 






The Japanese principles are notable for their pragmatism and syncretic variety whilst the Chinese Taipei 
principles are notable for their common theme; Chinese planning in Taipei was concerned with culturally 
connecting Taipei with its Chinese heritage in the context of technical innovation. Indeed, the overall 
principle in the Qing period was to continue traditional town planning; for illustration, see the evidence of 
axiality, courtyards and walled enclosures. However in the Japanese period a number of principles 
competed and no single principle controlled the others. There was, therefore much less diversity of 
principles in the Qing era, whilst the Japanese period was rife in contradictions. 
 
It is obvious from comparing fig. 4.13 that the Japanese administrators built a much wider variety of 
buildings than the Qing period. A major reason for this is that the Self Strengthening Movement had a 
very different internal context to the Meiji revolution. The Meiji Restoration was initiated and fully 
supported by the (new) governing body and the spiritual leadership of the emperor, whereas the 
Self-Strengthening Movement was begun by dissidents and continued as a peripheral activity for a 
limited amount of time and with limited aims. This is mirrored in the evidence in Taipei: LIU Ming-Chuan’s 
modernisation efforts were not fully supported in Beijing, received little investment, and after only four 
years of governorship, Liu was replaced by a more placid governor. In contrast, the Japanese Civil 
Administrator who modernised the city the most, GOTŌ Shinpei, was widely appreciated by the 
Japanese authorities, allowed to plan the city with a free hand, and had a statue built in his honour in 
Taipei New Park. This central support meant that the Japanese were able to do much farther reaching 
reforms of the city than China was able to do.  
 
In spite of these differences there were several commonalities between the two initial modernising 
periods. Increasing the status of the city was important for both authorities and for similar reasons: Qing 
Taipei had been recently named as the new province’s capital, and Japanese Taipei was the capital of 
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Japan’s first major colonial property. Another more subtle commonality was that, against expectations, 
Japan also attempted to continue with its traditional priorities. Education and scientific buildings were 
overrepresented in comparison to other building types, particularly the education of children. From 
Dutch learning in the 1600s, Japan had been open to foreign science (especially medicine) and a 
greater proportion of Japanese were educated than Chinese. These customary concerns were evident 
in Japanese Taipei, with eleven education and research institutions in the city centre, including a primary 
school in the intramural area.  
 
However, despite the continuation of tradition in these ways, both Japan and China were forced into 
what I call ‘protective modernisation’ due to the threat of Seiyō. Whilst Japan fundamentally changed its 
building types, Qing modernisation was not far reaching. This was understood by Hobsbawm (1975) to 
be because the Qing was able yet unwilling to match Seiyō on Seiyō’s terms, whilst the Meiji 
administrators were possessed of both the capability and the acceptance that their cultural values 
should be compromised. In Taipei, of the five education buildings in Qing Taipei’s intramural area, only 
one was related to foreign learning and this was only concerning language. So the basics of 
Euro-American technology were disallowed from education, and the fundamental prerequisite of 
modernisation was not supported by modernisation philosophy. Although both countries were 
concerned at the rise of Seiyō power, only one country, Japan, wished to join these powers, albeit as a 
wary peer. Whilst both regimes promoted the newly important status of Taipei, in the Qing period this 
status was within China and in terms understood by other Chinese, as illustrated by building square 
rather than rounded walls. Japan’s concern with status was in elevating Japan’s status within the world, 
to revise Japan’s unfair trade agreements and to be accepted as a world power, and it did so through a 
demonstration of technical ability and building Seiyō style buildings and several monuments. In contrast, 
the underlying Chinese belief that it was culturally superior to all other countries meant that such 
concerns with international status were irrelevant, and ultimately it meant that China in the late 19th 
century was unable to fully tackle modernisation.  
 
As could also be seen in Section 4.1, landmark buildings of the Japanese colonial period were crucial in 
bringing together the three major trends of Japanese modernisation: conceptual revolution, 
centralisation of power, and the construction of new boundaries, both physical and metaphorical. These 










A symbol of dual modernity: the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office 
 
 
“The architectural styles changed rapidly following Moriyama’s emergence, which heralded 
the coming of the second period [of change, 1909-1914].... The old systems were changed 
into new styles as the Engineering Bureau of the Government of Formosa was also new. 
Architecture in Taiwan was totally changed after the project of the new Office of 
Governor-General began at the start of the Taisho period and later entered the period of 
the Taiwan Industrial Exhibition [1916]. Everything changed from an old to a new system 
which was shown with the industrial harvesting of cypress trees on Mount Ali and the 
wholly open railway system [which enabled exporting the wood]. The [First] World War 
happened soon afterwards, which began an era when nothing was constrained and we 
could extend ourselves. In other words, [because of the foundation of 1909-1914] we could 
then enter adolescence.” from IDE Kaoru (Jap. 井手薰, 1879-1944),105 the Construction 
Director of Civil Construction and Maintenance Division of the Taiwan Governor-General’s 
Office from 1914. (Ide et al, 1944: 37, translated by Author)  
 
In the first ‘symposium on the transformation of architecture after colonial regime change’ at Taiwan 
Railway Hotel on 10th April 1943, the Japanese architects’ consensus was that the golden period of 
colonial architecture in Taiwan had been between Meiji 42 (1909) and the outbreak of First World War 
(1918). For these colonial architects, Taiwan’s architecture was at its most magnificent during a 
decade-long period, significantly between two wars both won by the Japanese. After the 
Russo-Japanese war and the beginning of the rule of the sixth Governor-General, SAKUMA Samata 
(Jap. 佐久間左馬太, 1844-1915), Japanese authorities started a large scale construction campaign 
focused on institutions for ruling Taiwan, funded by a large increase in the budget of the Taiwan 
Governor. Besides the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office, all the major city halls in Taiwan, the 
Monopoly Bureau Building, a major restoration of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Official Residence, 
and many other official buildings were all constructed at this time. Due to a consistent theme in the style 
and material of these buildings, the period was named the Brick Era, (Ide et al, 1943: 38) as brick and 
tile were replacing wooden buildings, some of which had been eroded by termites. From this period 
onwards, colonial Taiwan architecture came of age, flourishing with what the Japanese coined as ‘new 
                                                   
105
 Ide had graduated from the architecture department of Imperial Tokyo University in 1907 under Tatsuno. He worked at Tatsuno’s office 
from 1907-1909 in Tokyo and was entrusted as a technician of the Central Construction and Maintenance Division from 1911. In August 1914 
Ide was promoted as Construction Director yet when the main construction was nearly completed. From 1923 to 1940 Ide was promoted to 
head the Construction and Maintenance Division, and served the longest as its head. He was also the chairman of The Journal of the Taiwan 
Architectural Institute from its start in 1929. Ide lived the rest of his life in Taiwan and died there in 1944. 
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look’ systems, exemplified by the fully opened Railway (1908) together and the Railway Hotel (1908). 
The architecture produced in this period had much in common with that of the Rokumeikan era (1880s) 
in Japan, when the clear purpose was revising the general position of Japan through the emulation of 
Seiyō culture. The values of the 1890s were different, especially following ITŌ Chūta’s influence; in 
mainland Japan there was new consciousness that indigenous art and architecture should be set apart 
from imported Seiyō models. This new idea was not carried over to her colony’s own nation-building in 
official buildings, but was skipped altogether; following the European style authority buildings, 
Secessionist architecture was introduced in 1920 in the Empire of Japan. 
 
The magnum opus of Japan’s colonial modernity (in architectural terms) was built during this golden 
era: the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office. The building’s rationale, the building itself and its rhetorical 
aspects make it unique in Taiwan and in the Japanese Empire. This colonial official building tells the 
story of imperial expansion, symbolising Japan’s dual-modern space and semiotic persuasiveness, and 
presenting features of authoritarian display that combined to project a universal image of a modern 
Empire. Whilst these nuanced tasks were made real through other official constructions, the Office 
became the paradigmatic example of how the role of Seiyō conventions combined with the conditions 
of rationality and civilisation, a benchmark which influenced other Japanese colonies and later the 
Chinese Government-in-exile (the KMT). The building was neither just a Western-inspired institution 
nor merely a container of Japanese state power. It was within an urban showcase representative of 
Japan’s capable adoption of a foreign culture following its self-image as the modern Tōyō Empire in 
tandem with their invisible traditions: a symbiotic solution to Seiyō dualism.  
 
The Office’s completion in 1919 marked a turning point in Asian history: in the year following the end of 
World War I, the May the Fourth movement in Beijing began, protesting against the Chinese 
government's weak response to the Treaty of Versailles, especially Japan’s being allowed to receive 
territories in Shandong (Chi. 山東) which had been surrendered by Germany after the Siege of 
Tsingtao. This birth of a New Culture movement, drawing together nationalism and modern literature in 
China, occurred only two months after Japan had celebrated the completion of the new Office of the 
Taiwan Governor-General, her first territory in China, the handover of which began an enmity which 
lasts to this day. At the same time the Office of Governor-General, which had for 24 years been 
assigned to military governors, was given for the first time to a civilian,106 Baron DEN Kenjirō (Jap. 田
健治郎, 1955-1930). Den promoted a new policy of doka (Jap. 土化, lit. assimilation),107 where Taiwan 
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 From 1895 to 1919 the island was administered by a series of Japanese Governor-Generals chosen from the Japanese military; from 1919 
to 1936 civilians were appointed. 
107
 Den advocated extension of Home Rule (Jap. 內地延長主義) often associated with Japan's colonial rule of Korea between 1910 and 1945. 
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would be governed the same way as the Home Islands,108 and the Taiwanese would be assimilated 
into normal Japanese society. For each civilian Governor-General the backdrop of their handover was 
the most magnificent architectural monument of the colonial period, where twelve of the nineteen 
executives exercised their administrative, military and legislative power. It may seem ironic that after 
the Second World War, the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office was occupied in 1949 by the KMT 
government product of the May the Fourth movement thirty years before, so the building continued to 
house the highest authority of two very different political regimes. Whilst the KMT destroyed almost all 
overt architectural expressions of Japanese identity, the Office was kept as it was, retaining its 
message of core authoritarian rule as the initial site of a state of Tōyō announcing itself as a kindai 
(modern) Empire.  
 
As befitted the first seat of non-Western modern colonial power, the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office 
was used in a variety of ways, and one of the most important was its earliest use.  Even before the 
building was complete, the Office was the main site of the first Taiwan Industrial Competitive Exhibition 
in 1916. Its purpose was to exhibit the industrial and economic achievements of Taiwan, the mainland 
and other colonies in celebration of twenty years of colonial rule. The building was not simply spreading 
the ‘traditional’ functions of bureaucracy by representing the status of Japan’s consciously kindai 
(modern) administration. Given the weight of significance and expectation, the building process for the 
new Office of Governor-General was long and complex, with interventions by the central government 
on the building’s form and style including a demand to strengthen the central axis in order that the 
architecture might demonstrate the success of Japan in its progress to be kindai (modern). The process 
of design and competition, the technical and scientific innovations, the changing of spatial 
configurations, the stylistic choices, and the role and representation will each be analysed in order to 
draw out underlying notions of Japan’s imperial modernity through their authority and power in historical 
Taipei, and to discuss which forms, spaces, materials, semiotics and boundaries were chosen to be 
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 Because of this policy, Japan’s first legislation for an urban planning system of 1919 was simultaneously promulgated in Taiwan, displaying 
the maturity of the new Japanese state. (Sorenson, 2002: 87) 
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5.1 The establishment of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Official Residence and Office 
 
“In Meiji Year 32, the fourth of Governor-General of Taiwan, Count KODAMA Gentarō, was 
expected to be appointed. His first targets were to establish the ‘Taiwan (Shinto) Shrine’ 
and the ‘Taiwan Governor-General’s Residence’... Taiwan Governor-General’s Residence 
was to show the prestige of the Governor-General. Its purpose was to order the Taiwanese 
people to surrender and to threaten them; therefore, it should have an impressive style.” 
SOGAWA Katarō, a Civil Engineer of the Central Construction and Maintenance Division of 
the Taiwan Governor’s Office. (Sogawa, 1936: 337) 
 
As explored in Chapter 4.1, the expansion to the South of Japan was a long-held goal for the Meiji 
oligarchy, and the Governor-General in Taiwan was on the throne of this burgeoning Southern Empire. 
According to Sogawa, one of the first tasks of the new colonial government was demonstrating the 
prestige of the Governor-General through impressive architecture. Even before the Taiwan 
Governor-General’s Office was built, this purpose could be seen in the Taiwan Governor-General’s 
Official Residence. His Official Residence also functioned as an office, though only for the 
Governor-General and Chief Civil Administrator, as the main functions of the Office were temporarily 
set in the Qing Provincial Administration Yamen, the Official Residence’s office space being insufficient. 
The rapid construction of the Official Residence and its stated purpose echoes Markus’s notion about 
the effect of architecture on the populace: “buildings, particularly government buildings, produce a 
powerful experience, and the building form uses the mores and values of its society to great effect to 
influence the populace.” (Markus, 1993: 27) This influence is even stronger when the building is the 
seat of government (the Governor-General was the apex of political and military power in colonial 
Taiwan) and hence a symbol of the country in which it is based.  
 
As noted in the previous chapter, in accordance with Governor-General Kodama’s first targets, the 
Taiwan Shrine was the only Imperial Shrine and played the main ideological role in representing 
Japan’s sacred emperor, standing as a metaphor for the ‘unification of the people’s consciousness’. 
This metaphor only made sense for Japan in tandem with the Taiwan Governor-General’s Official 
Residence, which represented the colonial secular dominance by ‘ordering the Taiwanese people’, the 
other side of Japan’s dual modernity. These two architectural artefacts represented the creation of a 
dual-modern image for the colonial institutions, combining the colonial governor as the figure of 
‘centralised authority’ and the main symbol of progress, with the incorporation of traditions within an 




The Taiwan Governor-General’s Official Residence, 1899-1901 (rebuilt in 1911) 
The project to build the Official Residence was set in motion as early as Meiji Year 32 (1899), after four 
years of experiments in colonised Taiwan, by which time the first bank of Taiwan had opened, the first 
College (the Taiwan Governor-General’s medical school) had been established, the earliest  ‘Urban 
correction’ had been announced and construction had begun on the North-South Railroad from 
Keelung City (Northern Taiwan) to Kaohsiung City (Southern Taiwan), executed by the newly 
established Railway Ministry (1899). This highlighted Taipei’s symbolic topography as a kindai (modern) 
colonial capital in its Japanese period, and the Governor-General's Official Residence became the 
leading structure to represent Japanese progress. 
 
The Taiwan Governor-General's Official Residence was finished the same year as the Taiwan Shrine in 
Meiji 34 (1901), and became the pioneer colonial official building in many respects. The initial floor plan 
and façade design were completed in 1899, one year in advance of the construction; the design was 
formed together as the principal part of a block of official residences (planned in 1898). It was a 
two-floor brick and stone building109 with an asymmetrical neo-Renaissance façade associated with 
the Veranda style. Neo-Renaissance was very common for mansions in mainland Japan, influenced by 
Conder and his former pupil Katayama, the primary mansion masters in Meiji time, as discussed earlier. 
However, the Veranda style was not commonly mixed with Neo-classical by Japanese and European 
architects in mainland Japan as it was not considered as strictly ‘European architecture’, but this choice 
may have been a lingering effect of Josiah Conder’s eclecticism. Combination of styles was popular in 
European colonies such as British India and French Indo-China as a concession to the different climate. 
This choice seems to emphasise that the Veranda style should be erected in the colonies, yet it was 
widely used with the Neo-classical in the official buildings of Japan’s colonies.  
 
Among the designers of the building, the leader was HUKUDA Tōgo (Jap. 福田東吾, 1855-1917), a 
technician of the Taiwan Governor’s Office since 1898 and temporary manager in the Civil Affairs 
Bureau of Civil Construction and Maintenance Division of Taiwan Governor’s Office in 1901, who also 
supervised the Taiwan Shine in this role. Hukuda’s works were mainly for official residences, jails and 
land army accommodation with other facilities during the Taiwan rule. He was the colonial pioneer for 
accommodating officers, bankers, soldiers and even criminals. The Taiwan Governor-General's Official 
Residence could be considered his masterpiece in Taiwan. Planned as residence and office for the 
Governor-General, it also provided a guest house function. It was not just a mansion but a semi-public 
building, combining intense social spaces with Seiyō social manners in a clear example of promotion of 
Western behaviour, which had formally begun with Conder’s Rokumeikan as previously discussed. The 
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 The stones were partly from Taipei City Walls and mainly imported from Xiamen (Chi. 廈門), Southern China. 
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reception function was formed in highly grandiose manner, with the specification for a banquet room, 
drawing room and guest room, yet it soon served as a reception for royalty once it was completed in 
1901, rebuilt in 1911 for further expansion, and continued to do so until today (fig. 5.1). As for the office 
function, this asymmetrical Baroque building, rebuilt from Neo-Renaissance, was utilised only by the 
Governor-General, Chief Civil Administrator and Executives official meeting space, particularly by 





The Site of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office  
The new Office was a curiously authoritarian building which was urgently demanded because, since the 
beginning of Japanese rule in Taiwan, the main functions of the Japanese colonial administration had 
been run from the provincial-level Chinese yamen110 (fig. 5.2) within Taipei. The structure of this Qing 
dynasty building had severely declined both materially and symbolically, as outlined in Section 5.2. The 
Taiwan Issue records that in Taisho Year 5 (1916): “After a governance of several years, the 
Governor-General requires a new official office in order to show the political powers of his government 
and its dominion over Taiwan. In addition, the government’s official office from the Qing dynasty has 
not been repaired for a long period. The main structure of the building was made of timber which has 
been seriously decayed by termites.” (Taiwan Issue, 1916: 610) At the end of Meiji Year 38 (1905), a 
huge fire burnt down four office buildings within the yamen and caused very serious damage which 
pushed this proposal rapidly forward.  
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 For example: Japanese set up Headquarters in the Deng Ying Study Hall (Chi. 登瀛書院), a hospital in a Confucian Temple, military 
barracks in an examination hall, artillery Regiments in the Taiwan Provincial Governor’s Yamen (Chi. 巡撫衙門), the Governor-General’s 
Residence in the Native and Western learning hall, and the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office in the Taiwan Provincial Administration Yamen 
within the walled-city. 
5.1. The Taiwan 
Governor-General’s Official 
Residence, rebuilt in 1911. 
The main entrance. 






In the early proposed site seen in ‘Taipei Urban Correction’ of 1900 (fig. 5.3), the plan for the Taiwan 
Governor-General’s Office, Official Residence and Chief Civil Administrator’s Residence were explicitly 
specified; at this time the residences for other government offices had been completed. In this plan all 
the public and official institutions were proposed to be reserved within the walled area of Taipei as 
important sites. The Office was located at Wenwu Street (Chi. 文武街), in the middle of Taipei 
walled-city, and the total site area was around 35,723 square metres. The site was levied from the 
private ancestral halls belonging to the prosperous families Lin and Chen, an area with good feng-shui, 
as was necessary for the location of ancestral halls. In the five years preceding 1900, the Office’s site 
was temporarily used as a fashionable ‘Sports club’ which had an oval racecourse (fig. 5.4), displaying 
the rapidity of Japanese authorities implementation of foreign pastimes. The reasons for choosing this 
site for the Office cannot verified, but it is safe to assume that GOTŌ Shinpei’s Civil Affairs Ministry was 
responsible for its planning. The stipulated site was located together with the Taiwan 
Governor-General’s Official Residence, the Chief Civil Administrator’s Residence, and the Taipei Park 
on the official document for the Taipei city planning on 27th March Meiji Year 33 (1900). The previous 
office in the yamen was just next to the proposed the Office which may have been convenient, 
considering potential transport problems.  
 
The built area of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office is 7,158 square metres (20 percent of the total 
site area), a huge building project proposed to hold 1000 people. The enormous erection project was 
an illustration of the scale of effort required; the building included 793 doors, 1,227 windows, 13 
staircases and 9 entrances. The building was constructed in the context of early twenty-century 
Imperial Japan and brought with it a new construction process, new materials, technology and facilities; 
5.2. Temporary Office of the Taiwan Governor-General in the Reception Yamen.  
Source from the Taiwan Education Association, 1937. 
(Courtesy of Institute of Taiwan History, Academia Sinica Library)  
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also the relevant new firms, roles, and rules of ritual spaces which were produced during a seven year 









5.3. The Urban Corrections Plan of Taipei walled-city in 1900: 1 The Taiwan Governor-General’s Office; 2 Chief Civil 
Administrator’s Residence; 3 Taipei Park, and; 4 The Taiwan Governor-General’s Official Residence. Adapted from 
Allen, 2005. 
5.4. The site of the Office in 1911, the sport 
club. Adapted from Wei and Gao, 2005. 
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Design Competition, 1907-1909 
The government needed a building which showed the ambitions and values of the colonial government. 
The most vital and expected construction project was to establish a new Japanese authority building to 
symbolise its new dominion; “Gotō urged Kodama to take action which would distinguish the present 
colonial authority from the past authority in Taiwan. His recommendations included constructing a large 
and impressive governor general's office in the middle of the capitol, Taipei, set off by large streets, 
boulevards, and parks.” (Chang and Myers, 1963: 438) To accomplish this, the building project team 
decided to raise a design through an open architectural design competition after the Diet of Japan 
approved the proposal to build the Office.  
 
Gotō still suggested holding a design competition to get the best design even though there were 
several architectural technicians in the Central Construction and Maintenance Division in Taiwan, all of 
whom had graduated from the Imperial Tokyo University and were qualified to execute the project. 
(Huang, J., 2004: 83) This decision was fully supported by the Architectural Institute of Japan (AIJ) to 
promote talented architects and to practise their skills. Competitions were a very popular method of 
attracting high quality designs in Europe and Victorian Britain in particular. There were “no fewer than 
2500 competitions during the course of five decades [of Victorian rule]: an average of one per week.” 
(de Jong and Mattie, 1994: 7) This phenomenon in Victorian England filtered through to the Meiji 
government, as the British Empire was viewed as their ideal. Yet this method was exceptional for Japan: 
the design for the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office was the only competition in Taiwan during the 
colonial period, and it was the first of its kind for Imperial Japan as a whole. 
 
The competition project was formally proposed by the head of the Civil Engineering Bureau of the 
Taiwan Governor’s Office at that time, NAGAO Hanpei (Jap. 長尾半平, 1865-1936)111 on 14th Sep 
Meiji Year 39 (1906). The competition attracted more than fifty designs, all of which were from mainland 
Japan due to the strict regulations decided by the civil engineering department and announced after 
adjudication by the Governor-General. The idea for using stipulations was learnt from formal 
regulations first manifested in England and drafted by the Royal Institute of British Architects (RIBA) in 
1872. These “were developed in order to put paid to competitions.” (de Jong and Mattie, 1994: 8) Yet 
this draft proposal consisted mainly of a request for a budget for the competition, and a request for 
construction funding from the Japanese central government. The total cost of construction fees and 
administrative matters was proposed to be 1,500,000 Yen.112 The proposal was authorised on 26th 
April Meiji Year 40 (1907) and the competition was announced for ‘The Governor-General’s Office 
                                                   
111
 Nagao graduated at Imperial Tokyo University in 1891 and was appointed as the director of Civil Engineering of the Governor-General 
Office in 1898. He briefly lived with the foremost Japanese novelist NATSUME Sōseki when he was investigating harbours in London in 1901. 
 
112
 For reference, 1 Yen could buy 5 litres of rice in Taisho Year 3 (1914) in Tokyo market. (Shue and Huang, 2003: Chap4-35) 
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design prize’ (Jap. 總督府設計懸賞) on 27th May of Meiji Year 40 (1907) in the official newspaper and 
architectural journal, also in five other major Japanese newspapers the next day. Two days later on 29th 
May of Meiji Year 40 (1907), the main regulations from the ’Regulation for Taiwan Governor-General‘s 
Office new design prize’ (Jap. 臺灣總督府廳舍新築設計懸賞募集規程) were announced in ‘Taiwan 
Daily News (Jap.台灣日日新報)’ newspaper, and are summarised in Appendix V.113 
 
These regulations reveal several attitudes from the Civil Engineering Bureau. First, a long period 
between the stages and full range of addition information114 shows the vigilance of the project, as it 
allowed the applicants to read and digest the materials and improve their design. Second, the provision 
of information on the conditions in Taiwan showed that they wanted the construction to be well planned 
and suited to the environment from the beginning. Third, the generous prizes were used by the board to 
generate and encourage a large volume of high quality entries. Fourth, the Seiyō inspiration and 
knowledge of how to do architectural competitions was shown most clearly in a comment about the 
usual award sums in foreign countries. Fifth, some commitment to awarding fairly and without bias was 
shown in the process of guaranteeing the anonymity of the applicants, but conflict was feared as no 
explanation or objections were allowed. Compared with the European forms of competition, Meiji Japan 
implied an open and national set of competition rules as in Seiyō to “attract entries from hundreds of 
ambitious young architects, who see the competitions as a gateway to immortality, while renowned 
architects often decline to participate for fear of losing face.” (de Jong and Mattie, 1994: 9) Finally, the 
requirement that applicants be an architecture professional of ‘Empire Japan’ was imposed to obtain 
designs in a ‘national style' which resulted in most applicants merely submitting a narrow range of 
designs due to this unwritten understanding.  
 
The influence of Conder, Ende and Böckmann on Japan became even more obvious at this point, 
shown in the consensus between entrants’ designs: all were in Neo-classical style, propagated by 
these foreign architects in Japan. Whilst the Meiji government and civil society in mainland Japan had 
promoted Wakon-yōsai (Japanese spirit, Western technology) following the end of the Rokumekan 
era in the mid-1880s as discussed, this leading project of the golden period of colonial Taiwan 
architecture showed little influence of this philosophy. Instead the old accusation of imitation of Seiyō 
semiotics could be applied to the entrants’ designs despite any design restrictions. These controversial 
Seiyō images continued to operate in Japan’s colony’s official buildings. This brought out the issue of 
                                                   
113
 There are twenty-four listed regulations on the ’Regulations for Taiwan Governor-General‘s Office new design prize’ which was based on 
the proposal by the Director of Civil Engineering Bureau of the Taiwan Governor’s Office, NAGAO Hanpei , on 14th Sep Meiji Year 39 (1906). 
 
114
 The information included the site reservation city plan, site section, stratum section, Taipei coordinates and a weather table, the price of 
materials and transportation, the worker’s payroll, and the bureaucracy divisions. The regulations also stated the details on sales and 
configurations and even paper, ink, typeface and signs. 
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how persuasiveness was interpreted by the authorities in Taiwan. As agents of a new power, Japanese 
architects understood Seiyō architecture as that imbued with authority, and pursued this image only. 
  
Concern with authority was reflected in the competition’s structure too; whilst it was nominally an open 
and fair competition, the winning design was decided by the Taiwan Governor-General who indicated 
to the examiners’ board his preferred designs. Explanations and appeals were not allowed. As soon as 
the proposal was authorised, a temporary examiners’ board had been somewhat unreasonably set up 
before the ‘Regulations for the Jury’ had been established.115 This board was appointed by the Taiwan 
Governor-General and included seven jurors: TATSUNO Kingo, ITŌ Chūta, TSUMAKI Yoriyuki (Jap. 
妻木頼黃, 1859-1916), NAKAMURA Tatsutarō (Jap.中村達太郎, 1860-1942), TSUKAMOTO Yasushi 
(Jap. 塚 本 靖 , 1869-1937), NAGAO Hanpei (Head of the Civil Engineering Bureau of Taiwan 
Governor’s Office), and NOMURA Ichirō (Jap. 野村一郎, 1868-1942; Head of the Central Construction 
and Maintenance Division under Civil Engineering Bureau of the Taiwan Governor’s Office since 1904 
and a participant in the construction of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Official Residence). Two of 
these personnel worked at the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office, and so had good knowledge of local 
conditions. All were architects and graduates from the University of Tokyo/Imperial College of 
Engineering except Nagao who studied Civil Engineering; the others were products of Conder’s and 
Tatsuno’s architecture course. Yet they were undeniably a close group as Tatsuno, Tsumaki and 
Nakamura had been taught directly by J. Conder, whilst Tsukamoto, Itō and Nomura were taught by 
Tatsuno: a group without doubts of their supremacy in the Meiji architecture field. The jury included the 
two most influential architects of the country, Tatsuno and Itō, who were key figures of the practice and 
theory of the architectural kindai (modern) movement in the mainland Japan as discussed in Chapter 3. 
 
The first stage of the competition focused on the design concept and overall configuration, with 
drawings at 1/200 scale. The rating criteria were: practicality of the site and floor plans, specification of 
the construction description, and aesthetics of the elevations. Following this there was consensus 
between jurors, whereby seven entrants116 were approved for the second stage but were not ranked 
according to the judges’ preferences. Although these seven were selected, the jury member Nagao, 
head of the Civil Engineering Bureau of Taiwan Governor’s Office, criticised all applicants for failing to 
consider adapting their architecture to the conditions of tropical weather. (Taiwan Daily News, 1908) 
This raises the question of whether any of the applicants had actually been to Taiwan to survey the site. 
                                                   
115
 ‘Regulations for Jury’ were stipulated on 21st Aug Meiji Year 40 (1907). 
 
116
 These were NAGANO Uheiji (Jap. 長野宇平治), MORIYAMA Matsunosuke (Jap. 森山松之助), SUZUKI Kichibee (Jap. 鈴木吉兵衛), 
KATAOKA Yasushi (Jap. 片岡安), MATSUI Kiyotari (Jap. 松井清足), SAKURAI Kotarō (Jap. 櫻井小太郎) and FUKUI Fusaichi (Jap. 福井房
一).  
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Indeed, the jury itself was based in Tokyo according to the delivery address on the regulations.117 Yet 
the selected candidates did ‘fine’ for concept and design (Taiwan Daily News, 1908).  
 
It became significant at this point that many of the winners of the first round had links to Tatsuno, 
Conder and the Civil Engineering Bureau of Taiwan Governor’s Office. Of the finalists, Matsui and 
Kataoka had been working at Tatsuno’s architectural office since 1903 and 1905 respectively; Nagano 
was cooperating with Tatsuno’s working project and was entrusted with the business of the Bank of 
Japan since 1896; and Sakurai had worked at J. Conder’s architectural office in 1893-1896. It is curious 
that Moriyama was even entrusted to become a ‘contractual technician’ of the Central Construction and 
Maintenance Division from May 1907. So we can almost draw a family tree among these entrants, and 
in spite of the regulations about anonymity, it is likely that there were opportunities for participants to 
consult with jury members before formally submitting their designs. 
 
The second stage of the competition took place in 1909 and focused on the construction method details 
at 1/100 scale and all parts of the specific plans at 1/20 scale; the list of materials and construction 
methods became essential at this time. The ‘Regulations for the Jury’ for the second stage have not 
been found, but it seems at this stage the competition employed three more assistants from Taiwan 
Governor’s Office, and five more from the Ministry of the Treasury. According to one of the assistants of 
the second stage from the Taiwan Governor’s Office, KAGEYAMA Yorozukura (Jap. 蔭山萬藏) at the 
first ‘symposium on the transformation of architecture after colonial regime change’ (recorded in Ide et 
al, 1944) among the seven entrants selected from the first section of the competition, there were three 
main controversial issues. First, the smoking rooms on the inner corners of the structure were not 
appropriate for the seismic activity in Taiwan and led to design revisions. Second, and more seriously, 
one entrant was accused of plagiarism. The jury initially preferred the design project by Suzuki. 
However, his design was later disqualified as it was deemed to have copied the design of the ‘Peace 
Palace’ at The Hague in Holland (Ide et al, 1944: 40) which had recently been part of a design 
competition. The jury believed that this showed a lack of talent and imagination from the entrant in 
contradiction of the design competition’s equitable regulations. This comment provides proof that the 
Japanese did follow contemporaneous European competitions: Suzuki’s design was not similar to the 
finished building, as the Peace Palace was not even built until 1913. But it is an intriguing puzzle as to 
why this accusation was made, and whether Suzuki had actually copied the design from Louis-Marie 
Cordonnier’s first prize entry to the Peace Palace competition of 1906: for me there is little similarity, 
and even though Suzuki’s central façade section appears to be a miniature version of the front façade 
of the Peace Palace, it looks much more like the Post Office of Amsterdam built in 1895. 
                                                   
117
 Submission to the Dispatched official office of the Taiwan Governor-General Office at Tokyo city Kōjimachiku area Uchisange-chō town. 
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The third and longest running controversy occurred when the winner was announced in the official 
newspaper on 22nd April 1909: the first place was omitted, and the second placed candidate, Nagano, 
‘won’ the project and was rewarded with 15,000 yen. Kataoka won the third place and a reward of 5000 
yen and the other five entrants were each rewarded with 1000 yen. However Nagano did not lead the 
project to construct the building; that post was given to MORIYAMA Matsunosuke (who had failed to get 
through to the second stage of the competition) in 1910 when he was appointed by the Japanese 
authorities as the construction director of the project. After the announcement the winner, Nagano left 
Taiwan in anger and returned to Japan, but the controversy over the design continued.118  
 
Taiwan Daily News claimed the first place was omitted because the competition designs were not 
suitable for the humid, tropical weather in Taiwan: features had to be added reflecting the views of the 
examination board after the first stage. Also the design paid little attention concerning the location of 
the materials and how to transport these materials (Taiwan Daily News, 1909a). Such controversy was 
not unusual in a wider context: in the competition for the Peace Palace the winner was also typically 
contentious where “one of the outstanding features of the jury report …was its utter triviality.” (de Jong 
and Mattie, 1994: 9) 
 
In terms of style of competition designs, the main hindrance to the process was the paltry originality 
seen in the use of historical forms, with many entries showing remarkable similarity to previous designs 
for Amsterdam’s Peace Palace and Post Office, and Berlin’s Reichstag, to the extent of disqualification 
for plagiarism. In spite of the jury’s criticism on originality, nine years after the competition, Tatsuno’s 
‘Katsuta Hall (Jap. 勝田ホール, 1918)’ in fig. 5.5 was constructed looking suspiciously and remarkably 
similar in form to the winning design for the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office (fig. 5.6), designed by his 
own student, Nagano. This demonstrates that simple imitation of forms was still widespread, even 
between senior Japanese architects in the 1910s. Yet in spite of these troubled beginnings and 
reasonable criticisms, this project was considered and improved over a long period by Moriyama and 
his principal team, who conscientiously revised the plan, including integrating a number of clever 
technologies into the building, embedding a suitably Imperial hierarchy, and thus rounding off the 
golden period of colonial Taiwan architecture. 
 
                                                   
118
 Nagano soon after wrote in an architectural journal, describing the process as unfair and saying that the government acted like a 
restaurant owner who ‘advertises lamb and sells dog’ which was widely reported in journals and newspapers such as Taiwan Daily News on 
2nd May Meiji 42 (1909b). Nagano also complained that although his design was selected, his prize was cut in half due to being placed second. 
Nagano later issued a formal complaint to the civil administration of Japan, which was rejected as the regulations stated that any decision 
could be made with no objections by the applicant. He was so unsatisfied with the result that it affected his relationship with his ex-teacher 






MORIYAMA Matsunosuke: the leading colonial architect 
The construction director, MORIYAMA Matsunosuke, was a successful colonial architect in Taiwan, 
building many of the principal town halls. Moriyama was born into an aristocratic family in Osaka in 
1869 to a father who was the member of Japan’s House of Lords. He began the Imperial University 
architectural course in 1894 (two years after jury member ITŌ Chūta had graduated) after the course 
had been reduced from five years to three years in 1886 during the tenure of TATSUNO Kingo. 
Following graduation in 1897, Moriyama was hired by the head of the School of Architecture, Tatsuno, 
to work on building projects such as a branch of the First (National) Bank of Japan as a contract worker. 
This term as an assistant was short-lived as Moriyama left after three years to work at Tokyo Higher 
Technical School as an Architecture Lecturer until his Taiwan commission in 1907.  
 
Moriyama was an outstanding performer during his architecture course. He graduated at the first place 
on his design project thesis available at Architecture Department Library in Tokyo University. Both of 
Moriyama’s theses were practical: a design thesis on ‘A University Hall for the University of Tokyo’ (fig. 
5.7) and a longer technical thesis titled ‘A few considerations on stress in roof trusses and methods of 
dimensioning’ which demonstrated his talent of engineering technology and construction equipment. It 
is notable that Conder’s practice of asking students to write on the future architecture of Japan had 
stopped following Tatsuno’s tenure as Professor of Architecture; consequently after 1884 very few 
theses were based on the style and future direction of Japanese architecture.  
5.6. NAGAO Uheiji: Winning competition entry main front, 1909. Source from Huang, J., 2004. 
5.5. TATSUNO Kingo: Katsuta Hall, 1918.  




Moriyama’s design thesis is the more revealing of the two documents and contained insights into the 
man and how he saw the role of the architect. Moriyama’s winning design recalls British Gothic 
revivalism, with its stained glass windows and asymmetrical layout. The large scale and cool grandeur 
of the design evokes Tatsuno’s Bank of Japan, finished a year earlier in 1896. The red brick material 
was a nod to the preferred construction substance of the time, and other evidence of his understanding 
of the requirements of kindai (modern) buildings could be seen in his interior: the design includes 
fireplaces, stone staircases, use of concrete foundations and electric lighting. (Moriyama, 1897: 5) At 
no point does Moriyama use Japanese measurements of tatami or kiwariho which would have been 
taught on the University course by the master carpenter Kigo (Weldelken, 1996: 32) instead preferring 
the British measurement system of inches and feet. (Moriyama, 1897: 6-7) 
 
Supporting the conclusion of Section 3.6 (that the customary carpentry learnt by students at Tokyo 
University was assimilated within a Seiyō framework rather than being seen as a viable alternative), 
Moriyama followed the British practice on giving the central role of the construction process to the 
architect. Crucially, Moriyama protected the right of the architect to hire and fire any construction 
workers: “the Architect is to have full power to discharge or dismiss from the works any foreman, 
workman or workmen, either for… misconduct and incompetency or otherwise.” (Moriyama, 1897: 2) 
For Moriyama, the supremacy of the architect certainly stretched to dominion over carpenters; their role 
was to deliver to order, and fit “wood bricks” into “required positions for the attachment of window 
frames, door frames, dado and skirtings, wood panelling &c as may be directed.” (Moriyama, 1897: 9) 
The architect was central, and Moriyama gave no initiative to tradesmen: “Cases, projections and 
measures to be made where requisite for the carpentry, masonry, plastering and all other trades.” 
5.7. Moriyama’s graduation design 
project on ‘A University Hall for the 
University of Tokyo’ in 1897.  
(Courtesy of Architecture department 
Library, The University of Tokyo) 
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(Moriyama, 1897: 9) This implied that for Moriyama, carpenters were an architect’s subordinates and 
simply another part of the kindai (modern) building process, showing that Moriyama stood in the 
position of Japanese architectural common practice at that time.  
 
Furthermore, Moriyama saw the architect as having a quality control function, checking materials as 
they entered the construction site: “All the bricks used to be of equal quality” and cases should be 
“submitted to the architect.” (Moriyama, 1897: 7-8) Clearly, the education given the graduates from 
Tokyo University was sufficient to judge the quality of masonry materials as well as wood; for the 
University Hall, Moriyama stated that “The whole of the timber to be perfectly sound and well seasoned, 
free from sap wood and large, loose or decayed knobs… and all other defects.” (Moriyama, 1897: 
13-14) Overall, Moriyama had a clear and legalistic understanding of the role of the architect, from 
contracting to the rejection of bad materials. He comes across as eager, perfectionist, with a technical 
outlook and an obvious attention to detail; an architect who was confident and competent, steady rather 
than highly innovative.   
 
His education at the most prestigious University and his experience at Tatsuno’s office appear to have 
left Moriyama well equipped to teach on a range of topics, in spite of Tatsuno’s revision of focus of the 
undergraduate Architecture course. This revision had led to an increased depth of knowledge on 
technological and scientific issues and increased breadth of knowledge on construction and 
architectural history. Rather than Conder’s students, it would be Tatsuno’s protégés who would make 
up the architects who practised in Taiwan. Moriyama displayed his breadth of knowledge in writing ‘The 
History of Japanese Architecture’ in six volumes for a textbook (‘Lecture on Architecture’ published in 
1905) for the Tokyo Higher Technical School. The book was used as lecture material and covered eight 
topics119 of study for Japanese architects.  
 
Moriyama’s practical and academic experience, supported by his family’s prestige, gave him a platform 
for a good architectural career, and he demonstrated a breadth of knowledge from Japanese 
architectural history to earthquake proofing of buildings. At the same time, Moriyama was published in 
a journal on a subject of practical and historical interest which shows that he was an expert in his field. 
The example of Moriyama shows that Japanese architects understood customary Japanese 
architecture much better by the turn of the 20th century, enough to be confident to write about it at great 
length. The breakdown of topics, with Japanese history separate from world history, reflects a common 
                                                   
119
 The textbook ‘Lecture on Architecture’ included eight subjects: Architecture History (Jap. 建築沿革史), Japanese Architecture History (Jap. 
日本建築沿革史), Japanese Architecture studies (Jap. 日本建築學), Building Materials (Jap. 建築材料篇), Scientific assessment of the 
structural strength of materials (Jap. 材料構造強弱學), Building Tectonic methods (Jap. 建築構造法), Building Construction methods (建築施
工法), and Budget Preparation methods (Jap. 預算仕樣編成法). 
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conception of the time: that Japanese architectural history was viewed as separate to general 
architectural history, and needed to be studied separately.  
 
After seven years of lecturing, Moriyama was at first entrusted to become a ‘contractual technician’ in 
the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office. Two months earlier he had led his first building project, 
presumably as a part of this Taiwan commission: ‘Formosan Pavilion’ (fig. 5.8) for Tokyo Industrial 
Exhibition (Jap. 東京勸業博覽會臺灣館) at Ueno Park, Tokyo. The structure was known as the 
Vermilion building and had more than a thousand electric lights by the pond; it was described as a 
‘Dragon's Palace’ and made a strong contrast with other Western-style white pavilions. Three years 
later on 10th November Meiji Year 43 (1910), Moriyama was promoted to permanent ‘architectural 
technician’ as a ‘Colonial government office Architect’ and held the position for eleven years. He later 
led another exposition project, ‘The Taiwan Hall’ (fig. 5.9), at the Tenth Kansai Competitive Exhibition at 
Nagoya (Jap. 第十回關西府縣聯合共進會臺灣館). This two-level wooden building was described as 
the ‘Red Sweet Olive flower’. (Taiwan Daily News, 1910) These were the only two buildings he built in 




5.8. MORIYAMA Matsunosuke: 
‘Formosan Pavilion’ for Tokyo 
Industrial Exhibition at Ueno Park, 
Tokyo. 
 (Courtesy of the Digital Archives 















5.9. MORIYAMA Matsunosuke: 
‘The Taiwan Hall’, at the Tenth 
Kansai Competitive Exhibition at 
Nagoya.  
(Courtesy of the Digital Archives 
of the National Central Library, 
‘Taiwan Memory’) 
 355 
Moriyama’s two Pavilions were both in Chinese Southern Minnan style, chosen as an exotic style to 
represent the inherent characteristics of Taiwan’s Han ethnicity. These buildings emphasised the 
colony's own unique culture, a consistent style used in all other Taiwan Pavilions in different exhibitions 
by other Japanese architects. This scheme utilised the binary understanding of modernity at the time: 
‘modern’ and ‘Westernised’ were considered as the rightful representations for domestic Japan whilst 
colonial Taiwan fulfilled a subsidiary role with a characteristic native style of ‘Crepuscular’ and 
‘Colourful Savage’ which served to emphasise Japan as a great, progressive country. Although 
representing the architecture of Taiwan in native style, these buildings were not at all representative of 
the buildings Moriyama built in Taiwan; the concession to native style was for guests of the exposition 
only, and Moriyama’s skills were applied in the European idiom in Taiwan. However, this representation 
of Taiwan’s imagery remained with him for six years after he had returned to Japan, for in 1927 
Moriyama built a third and final Taiwan Pavilion (the old Royal Pavilion, fig. 5.10) at Shinjuku Royal 
Garden in Tokyo. The Garden was later rebuilt after the World War II as the National Garden, and the 
Taiwan Pavilion survived and was listed as a heritage building. Originally this pavilion was built to 
celebrate the emperor Showa’s wedding ceremony by the Japanese in Taiwan at that time. Moriyama 




It seems apt for Moriyama, whose buildings came to herald Japan’s architectural golden age in Taiwan 
at the end of their imperial childhood, to have begun his work in Japan rather than Taiwan. His buildings 
for the Taiwan Government General were intended to impress fellow Japanese as much as 
representatives of Seiyō and Tōyō (particularly the local Chinese). This appropriation of Tōyō style was 
curiously only deemed suitable for being brought to Japan proper; though Moriyama was a marginal 
figure in Japan, he was a successful and prolific architect in Taiwan, building many of the principal city 
This image can be seen in the printed thesis at the University 
of Sheffield library. 
 
5.10. MORIYAMA Matsunosuke: ‘The 
Old Royal Pavilion (1927)’ at Shinjuku 
Royal Garden in Tokyo.  
(Photography by NOMURA Kouhei) 
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halls and landmark buildings throughout the island. Moriyama almost always built in what was known 
as Tatsuno style, which was to dominate the administrative buildings and most other public buildings in 
the colony. Yet he was also the leading architect in charge of the Renovation of the Taiwan 




The Construction and Maintenance Division120 under the Civil Engineering Bureau of the Civil Affair 
Ministry supervised and regulated the architecture of the new Office of the Taiwan Governor-General, 
and Moriyama was the leading architect in charge, leading six technicians. During this highly 
prestigious commission, his first and most vital tasks were revising and leading the construction based 
on the winning design of architect, NAGANO Ueiji. To make up for the controversial beginning of the 
project, he inspected buildings and technologies in Europe and America for two years from 1912 to 
solve building construction and equipment problems; his rigorous approach may explain why the 
construction took seven years. As construction director, whilst the reason to have a competition was to 
construct a building based on the winner’s design, Moriyama, following the Central Construction and 
Maintenance Division’s recommendations, decided to modify the winner’s designs in reaction to the 
jury’s criticism. According to Ide, who participated as a technician of the new Office from 1911, the 
redesign was finished in two stages accomplished by the end of 1911. Revisions were made of both 
Nagano’s second placed ‘Tower design’ (fig 5.11) and Kataoka’s third placed ‘Dome design’. Moriyama 
took these designs back to Tokyo, and the revision of Nagano’s Tower design was chosen after 
discussion. Nagano’s design was weakened by being unable to accommodate the required 1000 
Government staff, which had not put him in a strong position to run the project. The redesign process 
was in fact crucial, and led to a stronger design, better able to fulfil the implicit purpose of design 
competitions in general that “the winning design would then serve a prototype for buildings of its sort.” 
(de Jong and Mattie, 1994: 8) Yet developing a prototype had only just begun by the end of the 
competition, since Nagano’s design was only used as the basis for a version which was radically 
changed. 
 
In the implemented design plans, the four entrances were made larger in scale with a driveway and two 
more bicycle entrances added. A magnificent entrance hall was created when the plan was enlarged; 
and four smoking rooms (assumed to be adapted from Suzuki’s design) on each floor were also added 
and redesigned to be seismic-proof. In the elevations there were more details on the style and the 
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 The Central Construction and Maintenance Division had just separated from the Central Civil Engineering Division under the Civil 
Engineering Bureau of Taiwan Governor’s Office in 1902. “Construction in Taiwan only happened after the military and political developments 
of 1896. After 1896 until the late Taisho period (1926), all administration lay under the direct jurisdiction of the Taiwan Governor-General’s 
Office. All construction was undertaken by the Central Construction and Maintenance Division.” (Li, Q., 2004 [1979]: 98) Before 1902 
construction had been undertaken by the Central Civil Engineering Bureau.  
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central tower was made five floors higher. It seems that the Central Construction and Maintenance 
Division looked at the work of all other entrants and merged the best parts to form the final plan with a 






Once finished, the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office appeared to be made from red brick and stone; 
the cladding over the reinforced concrete created the effect of horizontal bands of ‘red bricks’ and 
‘white pebbles’ on the outer walls. On the windows, non-structural keystones were arranged in a wheel 
shape to add diversity. The façade had sparsely-ornamented arcading along the second floor with the 
columns reaching down to the bottom of the ground floor. This arcading gave the building a certain 
Italian squareness and regularity of outline. Although the ground and first floor façade were simple with 
white square balconies which were separated by solid ‘brick’ columns (again made from concrete), the 
diversity of form from the second floor and ground floor made the front facade lively. This visual effect 
was very similar to the architecture of Tatsuno, yet the balconies spoke of adaptation to the climate of 
5.11. NAGANO Ueiji: The 
second placed design in 






















in 1911. Source from 
Huang, J., 2004. 
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Taiwan and a continuation of the Veranda style which had begun with the Taiwan Governor-General’s 
Official Residence.  
 
Others later criticised the jury for not allowing the winner to coordinate his own project and provide 
revisions to the style (following Tatsuno’s favoured red-brick with white banding), but it seems that 
Moriyama himself did not operate with a free hand. According to MORII Kensuke (Jap. 森井健介, 
1887-1976) in 1976, Moriyama’s role of technician on the project of the Taiwan Governor-General’s 
Office followed Tatsuno’s recommendation. Unsurprisingly it seems that the driving force behind the 
Tatsuno style in this building was the direct manipulation by Tatsuno, the head of the jury and a very 
influential kindai (modern) architect, not only in mainland Japan like many of his peers, but throughout 
the Empire of Japan.  
 
The fact that the final design ended up similar to the Jury Chairman’s preferred style is some indication 
that the authority for the design was not wholly with the designer. That the original design was given to 
Moriyama and his team of colonial architects to redraft rather than to the original designer, Nagano, is 
also suspicious: I assume that Nagano was not hired because he was not an employee of the 
Governor-General, whereas Moriyama was. The overall process was also presided over by the 
Governor-General himself, with the redrafts conducted to his specifications. These three key points 
indicate that centralisation was a strong force at play in the initial designing of the Taiwan 
Governor-General’s Office. As identified throughout this thesis, centralisation was one of the three main 
pivot points around which Japanese modernity was established, and was in some ways the key driver 
in the process to make it a cohesive movement that was capable of establishing a nation-state, with a 
particular, Seiyō-inspired spirit. For the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office competition to still end up as 
a victim to centralisation, whilst promising to be the first open architectural design competition in 
Japanese history, is another indication of quite how vital centralisation was to the construction of 
Japanese kindai (modernity). 
 
 
5.2 The utilisation and allocation of central leading institutions 
The design of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office was executed over seven years from 1912 to 1919. 
Given the extent of this project and the significance of the architecture for the Japanese project of 
colonial modernity, the building can be understood in various dimensions, each of which is a significant 
building block in explaining the scope, character, meaning and protrusion of the Office: first as a 
principal field of imperial/colonial space, second as a container of rational and conjoining technologies, 
third as a symbol of Japan’s sense of identity, and fourth as a projective influence for future architecture 
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in East Asia. These aspects derived and were cultivated from the experiment of the kindai (modern) 
architectural movement in Imperial Japan’s domestic spaces, but in many cases were first applied in 
her colonial spaces. 
 
These aspects of central institutions in her colonial spaces when distilled show an imperial hierarchy 
whose purpose was strengthening Japan, first actualised by adopting the local Chinese administrative 
buildings in line with Gotō’s biological principles: organic growth by first taking over the host country’s 
buildings. It was necessary to understand the habits of the Taiwanese population, particularly 
socio-political institutions, in addition to the reasons for their existence, before creating corresponding 
policies. After their arrival in 1895 the colonial government carefully studied the order of the Chinese 
bureaucrats’ buildings (yamen) and drew the floor plans of the yamen buildings clearly (these Japanese 
plans are the earliest existing official records of the yamen) and utilised these buildings until they were 
finally made obsolete by the construction of the Office in 1919.  
 
The Taiwan Governor-General’s Office housed within its architecture the highest colonial administrators, 
and was comparable in status to the Taiwan Provincial Administration Yamen in Qing Taipei. The Office 
building was created to fit each component of the Taiwan Governor-General’s bureaucracy. Reading 
architecture sociologically, the building encapsulated colonial Japan’s legal totality over Taiwan as its 
governing principle; Japan’s government buildings also contained totalising spaces, none more so than 
the Office. The Taiwan Governor-General’s Office was allied with the Official Residence as the centre of 
the administration on the island; the nature of this administration was at once rational and 
all-encompassing, which can be understood from the spatial experience of the Governor-General 
whose spaces emphasised his role as a centralised controller; the corresponding experience of the 
workers reflected this normative governmentality.  
 
Fulfilling Japan’s binary approach to public and private spaces, the centrality of the emperor remained 
partially hidden in this kindai (modern) colonial building; the construction of the Office presented a 
major challenge to the development of new architecture in the colony. A significant part of this challenge 
was due to the role of the emperor in Japan’s nation building, especially given that the relationship 
between the emperor and the Governor-General meant that the latter was an imperial delegate. 
Evidence of this connection meant that these imperial spaces and their significance in the Office give 
substantiation of a progressive tradition in modernity. Alongside this, the emperor’s subjects were 
exposed to what was then the cutting edge of Japanese modernity in the subordinate spaces. In the 
basement particularly, kindai (modern) spaces shaped the occupants’ behaviour and emphasised their 
subordination, whilst entrapping them within a modern paradigm.  
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From Yamen to Colonial Palace  
The Taiwan Governor-General’s Office is commonly associated with the building constructed 
1912-1919. However the Office was an institution first and foremost, and whilst its mature location was 
in the purpose-built building executed by Moriyama after 1919, for the first twenty-four years of 
Japanese rule, nearly half of the ruling time, the Office was mostly based in a Qing-dynasty yamen. As 
introduced in Chapter 4, the logic of Qing architecture and town planning was poles apart from the 
Japanese kindai (modern) plans and buildings built in Taipei. For the most part this gap was a reflection 
of the comparative progress of the modern movements in China and Japan. This gap became relevant 
the moment that Japan arrived in Taipei and began inhabiting Qing buildings. Before the establishment 
of modern bureaucratic institutions after 1895, the central Japanese authorities became engaged in the 
habitual spaces of the Chinese authorities. These spaces contained longstanding orders and 
sequences of space established by statutes relating to individual yamen for civilian and military officers. 
 
These statutes were embodied in the Qinding Da Qing huidian (Chi. 欽定大清會典, lit. Imperially 
endorsed collected statutes of the great Qing dynasty), which was revised in 1899 in the Chen Shu (Chi. 
政書, a record of laws and the institution systems of all the past Chinese dynasties). The edicts divided 
yamen into three overlapping spatial areas in the diagram below (fig. 5.13): an area for processing 
affairs, an administrative area and a residential area as shown in the diagram below which was the 
template for all kinds of yamen, added to depending on the functions required, and it was the 
sequences which were standardised rather than the scale. The yamen is entered from the left; the main 
Court is normally located after the ‘yi’ (Chi. 儀 lit. ceremonial) gate. Its function is for the Governor and 
his officials to administer affairs and to hold court. The second Court is located beyond the main court 
and its function is for County officials (Adjutants) to hold court. The third Court is the final area of the 
building and the residence for the Governor with his family. Yamens of different status vary, and 
depending on the grade of the yamen there may be additional spaces such as a storehouse, prison, 
ancestral temple or examination building.121 In Qing Taiwan and elsewhere in China, official building 
types followed a set formula and contained a number of functions together within a walled enclosure, 
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 For example the ‘Yingzao Fashi’ of the ‘Chen Shu’ recorded instructions for officials to build additional areas depending on the type of 
yamen which was required: 1. “Install a storehouse in the buzheng shi si (Chi. 布政使司, Institution of Provincial administrator) yamen and the 
yanyun shi si (Chi. 鹽運使司, Institution of control salt affair) yamen”. 2. “Install a prison in the anzha shi si (Chi. 按察使司, Institution of 
Provincial criminal Judge) yamen and local administration”. 3. “Install an ancestral temple inside the yamen”. 4. “Install an examination 











This sequencing is the foundational notion for all Chinese official buildings. Therefore whilst the 
buildings had a variety of functions, there was little difference between the space and organisation of 
religious, administrative or even residential buildings; rather the status of the building determined its 
size and collection of structures, the orders of beams and dougong (Chi. 斗拱, a structural element of 
interlocking wooden brackets) on a roof.122 The main space is formed by rows of buildings with 
courtyards in between. Entering the main court required passing through several gates, the number of 
gates depending on the building’s status. This demonstrates the importance of transitional spaces in 
Chinese culture, an importance which increases as the status of the building increases. The transitional 
spaces were open spaces representing thresholds; these were normally much more spacious than 
internal spaces as they were used as ceremonial ritual spaces, which comprised the main utilised 
spaces of Chinese buildings. These ritual spaces involved engaging in feats of perspective and 
memory and were not recognised as circulations; due to the ceremonial aspect these spaces have 
often been misunderstood as sacred spaces. Actually these ritual spaces were spaces of moral 
hierarchy which can be seen by the number of different thresholds and by the different height of 
doorway sills; both gave an indication of the rank of the occupant and the respect a visitor would need 
to pay. Following the relevant rules was mandatory and the actions performed depended which spaces 
were entered, as each threshold was associated with a difference in status. These two aspects 
demonstrate that form is much more meaningful than style in the Chinese architecture.  
 
The political status of Taipei as a provincial capital was architecturally crystallised by the construction of 
various yamen, the highest rank of which was the Taiwan Provincial Governor’s Yamen (or Xunfu 
Yamen, Chi. 巡撫衙門). This yamen housed the highest ranking government official on the island after 
the establishment of Taiwan Province in 1885. It was completed in 1889 under the first provincial 
governor, LIU Ming-Chuan. The position of provincial governor was essentially as an ambassador from 
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 Without understanding the orders of roof brackets, Chinese buildings have often been deemed to all look similar. For instance, according 
to the classic architecture history text, Rosengarten (1896), “The architecture of the Chinese temples does not differ from that of the other 
buildings.” (Rosengarten, 1896: 56) This appears to be the case only when the relatively subtle orders and details of structures are ignored 
which are key to understanding the rank and identity of ‘Oriental buildings’ as discussed in Chapter 3.  
5.13. Outline of a yamen template. Adapted from Huang, S., 2001. 
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the central officials in Beijing, separate and above the rest of the provincial apparatus. He was holder of 
the principal second rank (or the Zheng Er Pin, Chi. 正二品) assuming full responsibility over the 
military, people, punishments and government of a province. In spite of the high position, the Taiwan 
Provincial Governor’s Yamen consisted of civil and military ministries but was small in size and was 
only a minor collection of structures as it was initially a temporary office. This building was originally 
named Xunfu Xingshu (Chi. 巡撫行署, Provincial Governor Department) rather than being a full yamen 
until 1894 when the Taiwan provincial capital was officially moved to Taipei prefecture.123 As it was not 
amongst the largest administrative structures there are no reliable records of this building. According to 
Li, Q., (2004 [1996]) most of the structure was partly destroyed in 1895 when the Japanese army 
arrived in Taipei, and thereafter it was used by the Artillery division until being demolished in 1900. 
 
The most significant government building with respect to Taiwan Governor-General’s Office was the 
Taiwan Provincial Administration Yamen, or Buzheng Shi Si Yamen (Chi. 布政使司衙門).124 This 
building was completed in 1889 under the second Financial Commissioner, SHEN Ying-Kui (Chi. 沈應
奎)125 and was the highest status local government building built in Qing Taiwan in its role as the focal 
point of local governance. As with the Taiwan Provincial Governor’s Yamen, it was initially a temporary 
office named Fan Si Xingshu (Chi. 藩司行署, Treasurers Administrative Department) until 1894. The 
purpose of the Taiwan Provincial Administration Yamen was to administer Taiwan’s financial, taxation 
and grain systems, its soldiers and horses, and to announce government decrees to the city, county 
and prefecture. Specifically it served as the site for Qing government treasury affairs, military payments 
and even as a temporary residence for the government officials from Beijing on their inspection visits to 
Taiwan. This building cluster was used extensively as the initial main authority site by the Japanese 
because the Taiwan Provincial Administration Yamen was the biggest building group in Taiwan. The 
scale was further increased after an additional section was added to the yamen between 1892 and 
1895: the Reception Yamen (Chi. 欽差行臺) for Taiwan Provincial and Administrator Governors which 
served as a reception for other officials and also offered banquet spaces for executives. Following the 
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 Following the establishment of Taiwan Province in 1885 Taiwan’s Provincial capital was initially planned to be in Qiaozitou (Chi. 橋仔頭, 
now Taichung City) in 1887, moving the capital from Tainan prefecture (1684) for the first time. However the third Provincial Governor, SHAO 
You-Lian (Chi. 邵友濂, 1840-1901), moved the Provincial capital to Taipei prefecture in 1894; before this period Taipei was only used as a 
temporary capital. The construction of a new Taiwan provincial capital walled-city at Qiaozitou was ceased in 1891 after LIU Ming-Chuan, the 
first Provincial Governor, had left. The temporary Provincial Governor Yamen was built in Taipei city in 1891 as Taichung walled-city had not 
been completed and in the end was never competed. Such administrative complexity and the reversal of major decisions points to the chaotic 
nature of imperial rule in the late-Qing dynasty. 
 
124
 A Buzheng Shi (Chi. 布政使, Financial Commissioner) served under the xunfu's office, controlling the revenue of a province and held the 
Chong Er Pin (Chi. 從二品, secondary second rank) rank in the bureaucratic hierarchy. The buzheng shi was a post in Qing China in charge of 
a province's finances, taxation and related affairs. 
 
125
 Shen was previous governor of Guizhou (Chi. 貴州) Province who was awarded Military medals in the Taiping Rebellion. He was 
dismissed as previous governor of Guizhou due to accusations of felony. Afterward he was appointed to Taiwan during the Sino-French war in 
1884 and later acted as Provincial financial commissioner in 1889 for two years, before finally becoming the second provincial Governor in 
1891 for a year. 
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addition of the Reception Yamen, the whole building group was 2.4 times the width of the Taiwan 
Provincial Governor’s Yamen, indicating the difference in scale. However in the military vulnerability 
and independence movements which shook Taiwan during and after the Sino-Japanese War 
(1894-1895), this Reception Yamen was repurposed as a special military installation (Chi. 籌防局) by 






As the de facto headquarters of provincial administration its importance was indicated by the 
complexity of functions, with the granary, stables, temples and pleasure gardens all enclosed with its 
courtyards and gates. There were 18 building clusters within these two conjoined yamens (fig. 5.14), as 
5.14. Plan of the Taiwan Provincial Administration Yamen and the Reception Yamen. Adapted from Li, Q., 2004 [1979]. 
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well as ceremonial gate, front gate and two outer entrance gates (facing east and west). These two 
yamens were each fitted with a screen wall for the purpose of etiquette and feng-shui. Taiwan 
Provincial Administration Yamen was in Southern-Minnan style and had a main court and second court 
with the rest area as shown in the plan below. The ke rooms (office rooms) in the Process Affair area 
were within the side of the yi (ceremony) Gate following the statutes. This hierarchy contained a set of 
six official offices for bureaucrats and each housed government functions: lì (Chi. 吏, lit. minor official), 
hù (Chi. 戶, lit. household official), lǐ (Chi. 禮, lit. ceremony official), xíng (Chi. 刑 lit. punishment 
official), bīng (Chi. 兵, lit. military official) and gōng (Chi. 工, lit. labour official) rooms. These six 
institutions had a huge transitional space set straight before this main court due to its hierarchical 
importance. This space was followed by the private section of residences for officials’ dependents and 
a delicate rock garden which had components made from coral stone; the garden was placed behind 
the public halls and contained a pavilion, a fountain and a pond.  
 
The hierarchy of spaces can also be seen in the main hall of the Reception Yamen (also known as 
special military installation), Wanshou pai (Chi. 萬壽牌, lit. memorial archway of the emperor’s 
birthday), and in the north wing of the Reception Yamen which contains a place for prayer to the 
Northern Great Emperor as well as a theatrical stage in the front and a rock garden with a pond in the 
back. The yamen combined both public and private aspects and integrated all functions of the chief 
official into one expanded space.  
 
In spatial terms the status of the yamen was indicated by depth rather than height: the Taiwan 
Provincial Administration Yamen with the Reception Yamen was a sprawling collection of buildings, 
mysterious to residents, with transitional spaces separating and spreading the yamen across a large 
expanse of the city. For the Qing it was more useful to have a low administrative building that could be 
added to, rather than a tall building which could not easily be made taller; this logic reflects the elastic 
gamut of rigorous planning by Qing authorities, as yamen allowed for a more ad hoc approach. This 
contrasted with Japanese architectural modernity, as explored in Chapter 3, which generally moved 
away from temporary expedients (as embodied in Qing Taipei) towards a rational, planned future fitting 
with George Ritzer’s (1996) dimensions of modernity: predictability, calculability, efficiency and 
increased control. 
 
The predilection for administrative buildings in Japan before 1868 had been similar in many ways to the 
yamen that colonial administrators found in Taipei. Before the castle building era in the 16th century, 
Japan’s authority buildings (such as the Emperor’s Palace in Kyoto, or the Heijō Palace in Nara) 
followed a similar configuration of having square shaped walled compounds, gates indicating 
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transitional spaces, strong axiality and a mix of residential, ceremonial, reception and office functions. 
However, whilst there were broad brush similarities, the Japanese palaces and castles had none of the 
details that defined yamen, except the standard sequence of spaces. There were sufficient similarities 
that administrating the colony from the yamen represented a nostalgic return to the past, as the 
construction principles inherited from China were formative in creating Japan’s first palaces and 
temples from the Nara period (710-794) onwards. In Japan, administration continued to be from low 
palace buildings until the Meiji Restoration: even in the capital Edo, where the tallest keep in Japanese 
history was built at the beginning of the Tokugawa period, “the centre of ritual and administration shifted 
from the castle keep to the palaces erected within the castle walls”. (Coaldrake, 1996: 132) For former 
samurai it is likely that the architectural vocabulary of gateways (Coaldrake, 1996: 203) was more 
familiar to high-level Japanese than the semiology of classical revivalism.126 This familiarity may have 
contributed to the long utilisation of the Qing yamen as the main site of colonial authority. 
 
Taiwan Provincial Administration Yamen with the Reception Yamen was sketched and analysed intently 
by Japanese colonial authorities from the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office. Yet all these functions 
were not only studied by Japanese colonial authorities but were utilised for over half of the colonial 
period, most intensely for the first twenty-four years. Whilst the yamen was studied it was 
simultaneously used as the base of the Japanese Imperial Guard (Jap. 近衛師団) which were in the 
process of invading Taiwan in 1895. After a few months, when the Guard had advanced into southern 
Taiwan, the main part of the Taiwan Provincial Administration Yamen served the Army division (it was 
reformed and renamed as the Taiwan Army Headquarters of the Imperial Japanese Army (Jap. 臺灣軍
司令部) in 1919), which itself was under the Governor-General. Whilst the space of the Reception 
Yamen (later known as the Special Military Installation) was smaller than the Taiwan Provincial 
Administration Yamen, the building materials and architectural style were more sophisticated, owing to 
its function as a formal banqueting space (fig. 5.15).  
 
Whilst the Army used the larger space, the Reception Yamen was used as the Office of the 
Governor-General from 1895: the affairs office of the Governor-General was in the north corner space 
marked ‘O’ in fig 5.35 and initially his dormitory room was two doors away along the corridor (which is 
marked ‘X’ in fig 5.16). Notably the spatial arrangement of the two building clusters allowed for direct 
communication and coordination between the army and administration. Whilst the split between the 
army and the Governor-General is clear, the process of building occupation was complicated and was 
representative of the gradual supremacy of civil administration over military administration. 
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 For more detailed discussion of the Japanese ancient authority buildings at the Edo and Meiji, see William Coaldrake’s 1996 work, 
Architecture and Authority in Japan. 
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After six years of occupation, in 1901 the Taiwan Governor-General’s Official Residence was 
completed and the Governor-General and his key staff (such as the Chief Civil Administrator) moved to 
the offices on the ground floor of the Residence according to their plan. Construction of the Residence 
was a priority as it could contain many spatial functions necessary for a modern imperial state, 
purposefully reflecting the grandeur of the Governor-General. In its combination of living area, guest 
rooms, and offices, it was similar to the White House in Washington D.C. or India Office in Delhi in 
scope (if not scale). This allowed the government to build the Office methodically with evident attention 
to detail. The remaining staff are assumed to have stayed in the former Reception Yamen which 
became known as the old Office. This split in the staff remained until 1919 when the kindai (modern) 
Office was completed by Moriyama, (fig. 5.17) and the Reception Yamen/old Office was vacated. A 
year later the Army also moved into a new kindai building completed in 1920 yet again by Moriyama, 
the foremost architect for Government office buildings; this building also embodied the colonial kindai 
mission, strongly influenced by Tatsuno style, displaying consistency in nation-building (fig. 5.18). 
5.15. Interior of the old Office of 
the Taiwan Governor-General 
in the Reception Yamen. 
Source from MURASAKI 
Chōei, 1913.  
(Courtesy of the National 
Taiwan Library) 
5.16. Plan of the old Office of Taiwan 
Governor-General in the Taiwan Provincial 
Administration Yamen. Source from IDE Kiwata, 1937. 
(Courtesy of the National Taiwan Library) 
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What had been the Taiwan Provincial Administration Yamen was then used as a school amongst other 
functions. After 12 years of intermittent use, in 1932 the yamen complex was destroyed,127 the site was 
then occupied by the Taipei Assembly Hall (finished in 1936), the first Public Building for organised 
urban gatherings in Taiwan, which was used for staged events, meetings, conference and exhibitions. 
The decision to build the Assembly Hall was made in 1926 to commemorate the ascension of the new 
Shōwa emperor, and for 1928 a ‘Commemorative Exhibition for Royalty (Jap. 禦大典紀念博覽會的舉
行)’ was planned. Yet in the event this first building for public gatherings was used first as the main site 
for the extensive Exhibition in Taiwan: the 1935 International Exhibition held in Taipei. Given this use, 
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 Some architects wished to preserve the building, and a long debate ensued, where three options were offered: for the building to remain 
preserved as heritage of both the Qing and Japanese colonial rule; for parts of the building to be preserved elsewhere; and for the building to 
be completely destroyed. Eventually the architects reached a compromise where a small portion of the most valuable parts of the building was 
preserved, deconstructed and rebuilt partly in Maruyama Zoo and mainly in Taihoku Botanical Gardens (previously the Taiwan Forestry 
Research Institute) at the other side of the city in 1932.  
5.17. MORIYAMA Matsunosuke: 
The Taiwan Governor-General’s 
Office, 1919. The back (West) 
entrance.  
(Courtesy of the Digital Archives 



















5.18. MORIYAMA Matsunosuke: 
The Taiwan Army Headquarters of 
the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA, 
Jap. 臺灣軍司令部), 1920. 
Source from Guo and Ye, 2004. 
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the Assembly building was a thoroughly modern replacement for the yamen, holding multiple public 
functions.128  
 
The transfer of staff and functions from the old yamen and those working at the Official Residence to 
the kindai (modern) Office was a momentous event for Taiwan, a crucial step in the virtual cultural 
transition from Qing China to modern Japan. Japan’s use of the yamen up until this point as the old 
Taiwan Governor-General’s Office was notable for four reasons. First, regardless of the Japanese 
authorities exclusively building kindai (modern) authority architecture, a degree of comfort was implied 
by the long occupation by the Governor-General’s staff; it is difficult to imagine Europeans ruling from 
native buildings for almost 25 years in a similar manner, especially given the vast economic resources 
the Japanese central government put into governing the island. In addition, the clear study of buildings 
implies a discernable difference in the colonial modernity of Taiwan compared to European colonial 
powers. This difference may have arisen as the Japanese were colonising people of a related cultural 
background within the East Asia region, unlike Europeans in the era of high imperialism. Whilst the 
Japanese administrators made efforts to distinguish themselves from the locals, common interests and 
other commonalities meant that Japanese administrators could tolerate such spaces and adapt much 
easier than Europeans in similar contexts. 
 
Second, despite Japanese understanding the functions of the two building clusters and the logic of the 
sequencing (shown in the annotated fig. 5.13) these functions were not followed or respected. The 
main administration of the colony was housed in the Reception Yamen (used as a Special Military 
Installation by the Qing in 1895) and the army was housed in the administrative section, which included 
the spaces for the dispensation of justice and other governing functions. Rather than follow the Qing 
logic of spaces, the army – initially larger and more important in the colonisation of the island – took the 
larger building and used the spaces for their own functions. The Japanese study of the building 
alongside pragmatic utilisation of existing institutions reflects the Japanese approach in Taiwan more 
generally: to study the habits, customs and behaviour of the natives and utilise these according to 
Japanese needs, an approach which was also used in Manchuria from 1905. 
 
Third, the gradual move from yamen to kindai (modern) buildings was a trend echoed in other parts of 
Japan’s early modern history. Sociologists such as Pierre Bourdieu (1930-2002) have found that social 
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 Within the four floors of the building there were two main sections: first a gathering area with two layers consisting of 2056 seats, and 
second a restaurant area split over three floors with a dining area, games room, barber shop, VIP room and kitchen. This public institute was 
also comprised of a modern observatory dome with an equatorial refractor telescope on the roof. 
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habits are spatially and temporally defined as well as being embodied by people;129 this embodiment 
means that whether desired or not, traditions and habits of earlier times can continue in new settings 
and are accentuated in settings reminiscent of earlier locations. This is also likely to have occurred for 
officials in government buildings, given that major, authentic Seiyō spaces (charted in Chapter 3) were 
not built until the 1890s. This familiar, slow and elongated transition from Edo palaces to Western 
buildings was replicated in Taiwan with the slow transition from the somehow familiar yamen building 
through to the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office. This transition made the potential shock of visiting 
the  Office much greater, forcing a more dramatic change of habits and an implied change of self- and 
other-perception. For instance, the system of gates and spaces of transition was deeply rooted in both 
Japanese and Chinese architecture: the complete absence of similar gateways, replaced by lobby with 
corridors or service ‘boxes’, would have had some psychological impact on the administrators. The 
Japanese colonial government expressed its power in severing the link of customary practices, even 
whilst this was a link that was in some way sustaining a lived tradition. 
 
Finally, moving from combined occupation of the former Reception Yamen and the Official Residence 
to the purpose-built Taiwan Governor-General’s Office implied a remarkable, if gradual, increase in 
scale of government functions, which is explored below. This unpredictable growth of the Office from 
several hundred staff to over one thousand is over and above the growth in Taiwan’s population,130 
which had been under fifteen percent between 1905 and 1915, including Japanese nationals. Given 
this, the scale and scope of the new Office implied a growth in the ambition of the Japanese authorities 
with respect to both Taiwan and Asia. 
 
 
The Office and the Official Residence: totalising spaces of authority 
The organisation of Taiwan Governor-General’s Office was authoritarian with the Governor-General as 
the source and font of all authority: the Governor-General dominated the executive, legislative and 
judicial powers. The bureaucracy consisted of four main Ministries at the beginning of the Japanese 
colonial period: the Secretariat, the Ministry of Civil Affairs, the Ministry of Army Affairs and the Ministry 
of Assistants of the Navy. The Secretariat included the Secretary, Official clerk, Survey and Foreign 
Affairs divisions. The Ministry of Civil Affairs had the most divisions: Financial, Communication, Colonial 
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 The most common phrasing of this idea today is the notion of habitus which proposes that “human agents are historical animals who carry 




 According Spence ‘s (1999) figures the population of Taiwan from the first annexation by Chinese in 1624 until 1955 is shown in the table 
below: 
 
Year 1624 1684 1905 1915 1925 1935 1945 1955 
Population 25,000 100,000 3,039,751 3,479,922 3,993,408 5,212,426 6,560,000 9,078,000 
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Production, Civil Engineering (which included the aforementioned Central Construction and 
Maintenance Division) and Police Bureau; and Local, Legal Affairs and Academic Departments. The 
Ministry of Army Affairs included Staff Officer, Adjutant, Judge, Manager, along with Military, Medical 
and Veterinary departments. All these Ministries and divisions were to be housed within the ‘Old Office’ 
whilst the Governor-General himself was based in the Official Residence’s office as discussed.  
 
Given these central governance roles, the Governor-General’s Office was the centre of the 
administration on the island in a way that the Provincial Governor of Taiwan had not been; rather than 
being an inspector, advisor and executive, the Governor-General’s administration would by necessity of 
the functions of government be at once rational and totalising. All aspects of taxation, communications, 
public health, education, economic development, legislation, and law enforcement were covered by the 
Governor-General: “At the local level use was made of institutions of control inherited from the 
pre-colonial period: landlords, village headmen, household groups…. It was highly trained and tightly 
organized.” (Beasley, 1987: 145) Compared to Korea, Taiwan was slightly more controlled from Tokyo, 
with the Governor-General answerable to either the Home Minister or the Prime Minister, depending on 
the politics of the time.131 Law in Taiwan was therefore more connected and similar to Japan than it 
was in Korea, particularly after 1923 when most of the constitutional rights of Japan (established in 
1889) were given to Taiwanese. Within four years of the building’s completion in 1919, Taiwan would 
begin the process of becoming legally continuous with Mainland Japan, under which most Japanese 
laws were directly implemented in Taiwan.  
 
The legal system that was implanted to Taiwan was so tied to the business of ruling the colony and the 
system of micro-governance that this role was embodied in the Office building itself. Japan’s laws were 
first patterned on the German legal system. Codifying began during the negotiations to remove 
extraterritoriality as part of the process of proving that Japan could be trusted to do justice to foreign 
residents. This legal code was written and tied to constitutional rights, thus more clear than the Qing 
(and British) legal system, which was based on an unwritten constitution, natural justice, and was 
heavily interpretive. The Governor-General was responsible for enacting the Japanese legal system in 
Taiwan which “was clearly defined, resorting to a well-calculated mechanism of governmentality, which 
was – ideally at least – universal in application and articulate and rationalistic in contents. Colonial 
authorities derived their power from, and legitimised their actions with, this legal code.” (Ts’ai, 2009: 19) 
 
                                                   
131
 According to Beasley, “From 1897 to 1910 there was no central office responsible for overseas territories: Taiwan and Karafuto came 
under the Home Ministry, Kwantung in most respects under the Foreign Ministry. In June 1910 a colonial bureau was created, responsible to 
the Prime Minister, to deal with Taiwan, Karafuto, and non-diplomatic matters concerning Kwantung. It had a chequered history: abolished in 
1913; revived in 1917; transferred to the cabinet secretariat in 1922; finally, absorbed into a full-fledged Colonial Ministry in 1929. At no time 
was Korea effectively subordinate to it.” (Beasley, 1987: 144) 
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The change in legal system in the early 1920s had an enormous impact on life in Taiwan. Even prior to 
this, whilst the separation of court functions to new buildings had been well established in mainland 
Japan, removing courtyards and dividing walls in changing from the yamen to the court-house and the 
prison-house caused a major change in the Taiwanese perspective. From a colonial subject’s 
(Taiwanese) point of view, they had to adapt to a new legal system (albeit gradually) that was in theory 
much less corruptible and covered far more of their daily lives. Taiwan experienced a change in the 
legal paradigm, from a loose, malleable system to a totalising function. This was a great contrast for 
colonials, both in terms of bodily experienced space (going to a court, rather than yamen) and in terms 
of the encompassment of the law: “The administration of home affairs were almost all-inclusive in the 
regulation of people’s daily lives, including not only social order and sanitation but also education and 
economics. This… enabled the Japanese government to penetrate to the bottom of Taiwanese society.” 
(Ts’ai, 2009: 19) This indicates that the Governor-General’s role and his office should naturally follow 
this rigorous, controlled approach to the organisation of social spaces, and be an obvious exemplar of 
progressive thinking. 
 
The inspiration for this role unsurprisingly originated in Europe and America. Japan’s legal codes were 
aimed at eliminating extraterritoriality; formed in the late 1800s, Japanese administrators formulated a 
legal code that would be acceptable to foreign residents. (Ts’ai, 2009: 22) Given that these legal 
systems were aimed at gradual assimilation using Seiyō legal codes, the Governor-General was 
creating a social space and political institutions that had at their basis foreign notions of 
governmentality, the powers of government, the rights of citizens, and the paraphernalia of the ruler, 
some of which could be physically seen in the spatial organisation of the Office. Although the building’s 
style was undoubtedly important to colonial Japan (and is explored at some length in Section 5.4) the 
impressive façade presents a limited scope for understanding the substantial utilisation and allocation 
of the building. In terms of communicating and directly influencing the building’s inhabitants, perhaps 
the most direct effect was from the organisation of the building’s spaces. The organisation of space 
“provides the material preconditions for the patterns of movement, encounter and avoidance which are 
the material realisation – as well as sometimes the generator – of social relations.” (Hillier and Hanson, 
1984: ix) The spatial structure shows the practical purpose of the building as well as embedding and 
managing power relations; the circulation of the building connected all the spaces to emphasise the 
borders of power and hierarchy. Some of the trends explored in the preceding sections of the thesis - 
adapting to Seiyō, control over more aspects of life, and new types of spaces - could all be seen within 
the Office. 
 
The building was simultaneously designed for the Governor-General (and his staff) and was designed 
to shape his and his staff’s behaviour. The route through the spaces from the front entrance to the 
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Governor-General’s personal office discloses a high level of symbolism. The building shaped the 
building users’ behaviour in a new way, moving from the Qing period yamen to a Seiyō-style authority 
building: as with the administrative changes, using this spatial lexicon meant that the building users 
were following a different historical trajectory. In fact, the use of class based entrances was an 
important and significant aspect of Japanese authority architecture from before the Edo period. In the 
early 1800s a government edict on gateways explained the types of gateways that were allowed by 
different ranks of samurai and daimyo, which was later reproduced in an etiquette and regulations 
manual (the Aobyoshi, lit. Blue cover book) which had a whole section dedicated to daimyo gateways, 
showing the importance of understanding which gateways were for whom in Edo society. (Coaldrake, 
1996: 203) This was a similar lexicon to the ancient Chinese authority architecture used before 1919 
displaying the neighbourhood of East Asia region influences. Even though the lexicon had completely 
changed, the reproduction of ranked gateways in the Office can be seen as a continued engagement in 
segregation according to rank and class. 
 
The route of the Governor-General is logically the main hierarchy in this building which begins from the 
main official entrance on the ground floor. This entrance was one of nine entrances and the only one 
which rose from basement floor to the ground floor with a carriage ramp up to the piano nobile. This 
official entrance in the middle of the front of the building had a delicate façade surrounding, composed 
of an independent portico which is often seen in England and Italy, where it was usually preceded by an 
ornate outer staircase. It often fulfilled the function of allowing inhabitants to access the first floor 
without using the servants’ floor below. This principle of class-based entrances appears to have been 
applied to the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office, given that the basement floor was the servant’s level. 
The axiality and entrance to the building connoted a very different tradition of ceremonial entrance, 
unlike the main entrances at the yamen which were to the sides. The formal Roman Ionic portico 
entrance meant that the Governor-General would need to change his behaviour and often parade to 
enter his office. (fig. 5.19) This followed other European authority building examples such as the 
Austrian Parliament Building (1874-1883, fig. 5.20), one of the largest structures on the Ringstraße, 
Vienna, in which the architect responsible for the building in a Greek revival style was Theophil Edvard 
Hansen. The square shape of this plan, with the portico ramped entrance, meant both buildings shared 
a remarkably strong central axis. (figs. 5.21 and 5.22) This emphasis on hierarchy, authority and control 
at the Office was supported by high security at each of the entrances, particularly the vestibules at the 
main front entrance which contained security guards.  
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5.21. The main entrance of the 
Taiwan Governor-General’s 
Office. Redrawn by Author. 
(Courtesy of C. Y. Li Architecture 
& Engineers) 
 
5.19. The Taiwan 
Governor-General’s 
Office, Taipei.  
















5.20. The Austrian 
Parliament building, 
Vienna.  
(Photography by Author) 
5.22. The main entrance 
of Austrian Parliament.  
(Public domain) 
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The Governor-General's entrance to his personal office was extremely direct, only up one flight of stairs. 
The Governor’s office and his secretary’s office lay in front and just to the right of the central axis 
respectively and faced out of the front of the building on the first floor with a balcony at the centre of the 
main facade. He was also able to enter from the stair with a direct lift to the left of his office so he did not 
necessarily need to parade. The need to make the Governor-General inaccessible meant additional 
security was organised for him. This complemented his prime position at the front of the building 
overlooking the front entrance, which itself was guarded by soldiers. This central position, at the front of 
the building and overlooking the city from the tallest building in Taiwan, at once implied control through 
observation and intimidation.  
The Governor-General’s personal office itself was embedded in symbolism that connoted Japan’s 
adaptation to the tastes of Seiyō, at times regardless of suitability (shown in fig. 5.23). It was a luxurious 
space with high quality modern facilities. The first notification of this was that it housed one of three 
fireplaces in the building:132 other heating facilities were not constructed until 1922. This was a feature 
imported from the West, (the central element of interior decoration with the dominant status since 1600 
of English houses) 133 as fireplaces were very rare in Japanese houses where braziers were more 
commonly used. Fireplaces were, however, common to buildings constructed by architects educated at 
Tokyo University; in Moriyama’s design thesis of 1893, fireplaces were put in the rooms for the emperor 





                                                   
132
 Besides the fireplace in his office, the other two were in the Governor’s private reception room and in the VIP lounge. 
 
133
 According Girouard, “Wall fireplaces, for instance, first appeared in England in the late eleventh century. Although at first they were luxuries, 
by the end of the Middle Ages they had become standard fitting for all the inhabited rooms in a country house.” (Girouard, 1980: 246) 
5.23. The Taiwan Governor-General’s personal office (fireplace right of 
bookcase). Source from Huang, J., 2004. 
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This was evidenced even more strongly in the first prestigious target of the Governor-General, the 
Official Residence, where the original design contained eights fireplaces. This number was increased 
to seventeen fireplaces when the Official Residence was rebuilt in 1911 (within the construction area 
only 1900 square metres, fig. 5.24) all constructed with mirrors above them and decorated with different 
plaster sculpture ornaments. These Seiyō elements were highlighted by using authentic materials: 
imported tiles from Britain were plastered outside the fireplaces (ten among them). In European 
countries such as England, heating was crucial. The traditional fireplace symbolised the heart of the 
home and formed a focal point around which people gathered. (Conway and Roenisch, 1994: 79) 
Architects in England at this time would always look at the impact of the fireplace on the room as a 
major focus and celebration. The fireplaces suggested comfort and welcome particularly as they were 
placed in the reception, meeting, and dining rooms; this matched one of the main functions of the 
Official Residence.  Use in the personal office of the Governor-General is further proof that the 
fireplace is a strong Seiyō symbol within a Victorian idiom and the architect saw a need to have one in 
the Governor’s personal office even though it was functionally nearly redundant in the sub-tropical 






5.24. Upper floor plan of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Official Residence, 1911, fireplaces in the red. Adapted from Liao, C., 2007. 
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The second kindai (modern) element was the floor of the Governor-General’s personal office which was 
carpeted, something anathema to Japanese traditionalists. (Sand, 2005: 107) In the Near East, the 
carpet always had and still retains a practical function, as well as a symbolic function whose meaning is 
now obscured. It signified a magical space whose borders stood for the terrestrial, human sphere, 
erected as a protective barrier around the field, which symbolised the sphere of the heavens and the 
divine. (Milanesi, 1993: 26) Unlike the consideration the carpet enjoyed in the Near East, it was 
deemed exclusively a luxury object in Europe, a symbol of authority and power, totally devoid of ties to 
practical everyday life. (Milanesi, 1993: 184) Given the décor of the room, the use of a carpet by a 
Japanese designer in this period was almost certainly following contemporary Seiyō usage and 
symbolism rather than historical Chinese/Middle Eastern carpets. In the late-Meiji period, “all rooms 
with chairs had carpeting – the minimum two elements needed to make a room ‘Western’.” (Sand, 2005: 
107) In Japanese interior design a dichotomy developed between ‘light and refined’ Japanese rooms 
where one sat on the floor, and ‘rich and gaudy’ Seiyō ‘chaired’ rooms, which was maintained 
throughout Japan, (Sand, 2005: 107) making the Governor-General’s personal office an 
unambiguously Seiyō space. 
 
It seems that Seiyō spaces were ingrained with Japan authorities yet not only within form but also 
functions in various degrees. In addition, as with the sports club built on the site of Office, before the 
Seiyō reception function of the Official Residence was built, the reception hall was placed in the Qing 
‘Western Learning Hall’. The legacy of Conder’s Rokumekan of slavishly promoting western behaviour 
for interactions with Europeans and Americans continued in Taiwan. This reliance on Seiyō spaces was 
associated in the Official Residence. Apart from multiple fireplaces, the rooms were layered with both 
conventional ‘pile’ carpet and ‘linoleum’ carpet; lace curtains were also added. Moreover, in accordance 
with the European convention of the upper class as the image of up-to-date,134 the Seiyō social spaces 
were inputted entirety into the Official Residence, particularly following the rebuilt Baroque style 
building in 1911 by Moriyama: a tennis court, a small-scale Western front garden, a games room with a 
pool table for gentlemen, a women’s guest room and a Western-style banquet dining hall were all 
included.  
 
Remarkably the floor in the outside corridors and in the ground floor lobby utilised English ceramic tile, 
whilst the stairs utilised white marble, Romanesque columns were used throughout the building, and 
crystal chandeliers were decorated throughout the buildings in a similar fashion to English mansion 
houses. The features of a country house were also in evident in the Official Residence by the two level 
                                                   
134
 The Victorian upper classes were reasonably keen to seem up-to-date, but their modernity tended to be put under pressure by other 
values. (Girouard, 1980: 274) 
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servant’s wing in the southern-east area with a butler’s pantry opposite to the dining hall135 which was 
itself divided into four zones following Victorian standards: the butler’s, the cook’s, the housekeeper’s 
and the laundry-maid’s zone136 each of which displayed the technology and the spatial organisation of 
a country house. (Girouard, 1980: 276) Japanese Seiyō taste, particular for forms and spaces, were 
purposefully following the zeitgeist, the authentic, fashionable standards of the day, which can be seen 
in any official Residential buildings of this period as the previous examples such as Akasaka Palace 
showed.  
 
Given that it is easy for the less familiar to label Meiji design ‘imitative’, acting as a unique nation-state 
was often subtle in Meiji architecture, and was often strongly linked to the Imperial family. (Nish, 2000: 
84) This was reflected in the constant effort to maintain a dual modernity from the early years of the 
Meiji Restoration which, whilst adopting Seiyō forms, maintained a Japanese unit, following the Meiji 
official slogan: Wakon-yōsai (Japanese spirit, Foreign/Western technology) as remarked in Chapter 2.  
As the institution of the emperor was over two and half thousand years old, the Meiji emperor was 
prima face identity symbol to utilise in Japanese nationalism: underlying the 1890 constitutional reforms 
“was a strong emphasis on Japanese nationalism and that nationalism was identified with the position 
and ideology of the Emperor, the focus of the new state becoming the emperor system (kokutai [Jap. 
國體]).” (Nish, 2000: 84) The development of State Shinto and the consequential denigration of 
Buddhism fitted the Meiji emperor within the global trend of nation-building and the process of creating 
national symbols of the country. As shown earlier in this thesis, the emperor had been explicitly tied to 
resistance to foreigners and became a rallying symbol for the whole country from the earliest stirrings 
of the Restoration. As far back as 1864, Japanese scholars argued that Japan’s ‘national essence’ was 
a ‘divine country’, with a divine being as emperor. (Sakai, 1978: 163) Japan’s modern development 
began with the Shogun’s aides deferentially consulting the Imperial court (and all daimyos) on how to 
address the issue of the Black Ships in 1853, and the emperor remained central to the Japanese kindai 
(modern) identity from this point onwards until 1945. 
 
Inspired by Britain’s use of Queen Victoria in creating a coherent and powerful identity, Japan 
reimagined the emperor and his family, and he became a potent nationalist symbol, one more central to 
both the government of the country and the state religion than the monarch was in Britain. The emperor 
Meiji was said to exemplify a ’sacred and inviolable‘ tradition dating back to earliest times and was 
therefore not photographed except in the earliest years of his reign. On the other hand, the emperor 
                                                   
135
 In the Victorian country house, “the butler’s pantry was often close to the dining room, as at Lynford; the kitchen almost never was. The 
Victorians, like earlier generation, thought it more important to keep kitchen smells out of the gentry end of the house.” (Girouard, 1980: 280) 
 
136
 In the Victorian country house, “the butler’s zone was entirely male, the other three entirely female, except, possibly, for a male chef at the 
head of the cook’s department. Male and female zones were kept separate, each with its own staircase to its own bedrooms. The servants’ 
hall and steward’s room occupied the neutral ground between them." (Girouard, 1980: 279) 
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and his family were presented as symbols of the nation's progressive ’Westernisation’ of manners and 
modernisation. These were two live issues from the 1860s onwards with popular rebellions occurring 
as outlined in Chapter 2, bringing the renewed importance of having a linking entity. From the late 
1880s, Japanese woodblock artists produced many prints celebrating the imperial family, always 






These postcards usually showed the Meiji emperor in two distinct ways, simultaneously: as inhabiting a 
field full of Japanese traditions, including customary carpentry and nature, whilst his personal behaviour, 
clothing, habits and opinions were modern. The emperor was therefore important as a bridging figure, 
an icon who allowed a Japanese modern identity, able to adopt the latest international trends whilst not 
shedding all meaning and context from the past, becoming a model for Japanese to emulate. The Meiji 
emperor was the figure who managed to successfully straddle the Edo/Meiji period divide, a fulfilment 
of Fukuzawa’s phrase that Japanese people were each one person, two lives. (Hiraki, 1984: 211) His 
value as a symbol to the Japanese state, particularly in Japan’s imperial expansion, was therefore 
enormous. The subtlety of this hybrid figure, both modern and traditional, was rarely captured in 
popular representations of the emperor in Europe, where the Meiji emperor was either shown as a 
figure of ‘tradition’, dressed in kimono as he was never shown in Japan (fig. 5.26), or as a Westernised 
military figure (fig. 5.27).  
5.25. Detail of Japanese 
postcard of the emperor Meiji 
‘Maple Leaves at New Palace,’ 
artist unknown, December 
1888.  
(Courtesy of the MIT 











As head of state, the emperor was directly linked to the Governor-General in that “The 
Governors-General of Korea and Taiwan were responsible in theory to the emperor personally.” 
(Beasley, 1987: 144) Given this central role, the emperor completed the imperial hierarchy of the 
Taiwan Governor-General’s Office, and gave the axis a meaning linked to Japanese tradition. The top 
of the lobby’s ceremonial stairs was an important space in the building, as directly behind this point was 
a huge portrait of the emperor, located at the back of the two-floor high meeting hall, the main collective 
decision-making space. This room also formed the main core of the building in the space-syntax.137 
This use of the portrait symbolised that the emperor was always the executive behind the chairman for 
colonial state meetings where, besides the speaker’s area, the meeting tables faced to the invisible 
room, the alcove where the emperor’s portrait resided, as shown in pictures of meetings in 1929 and 
1935. (figs. 5.28 and 5.29) 
                                                   
137
 The dignity of the meeting hall was emphasised with a wide-span of space containing ten exposed Ionic columns rising through a double 
floor with a Baroque ceiling, curved and plastered, and a chequer-pattern of floor tiles.  
5.26. French postcard of the emperor Meiji during Russo-Japanese 
war, 1904-1905 ‘The Grand Duel Yellow and White’. Note the hidden 
dagger in the emperor’s right hand and the allusion to the’ yellow race’ 
in the colour of his kimono and the postcard’s title. 
(Courtesy of the MIT Visualising Cultures Collection) 
 
5. 27. German postcard of the emperor 
Meiji during Russo-Japanese war, 
1904-1905 ‘Mutsuhito, emperor of Japan’. 
Unlike the postcard above, this postcard 
had few racial allusions with a 
corresponding set of postcards of 
Russian leaders which made few 
distinctions between the two sets of 
leaders.  







5.28. A meeting in 1929 ‘National 
Library Association’. Source from 






















5.29. The 1936 Taiwan Exhibition. 






















5.30. Emperor’s portrait room 
behind the stage of the meeting 
hall. Source: Huang, J., 2004. 
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The portrait was covered by one of only two curtain sets138 in the Office with a photograph of a sunrise 
on the top of the exit (fig. 5.30), further increasing its authority. This was the exact point where the two 
halves of the building are back to back and so it can be seen as the culmination of axial hierarchy. 
Therefore in the Office the most important person was the staged portrait of the emperor, placed right 
on the central axis. This space rose up, with only emptiness above it for two levels; the small space 
continued straight all the way to the roof and even had its own rooftop (fig. 5.31). To the sides were two 
small spaces, lower than the central portrait space, and the front entrance was in the middle of the 
room, directly in front to the portrait and leading into the central meeting room. Whilst the space above 
was empty the space below was the vault on the ground floor where the wealth of the colony was kept. 
Although the emperor was not present in person, merely as a portrait the imagery is striking; the 
emperor’s protection of the state’s wealth and safety was drawn in the space-syntax purposely. This 
also perhaps reflects an East Asian tradition inherited from the Chinese, for whom ancestors occupied 
a similar central and elevated position within a symmetrical progression of buildings laid out along a 
centre-line; this type of sacred space was rare to see in European modern buildings. Yet, rising up 
staircases in this hidden room (as adopted to the modern building) was passing through thresholds of 
other floors but did not represent a transitional space; the space indicated the hierarchy of the emperor, 




                                                   
138
 The other set of curtains were used in the Taiwan Governor-General’s personal office. Using this Seiyō symbol of luxury and pomp alludes 
to the hybrid position of the emperor in Japan’s nationalism. 
5.31. Cross section of the central axis showing the Taiwan 
Governor-General’s personal office and the emperor’s portrait 
room. Redrawn by Author. 
(Courtesy of C. Y. Li Architecture & Engineers) 
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Whilst the portrait of the emperor was at the centre of the vertical and horizontal axes (space 45 in fig. 
5.33), the position of the Governor’s personal office (space 46 in fig. 5.33) also lay at the front of the 
vertical axis, above the official main entrance. His personal office was under the VIP room after which 
there were no further rooms; above this room was the central tower, which continued straight up for five 
floors. This position extending front, centre and into the sky emphasised the extension of domination 
from the Taiwan Governor-General. Direct and unflanked by obstructions, the position displayed the 
‘authoritarian Imperial power’ the underlying premise of Japan’s propaganda thrust used in the colony 
(an analysis of which is found in Section 5.4). Given this, the Governor-General himself could overlook 
the city outward and look inward to see much of the building, viewing the two-floor-high lobby with long 
snaking corridors penetrating left, right and centre. This is similar to official buildings in Europe, often 
with a central axis and facing the front of the building above the entrance floor. This front vertical axis 
contained a variety of powerful elements as the emperor was behind this office: it is only by traversing 
the central axis via a set of stairs that anyone could have been taken through to the 
Governor-General’s personal office, sometimes through the majestic two floor high committee hall 
(space 44 in fig. 5.33) and past the portrait of the emperor. This was the central route for higher officers, 
the important honoured guests, or any important ceremonial activity; the vertical axis is reserved for 
those of a high status, even the dining hall for higher officials was placed at the back (space 43 in fig. 
5.33). This was clear to see from the space-syntax diagram (fig. 5.32) below, where the high status 
rooms (the higher dining hall 43, the meeting hall 44, the portrait 45, and the Governor’s private room 




5.32. Space-syntax of First Floor Plan of Governor General’s Office for workers’ exits. The starting point, 0, is the ground floor and 







The floor plan is shown above in two ways: as a conventional floor-plan and as a space syntax 
diagram,139 used to demonstrate the rationality applied to the building plan and the most inaccessible 
spaces. The floor was also designed so that from any of the six sets of stairs leading to the first floor, a 
worker needed to go through a minimum of four spaces on the first floor to get to his office (space 46 in 
fig. 5.33). This conforms to Markus’ position that “depth indicates power… The person with the greatest 
power is at the tip of a tree, reached through corridors, stairs, outer and inner offices and waiting 
lobbies.” (Markus, 1993: 16) Given this is appropriate that the deepest room was the 
Governor-General’s private toilet (space 48 in fig. 5.33). Through the Governor-General’s spaces and 
the emperor’s positioning, Moriyama utilised space to evoke nationalist sentiment: in space and form, 
acting as a centrally planned, dominant nation-state underlay configurations of architecture during the 
late Meiji period. This sentiment was extrapolated in the Governor-General’s Office to emphasise the 
authority of the state, simultaneously hard to reach yet central and controlling, as befitting his role as 
head of a totalising political apparatus. 
 
                                                   
139
 Started by Hillier and Hanson (1984) and further developed by Thomas Markus (1993), space syntax is a method of analysing floor design 
by mapping the connections between rooms. Each door passed represents a further level. The further up the levels are, the further from the 
point of entry. Space syntax diagrams help understand the logic of special arrangements by analysing which room are least and most 
accessible and the efficiency of the planning. 
5.33. First floor plan of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office. Redrawn by Author. 
(Courtesy of C. Y. Li Architecture & Engineers) 
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Subordinate modern spaces 
The building was arranged with clear status distinctions, harking back to both the Japanese caste 
system and European divisions between servants and non-servants which were implicit in government 
buildings. For instance, the Governor-General’s position in the centre-front of the first floor harked back 
to Japanese castle design where the Daimyo would reside in the central, tallest keep. Thus the first 
floor was the centre of authority which continued from to the ground floor (fig. 5.35) and below this were 
subordinate spaces. Whilst the front staircase in the lobby (space 51 in fig. 5.35) on the ground floor 
was more ornate and used to reach the high status first floor,140 on the ground floor, there were eight 
exits/staircases that could be used (labelled 1 to 8). The main entrances were the front ceremonial 
carriage ramp (space 8 in fig. 5.35) and the back entrance with a smaller ceremonial staircase (space 
7 in fig. 5.35), both for the higher officials. The staircases at the four corners and the back side 
entrance, off the back ceremonial staircase (labelled 1 to 5) were for general office workers to use. The 
smallest staircase (space 6 in fig. 5.35) right on the side of the main entrance was reserved as an exit 
for the servant level below only which plainly separated the functions. Besides the main and back 
entrance (spaces 7 and 8 in fig. 5.35), the other six entrances all led to the basement floor (labelled 1-6) 
which mean the lower-ranked workers had to enter from the subordinate level. The circulation was 
planned precisely with this complex series of exits in mind. Therefore the spatial design sacrificed only 
a little efficiency to maintain the obvious hierarchical importance of the Governor-General and his 
closest officials. For the ground floor, the further spaces to reach were vaults of space 48, 49 and 50 as 




                                                   
140
 There was also a side staircase (space 9) by the main entrance mainly for the Governor-General to quickly reach to his private office which 
did not reach the subordinate basement level, but reached to the upper floors. 
5.34. Space-syntax of Ground Floor Plan of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office for workers’ exits. The starting point, 0, is the 







On the subordinates’ level, the basement floor (shown in fig. 5.36 below), there were eight entrances: 
four at the four corners (labelled 1-4), the back entrance (5 which could go straight to the ground floor), 
the service entrance (space 6 in fig. 5.36) behind the main front carriage ramp entrance, and two 
driveway passages (spaces 7 and 8 in fig. 5.36). The functional service entrance (space 6 in fig. 5.36) 
was planned efficiently: a servant could go straight to the stairs (space 57 in fig. 5.36) to reach the 
ground floor from the basement and to the coal storage (space 54 in fig. 5.36) and boiler room (space 
53 in fig. 5.36) with parking straight outside. The latter passages were ramped, and one was often used 
for bicycle parking (space 8); they went right into the middle of two courtyards behind the west façade. 
According to my interview with C.Y. LI, the entrances were not equal; as a Taiwanese working at the 
office, he would always use the minor back entrance (space 1 or 4 in fig. 5.36) because there was a 
strong implication that he should, rather than because he was expressly forbidden from using other 
entrances. (C. Y. LI, 2009, my translation) 
5.35. Ground floor plan of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office. Redrawn by Author. 





According to the spatial details (particularly by the size of the area and type of servants), spaces in the 
Office were influenced by the layout of Victorian buildings. In common with the Office, “the peculiar 
character of Victorian servants’ wings was the result of early-nineteenth-century arrangements being 
revised to make them more moral and more efficient.” (Girouard, 1980: 276) As revealed above for the 
Official Residence, this was also the case in the Governor-General’s Office where men were separated 
from women, with women only present in the basement; the basement itself being divided into 74 
separate spaces, more than any other floor. Following the Official Residence, the Office used a typical 
Victorian spatial plan, containing a cook’s zone (space 24, 26 and 28 in fig. 5.36), and contained other 
similar functions such as the night duty room and the servant’s rooms. The pantry room (space 26 in fig. 
5.36) even had one of the eight lefts in the building installed for food which delivered the meals to 
ground, first and second floors. This was unsurprising given that the basement service level contained 
most of the modern equipment and facilities which needed workers to function, such as the power 
5.36. Basement floor plan of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office. Redrawn by Author. 
(Courtesy of C. Y. Li Architecture & Engineers) 
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distribution room (space 49 in fig. 5.36), the boiler room (space 53) in fig. 5.36, and the electric clock 
room (space 62 in fig. 5.36), powering the rest of the Office. The servants’ territory was elaborated 
hierarchically in the Governor-General Office, with unclean functions such as cooking, storing coal, and 
even rubbish disposal (collected in the corners of rooms 17, 18, 19 and 20 in fig. 5.36 from the disposal 
chutes in the upstairs smoking rooms) all taking place in the basement. Officers who were senior 
enough to work above the basement level could avoid accessing the basement level by entering a 
corner entrance all the way to their floor, and thus avoid any perceived contamination. 
 
Concurrent with hierarchy, comfort, efficiency and hygiene were obvious features of the interior spaces 
of the Office. The main servant’s unit, the cook’s zone with its kindai (modern) space and pantry, was 
many steps removed from the ‘traditional’ Japanese and Chinese concept on a pantry based on 
wooden cabinetry. An Edo period pantry was a mobile storage cabinet, not a stationary space, and was 
first recorded in the Genroku era (1688-1704). The Meiji period saw changing social spaces when the 
customary Japanese kitchen moved from a cabinet system into the European idea of a pantry in the 
Office. The pantry was linked with each dining room, yet kept segregated from the kitchen. This 
separation was a feature of Victorian life and was applied as thoroughly in the Official Residence. The 
four pantries in the Office had modern equipment installed, with a ventilation system and an 
engine-driven service lift for delivering food efficiently so that kinks in the corridor were not needed to 
keep kitchen smells out and only one central kitchen was necessary.  
 
The kitchen was considered a relatively dirty area reflected in its name ‘katte’ (Jap. 勝手 lit. backdoor). 
The kitchen was separate in all Japanese houses except single-bed apartments, and it was a space 
subject to government hygiene campaigns in the early 1900s. (Sand, 2003: 68) Indeed, by 1931 “the 
everyday world of kitchen work had been transformed by the kindai (modern) hygienic regime into a 
realm of special danger and taboos.” (Sand, 2003: 73) This taboo was reflected in the difficulty to 
access the kitchen zone (space 24) from any entrances where the food storage room (space 28) and 
the pantry (space 26) behind were simultaneously close to the entrance and deep enough from public 
access rooms for most staff only to see the food when on the table. A popular reform from the late Meiji 
era can also be seen in this space: from the basement plan several square shapes in the kitchen 
appear to indicate that the movement for ‘standing spaces in the kitchen’ had caught on in the 
Governor-General’s Office. In Japanese (and Chinese) customs, kitchen tasks were done in a sitting 
position: the movement to working standing up was not due to the assumption that standing would be 
easier, but because standing was thought to be more hygienic and fitted the general notion of 
rationalising routines. (Sand, 2003: 85)  
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The kitchen was planned on an open format, with gas used for cooking; in Japan in 1910, the 
government was attempting to improve kitchen technology under the slogan “Reform of the Kitchen Is 
Achieved Through the Use of Gas.” (Sand, 2003: 79) Further than this, gas had only very recently been 
introduced to Japan in a concerted fashion and was strongly associated with social advancement; for 
instance HANI Motoko’s 1912 article “Economic study of fuels” called for further study of gas as the 
“fuel of civilisation” in the magazine Ladies Companion. (Sand, 2003: 80). The prominent place of this 
civilised fuel in the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office – an island previously famous in Japan for its 
savagery – was an important indicator that the Office was being designed as a site of modernity.  
 
On the topic of hygiene, there were smoking rooms at each of the four interior corners of every floor 
(adjacent to the corner staircases) apart from the servant’s floor, with sixteen in total. Given social 
taboos of the time, these rooms indicate that the building was designed for men and that Japan was 
influenced both architecturally and behaviorally by Victorian Britain where “tobacco had a stronger 
influence on Victorian planning than tea”. (Girouard, 1980: 294) In Britain even “the smoking room 
habits of the upper classes came and went in a slightly mysterious manner” (Girouard, 1980: 294) yet in 
the early 20th century smoking was in vogue again in Britain.  
 
The smoking habit had clearly been transferred to the Japanese bureaucrats, with smoking spaces 
having a view of the courtyard. These spaces were even hierarchically arranged: there was a single 
smoking room for higher officers for the authorities of the First Floor, which contained hand-washing 
facilities. In addition, each of the smoking rooms was allocated to a different division and contained a 
ventilation system for the smoke. On south-east of the third floor, for example, there was a smoking 
room for the Civil Engineering Bureau near their offices, nearby to the smoking room for the Mining 
Division.  
 
Whilst it was probably inspired by British country houses, there appears to be a particularly Japanese 
aspect to this space which puts into question the role of this social space, if not the habit of smoking. 
Although a smoking room could also be found within the Official Residence it was renamed as the 
‘games room’ (Jap. 遊戲室). It had a huge size and was separate to the drawing room as it was for 
separate activities; usually for men, originally deemed dirty due to the odour of smoke (before smoking 
indoors became normalised) and therefore situated far from bedrooms, the kitchen and dining areas. 
Such spaces were novel in Europe since they replaced the old idea of simply moving furniture around 
the room to suit various purposes throughout the day, creating a sense of permanence in the spaces of 
the building. Through following the modern standards of Victorian houses141 the Office building 
                                                   
141
 In the Victorian house, smoking “became the accepted ritual for the men in a house-party, after the women had gone to bed, to don 
elaborate smoking jackets and retire to the smoking room, where a tray of spirits was laid out for them, in addition to a supply of cigars… 
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achieved the same purpose. Although the notion of smoking rooms derived from Seiyō (and likely from 
Britain due to Conder and Tatsuno’s influence: both worked with by Burges who was famous for his 
summer and winter smoking room in Cardiff Castle, fig. 5.37), smoking rooms were uncommon outside 
residential buildings in Europe, and it is likely that Japan adopted this space for administrative buildings 





Further evidence of Japan’s adoption of modern standards could be seen in the twenty-one bathrooms 
and one bathing room in the Office to cater for the staff (numbered over one thousand), the layout of 
which supports the argument that the Office, from ground floor up, was all populated by men. The only 
bathroom for women in the whole building was located on the basement floor (fig. 5.38). This design 
made gender relations somewhat permanent. All bathrooms beside the basement had a similar design 
with a separate wash room (figs. 5.39 and 5.40) adjacent to the main bathroom, each of which 
contained modern standing urinals, squat toilets and taps with an efficient drainage system. This 
separation of spaces within the toilet unit gives evidence of the centrality of hygiene in the Office and 
throughout the colony.142  This ‘kindai (modern) toilet unit’ (containing a flushing squat toilet for 
defecating separate and a urinal space, both connected to the sewage system, with water taps for 
hand/face wash from city’s water supply) first appeared in Taipei in the Taiwan Railway Hotel in 1908 
following the first units in Japan in 1884 in Tokyo, yet the toilet bowls were imported from Britain and 
made from porcelain. (Chen, Q., 2005: 92) Although at the time, kindai toilet units could only be seen in 
                                                                                                                                                                               
smoking rooms first started to appear in a small way around 1850. They rapidly became one of the most important features of Victorian 
houses.” (Girouard, 1980: 294-5)  
 
142
 One of the most important modern indicators, tap water, was first supplied in Taipei in 1899 after three years of engineering projects by a 
British technician, William Kininmonth Burton, who was also a sanitation consultant in Taiwan. 
This image can be seen in the printed thesis at the 
University of Sheffield library. 
 
5.37. William Burges: 
Cardiff Castle, The 
summer smoking room, 
1868. Source from 
Girouard, 1980. 
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official buildings, even in the prisons, the toilet culture brought convenience to everyday life in Taiwan 
due to the intervention of Japanese authorities.143 Again this ‘kindai’ culture was not present in the 
official residences although even those toilets had ‘Western toilets’ constructed (using a septic tank 
system rather than a sewage system) particularly following the ‘House Building Rules in Taiwan’ of 
1901. (Dong, Y., 2005: 37) 
 





Apart from these kindai facilities and technologies, modern customer services, resources, media and 
dissemination institutions were set up inside the building to fulfil the aim of making the institution of the 
Office comprehensively efficient; these functions could be seen in the post office (space 37 in fig. 5.36) 
side-by-side with the printing/publishing room (space 39 in fig. 5.36) on the basement floor. These 
service functions were placed on the upper floors, above the main divisions of the Office but not close 
to the central axis, effectively constricted to the peripheries. There were numerous spatial signs which 
indicated that Japanese modernity in the Office consisted of attention to detail on hierarchy and place, 
efficiency and comfort, hygiene, cleanliness and service.  
 
Japan’s new administrative order in Taiwan was prefaced on a philosophy of legal restrictions and 
repression of dissidents, but alongside this was the gazette system which required a complex 
combination of technologies from newspaper editors, to printers to a functioning postal service, the 
centre of which was at the Office. The Office had its own photographic darkroom on the third floor; its 
own individual library space (above the back entrance), and a blueprint space for the Civil Engineering 
Bureau on the fourth floor. These functions consisted of the heavy service of the Taiwan 
Governor-General’s Office: the regular newspaper and propaganda publications, for instance, were 
                                                   
143
 In Taiwan, the toilet culture started from Japan’s arrival as sanitary matters were part of the initial nation-building policies which was 
discussed in Chapter 4. This policy was started in 1896: punishing public defecation with a ten yen fine or 15 day detention (a rule deemed 
ridiculous for Taiwanese at the time) and the beginning of the construction of many ‘public toilets’ (Jap. 共同便所, Communal latrine)’. There 
were five within Taipei walled-city near the five gates, three in Mengjia, and four in Dadaocheng. (Dong, Y., 2005: 26)  
5.38., 5.39. and 5.40. (Left and Middle) Bathroom units on the basement floor. (Right) Bathroom unit for men on the third 
floor. Redrawn by Author. 
(Courtesy of C. Y. Li  Architecture & Engineers) 
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evidence that the building was a hive of activity that controlled and nudged the behaviour and mental 
lives of colonial subjects outside of the Office. This gazette system was new function of governmentality, 
a break from the Qing past and, for Ts’ai, an attempt to create a new spatiality in Taiwan:  
 
“Unlike the late Qing government, the colonial government managed to reach and educate 
the masses, and the channel of circulation was made visible via printed media such as 
gazettes and newspapers. Borrowing Benedict Anderson’s concept of “imaginary 
communities,” Huang Ch’eng-yi envisions the birth of a “print-capitalism” in Taiwan under 
Japanese rule. He in effect goes so far as to hypothesize a “legal spatiality,” of which the 
administrative law made a permanent impact of colonial modernity on the society by 
allowing people to conceive of Taiwan as a place existing simultaneously with, and in 
historical complementality to, Japan.” (Ts’ai, 2009: 19)  
 
The gazette system was centred on the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office and allowed the creation of 
a new space of ‘Taiwan’, albeit only as subordinate to ‘Japan’. This required a considerable effort as 
Japanese bureaucrats worked much more systematically to join people together psychologically than 
the Qing had (whose most obvious attempts had been through city planning in Taipei, joining Taiwan to 
the Qing dynasty through institutions and a nostalgic city wall, which could only simply utilise modern 
lighting and railway systems). However, whilst it was complex, the gazette system in Taiwan under 
Japanese rule was limited in its effectiveness: newspapers did not penetrate far outside of urban elites. 
Instead everyday lives were impacted much more by neighbourhood organisation, traffic and market 
regulations, and improvements in sanitation and education. Whilst the Japanese wished to wholly 
create the institutions of a kindai (modern) nation-state in Taiwan, these were only partly implemented. 
Taiwan remained largely non-industrial, having a largely rural and agricultural economy to feed the 
growth of Japan. Even though imagined modernity was limited in its scale in Taiwan, spaces that 
displayed the sacred imperial might of Japan were prevalent in the Office itself. 
 
Japanese colonial rule over Taiwan, as with Korea and Karafuto, was always predicated by the idea 
that these territories would ultimately be integrated into Japan, as the Ryūkyūs and Hokkaidō had been. 
Another assumption was that Japan had a civilising mission, which applied to promoting education, 
public health, economic development, political behaviour, eventually relating colonies to the national 
polity and a special relationship with the emperor. (Beasley, 1987: 143-144) This developmental 
philosophy implied that one day the subjects of rule would become civilised, a philosophy which could 
be associated with traditional Confucian concepts of a monarch’s educative function. (Beasley, 1987: 
143)  
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In spite of this ideal of eventual assimilation, during the early years of rule the Taiwanese were clearly 
seen as inferior, less reliable and best suited to menial work. During the construction of the Office, 
Taiwanese were only involved after the beginning of construction due to the limited skilled labourers 
available and the small scale of the construction industry at that time. Yet the construction required a 
huge amount of labour which of demonstrated by the scale and breakdown of roles. In the case of ‘the 
land levelling work’ on the site in Taisho year 4 (1915): the director of construction, Ide, proposed 1300 
workmen and 200 labourers from mainland Japan and 1300 labourers from Taiwan. (Shue, and Huang, 
2003: Chap3-19) It seems that more Japanese than Taiwanese were needed. This was indicated in the 
breakdown of types of labourers. First, semi-skilled workmen: these jobs were only available to 
mainland Japanese. The other type, labourers, were used only for low level work. In a further sign of 
colonial division of labour, “the wages of the Japanese could be three times greater.” (Shue, and Huang, 
2003: Chap3-19) According to the official collection of the ‘Taiwan Sotokufu (Governor-General)’ on the 
transaction of balusters, the Japanese were mainly responsible for construction, whilst transport of 
materials was solely by Taiwanese.  
 
The colonial limits on work was also revealed from my interview with C. Y. LI, a Taiwanese architect 
who worked under the Civil Engineering Bureau in the Office at the end of colonial period: “I was never 
allowed to undertake further responsibilities than basic drawing even  though I was very keen to 
practice with my own time. I was actually secretly learning in my spare time by finishing my work quickly 
and practicing from virtual and freehand [hand drawing], coping from anything around my office.” (C. Y. 
LI, 2009, my translation) In the social spaces of the Office these ethnic divisions were also played out. 
The dining rooms were clearly reserved for ordinary officers and higher officers (fig. 5.41) which 
showed a boundary of hierarchy on floors. Indeed whilst there was an ordinary dining room on the First 
and Ground floors, according to C. Y. LI, he never went into these rooms: although he was not 
expressly forbidden, Li was afraid to go to these rooms for meals and instead he always ate at his desk. 
For non-bureaucrats there was also a dining room for servants on the servants’ level, which was 
adjacent to the kitchen and the pantry. Yet even for the servant’s level, LI never had the chance to visit 
only walking through from one of the back entrances, never using the lifts or the smoking rooms (even 
though he smoked).  Although this was allowed, as a Taiwanese he said that he already appreciated 
his role in the Office; he knew his responsibility was to not cross the unwritten code of manners due to 
his past Japanese education experience and his feeling of awe. (C. Y. LI, 2009, my translation) Given 
this feeling was so strong in a Taiwanese official who could closely touch the highest authority’s space 
in Taiwan, this shows the unwritten implicit hierarchies contained in the building: imperial power was 







In summary, the spaces of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office were infused with a blend of foreign 
notions of governance alongside residual pre-Meiji traditions and new syncretic Japanese modernity, 
which fused Seiyō concerns with Japanese interests in hygiene, class-divisions and the divine emperor. 
It was also clear that, at the top level at least, the Japanese administrators showed preference Seiyō 
over Chinese spaces: from the transition from the yamen building to the carpeted ‘chaired room’ of the 
Governor-General’s private office, as a fundamental principle the administrators and architects agreed 
that the Japanese-built official spaces should still be as close to authentically Seiyō as possible, 
apparently fusing its Seiyō style with Japanese taste.  
 
The Office was a learning environment in many respects, with spaces having normative implications 
towards dirt, smoking, gender and the superiority of Japanese over the natives. The spaces of the 
Office were designed to showcase modern behaviour and the ultimate authority of the emperor and the 
Governor-General. The architect, Moriyama, combined these aims in an impressively skilful manner. 
After their long occupation of the Qing yamen the natives’ old habits were removed from the spatial 
logic of the new building, and Japanese and Taiwanese administrators found themselves inserted into 
architectural spaces which had refined imperial hierarchies. This was a purposeful aspect of the 
Japanese imperial institution’s self-presentation to the Euro-American world powers, forcefully 
displaying the Meiji government’s continued belief that Seiyō would admit Japan as a social equal if 
Japan adopted the West’s common colonial rulings, whilst sedimentary habits which were allowed to 




5.41. The dining 
room for higher 
officers. Source from 
Huang, J., 2004. 
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5.3 A showcase of scientific evolution 
The new Taiwan Governor-General’s Office’s space was organised efficiently and designed to impress 
visitors; most of materials were imported from mainland Japan, and were the most advanced materials 
available at that time. Alongside the kindai (modern) spaces within an Imperial hierarchy was a 
mechanical and material hierarchy within the building. Important spaces such as the Beaux-Arts lobby 
contained hidden technologies, the lift and ventilation system in the dining rooms, smoking rooms and 
treasury. The use of the building as a space for the display of technical and industrial products was 
entirely in keeping with the building’s structure and functions. One of the most intriguing aspects of the 
building was the place of modern materials and functionality. The sources of these technologies also 
give an indication of the root of Japan’s modernity.  
 
The mechanisms in the building were in some cases surprising updates on what existed in Europe and 
America at that time, and satisfaction with the building was shown in its role as the first international 
showcase venue for an industrial exhibition in Taiwan. When the building was 80 percent complete it 
was used to hold the “Grand Sight of Formosa Exhibition”, to celebrate the 20th year of the colony’s 
foundation under Japanese rule by the Taiwan Governor’s Office in Taisho Year 5 (1916). It was a 
so-called ‘Taiwan Industrial Mutual-Progress Fair’ (Jap. 台灣勸業共進會) which implied the building 
was simultaneously a container of exhibits and itself a common signifier of modern style, a strong icon 
of progress for the Empire of Japan.  
 
The space of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office was characterised strongly by rational design, 
efficient use of technological products, and this was used as a technological showcase. Rationalisation 
could be seen on a number of levels, down to the large number of individual spaces with separate 
functions. Just as Mark Girouard wrote of the English country house: “Efficiency involved analyzing the 
different functions performed by different servants, giving each function its own area and often its own 
room, and grouping the related function into territories accessible to the gentry’s part of the house 
which they serviced.” (Girouard, 1980: 276) Public buildings in Japan were able to incorporate 
Euro-American cultural practices to a much greater extent than Japanese private houses, evidenced 
from the practice of the design competition to the scientific planning to keep the building hygienic. 
Public buildings, particularly national symbols such as the Office, became more than simple symbols of 
civilisation, for they also attempted to force the building users to become civilised through acculturation. 
The Office was a key component in Japan’s consciously scientific revolution in colonial Taiwan, a 




Exemplar of Colonial kindai (modern) technologies 
One of the most intriguing aspects of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office was the place of modern 
materials and functionality. The sources of these technologies also give an indication of the root of 
Japan’s modernity, fitting as they do within my understanding of Western modernity as deriving from 
enthusiasm for critical reason and fashionable technological products. Given this, the building materials 
were in line with a long term trend in Japanese architecture, from even before Conder’s arrival. The 
wooden carpentry of Japanese buildings was derided in Britain, and commonly associated with a 
generic “medieval period”; former British consul, Sir Rutherford Alcock wrote in 1863 “We are going 
back to the twelfth century in Europe” when describing the frame of mind needed to understand Japan. 
(Clancey, 2006: 49) Opinions towards Japanese carpentry and their use of wood scarcely changed in 
the following decades. In 1892 at a practical demonstration of Japanese and English carpentry in 
London, former professor at Tokyo University, George Cawley said there were “two types of carpenter, 
two types of carpentry, and two classes of tool: ‘The Japanese wood worker is a master of decorative 
rather than constructive art. For the British wood worker I would generally claim the exact opposite.’” 
(Clancey, 2006: 47) Japanese carpentry was seen by most Europeans as weak, lacking solidity and 
merely decorative and those who opposed this view were given little credence by the new architectural 
elites of Japan. For instance, Christopher Dresser in 1882 “brought the attention of western audiences 
to the earthquake-resistance of a five-story pagoda, a contention bitterly contested by a 
Japanese-resident expatriate architect, Josiah Conder.” (Clancy, 2006: 92)  
 
Partly due to his elevated position as prime educator of architects in Japan, and partly because the 
rhetoric on building solidity was so pervasive, Conder won this argument on the solidity of European 
architectural materials over wood, at least for any architecture built by graduates of his own course. 
These graduates built almost all the public architecture for the thirty years following Tatsuno’s 
graduation. Following Conder’s exhortations, solidity was interpreted as equated with masonry 
architecture. For instance, an anonymous Japanese author wrote in the first architectural journal 
Kenchiku zasshi in 1888 that: “Gradually, we should make every building in Japan completely in brick or 
stone. Academically trained people should be in charge of this, and architectural regulations should be 
set. This is the basis of a strong nation.” (Clancey, 2006: 19) 
 
Yet following the 1892 Nobi earthquake near Tokyo, these brick and stone materials were shown to be 
insufficient against seismic shocks, with several high profile European-style buildings damaged and 
destroyed. Japanese architects displayed the Enlightenment ideal of rational development of science 
and technologies to great effect following this experience. In 1892 “the Diet funded the Ministry of 
Education’s modest proposal for the Seismological Research Commission by cutting the budget for the 
army.” (Bartholomew, 1989: 136) This commission heralded a new role for Japanese architects whose 
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first response to this seismic destruction was to innovate and attempt to make European masonry 
constructions more resilient to tremors (Clancey, 2006: 180), as introduced in Section 3.5. These 
attempts signified a key juncture in Japanese architecture to move away from direct imitation of Seiyō 
buildings; seismic proofing was inevitably a local concern. 
 
By the turn of the 20th century materials in Japanese authority buildings were created using 
sophisticated techniques. The most important of these was steel- (or iron-) reinforced concrete (also 
known as ferro-concrete). The earliest use of reinforced concrete in Taiwan was in 1901 in the structure 
of the Official Residence where steel rods were used to construct a reinforced concrete balcony. 
According to FU Chao-Ching, the method was “many years ahead of its time and was a pioneering feat 
for the whole of Asia because at that time reinforced concrete techniques had not yet reached maturity 
even in Japan or the West.” (Fu, C., 2007: 174) A key figure in this was TOGAWA Yoshitaro at the 
Construction and Maintenance Division who recommended the use of reinforced concrete at the 
Official Residence, and then in 1905 helped to design the first reinforced concrete floor in Taiwan in the 
Government-General’s Research Institute. This trend was further elaborated in 1908 with the Taipei 
Telephone Exchange, designed by a structural engineer, which “became the first building completely 
constructed from reinforced concrete [in Taiwan]. From then on, reinforced concrete became the 
fashion in construction as well as a symbol of modernity for those who favoured progress in building 
development.” (Fu, C., 2007: 174)  
 
In Taiwan, this use of reinforced concrete was a part of two trends: the scientific approach to building 
technology and the desire to set Japanese buildings apart from native architecture. Building materials 
were used to show the superiority of Japan over the natives, for instance during the Meishan 
earthquake (Jap. 梅山地震) of 1906 in central Taiwan which left all buildings levelled to the ground in 
the town of Dabyo, with only the Japanese Sub-Prefectural Office (made of brick) remaining. (Clancey, 
2006: 175) Following the refinement of the techniques to build reinforced concrete buildings, authority 
buildings in Taiwan were also made earthquake-proof through use of steel-reinforced concrete. The 
innovative use of ferro-concrete (first invented in France in 1849) was an achievement discovered 
through rational means and empirical enquiry, which points towards an understanding of natural 
phenomena using scientific methods, the earthquakes forcing “Japanese architecture into a more 
complex relationship with the Earth” (Clancey, 2006: 212) and with the building materials inherited from 
Europe and America. 
 
The most recent developments in construction materials of Imperial Japan were used in the Taiwan 
Governor-General’s Office: reinforced concrete and Japanese patented materials such as 
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affixed-refined-tile and seismic cement blocks. In using these, the construction team were exploiting the 
most up-to-date materials available to both Euro-American and Japanese architects at that time (a key 
component in the English definition of the ‘modern’). Most innovations in material or construction were 
based on the aim of increasing the resilience and durability of buildings whilst maintaining a preferred 
aesthetic. Both earthquake-proofing and new materials reflect Conder’s insistence “that a building must 
be substantial.” (Conder, 1878b: 3)  
 
In order to maintain this cohesive outlook, from the competition and examination to construction and 
modification of the building, all decisions were made and executed solely by Japanese. Even the 
construction firms were all Japanese companies with branches in Taiwan. There were three 
construction firms involved in the building of the Office: ‘Horiuchi Chambers of Commerce’ (Jap. 堀內
商會) was founded in Taiwan in 1899 and specialised in the reinforced concrete construction and 
traded imported building materials from Britain and America; ‘Takaishi Group’ (Jap. 高石組) was 
founded in Taiwan in 1899 and also traded building materials; ‘Sawai Group’ (Jap. 澤井組) was 
founded in 1898 and specialised in civil engineering.  
 
These three companies constructed most official buildings in Taiwan but only combined forces on this 
project, demonstrating the importance and scale of the construction. Producing and supplying materials 
was a challenge for the first huge construction project in colonial Taiwan. In general, the materials 
consisted of local and patented construction methods and materials which included tiling, timber, 
ironware, bronze, quicklime, cement, seismic cement blocks and steel windows. The main structure of 
the building was constructed using reinforced concrete, brick and tile. Timber was secondary and all 
the windows, doors and roof trusses used timber.  
 
The primary material, the reinforced concrete, needed a huge amount of cement which was also made 
using a patented contracture material. The common cement was supplied by Asano Midoro Co., Ltd 
(Jap. 淺野水泥株式會社). In colonial Taiwan, cement was needed for various projects and was 
imported from Japan until 1917, when a branch of Asano Midoro Co., Ltd established a factory in 
Kaohsiung (Southern Taiwan). ‘Sakai’s seismic cement blocks’ (Jap. 酒井式耐震水泥磚) were used on 
the balustrades of all floors to confront the earthquake environment. This patented contracture material 
was proposed by architect SAKAI Yūnosuke (Jap. 酒井祐之助) who had failed to qualify for the second 
stage of the design competition.  
 
This use of two patented materials in the basic material is an indication that by 1910 new types of 
construction materials were reaching maturity in Japan, and a patent system had developed. (Huang, 
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J., 2004: 120) The use of patented materials in the Governor-General’s Office also included two kinds 
of applied tile. First was white affixed-tile used for the inner walls of bathrooms and the face-wash 
rooms on the ground, first and second floors which were imported from ‘SAJI Ceramic Manufacturing’ 
(Jap. 佐治製陶所) in mainland Japan. The other patented affixed tile used was a red affixed-refined-tile 
applied to the outer walls of the building. (Shue, C. and Huang, J., 2003: Chap 3-15) This tile was used 
to give the appearance of brick-facing and was attached to the main structure. The application of tiling 
had the additional benefit of making the reinforced concrete waterproof. This was a new technology at 
the time, developed to replace load-bearing brick structure, as brick had been proven very weak during 
seismic events.144  
 
In pursuit of this aesthetic, the red affixed-refined-tile was without glaze, so the colour and the feel were 
exactly the same as red brick. That the Office used so much red affixed-refined-tile shows the 
preference for brick-like structures in colonial Taiwan. Taiwan had imported brick technology from China 
before the Japanese colonial period, but there were 36 ‘new style’ brick factories during the Japanese 
period, the first of which was set up in 1901. (Wang, H., 2001: 2) However, the red affixed-refined-tile 
for the Office was imported from mainland Japan and utilised patented material supplied from the same 
factory as used for the construction of Tokyo station: ‘Shinagawa Shirorenga Co., Ltd.’ (Jap. 品川白煉
瓦株式會社).145 Indeed the format of red affixed-refined-tile used on the Taiwan Office was nearly the 
same as that of Tokyo station (1914) (figs. 5.42 and 5.43). This kind of affixed-refined-tile used on 
reinforced concrete was only popular for 15 years after its first use in 1912, and developed at nearly the 
same time as reinforced concrete. (Shue and Huang 2003: Chap 4-31) This invention was treated like 
most modern technologies at that time, and brought Japan into a new era as these materials were 
stable for construction and also a symbol of Seiyō aesthetics. However, after the Great Kantō 
earthquake in 1923 damaged many brick buildings, brick became a symbol of weakness and even the 
red affixed-refined-tile gradually lost its popularity.   
 
                                                   
144
 This concept of hiding structural materials with a brick façade was one that was practised in Europe and America yet had a distinctive twist 
in Japan. Jordan’s Sand’s recent study of Tokyo vernacular buildings found that this principle stretched even to native carpenters where the 
wooden structure was hidden and replaced with a Seiyō-inspired façade. For example, the most common type of modern buildings in interwar 
Tokyo did not use concrete as the structural material, but wood. Named ‘signboard architecture’ in the 1970s, this architecture was the most 
common vernacular type found in Tokyo by FUJIMORI Terunobu (Jap. 藤森照信) which was constructed “in wood by native carpenters but 
fronted with ornamental façades in brick, tile, and copper that made the buildings superficially Western.” (Sand, 2013: 96) Fujimori’s activities 
and enthusiasm for these buildings was criticised by senior scholars who did not believe these uncanonised modern buildings were worthy of 
study. (Sand, 2013: 97) Whilst Fujimori has continued his activities, modern wooden buildings at that time and until today have been 
disparaged by the architectural academy, yet they appear to have a principle akin to the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office: that the building 
should have the appearance of ‘modern’ (that is revivalist) architecture regardless of the structural material. 
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Other patented materials like steel windows and door frames used steel production processes from 
Sugamo Manufacturing (Jap. 巢鴨製作所) in Japan, as the product was solid, resisted strong winds, 
was fireproof and even waterproof due to the manufacturing process of advanced machinery and the 
forging of each piece at very high temperatures. Ironware locks were imported from America by 
Moriyama in 1915, one of the few instances of importation from outside the Japanese Empire. Bronze 
for decorations on the columns and metallic materials for handrails were imported from Japan but cast 
in Taipei. At that time, there was a complete casting manufacturer in Taipei, demonstrating the maturity 
of the cast metal industry in colonial Taiwan. SAITO Shizumi (Jap. 齊藤靜美) was appointed as casting 
operator by the new director technician Ide, as Saito had good experience of making bronze statues in 
Japan. 
 
These patented materials were also a sign of the times in Japan, where by the 1900s Japanese 
companies began to be bearers of news of the “latest products and lessons of civilization.” (Sand, 200: 
80) Such technologies were bound up in a network of knowledge that integrated all players into social 
and cultural hierarchies. Europe and the United States were seen as the sources of technological 
authority, and civilisation was often embodied in new commodities (Sand, 2003: 80) but could also be 
seen in new building functions and patented materials. In addition, the development of Japanese 
patented materials was a signifier that technical authority was beginning to also be located in East Asia 
as well as Seiyō. 
 
Wood was the only natural material from Taiwan used apart from quicklime, as timber from Japan was 
not suitable for Taiwan’s climate, the tropical weather and the high humidity. Also timber was too 
5.42. The schematic format of the red 
affixed-refined-tile on the Tokyo 
Station. (Unit: mm). This method was 
later copied for the Taiwan 
Governor-General’s Office. Adapted 
from Shue and Huang, 2003. 
5.43. The schematic format of red 
affixed-refined-tile on the Taiwan 
Governor-General’s Office (Unit: mm). 
The alternating thickness of the tiles 
(on the right) meant the structure could 
bear more weight. Adapted from Shue 
and Huang, 2003. 
 400 
expensive to import from Japan, so using local material saved time and money for transport. Taiwan’s 
timber was considered to be good quality and was later even exported in huge amounts to Japan. 
Several types of timber were used in construction: first, Taiwan cypress (Jap. 扁柏)146 and Formosan 
cypress (Jap. 紅檜)147 were logged by ‘Chiayi-Prefecture Lumber Works’ (Jap. 嘉義製材所) of the 
Forest Management Bureau from Alishan (Jap. 阿里山, lit. Mount Ali) area; and second, beech wood 
(Jap. 櫸木)148 was produced by ‘Taiwan lumber Co. Ltd.’ (Jap. 臺灣製材株式會社) from the aboriginal 
area in Hsinchu-prefecture Dahu sub-prefecture (Jap. 新竹廳大湖支廳) (Shue. C and Huang, J., 2003: 
Chap 3-14). Both areas were difficult to reach, especially the Alishan mountain area which has an 
average altitude of 2,500 metres. As explored in section 4.4, transportation was enabled by the 
construction of the Alishan Forest Railway in 1912 to facilitate the logging of cypress and Taiwania 
wood. This shows both the advantage of the transportation system and the importance of materials to 
the Japanese colonialists. Timber was the only building material used with spiritual significance for the 
Japanese and was the only material used in their ridge-beam raising ceremony in this building, as 
detailed in Section 5.4. 
 
As might be expected, the wooden components of the building were non-structural. This was in line 
with how Conder taught wood in the Tokyo University course: wood was only to be used for certain 
parts of the building (roofs, floors, staircases) rather than whole buildings. Wooden buildings were 
normally associated to be fire hazards by Conder and his successors. (Clancey, 2006: 14) That 
Moriyama would continue this trend was obvious even from his design thesis, where he detailed that 
wood would be used “for window frames, door frames, dado and skirtings, and wood panelling [Sic.]” as 
directed by the architect, who would lead the carpenters and make projections and measures for these 
workers. (Moriyama, 1897: 9) By this point in Japanese history, carpenters were clear subordinates to 
architects and merely another part of the kindai (modern) building process.  
 
According to the archives of official documents from the Governor-General’s Office, and as shown in 
the foregoing section, construction materials were chosen first on consideration of quality and only 
second on the basis of price: as a result the costs greatly exceeded expectations. The quality of 
materials was decided using a strict process:  
 
                                                   
146
 Taiwan cypress is a species of cypress, native to the mountains of Taiwan. The tree only grows at altitudes of 1300–2800 metres. 
 
147
 Formosan cypress is a species of Chamaecyparis which is native to Taiwan. It mainly grows in the central mountains of Taiwan at 
moderate to high altitudes of 1000–2900 m. As an indicator of its popularity, Formosan cypress is now extinct due to habitat loss and 
over-cutting for its timber. 
 
148
 Beech wood is from a species of Zelkova native to Japan, Korea, eastern China, and Taiwan. It is often grown as an ornamental tree, and 
used in bonsai. 
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“in order to control the quality of materials, all the purchases were treated exclusively and 
authorized by the Governor-General. Each material was proposed by the Construction 
Director to the Governor-General and they were then evaluated (with the choice of listed 
factories) according to the construction need. After this purchasing procedure a contract 
was signed to guarantee the quality and deadline. Upon arrival the materials needed to 
qualify to the product test standard of the Research Institute of the Governor-General’s 
Office which provided acceptance by the Civil Engineering Bureau.” (Shue, C. and Huang, 
J., 2003: Chap 3-18)  
 
Such a careful attitude to quality control shows how much attention the Japanese government 
bestowed on the building, and the value they placed on durability. The colonial construction bureau was 
led by architects who had been trained at Tokyo University, which put much emphasis on quality control, 
usually centred on the architect:149 in this instance, the controlling influence of the Governor-General 
himself was shown as being the ultimate authority on adequate quality. This quality control task was 
made more difficult by the trust put in Japanese production, as almost all the materials were 
transported from Japan by ship. This created transport difficulties, as materials were often delayed by 
weather and shipping problems (and presumably rejections would have taken much longer to resolve). 
However using this method each building component was of high quality, reliable and up-to-date, even 
by contemporaneous Seiyō standards. The ability to import almost every material from Japan 
demonstrates the modernity of production in domestic Japan. 
 
The basement of the Office was the service level, containing most of the modern equipment and 
facilities, and powering the rest of the Office. It contained a power distribution room, a boiler room and 
an electric clock room, rationally designed with new technologies and fuels. The technological features 
were characteristic of Moriyama’s approach and partly a consequence of his tour of Europe and 
America 1912-1914 assessing the latest technological developments. However, there were also a 
number of innovations that spoke to the genius of Japanese designers, which explain why the second 
draft of the design took over one year: 
 
• Ten lifts were provided within the building, seven for people and three for food. The dining 
rooms were all placed directly above the central kitchen to allow the lifts to efficiently 
transport the food and to keep food smells outside the rest of the building. 
                                                   
149
 Moriyama’s design thesis (1897) elaborated one of the key roles of the leading architect as the quality controller of materials, with the 
sense that only an architect could be trusted in the Japanese architecture system to adequately assess all types of materials. 
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• Ventilation facilities were installed, one for each of the smoking rooms and four for the 
kitchen area. An air exchange device was used for the vaults to make sure the money was 
well ventilated. 
• Rubbish was collected through chutes on each floor. These were placed within the smoking 
rooms and collected at the corners of the basement rooms. 
• The chimneys were very novel. They were emplaced within the clusters of giant order 
columns in the lobby, the most pristine area in the building. The chimneys started in the 
large boiler room in the basement and went through to the roof. 
 
There were other areas of the building which required particularly advanced technology. The third floor 
had an official photo development room which was extended into the balcony spaces during the 
construction due to lack of room. The basement floor possessed the most expensive supplementary 
facilities: fire prevention protection water supply installations (costing 9,257 Yen); electric clock 
installations (13,298 Yen); gas water-heater unit (4,694 Yen); warm water device (4,485 Yen); heating 
devices (118,568 Yen); and kitchen facilities (747 Yen). The Office was therefore replete in 
technological features to make the building more comfortable, attractive and impressive.  
 
 
The 1916 Taiwan Industrial Exhibition 
The Office’s structure and functions were entirely in keeping with the building’s initial use as a space for 
the display of technical and industrial products. The first use of the building reflected the Office’s status 
as the site of the most advanced technology on the island: it was the main venue of the 1916 Industrial 
Exhibition, an event which uniquely combined modernity and empire as with all the first path-breaking 
expositions. Since 1851, the Great Exhibition of the Works of Industry of all Nations in London had 
established expositions as the highest platform to celebrate the emerging trends of modern industrial 
technology and design. Expositions became venues to display the political-economic culture and 
prosperity of all Empires and also provided the opportunity to present the results of ruling colonies. The 
imperial ‘mission civilisatrice’ that justified colonisation even lowered the boundaries of where such 
international expositions could be held, first spreading to colonies with that at Sydney in 1879. The 
rhetorical closeness between the central Empire and the peripheral colony in the advent of New 
Imperialism became an important aspect of exhibitions, as they showcased the political and cultural 
achievements of Empire.  
 
Japan was very enthusiastic for all kinds of exhibition all over the world during its modern movement 
following the Meiji Restoration, and one of Josiah Conder’s first buildings, Ueno Museum, was built for 
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Japan’s first International Exhibition in 1877. These events were seen as excellent opportunities to 
implement the targets of Meiji polices and fulfilled slogans such as ‘Encouragement of new industry’ 
(Jap. 殖産興業) and ‘civilisation and enlightenment’ (Jap. 文明開化). Therefore as they were ruling 
Taiwan, Japan were ambitious to spread the exhibition experiment there as part of the colonial 
domination and as an instrument of propaganda. 
 
From 1910, the issue of how to promote the achievements of colonial rule to the world was raised in 
‘Taiwan Daily News’, which debated whether to hold an international exhibition in colonial Taiwan. 
Along with books such as the English language Japanese rule in Formosa (1907) it seemed that Japan 
were attempting to raise global awareness of the effects of their efforts on economic infrastructure and 
industrial productions in Taiwan. The decision to hold the first major exhibition was made in 1915, after 
twenty years of imperial rule. It was an enormous task for the Taiwan Governor’s Office to host an 
international exhibition given that the majority of exhibition experiences to date had been merely 
representing Taiwan in Japanese exhibitions. Eighty-four buildings had been constructed for exhibitions 
in Japan starting in 1897 in Nagasaki, and they often represented Taiwan with a ‘Taiwan Pavilion’ (as 
with Moriyama’s first buildings in Japan, covered earlier), a ‘Tearoom’ or a ‘Sales room for special 
products’ presenting a supposedly typical Taiwanese house.  
 
The most successful ‘Taiwan Pavilion’ in Japan was built for the fifth Domestic Industrial Exhibition in 
1903, in Osaka, and was the representative prototype for future Taiwan Pavilions. The building was 
sufficiently lauded to be represented on a woodblock print by the celebrated artist, YAMAMOTO Shōun 
(Jap. 山本昇雲, 1870-1965), presumably due to its exoticism. The drawing was made in 1903 in fig. 
5.44 and shows the rhetorical purpose of the building: it is a Chinese building, but festooned with the 
most obvious symbol of Japanese nationalism: the flag of the rising sun. Flags played a prominent role, 
and there is a flagpole erected by guests festooned with commendation flags centre-front of the picture. 
In addition, the red and white flag was a short-lived flag for the Japanese army and its exuberant use 
symbolised both the role of the army in the administration of the colony and the growing militarism of 
Japan in the wake of the successful Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. This red and white flag also 
recalls the Satsuma domain flag used in the Meiji Restoration (and the same shades of red and white 
were used for each of Satsuma’s allies at the time), highlighting the continued legacy of the Restoration 
and its geographical roots. The populace milling excitedly around the building is mostly Japanese, but 
central to the picture, given almost as much prominence as the building, is a group of Chinese guests 
with their hair in pigtails as well as a group that appears from their hair colour to be Europeans or 
Americans. The admiration these foreigners had for the building is clear from their body language as 




The main effects of these ‘Taiwan Pavilions’ were to promote the results of colonial rule and to entice 
visitors in domestic Japan to expand their capital investment in Taiwan; doing so was said to build the 
glory of the Empire of Japan. Thus the Chinese Southern Minnan style was a typical form of the binary 
viewpoint which pointedly saw Tōyō as static and unprogressive. That this style was part of a paradigm 
rather than an isolated stylistic instance is shown by the fact that all the commissioned architecture to 
represent Taiwan in Japan was in this style. These pavilions were successful and popular, lending 
confidence in how to exhibit Taiwan as ‘traditional’, without reflecting the architecture which was 
actually being built by Japanese colonial architects like Moriyama. 
 
Exhibitions in Taiwan itself displayed a different purpose: to provide concrete examples that the whole 
island was being ‘civilised’ through colonisation. This different consideration was because Taiwan was 
Japan’s first public baptism in colonial development (far more public than the sparsely populated 
Hokkaidō). To build in a native Chinese style in Taiwan would have undermined the consistent and 
totalising image of Japan as a precise, modern power whilst potentially bolstering the burgeoning 
native nationalism in Taiwan. Given this, the persuasive capacity of architecture was central to the 
exhibition’s vision, yet even before monumental buildings had been built in Taiwan, the colonial 
authorities had organised a large number of exhibitions. The groundwork for organising the 1916 
International Exhibition in Taiwan was laid in the ‘Products Competitive Fair’ (Jap. 物産品評會) and 
‘Products Showcase’ (Jap. 物産陳列所) each organised by a local colonial government with a 
cross-island audience. The first was as early as 1898 in Taipei, yet after Gotō arrived, and mainly 
5.44. The Taiwan Pavilion at the 5th 
National Industrial Exposition, 1903. 
(Courtesy of the National Diet 
Library of Japan) 
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concerned Japanese products; the first time basic Taiwanese products were introduced was in 1899 in 
Tainan. 150  (Lu, S., 2007: 197-8) These products were from mined Taiwan resources (gold, coal and 
aquatic products), whilst later exhibitions had more sophisticated kinds of agricultural products. The 
business of exhibitions in Taiwan became sufficiently serious for ‘Regulations for the Examiners 
Committee of Products Fairs and Competitive Exhibitions’ to be established in 1904 and ‘Prizes and 
Rules for Products Fairs and Competitive Exhibitions’ was promulgated in 1908. The regulation and 
prize system established a source-based approach for further exhibitions which connotes the 
requirement of ‘standardisation’ and ‘productionisation’ of Taiwan agricultural products and the polices 
of industrial upgrading from Taiwan Governor’s Office. 
 
‘Competitive Fairs’ were being held frequently in Taiwan but it was not until 1908 when the island-length 
railway was fully opened,151 that a larger fair, the Competitive Exhibition (Jap. 共進會) could be held. 
This was organised by several local governments, and was held to celebrate the railway’s opening, the 
railway being a real symbol of the compression of time and distance encapsulated in Japanese Taipei 
as discussed in Chapter 4. The items displayed at ‘Competitive Exhibitions’ no longer focused on 
agriculture but widened to cover diverse fields including sanitation, education, aborigines, agriculture, 
industry, commerce, livestock, forestry, civil engineering, transportation, and electrical appliances. 152 
(Peng, H., 2006: 48) The predictability, calculability, efficiency and increased control of modernity were 
applied and displayed with growing confidence at these exhibitions. The whole island could be 
exhibited to all visitors, and exhibition products could be transported more easily on the North-South 
railway. Indeed, use of the railway was actually one of the main activities during the 1916 Exhibition for 
visits to the rest of the island. Yet some critics complained that whilst the transportation within the island 
was acceptable, transportation with the outer world was not, and there were insufficient hotels to 
accommodate visitors. 
 
At the same time during this period in Taiwan, national consciousness movements were raised 
following the fall of the Qing Empire in 1912, and armed resistance flared five times between 1912 and 
1915. Moreover, by 1914, the ‘Taiwan Egalitarian Association’ (Jap. 台湾同化会)153 had been founded 
                                                   
150
 The 1898 ‘Products of Domestic Fair (Jap. 內地物產展覽會)’ advocated the importation of products from domestic Japan to Taiwan as 
references in order to improve Taiwanese products standards. The 1899 ‘Agricultural Products of Tainan County Fair (Jap. 台南縣農產物品評
會)’ was the first fair to show Taiwanese products in Tainan City. 
 
151
 In order to celebrate the railway opening fully, the capital Taipei held ‘The 1908 Taipei Competitive Exhibition’. However this exhibition was 
only organized by the Taipei Agricultural Association as it was more similar to a Competitive Fair than a fully-fledged exhibition. 
 
152 The first exhibition with such a wide range of exhibits was the first Competitive Exhibition of Southern Taiwan (Jap. 第一回南部臺灣物産共
進會)’ organised by Chiayi, Tainan and A-Kau (now Pingtung) City governments in 1911 in the second common school in Tainan City. 
153
 The Association's main purpose was to work for the unification of Asians to resist Europe and America. The main pillar of this unification 
was to be that of close and friendly Japanese-Chinese relations, and so Taiwan was key as an area in which the two peoples come into 
contact with each other. The Association called for assimilation in Taiwan based on natural fusion, and the Association would be the agency of 
international exchange between Taiwanese and Japanese people to promote mutual closeness between the two peoples.  
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and was supported by the Meiji reformist ITAGAKI Taisuke (Jap. 板垣退助) as a pioneering Taiwanese 
political organisation in the Japanese colonial period. (Lu, S., 2007: 215) However, it was forced into 
dissolution within two months by the Japanese central authority. Unlike American colonial rule in the 
Philippines, the Japanese treated Taiwan instrumentally, as a shifting platform used to extend power 
towards Southern China and Southeast Asia under the ‘Southern Expansion Doctrine’. The proposal to 
open an ‘Exhibition of Taiwan’ became firmer under this momentum, and stood in opposition to native 
nationalist movements which were growing on the island. 
 
The aims of the Taiwan exhibitions were multiple under this aggressive doctrine: first to show off 
Japan’s successful tropical experience, second to attract Japanese investors and immigrants, third to 
exhibit products from Southern China and Southeast Asia in Taiwan, fourth to dissolve the potential 
national consciousness of the Han people, and finally to show the results of colonial rule. As was 
shown in Chapter 4, Japanese administrators wished to demonstrate that they were not only 
developing resources but also enlightening the people, with a particular focus on the aboriginal native 
people. The global ambition of the 1916 exhibition was shown in the claim that this was a ‘Worldwide 
South Pacific Exhibition’ which encapsulated the Japanese colonies of Taiwan, Hokkaidō, Sakhalin, 
Ryūkyūs, Korean and Manchuria. Also invited were South China, Hong Kong, French Indochina and 
Siam, British India and Malay Peninsula, Java, and American governed Philippines. Colonial Taiwan 
was being presented as the ‘key to Japan’s south gate’ the overarching aim of the paradigm of 
Southern expansion. The ‘South Seas Pavilion’ and ‘Philippines Farmhouse’ were particularly noted as 




5.45. The South Seas 
Pavilion at the 1916 
Taiwan Industrial 
Exhibition 
(Courtesy of the Digital 
Archives of the National 
Central Library, ‘Taiwan 
Memory’) 
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Given these aims and the complaints from previous exhibitions, in order for a national and colonial 
showcase of products to be fully effective other infrastructure was needed which was not yet readily 
available at the turn of the 20th century in Taiwan. It was not until the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office 
was almost complete in 1916 that the infrastructure was in place to address the previous criticisms. The 
Office was one of three buildings which formed the first venue of the exhibition. As well as the Office 
itself, the Taiwan Governor-General’s Museum (introduced in Chapter 4) had already been finished in 
1908 alongside the railway, and was used as a branch of the first venue. Besides this, the Taiwan 
Governor-General’s Library, which had also been competed in 1908, provided a showcase for 
Japanese domestic arts and crafts. 
 
The first venue formed by the unfinished Office (along with the Museum and Library) was followed by a 
second venue (set up more with an entertainment function) in the nursery plant field of the Taiwan 
Governor-General Forestry Research Institute (now Taipei Botanical Garden). There were seven 
pavilions with facilities for a guesthouse, an entertainment hall, a music hall, a teahouse and rest spots 
which contained calligraphy and painting galleries, and a large number of temporary shops. The most 
noteworthy of these spaces was the ‘Aborigine Pavilion’ (also known as the Hall of the Barbarous 
tribes). Its appearance strongly emphasised the results of colonial governance: the abandonment of 
brutality and the learning of civilisation through Japan. Within this building the natives were shown 
sitting down counting knots, so introduced as possessing an immature economy without written 
languages, yet aboriginals were presented simultaneously as tribes under the control of Imperial Japan 
and ‘developing’ (fig. 5.46). In contrast, to the side of this ’Aborigine Pavilion’ was a Magic Arena 
advertised as ’the biggest spectacle of the 20th century’ (fig. 5.47). The front gate of the second venue 
had two enormous pillars of electric lights (fig. 5.48).  
 
 
5.46. The Aboriginal 
Pavilion at the 1916 
Taiwan Industrial 
Exhibition. 






The 1916 Taiwan Industrial Competitive Exhibition attracted more than eight hundred thousand visitors 
in its two venues. The design of displays, venue planning and general arrangements were the 
responsibility of the Taiwan Governor’s Office. The plan of categories above, which contrasted the 
technical advancement of the Japanese against the primitive natives, shows the intention of Taiwan 
Governor’s Office to transplant a particularly Euro-American framework on arts and edifices. There 
were eleven categories of exhibits in total, far more than in previous exhibitions in Taiwan. The list of 
exhibits was arranged with two categories on top, which were ‘Education/Scholarship/Sanitation’ and 
‘Arts and Crafts’. Whilst the number of exhibits in these categories was nearly thirty times less than in 
the ‘agriculture’ and ‘forestry’ categories, the top two categories were obviously a priority for the Taiwan 
Governor-General’s Office, for there were a number of associated activities including public lectures by 
Professors from Japan, and all the arts and crafts exhibits were imported from Japan. Whilst the name 
of the exhibition emphasised industry, there were only 3,924 industrial exhibits (under the categories 
5.47. The Magic Arena at the 
1916 Taiwan Industrial Exhibition. 



















5.48. The Welcome Gate at the 
1916 Taiwan Industrial Exhibition. 
(Courtesy of the Digital Archives 




‘Industry’, ‘Machinery/Institutions’ and ‘Civil Engineering/Architecture/Transportation’) out of a total 
26,443. Because of the lack of items related to industry, it appears that the progressive technologies 
were not yet mature at this time or ready to be exhibited; the lack of industrial progress before 1945 in 
Taiwan was also noted in Chapter 4.  
 
Because of this lack of indigenous industry, the main venue itself, the Office, seemed to be on display in 
itself rather than just being a container. As shown above, the building included diverse technological 
objects produced mainly by the Empire of Japan – both domestic Japan and her colonies – and so the 
exhibition gave a central role to the new building; the Office attracted nearly double the number of 
visitors seen by the nearby second venue with its lively entertainment function. The Office enticed over 
five hundred thousand visitors during the exhibition, of which 146,000 were Japanese and 379,000 
were Taiwanese, along with only 321 foreigners. (Lu, S., 2007: 232) 
 
Attracting so many visitors (particularly local Taiwanese people) demonstrated the lure of Japan’s 
unique kindai (modern) empire building: the Office’s advanced Seiyō Classicism style and attendant 
modern technologies were fully shown and utilised from the ground floor to the third floor, where there 
was an extra external temporary entrance. The front entrance plaza also emulated Euro-American 
expositions, as a fountain was built with flanking buffalos and two ponds were landscaped with 
coloured lighting appliances used at night. (fig. 5.49) Perhaps most interesting for visitors was that the 
tower became a feature of the exhibition: open to visitors, it functioned as an observatory with its two 
stage lift. This tower was in fact more popular than the exhibition inside the building. (Taiwan Daily New, 
16th April 1916) The tower became a landmark for the capital and for the exhibition, a position first 
established by the Eiffel tower in The Exposition Universelle of 1889 in Paris and inherited here by 
colonial Japan. The experience of ascending was touching and provoked intense sentiments in the 
Taiwanese visitors in particular, who made up 72 percent of the visitors to the first venue. (Lu, S., 2007: 
232) One Taiwanese wrote several poems during the exhibition to express his feelings, and perhaps 
the most powerful was written when atop the tower, titled ‘The consummate experience of ascending 
the tenth floor’ (Chi. 登十層樓二絕): 
 
The low clouds were wonderful, superb,  
Misty eyes surrounded by bright light, 
Facing west toward the sea and facing north toward the heavy mountain, 
This painting mentioned rice paddies and an ocean landscape. 
 
Choosing to board this victorious platform gives unrestrained emotions,  
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The body in repose half as high as the sky, 
Mountains and clouds are passing the eyes… 







Creating strong emotions in the colonial populace was a key function of the exhibition. It was 
advantageous for propaganda purposes to promote the advanced technologies that allowed this view 
in the first instance, and such a (comparative) skyscraper visibly signalled a booming economy and a 
power to rival nature. This rhetoric could also be seen in a set of postcards for remembrance of the 
exhibition issued by the Taiwan Industrial Mutual-Progress Association. In the postcard in fig. 5.50, the 
Taiwan Governor-General’s Office provided a strong background which highlighted the lively 
impression created by the fountain and ponds. Most interesting is the postcard in fig. 5.51, where the 
Office was placed together with the reception pavilion in the second venue which was in Japanese style. 
This was in general rare for representations of the Japanese Empire, as Japanese style was normally 
hidden, but it was logical given these two buildings were the main venues for the exhibition. The 
Japanese design features in the Reception Pavilion implied the identity of the host of the exhibition, and 
the composition of this postcard, putting the Japanese style together with the highest order of official 
building in Renaissance-Revival style, connotes the power of their Empire expressed alongside its 
deeper identity. 
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 Chang, L., (2000), vol. 4, translated by the author. 
5.49. The front entrance plaza of the Taiwan 
Governor-General’s Office at the 1916 Taiwan Industrial 







The results of the exhibition were multiple: even though attracting immigrants was not achieved, by 
1919 the number of Japanese-founded enterprises in Taiwan almost quadrupled, and the number of 
Taiwanese-founded companies increased by more than eight times from the 1917 level. Most of these 
companies were industrial and commercial, fitting the theme of the exhibition. The increase of 
Japanese-founded enterprises may have been as a result of the Great War which positively affected 
Asia resulting in an economic boom, and investment of Japanese capital in Korea and Manchuria also 
increased around this time. Moreover according to Nakamura, Taiwan’s role as the key to Southern 
expansion was confirmed after the 1916 exhibition. (Nakamura, 2002: 23) The southern expansion was 
observable in these new firms: the joint-stock company, the Southern China bank (Jap. 株式會社華南
銀行) and the Southeast Asia Warehouse Company (Jap. 南洋倉庫) were established in 1919 and 
1920 respectively. These companies’ names and functions imply a close relationship with the policies 
of the Taiwan Governor’s Office. Another trace of this policy is reflected in a remembrance postcard of 
5.50. Postcard of scene for the 
Taiwan Industrial Exhibition, 1916, 
in front of the Taiwan 
Governor-General’s Office. 
Source from Lui, Q., 2004. 


















5.51. Postcard of the Taiwan 
Industrial Exhibition, 1916, of the 
Taiwan Governor-General’s Office 
and the Reception Pavilion. 
Source from Lui, Q., 2004. 
(Courtesy of the National Central 
Library) 
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the 1916 exhibition, which included the regions of Taiwan, the prefectures of Japan, Sakhalin, Korea, 
State of Northeast China, Hong Kong and Southeast China, and Indonesia. 
 
The most successful result of the exhibition was the more immediate aim of promoting the 
achievements of colonial rule in Taiwan and showing the successful application of kindai (modern) 
technology and design to the tropics. This success prompted the industrial exhibition to be repeated 
every ten years following 1916. Two groups seem to have been affected most by the exhibition. First, 
visitors from China were especially filled with emotion and laments at the progress that Japan had 
made in comparison to their country.155 Second, the Taiwanese themselves: the effect could be seen 
from another Taiwanese poem, titled ‘the Governor-General’s Yamen’ (Chi. 總督府衙), a Chinese 
translation of the Office’s name. Written in 1916 whilst at the exhibition, the poem shows the impression 
that the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office left on its author: 
 
The towering space cascades into the sky,  
Stones and bricks stacked white and reflected red, 
This overflowing spirit gives exaggerated pleasure,  
And manages to resist any attack by the common people. 
 
Thoughtful planning and a precise structure,  
A rocky boundary is the first step in declaring the territory, 
Boarding here and setting down they can watch the people’s thoughts…  
Not only is trade and industry flourishing but it is congealed together. 
(Chang, L., 2000: 335-37; translated by Author) 
 
This poem is notably heavier than the poem written on the tower, with the Office representing a 
statement of ownership, a ‘rocky boundary’, designed to ‘watch the people’s thoughts’. It was also a 
symbol powerful enough to bring the Imperial subjects ‘congealed together’ under Japanese rule on the 
basis of trade and industry. The admiration of the preciseness of the structure is obvious, suggesting 
that the natives could engage in the project of modernity through simply experiencing the building itself. 
And yet the building’s purpose, to resist attacks from the common people, implies that it was the rulers 
who held the expertise, coldly watching behind ‘stones and brick’ without engaging with their subjects. 
The scientific and technological revolution by Japan was held by Japan alone and was possessed as a 
sign of superiority. 
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 One of the officials CHANG Zun-Xu (Chi. 張遵旭) from Fujian Province wrote A travel journal about Taiwan (Chi. 臺灣遊記) (1960) during 
his 18 day stay. Another official, QUAN Qi-Zhao(Chi. 全其照), from Jiangsu Province also wrote a visit report about the Exhibition.  
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Provisionality and a technological evolution 
The building itself was a product of a new ‘civilisation’ and it is disingenuous to assume that the 
civilisation embodied in the Office was that the same as could have easily been seen in Europe or 
America at the same time. The precise configuration of technology and the strong desire to exhibit this 
to natives (who had a similar Confucian background) was a unique occurrence amongst the Great 
Powers of the time, and more particularly in East Asia. At the same time, the effect of adapting Seiyō 
conceptual terms such as science, technology, industry and reason, pointed to a shift in the basis of 
thinking. In Taiwan, this shift could be seen most clearly in GOTŌ Shinpei’s biological politics, but 
perhaps the most profound revolution in thinking was in Japanese architecture.  
 
The strong, rational elements of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office, evident even to Taiwanese 
visitors, were a consequence of the way the ideals of the enlightenment were integrated within the 
architecture project inherited by Japan in the 19th century. As shown in the introduction, it is often 
assumed that it was modernism which presaged rational, humanistic architecture yet it was popular for 
European architectural historians in the Victorian period to link their architecture with Reason: 
Eugene-Emmanuel Viollet-le-Duc (1814-1879) attempted to prove that the Greek temple was not 
copied from the wooden hut, whilst India and Muslim states derived their stone architecture from 
carpentry practice. Greek architecture was seen as a uniquely European alliance between stone and 
reason. (Clancey, 2006: 15) Conder gave credence to this view, writing that European architecture 
“does not receive its inspiration from natural objects, but follows laws established to meet certain 
necessities. These laws are the result of reasoning.” (Clancey, 2006: 16) Following Conder, early 
modernist architects such as Otto Wagner pushed this point even further stating that reason should be 
almost all encompassing in architecture and romanticism should be almost eradicated. (Wagner, 1988 
[1902]: 79) European architecture was perceived as a rational product of the Enlightenment by 
European architects, which fitted a paradigm claiming that wood had been replaced by masonry 
wherever civilisation had occurred: “the presence or absence of civilization in European eyes was 
marked not only by the presence or absence of agriculture, but by masonry, and more especially by 
ruins.” (Clancey, 2006: 15)  
 
As noted throughout this thesis, Japan adapted a whole conceptual framework from Europe and 
America following the Meiji Restoration, yet as these translations occurred through the unequal contact 
zone, the changes resulted in something which was transcultural, that is, neither Japanese nor Western. 
Concepts such as architecture, art, science and technology did not have equivalent concepts in the 
classical Chinese script that Japan used, and new words and concepts were created. For science and 
technology in the early Meiji era, “The conceptual schemes of Western science at the time were taken 
as true because they came from the West, and Meiji commentators gave little attention to differences 
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between science and technology, regarding them as the same thing, and foreign.” (Bartholomew, 1989: 
4) Eschewing debates on the properties of science in the Meiji period, scientific growth occurred in a 
way that was dissimilar to Europe. One example is that medicine was the scientific field of greatest 
growth in Japan rather than physics. (Bartholomew, 1989: 4) By the time the Taiwan 
Governor-General’s Office was being constructed (1912-1919) the traditions of scientific research had 
formed and were reaching maturity. (Bartholomew, 1989: 3) 
 
The European discourse of science was also strongly associated with individuality and lack of social 
control, traits that did not fit in with Japan: 
 
“complaints on behalf of individualism in science have a long tradition in Europe and 
America. Sociologists from Max Weber to Talcott Parsons, as well as numerous historians 
and scientists, have insisted for decades that science can develop only in societies that 
have thrown off all vestiges of feudalism. Sociologists and social historians have usually 
condemned feudalism for obstructing social mobility, impeding disclosure of technical 
information, and impairing development of personality. Leading figures of the French 
Enlightenment even saw feudalism as contrary to nature.” (Bartholomew, 1989: 2)  
 
As seen in Sections 4.2 and 5.2, social control was a key factor in Japan’s society and the 
administration of Taiwan in particular, from grassroots upward to building design. This continuation of 
social control reflected the Confucian hierarchies that had remained in place in Japanese society; 
Fukuzawa’s attempted movement for individuality and freedom were largely ineffective in producing 
any deep change in attitudes to obedience and proper place in Japanese culture. A sign of this is the 
way scholars and architects were quietly co-opted into the nation building project, as shown in Sections 
2.3 and 3.5-6. Partly because of this, the appeal of technology was more salient to Meiji intellectuals 
than the idea of freedom: according to the Meiji intellectual SAKATANI Shiroshi, “education in the 
technical areas develops thinking and skills, which encourage the production of technology, which 
forms the ground of morality.”156 (Howland, 2002: 56) Slogans such as “Japanese spirit, Western 
technology” (and equivalent slogans in Qing China) support the argument that it was initially technology 
which was the greatest focus for Japan, rather than (potentially transformative) science. 
 
Therefore science had a less formative effect on Japanese society than it had in Europe, and was 
generally used for practical measures. This implies that science in Japan was conceptually tied to 
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 This link between technology and morality was first made in Ancient Chinese classics, familiar reading for early Meiji elites, where a good 
king was one who improved the lives of his subjects through development of technology. (Gao, X., 2003: 53) Technology was also seen as 
important as it would “teach people by using rules, and followers must learn how to apply such rules”. (Gao, X., 2003: 53)  
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technology, rather than as a means for cultural criticism. Bartholomew has argued that science did not 
have a revolutionary impact on Japanese society:  
 
Japan “has not historically been part of the Western tradition, and while this fact is obvious, 
some of its implications are not. Japan’s dominant Confucian intellectual tradition was 
loosely structured and relatively tolerant of new ideas and perspectives. There was no 
legacy of revealed religion with an elaborate structure of natural philosophy intricately 
woven with a formal theology. Controversial theories of modern Western science like 
heliocentricism or the origin of the species aroused little opposition in the Japanese context 
and were readily espoused. Japanese scientists did not consider it necessary to slay the 
dragons of traditional religion but adapted to popular beliefs and refrained from developing 
a scientific philosophy. The physicist Yuasa Mitsutomo, who noted and disapproved of this 
fact, even wrote: ‘It was as though Japanese science had had its spirit of [cultural] criticism 
removed.’” (Bartholomew, 1989: 3) 
 
Since Japanese science lacked substantive social criticism the development of science in Japan 
allowed the continuation of some deeply held convictions, even if these were kept private. Scholars 
have written that the adoption of European science was an incomplete paradigm shift, from an East 
Asian understanding of nature to a translated Western one. This process could not be completed 
because the underlying philosophies of how nature could be understood were incompatible. 157 
Because of the incomplete transfer of science to Japan, traditional views of nature in Taiwan and, to a 
lesser extent, Japan were largely retained, even if these views were not flaunted and not shared to a 
great extent by Japanese architects (as will be shown in Chapter 5.4). This retention of culturally 
important traditions contrasted starkly with the way traditional branches of science in Europe such as 
dietetics were fundamentally split off from scientific knowledge following the Enlightenment, and the 
idea of the divine rights of kings was severely eroded following the Renaissance and Enlightenment. By 
contrast in Japan the notion of the divine emperor was strengthened by the Meiji Restoration, which 
had a significant consequence on the axial hierarchies in the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office. 
 
The continuation and strengthening of some Edo cultural practices also had an impact on the practice 
of science and development of technology in Japan, as well as allowing architectural movements such 
as the Metabolism Movement to flourish after 1945. Understandings of science following Thomas Kuhn 
see science as tied to the social and cultural background in which it is practised, which are not only 
influencing factors but crucial and necessary conditions. (Togo, 2003: 280) These cultural aspects were 
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 The East Asian states of China, Korea and Japan shared an understanding of the universe where, for example, Qi energy was central. The 
role of Qi had a major influence on architectural design, but Qi has been deemed immeasurable by Euro-American scientists, partly due to 
differing epistemological foundations. (Lee, S., 2003: 64) 
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important, given that Japanese history had neither the stone ruins nor the concept and tradition of 
scientific research. The underpinnings of science and scientific architecture in Japan were necessarily 
different to those of Europe and America, providing a different shape and focus. Yet the impetus to 
adopt rational practice was increasingly present in Japanese architecture, with the buildings produced 
tied to the kindai (modern) project of progress in science and technology. 
 
The very first use of the Office, as a space for an international industrial exhibition, displayed both the 
products of Japanese industry within the space and the products of modern engineering in the fabric of 
the building itself. The seismic proofing was a logical extension of what Clancey (2003) called 
“locationally-induced tensions”: strains produced by possessing wooden architecture deemed by 
foreigners to be flimsy, residing in a region prone to earthquakes, and training architects and scientists 
who took on the task of researching and solving the problem of earthquake-proofing by innovating with 
masonry materials. This was a great success from a very early time: in 1887, less than two decades 
after the Meiji Restoration, the Swiss earthquake investigator F. A. Forel wrote that “More has been 
learnt from the seismograph-tracer of the Anglo-Japanese observers in two years, than twenty 
centuries of European science had been able to show.” (Clancey, 2003: 41ft) By the 1910s, Japan was 
producing and showcasing edifices such as the Office, which since 1919 has withstood over fifty 
earthquakes registering over 5.5 on the Richter scale whilst standing 60 metres tall.  
 
Whilst starting as a local concern - to prevent the destruction of buildings by collapse or fire - 
seismology was also a chance for Japan to fill and dominate a scientific niche, and be a part of the 
global scientific community. (Clancey, 2003: 31) In a similar fashion, Japan embraced the international 
exhibition, the new notion of hygiene, and rational methods of control through buildings, all of which 
had originated in Europe and America before taking seed and growing in a new way in the Japanese 
Empire. International exhibitions were a good mechanism for Japan to showcase their technical 
developments; if Japan’s new expertise did not receive recognition it would count as a hollow victory. 
This blend of local and global influences in Japan indicates again that the idea of scientific architecture 
underlying the Office was not simply a ‘Western’ transplant, but an amalgamation of continued 
customs/concerns, foreign fashions, and new Japanese contributions to the science of building.  
 
That any contribution to science was made stood at odds with prevailing views of Japan at the time as 
either static and unable to progress, or as a mere imitator of the ‘West’ (as revealed in Section 2.2). 
Through their engagement with seismology, Japanese architects built resistances into ‘Western’ 
building systems that were not already there. This new architecture was a technocultural artefact which 
became ‘Japanese,’ and Japanese architecture began to become something other than Western 
architecture in Japan. This process would be taken much farther in the succeeding Taisho period, as 
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Japanese architects largely abandoned both wood and masonry and “learned how to resist 
earthquakes with novel materials.” (Clancey, 2006: 211) It was through engagement with science that 
Japan was able to create architecture that would become recognisably Japanese. 
 
This blend of influences was not at all static, and the balance altered depending on the socio-political 
situation. The choice faced by the architect and suppliers was between gaining autonomy and 
accepting a deepening dependence on Europe, which was also a key theme in the development of 
science in Japan. (Bartholomew, 1989: 7) There was never a consensus on what this balance should 
be, even amongst officials. However, before 1914, many Japanese officials stressed importation of 
Seiyō technology and science rather than supporting research at home. Importation was often 
expressed through spending money on overseas study instead of on domestic research. (Bartholomew, 
1989: 7) This dynamic could also be seen in Japanese architecture; although Japan relied on its 
science of seismology and on Japanese firms in supplying materials, Moriyama toured Europe between 
1912 and 1914 in search of the latest technological products to display in an international exhibition. 
This gives another indication of the unstable binary between taking a unique new path and following 
Seiyō. But given that science was understood as intrinsically tied with technology, even following Seiyō 
would result in a degree of provisionality; Japan’s approach meant that oscillating foreign and domestic 
influences led to a constantly adapting technological apparatus used in buildings.  
 
Japan’s willing adaptation of the modern clearly had a deeper effect on scientific development with 
them than on the native Taiwanese people’s adoption of science and technology under colonial rule. In 
the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office, the early modern technology was impressive, used and 
understood in an idiosyncratic way with concerns that were largely local such as earthquakes and 
cleanliness. The construction of this monumental building was itself a vehicle to improve 
construction-related technologies due to the scale and symbolic importance of the project. Local 
Taiwanese were never involved in the construction beyond the role of labourers and low-level workers. 
Given that they were uniformly of lower rank and usually of inferior education, Taiwanese subjects only 
shared in Japanese science to a very limited extent.  
 
The adoption of scientific skills and knowledge by Taiwanese was necessarily shallow. Scholars of 
Japanese science believe that transfer of science to Taiwan and other Japanese colonies was a 
complex process, whereas with technology a simple transfer was impossible. The transfer of scientific 
knowledge to colonial Taiwan implies several levels to be understood simultaneously: in the first 
instance transfer of knowledge from Western culture to non-Western culture (Japan); second the nature 
of colonial science among the Japanese; third the nature of science as practised by subordinate 
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Taiwanese; fourth, the development of scientific curiosity by subordinate Taiwan; and finally the 
interrelations and encounters between the colonialists and the colonised. (Togo, 2003: 282)  
 
Whilst applying this model in depth is beyond the scope of this study, transfer of scientific knowledge to 
the colony was evidently part of the overarching ‘civilising mission’ of Japan. Yet “Science was the 
intellectual symbol of colonial dominance, and at the same time, it was the colonialists’ most valuable 
tool for dominance.” (Togo, 2003: 284) This could be seen from Gotō’s biological politics, and the 
exhibition of 1916 was an example of using the products of science for domination: the Taiwanese were 
by far the most represented national group of visitors to the exhibition. As colonial subjects, their 
experience must have been overladen with awe (and a degree of fear and respect) for their colonial 
masters, and such experiences would have awakened scientific curiosity in some natives through 
interrelations with their colonial masters. In my argument of Chapter 1.2, the reification of dominance is 
a key component of being modern, and it was in such settings as the Industrial Exhibition at the Taiwan 
Governor-General’s Office that this process of realising dominance must have occurred, fulfilling 
Japan’s sense of modernity. Yet whilst much of the symbolism used by Japanese colonialists in the 
Office was reflective of familiar adoption of Seiyō aesthetics, the remaining undercurrent of traditional 
modes of thinking were still apparent in the building. 
 
 
5.4 Authoritarian displays of Imperial power 
Scientific and technical advancement were crucial in order for the building to become an important 
symbol to Taiwanese and others of the Japanese capacity to create modern monuments. Without this 
grounding the building could never have filled its role as a symbol of Seiyō advancement, nor had the 
capacity to hold international exhibitions or one thousand staff within a single building. Yet these 
technologies, the initial Exhibition, and spatial interpretations of the building were only the groundwork 
in terms of what the building was designed to mean. The aesthetics of the Office were particularly 
meaningful because of the composition of the jury. As a Renaissance revival associated with the 
Veranda style building of the early 20th century, the semiology of the building was a rich tapestry of 
implicit European meanings, Japanese reconfigurations of Classical symbols, and new imperial icons 
that co-opted Taiwanese scenes to display the dominance of Japan on the island.  
 
The Taiwan Governor-General’s Office was used with many rhetorical purposes: to create Taipei as a 
site of colonial modernity, to display the political dominance over the Japanese over the native, and as 
a monument to Japanese progress. Yet in spite of this, the building can still be read as containing 
invisible traditions. Whilst by and large these were hidden from view and set apart from the official 
rhetorical purposes of the Office, the existence of residual customs in the building points to the 
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incomplete nature of Japan’s replication of modernity, and it influenced the way Japanese architects 
were able to resurrect and reinterpret customary architecture after 1945. Japan’s process of creating an 
overly Western architecture of authority only makes sense in this context of residual ‘traditions’. Despite 
the efforts to create a sense of national amnesia around buildings from the Victorian Japan period, the 
Western-derived conceptual frameworks and binaries remain central to Japanese kindai (modern) 
architecture. 
 
As described in the preceding section on the 1916 exhibition, the image of the Office was used by the 
Japanese government for persuasion through postcards and prints. Representation in 
Japanese-occupied Taiwan was significantly different to the way European Great Powers used colonial 
buildings, simply because combined styles were implicitly “forbidden” in Taiwan. Instead, architecture 
was used as a part of national culture, integrating the colony into the construction of a kindai (modern) 
self-identity. The conundrum faced by Japanese postcard makers was that whilst nationalist semiotics 
defined Japanese colonial administration, from their inception, kindai (modern) Japanese buildings had 
been designed to be indistinguishable from Seiyō in order to comply with the zeitgeist of the time. 
Because these representations of the Office were used to infuse the colonial administration with 
monumentality, particularly by contrasting the building with the yamen to show progress, towards the 





As shown in the previous section, Josiah Conder and other prominent architects in 1910s Japan, such 
as the structural engineer SANO Toshikata (Jap. 佐野利器, 1880-1956), emphasised the technical 
development of architecture following several earthquakes. This led Conder to state that the art of 
architecture was much less relevant in Japan than in Europe due to the importance of seismic proofing. 
This claim by Conder and Sano was against the inclinations jury members of ITŌ Chūta and TATSUNO 
Kingo, who continued to see the value in architecture as an art and were the main proponents of this 
position in Japan. (Clancey, 2006: 183) Whilst technology was very significant in Japanese architecture, 
it would only be of primary importance following Sano’s promotion to Professor of Architecture. By 1920 
aesthetic attitudes had changed to the extent that none of the designs made by architecture graduates 




The art and style of the Office were crucial to Japan’s projection of power across Taiwan and the rest of 
Asia, and projection of an identity through art was one of the key purposes of the building from its first 
proposal, due to the personalities and status of the jury members and the culture amongst Japanese 
architects at that time. The appointment of Tatsuno as chairman by his peers demonstrates how much 
he was respected in his profession and displays an unwritten Japanese rule of respecting seniors. As 
jury Chair, Tatsuno was awarded 10,000 Yen; Tsukamoto was awarded 3000 Yen; all the others 
awarded 6000 Yen (Jap. 臺灣總督府公文類纂, The Official Document of Taiwan Governor-General 
Office) meaning that Tatsuno received nearly double the fee compared with other jury members. 
According to Hwang, Tatsuno’s activities were more extensive than any other jury member, and he was 
even involved in the stipulation of the design prize regulations. (Huang, J., 2004: 86)  
 
The competition jury was unique in the world thanks to Japan’s highly centralised architectural 
education system. Not only were all members familiar with each other, but all architects in Japan were 
likely to be acquaintances. In 1897, only around 45 Japanese architects had graduated from the only 
architecture course in the country; by contrast, the British 1901 census showed 10,781 men who called 
themselves ‘architect’. (Clancey, 2006: 20) This reflects the strict way that Japan interpreted the idea of 
‘architect’ from Conder and the founder of the College of Engineering, Henry Dyer, compared with the 
informal architectural training in Europe and America: “this training and titling of architects by the 
Japanese state was a situation new in world history.” (Clancey, 2006: 20) It resulted in all Japanese 
architects being ‘classmates’, their exclusivity bolstered by their small numbers. (Clancey, 2006: 20) 
Restricting the field to Japanese architects demonstrated that the authorities were acting as a 
nation-state, yet it also meant that all the designs produced would follow similar templates, each 
showing a keen understanding of European revival styles. 
 
Given that following graduation all Japanese architects served the government, it would have been 
impossible to find any unaware of the state’s need to define an identity to the world. This identity was 
difficult to define, as both revivalism and native-inspired architecture were problematic for architects 
and their clients: “The Japanese architect faced the dilemma that if he adopted the eclectic styles of his 
European counterparts, he was seen by them (and sometimes by his Japanese peers) as betraying his 
native tradition, whereas if he championed a native style, he risked falling back into the drawer 
prepared for him by European Orientalism.” (Sand, 2005: 112) This was a drawer Japanese authorities 
were keen to avoid, for through their colonies in particular, they wished to be seen as a progressive 
nation, capable of effectively colonising another people. 
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That Tatsuno style was consciously used in the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office was shown by 
having the winning design altered from a pale and unadorned façade to one with red ‘bricks’ and white 
banding. This government and jury interference can be seen as a rubric of nationalism and 
international architectural trends of the time: to have declined to join in with this nation-building exercise 
would have appeared ‘uncivilised’. Highly visible architecture in these colonies was built in this style 
under the patronage of Tatsuno and Moriyama. (fig. 5.52) It is likely that Moriyama’s familiarity with 
Tatsuno style from working in his office is what made Tatsuno recommend Moriyama. Moriyama’s 
subsequent employment as chief architect for the most high profile official buildings in Taiwan speak to 
both Moriyama’s skill and the power of Tatsuno’s patronage. If the style had not been used in the 
colonies, particularly Taiwan and Manchuria, it is unlikely that it would ever have been called a ‘national 







There were echoes of the Queen Anne style in the building, a style which was in vogue when Tatsuno 
worked in England in William Burges’s office. Enormously popular in the 1870s and surviving into the 
early years of 20th century, “Queen Anne came with red brick and white-painted sash windows, with 
curly pedimented gables and delicate brick panels of sunflowers, swags, or cherubs, with small window 
panes, steep roofs, and curving bay windows, with wooden balconies and little fancy oriels jutting out 
where one would least expect them.” (Girouard, 1977: 1) This was a suitable style for much of the brick 
architecture constructed in the Meiji period, which Tatsuno recommended as “cheap and easy to 
learn”.158 (Stewart, 1987: 38) The main traits of Queen Anne were “the use of plain red brick, English 
(and perforce Dutch) Renaissance details, a returning inclination towards symmetrical composition, 
and a quality of lightness and delicacy in treatment not associated with High Victorian architecture.” 
(Macleod, 1971: 27) As used by Tatsuno, the lightness of the style was less evident than an emphasis 
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 This was a similar consideration for the interior design of the famous Japanese designer of the early 20th century, Hayashi. Hayashi spoke 
of the need to attain “the most harmonious, pleasant style for the least expense”. (Sand, 2003: 109)  
5.52. The view of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office in the city. 
Source from Matsumoto and Hiseh, 1990. 
(Courtesy of the National Central Library) 
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on solidness (expressed most obviously by a preference for 90 degree angles rather than rounded 
edges) and the use of white stone to add decoration to the red brick façade. Whilst it is likely that 
Richard Norman Shaw’s Alliance Assurance buildings (1881-83) were what caught Tatsuno’s 
imagination with regard to the Queen Anne style (Stewart, 1987: 38) Tatsuno’s buildings look more 
similar to Shaw’s later work, such as the Norman Shaw Buildings around London’s Scotland Yard 
(1887-1906, fig. 5.53). They have a robust yet lively façade, similar to a typical Tatsuno style building 
such as Osaka Hall (1918, fig 5.54). 
 





This building style was used in Taiwan for a tapestry of reasons, most fundamentally its political value. 
In colonial Taiwan, the formal expression of public buildings was a political statement, not just an artistic 
and aesthetic symbol as was more common in mainland Japan. (Fu, C., 2007: 174) Whilst public 
buildings in Japan were targeted at both Japanese and foreign visitors, in Taiwan architecture had the 
added dimension of addressing the native Taiwanese. Fu gives specific examples of how the form of 
architecture served political purposes: “Tainan Prefecture Hall and Taichung Prefecture Hall are each 
crowned with a luxurious mansard roof. The dome and portico of the Tainan District Courthouse and 
the continuous arcade and Roman portico of the Taiwan Army Second Regiment Barracks also display 
monumental elements that the people of Taiwan had rarely seen before. Therefore, through these 
monumental buildings, the Japanese government created a sense of authority in the urban 
environment.” (Fu, C., 2007: 175-176) The value of these buildings lay in their evident expertise in 
handling European architectural forms and the sense of superiority derived from this skill.159  
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 This discourse of superiority over natives was represented in colonial architecture and policies where, unlike British policies, schooling 
instruction was in Japanese, integrating the superiority of the Japanese over the natives into the social structure. 
5.53. Richard Norman Shaw: 
The Norman Shaw 
Buildings, Westminster, 
1887-1906.  
(Photography by Author) 
5.54. TATSUNO Kingo: 
Osaka Hall, 1918.  
(Photography by Author) 
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Tatsuno style was a cumulation of a long trend: from the first generation of Japanese architects 
onwards, their “handling of yōfū (Western-style) architecture was almost indistinguishable from its 
handling by Westerners in Japan or abroad. Such indistinguishability was indeed the treasured goal of 
both the first generation of zokagaku-shi and their ministerial, commercial and industrial patrons.” 
(Clancey, 2006: 19) I asked one British Professor of architecture history about the Governor General’s 
Office and he was shocked that it was a Japanese building, believing it more likely to be French or 
Swiss,160 understandably so given the stylistic similarities of Tatsuno style with European Queen Anne 
derivations. This indistinguisability in colonial Taiwan meant the building had the potential to be used as 
a symbol to show that Japan’s level of civilisation could be equated with Seiyō. Further, the use of the 
same style in both mainland Japan and Taiwan gave the explicit message that Taiwan was being 
integrated into the Japanese national identity. 
 
The Office's brick-tiled concrete construction, colonnades, gables, vaulted and oeil-de-boeuf windows, 
brackets, and composite columns reflect classic European elements common during Taiwan’s 
Japanese Occupation.  Tatsuno style, with its elements of Queen Anne revival, has its roots in Italian 
Renaissance revival, clear from its symmetrical layout around a vertical axis and classical features. 
Historically Renaissance architecture represented a return to Roman standards and motifs, and this 
can be seen in the ornamentation in the Office as well as in the use of Roman varieties of columns such 
as Roman Ionic in the portico and a variation of the Roman Composite order in the official entrance 
room. These features created a complex and imposing façade whilst the squareness and proportion of 
the building gave a feeling of permanence. As noted in Chapter 3, this style was more suited to Japan 
than Gothic revival would have been, due to Renaissance Revival’s lack of connection to Christianity. 
Given that Japan wished to demonstrate its identity as civilised and enlightened rather than medieval 
(as numerous British politicians and writers had characterised Japan), the Gothic style would have 
been an inappropriate choice, and easily criticised by foreigners. In addition, whilst state buildings in 
Taiwan almost always used appropriated styles, the competition participants also ignored native styles 
since Japanese architects had accepted that “styles that could have been appropriated, such as those 
used for Shinto shrines, were patently unsuitable for the new types of buildings needed because they 
lacked monumentality.” (Watanabe, 1996: 23) The Taiwan Governor-General’s Office was a clear 
example of the influence of this borrowed type of modernity: as the tallest and largest building in Taiwan, 
taking seven years to build, it was meant as a demonstration of the capabilities of the Japanese 
colonialists. At 60 metres high it was probably the tallest building that most colonial natives would ever 
have seen, far taller and more robust than the yamen it replaced. 
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 Private correspondence. 
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Given the narrowing of Japan’s stylistic palette, a consensus formed about official building styles which 
could be seen from the competition entrants' designs. Despite lack of restriction by any design 
regulations all were in (Western) Neo-classical style. At this time, the Meiji government and civil society 
in mainland Japan promoted Wakon-yōsai (Japanese spirit, Western technology) following the end of 
Rokumekan era from the mid-1880s,161 as discussed in Chapter 2. However as the leading project of 
the new system era in the golden period of colonial Taiwan architecture, the designs of the Taiwan 
Governor-General's Office showed no influence of this slogan. Instead the value of replication of Seiyō 
semiotics remained in entrants' designs which continued to operate in the official buildings of Japan’s 
colonies, and reflects the notion of using architecture for persuasion inherited by GOTŌ Shinpei from 
Imperial Britain. This policy brought out the asynchronous progress between Japan and China in Taipei: 
public buildings built by the Japanese were clearly beneficiaries of 'Westernisation' unlike the Qing 
authority buildings.  
 
Renaissance revival as a stylistic blanket was becoming the default in Europe’s empires, displaying 
power with proud roots in a rational Greco-Roman past: "Classicism would no longer defined only 
Europe in its geographical and cultural regime at the turn of twentieth century, but develop as a 
common language of power, empire, and political legitimation. The Classical idiom, the universal 
signifier of modern high style... was the expedient thrust into international visual politics that Japan 
desired."  (Tseng, 2006: 133-134) Whilst the stylistic vocabulary and grammar used between empires 
in the early 20th century was broadly similar, each empire used these building blocks with varying skill 
and to tell different stories. 
 
The details of this narrative lay in the composition of the more meticulous spaces of the Office, 
particularly the portico and lobby, the most impressive and public parts of the building. It is also easier 
to analyse the front entrance and lobby because the vast majority of detailed photographic evidence of 
the Office from before 1945 is of these two spaces, and after that much of the building was gutted by 
fire and bomb damage. My interviewee, C. Y. LI, was then ordered to repair it within three months or 
face being shot by the new KMT government, and therefore much of the original design was greatly 
simplified. Because under Japanese rule Li had been only an architectural assistant without 
comprehensive training, the semiology of the building was not understood and some architectural 
details of the Office were changed drastically. Li had to focus on the main structure first, and could only 
try his best to repair other parts like the entrances, paving and details to make them as similar to the 
original as possible. However difficult elements such as the bronze classical ornaments on the columns 
in fig. 5.55 were interpreted by him as in fig. 5.56 as there was no choice. Therefore the analysis of the 
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 It was revising its general position on the emulation of Seiyō culture and values in 1890s, there was new consciousness that indigenous art 
and architecture should be set apart from imported western models. This revising was continued to the modernism was introduced by 
Secessionist architecture in 1920 in the Empire of Japan. 
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semiotics of the building below relies on the extant photographs and postcards of the Taiwan 










From this evidence, it was clear that the front entrance was the most high status entrance, only for the 
Governor-General or important visitors such as the Imperial family; on visiting they would be driven in a 
private carriage from the left to right ramp (fig. 5.58). The portico (fig 5.57) had large, imposing Roman 
Ionic columns in octostyle with eight columns presented on approach and was roughly rectangular in 
shape. Between the middle columns there was a segmental arch with simple boxes hanging in the 
cornice below the front arch, which was repeated on either side. Under this arch was a large 
foliage-based relief, which has since been removed, along with much else of the portico following 
damage in World War Two (fig 5.59). However the original photographs show a classically inspired 
official entrance which is particularly decorative due to the adoption of Roman, rather than the simpler 
Greek, Ionic capitals.  
5.55. and 5.56. Bronze 
decorations on a column of the 
Taiwan Governor-General’s Office 
lobby outer wall. (Left) Original 
pre-war decoration. (Right) 
Restored post-war decoration. 
Source from Lin M., 2009.  








Once through the portico, the Governor-General (or high status officers and guests) would have 
reached the lobby. In European and American government buildings the grand staircase of the 
entrance lobby was often one of the key points of the building. For instance, the three-dimensional 
sketch of the Foreign Office in London (fig. 5.60), built in 1868, shows as much dignity as the architect 
can muster: a delicate curved ceiling with huge decorated pendant lamps and the grand staircase 
which branches left and right. The equivalent purpose and a similar stairway form can be seen in the 
Taiwan Governor-General’s Office. (fig. 5.61) It was a three story high-ceiling Baroque style room which 
used the Composite order of columniation. Along each side of the lobby there were three openings. 
Flanking each doorway were two-story high double-pillars with a pair of square-walled pillars directly 
behind them.  
5.57. Official entrance 
Portico. Source from 
Huang, J., 2004. 
5.59. The official 
entrance portico after 
the Second World War. 
Source from Shue and 
Huang, 2003. 
5. 58. The ramp at 
the official entrance. 
Source from Shue 





The column stylobate was tall, around waist-height. The openings at ground level were rectangular and 
each interrupted gable was originally decorated with flowers and mouldings (fig. 62). A large mural by 
Japanese artist OKADA Saburosuke, a ‘Western-style’ painter and one of the founding members of the 
Paris-Pantheon art group in 1900, hung on the wall during the Japanese Occupation. The openings at 
the upper level were arched and had a roaring lion's head at the top (fig. 5.63). Neither Taiwan nor 
Japan have native lions; instead this may be a generic empire symbol given that lion is the national 
symbol of Britain. These lions’ heads stood alongside other imperial symbols, such as bunches of 
grapes. Fruit was commonly used to represent Taiwan since the colony was known as Japan’s 
Southern Treasure House, supporting much of the empire’s agriculture.  
This image can be seen in the printed 
thesis at the University of Sheffield 
library. 
 
5.60. (Left) George 
Gilbert Scott: The grand 
staircase at the Foreign 
Office in 1868. Source 
from Toplis, 1987. 
5.61. (Right) Lobby of 
Governor General’s Office. 
(Courtesy of the Digital 
Archives of the National 







The bull’s skull in the fresco above these Composite columns, shown below (fig. 5.64), was unusual in 
its prominence. This motif (Bucranium) was used in classical architecture and often garlanded, but only 
used with the Doric order. (Parker, 1896: 156; Summerson, 1980: 123; Vitruvius, 1960) The presence 
of a Bucranium in the centre of a Composite order’s frieze is puzzling in its symbolism, given the 
importance of its position in the centre of the frieze above the official entrance lobby. The position did 
demand some treatment and, using the grammar of the classical orders, Moriyama may have found the 
bull’s skull eye-catching, rather than imbued with meaning. According to Professor Peter Carl: “I agree 
the bull is a bit odd, but all the ornament seems to be slightly over-developed from well- known 
prototypes (e.g. what appear to be wings on the capitals); but then this is characteristic for late 
19th-early 20th architecture in Europe and America, governed more by the aesthetics of the fine arts 
than by tradition.”162 On balance, it is more likely that this fine arts trend had reached Japan rather than 
Moriyama being unfamiliar with European architectural traditions. 
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 Private correspondence. 
5.62. Interrupted gable 
decorated with flowers and 
mouldings. Source from Shue 















5.63. Decoration of a roaring 
lion's head. Source from Shue 









The columns in the lobby, shown below in fig 5.65, were in the giant order and the capitals roughly 
followed the Composite order with the key addition of a bird placed between the Roman Ionic volutes, 
probably an eagle rather than a phoenix, a more ancient symbol for Japan. Along with the lion, this 
possible use of a Roman Imperial symbol may have reflected that its imperial connotations were 
suitable to Japan’s first overseas colony, and it came in the aftermath of Japan’s heralded victory over 
Russia, whose national symbol was a double-headed eagle. (figs. 5.66 and 5.67) Since the fall of the 
Roman Empire, eagles have been used throughout history as symbols of imperial might: the German, 
American, Russian, Byzantine, Holy Roman, Spanish, and Polish-Lithuanian Empires all used eagles 
to symbolise their dominion. Given the way the symbol of the lion was also used, it appears that the 
architect was attempting to imbue the lobby with generic, received symbols of imperialism, alongside 
several Japanese artistic elements, all placed within a European, Renaissance revival setting.  
 
 
5.65. Customised Composite 
capital in lobby. Source from 
Shue and Huang, 2003. 
 
5.64. Bucranium on 
Composite frieze in lobby. 
(Courtesy of the Digital 
Archives of the National 
Central Library, ‘Taiwan 
Memory’) 
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Invisible traditions, hidden traditions 
Whilst the overall colonial policy of ‘civilising the natives’ in Taiwan was roughly similar in tone to 
European colonial policies, a syncretic style of architecture was never used in Taiwan, even after 
architects like ITŌ Chūta had begun using such styles from the turn of the twentieth century in mainland 
Japan. This was not due to lack of will or skill from the relevant architects. Moriyama produced 
commendable Minnan style buildings for expositions in Japan. IDE Kaoru, the architect who replaced 
Moriyama in the final years of the construction of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office, and became 
the most influential architect and the director of the architectural department in the colonial government 
in the 1930s, wrote that the regional character of architecture in Taiwan should be made more 
important. (Fu, C., 2007: 178) FU Chao-Ching states that Ide was subsequently unable to pursue this 
policy in Taiwan and was limited to “various modern styles” “owing to practical considerations and his 
clients’ requirements”. (Fu, C., 2007: 178) I have noted above that the semiology of the Office had been 
infused with European motifs, specifically appropriated to emphasise both commonly used symbols of 
5.66. ‘Eagles 
Flying Over 
Japan with the 
Japanese Flag 
Design, 1907.   




5.67. ‘Eagle Carrying the Magatama with an 
Illustration of Emperor Jimmu’ from an unidentified 
series, 1907. Note the blend of ancient and modern 
imperial symbols: the first Japanese emperor within an 
ancient jewellery shape, carried by a modern imperial 
eagle behind the national flag of Japan.  
(Courtesy of the MIT Visualising Cultures Collection) 
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imperialism from European powers and, more subtly, to convey the Japanese as opposed to Taiwanese 
identity of the building’s users. However, when it came to the overall style, the architect was never 
allowed to express a blend of ‘traditions’.  
 
Because the ‘Western style’ became obligatory in Japan’s colonies, ‘Japaneseness’ is difficult to show 
in the case of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office; for ‘traditional’ forms were not even an option 
except for residential and religious buildings. Yet hidden under the blanket forms of European 
revivalism, several details suggest that the Japanese customs had been changed little by modernity, 
and were retained or redeveloped. The first example was not hard to find. In the front lobby the stained 
glass in the windows (figs. 5.68 and 5.69) was prominent and unusual, for throughout its history, 
stained-glass was used mainly for Churches and other religious buildings in the West; it therefore gave 
a religious flavour. As Japanese building traditions did not use glass, this technology was one imported 
from Europe (or possibly through America given the use of stained glass in Art Nouveau). The creation 
of stained glass required artistic skill to conceive a design and engineering skills to assemble the glass. 
Japanese artists approached this art form maturely in the early twentieth century after it had been 
developed strongly in Victorian Britain. This is reflected in the Japanese floral designs, which 
demonstrate the lightness and grace of Japanese wood block prints of the Edo period.  
 
    
 
 
5.69. North elevation of the lobby 
with Stained glass. Source from 
Shue and Huang, 2003. 
5.68. Stained glass of the Taiwan 
Governor-General’s Office. 
Source from Huang, J., 2004. 
 432 
Whilst foreign visitors to the Office might have seen the patterns as an example of ‘traditional/timeless 
Japan’, for the Japanese they would have been an example of modernity due to the recentness of the 
development. It was only in 1908 that such re-developed traditions in interior design were gaining 
popularity. A key figure was Mitsukoshi’s first chief of interior design, Hayashi who 
 
“created distinct motifs for the surfaces and upholstery of each room in the 
[Japanese embassy in Paris], including ‘autumn colors,’ ‘cherry blossoms,’ 
‘chrysanthemums,’ ‘bamboo,’ and ‘weaponry.’ Upon its completion in 1908, the 
embassy design was well-received in Paris, where it served to represent traditional 
Japanese taste. In Japan, Mitsukoshi promoted the design by publishing a book by 
Iwaya describing a fictional visit. Here the novelty of the design and its distinction 
from traditional architecture were emphasized…. From Mitsukoshi’s perspective, 
Hayashi’s innovation was to create a Japanese style distinct from the work of 
vernacular carpenters. In the context of European Japonisme, its only true 
distinction may have been that it was the authentic work of a Japanese designer. 
But within Japan, Hayashi’s work could claim to bear Japanese interior aesthetics 
across the threshold from an unconscious and artless vernacular past into 
enlightened modernity.” (Sand, 2003: 108)  
 
That such designs were chosen for the lobby of the Office emphasised that the Taiwan 
Governor-General’s Office was a site for the ‘state of the art’ in both design and engineering. Yet this 
example serves better to emphasise that even obviously Japanese designs of the early 20th century 
were not ‘traditional’ but already re-imaginings and distillations of past practices. They represented a 
move away from the binary choice between unfashionable Edo art and Seiyō art that did not culturally 
resonate. They allowed a third way to be created: designs which could incorporate new national 
symbols (such as cherry-blossoms) within the kindai (modern) paradigm. Stained glass was a perfect 
vehicle since it was fashionable in Europe with the Art Nouveau movement, but glass was not found in 
Japan prior to 1853 and so was an unmistakably kindai material. Use of historically derived patterns 
meant that this stained glass fulfilled several purposes: symbolically representing continuations from 
the past, mastery of foreign technology, and enlightened modernity. 
 
This was an example of a re-developed tradition,163 distinct from the following example which was a 
retained tradition. By Taisho year 4 (1915) the main construction was almost completed and more effort 
                                                   
163
 Some (such as Wu, N., 2012) argue that another re-developed tradition can be found in the building plan. The frame of the plan was 
changed to have two courtyards so that the outline was the same as the character (Jap. 日) which meant ‘Sun’, the symbol of the Japanese 
state, but this seems as likely to be accidental as purposeful. 
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was focused on installing the drainage system, sewerage pipelines, glass for the doors and windows, 
balconies, balustrades and drainage for the roof. Along with these activities, all common to constructing 
architecture with Europe, an important ritual took place: the ridge-beam raising ceremony. On the 25th 
June 1915 a ceremony of just over one hour to celebrate the placing of the highest beam took place. 
Even today, the related ceremonial object can be found in a room at the top of the main tower. This is 
an ancient Shinto and Buddhist ceremony where “the old spirits that dwell on the property – be they 
rice-field spirits or forest spirits – are kindly asked to vacate the premises.” (Brown, 1989: 149) Led by a 
carpenter, the Governor-General and his staff ascended to the top of the tower, where the beam was 
placed in its position, and biscuits were spread upon the area in the customary fashion to induce the old 
spirits to leave. (Brown, 1989: 149) Afterwards the leader of the Construction Division thanked 
everybody and held the customary feast (though given the time in the morning it is unlikely that the 
customary sake (Jap. 日本酒, lit. Japanese liquor) was drunk).  
 
The ‘beam’ was actually a Taiwanese cypress tablet (figs. 5.70 and 5.71), inscribed with the date of the 
ceremony and the names of the government officials and workers responsible for the construction of 
the Office. The use of a Taiwanese cypress tablet to mark the most important ceremony in the building 
process harked back to building traditions once shared between the two countries, reflecting their 
geographical bond. The wooden tablet was clearly a derivation of a custom, given it was not structural 






5.70. and 5.71. Cypress tablet for beam raising ceremony.  
(Courtesy of C. Y. Li Architecture & Engineers) 
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The use of a full ceremony spoke to an underlying Shinto belief in qi and kami, used to ward off 
hazardous spirits that previously resided in the area. That the ceremony was led by a carpenter shows 
that, although relegated in importance, the carpenter retained a role as master of hogaku, as 
introduced in Chapter 3, even while being co-opted into the modern building process. The ritual is 
significantly different in tone to the European ceremony of topping out, which has a similar form (to 
place the final ‘beam’ at the top of the completed building) but a different function (to deter spirits (kami) 
from the building rather than simply completing it) even if the original function was the same. The 
retention of spiritual traditions within a scientific building emphasises the point of the previous section: 
that science ran alongside tradition in Japanese society rather than in dynamic opposition. 
 
This explanation of customs able to continue with little adaptation must be seen from the perspective of 
architecture that was not for show. Analysing the residential preferences of the Governor-General 
shows a split between public rational architecture and a more customary, arguably more authentic, 
domestic architecture. The rhetorical purposes of the Office stood in opposition to the lived reality of the 
Japanese colonialists, from the office workers to the Governor-General. In the expansion of Taipei 
under GOTŌ Shinpei, the residential houses of the Japanese were developed en bloc with a clear 
vision: the colonials built “houses and Shinto shrines (jinja) in various traditional Japanese styles in 
Taiwan, not only imposing a Japanese spiritual culture on the colony, but also providing the Japanese 
residents psychological relief from homesickness.” (Fu, C., 2007: 174) The residential life of the 
colonialists was de-emphasised and not publicised in comparison with the public buildings. 
 
The homogeneity of Japanese residences was broken by guest houses, which used the forms, 
functions and spaces of Seiyō country houses for Japanese gentry164 and were strongly influenced by 
Victorian tastes and habits. In Taipei the only residences built in European style were those for high 
officials such as the Governor-General, where he was also supposed to host events for guests. The 
Official Residence was one the first foreign style buildings with substantial authenticity and it had two 
gardens, one Seiyō style and one Japanese style which followed a legendary land of Chinese 
mythology:165 the Taoist immortal island of Penglai (known in Japanese mythology as Hōrai).166 The 
Official Residence is the large building in the middle of figs. 5.72 and 5.73, with the ‘Western’ garden at 
the front entrance where guests entered and the Japanese garden at the rear, invisible to passers-by. 
This follows the principle that Japanese architecture and landscape gardening were visible only in more 
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 Examples of similar buildings in Tokyo were given in Section 3.5. 
 
165
 There was a pond with a fountain and a tiny artificial island which was accumulated from clear pond sludge, two delicate European 
pavilions with copper roofs on the east and west side each, a stone bridge made from materials from the Provincial Tian Hau temple within the 
Taipei walled-city. The stone lion by the stone stairs was also a relic of the Tian Hau temple. 
 
166
 Whilst the presentation of Mount Hōrai in the Japanese cultural tradition is somewhat different from the earlier idyllic Chinese myth 
according to Lafcadio Hearn's ‘Kwaidan: Stories and Studies of Strange Things’ it derived from this.  
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private areas in Taipei, with a perhaps unwitting sense of shame, whilst the Seiyō design was the public 
face: an example of Japan in this period publicly giving a higher status to borrowed cultural traditions. 
 




In 1901, Gotō had justified the building’s expense to the National Diet by saying that “The Taiwan 
Governor-General is on the Southern throne and therefore his Residence should be as perfect as 
possible…. If people criticise the Residence like this, then they do not understand how we manage the 
South.” (Tsurumi, 1943: 45-6) Yet in spite of its perfection, representing authority and containing the 
essential spaces to make it a house of power, the various Governor-Generals did not live in the Official 
Residence. In the first place, a separate private residence for the Governor-General was built in 
customary wooden style during the governance of Kodama in 1899, next to the south-east city wall 
near the Japanese residential area. (fig 5.74) It was built on one level, with trees on all sides, and 
5.72. (Top)The detail of 
Governor General’s 
Official Residence in 
1911 map. Source from 
Wei and Gao, 2005. 
 
5.73. (Bottom)The Japanese garden 
of Governor-General’s Official 
Residence in 1919. Source from 
Matsumoto and Hiseh, 1990. 
(Courtesy of the Digital Archives of 




appears to not have been used for receiving guests. Compared with the Official Residence this building 
lacks monumentality and a sense of modern fashions, besides the flag of Japan hanging by the front 
door. It was named ‘Kodama’s Pavilion’ and was also called the ‘Southern Vegetable Garden’ referring 
to Kodama’s habit of painting there in his spare time. After Kodama died in 1906, it was donated to ‘The 
Women’s Patriotic Association of Taiwan’ and was temporarily provided as a residence for the 
Governor-General again while the Official Residence was rebuilt in 1911. After 1920, a private 
residence was built permanently where the Governor would live ordinarily, again a wooden Japanese 
style bungalow, set beside the Japanese back garden of the Residence. (fig 5.75) It was built by order 
of the 8th Governor-General Den Kenjirō, the first civilian to hold that position who promoted 





5.74. The entrance of 
Governor-General’s private 
residence. (Courtesy of the Digital 
Archives of the National Central 























5.75. The private residence by the 
Official Residence after 1920.  
 (Photography by Author.) 
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It is likely to have had tatami flooring, and certainly used a form of shōji (Jap. 障子, lit. small barrier); it 
would be tempting to describe the building as a nostalgic revival, except that this type of residence was 
never replaced by ferro-concrete and was normal for the period. Even today the vast majority of 
residential buildings in Japan are wooden.167 Customs have also survived alongside these buildings. 
As with Shinto Shrines, even today wooden residences are considered to have a lifespan of twenty 
years and are often pulled down and rebuilt after this time has elapsed.168 Whilst wood was virtually 
forbidden in colonial public architecture, non-wooden materials have remained largely absent in 
residential architecture. This meant that whilst the adaptation of kindai (modern) architecture meant 
that Japanese officials worked within a rational, modern spatial arrangement with relatively unfamiliar 
symbols and scientifically developed technology, even the Governor-General lived in a building notably 
derived from pseudo-religious forms, its wooden structure undoubtedly built by a carpenter, familiar, 
and reminiscent of ‘home’ in Japan.  
 
In this sense the Office building’s form was deceptive: it was not necessary the preference of the 
inhabitants to work in such spaces, which were uncomfortable to some extent. The changes in 
Japanese architecture following 1919 with the arrival of Secessionism and a later return to nativism 
(which never reached colonial Taiwan to a significant extent), point to the discomfort that Japanese 
architects also felt with modernity in buildings, and a desire to be truthful to ‘Japanese traditions’. The 
idea of an ‘invisible tradition’ that ran alongside the Meiji modernisation was the source of some 
discussion in Japan after 1945. As mentioned in the introduction, the Metabolist movement was 
foremost amongst the architectural responses to Westernisation, and clearest in their vision to heal the 
gap between past and present, and between public and private architecture. The Metabolist architects 
were a radical avant-garde movement pursuing the merging and recycling of architectural styles and a 
rediscovery of the ‘hidden tradition’, the ‘invisible tradition’ within an Asian context since the second half 
of the 20th century. (Kurukawa, 1993: 7) 
 
Whilst the Office showed few signs of this invisible tradition, the informal residences point to a parallel 
process of modernity at play in early twentieth-century Japan, with public architecture almost shedding 
visible traditions, whilst private architecture only reformed slowly to the modernity of public life. This 
dualist life of Japan was implicitly recognised in the Metabolist movement: at its core, the movement 
was concerned with healing the dualism inherited from the early Meiji reforms, to create a new 
symbiosis that did not reduce elements to a binary opposition. (Kurukawa, 1993: 10) The template of 
how a symbiosis could occur can be seen in the stained glass in the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office, 
                                                   
167
 According to the 1983 Management and Coordination Agency survey, there were 34.75 million occupied dwellings in Japan, of which 46.1 
percent were built of timber, 31.3 percent of fireproof timber, and 22.6 percent of ferroconcrete or other non-timber materials. 
 
168
 As with Shinto shrines, the wood is often stored in a pool and reused to build the residence anew. 
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where traditions were re-developed: forms which had gone out of architectural practice and were being 
reinserted, fashionable again. This process did not devalue the ‘tradition’ but inserted it into an altered 
reality, changing the practice and approach in doing so. Whilst to some extent ‘traditional’, this process 
was syncretic, by which past practices were co-opted into a new template. Whilst it was impossible to 
return to the past or ‘Overcome Modernity,’169 the effort to return was meaningful and had a degree of 
authenticity due to the parallel paths of modernity practised in Japan. In the Office building itself 
however, the expression of form was almost wholly exclusive of such traditions.  
 
 
Representing colonial modernity 
Modern architecture can be understood as a purposeful representation of rhetoric, and this rhetoric can 
be better understood by examining it not only in writings and policies, but also in buildings and the way 
they are presented in media. In this sense, representation “concerns the form and structure of rhetoric 
rather than simply its outward effects.” (Levine, 2009: 5)  Very often the rhetoric of public architecture 
is not employed to discern and persuade of the truth but to deceive: “In architecture, as in theatre or the 
other visual arts, the process of deception occurs in the slippage from truth to verisimilitude – from 
reality to the appearance of it.” (Levine, 2009: 5) For instance, in the French colonies of Indo-China, the 
French created a new style of Indochinese/French architecture, particularly in Vietnam. In the process, 
the generic ‘lightness’ of ‘Oriental architecture’ was identified and syncretically appropriated whilst 
introducing modern architecture as part of the “civilising mission” in “bringing progress and protecting 
local cultures.” (Hahn, 2011: 28) Simultaneously, such architecture had at its premise that what was 
being revived was a long-gone ‘glory age’ of the occupied country, that only a modern imperial power 
could understand this history using Reason, thus giving it a new, progressive direction through 
architecture. The following section will analyse the differences between the image Japanese 
administrators wished to project and the resulting Office. 
 
Beatriz Colomina wrote in 1994 that modern architecture is ostensibly described as artistic practice but 
in fact buildings are an integral part of mass culture: 
  
“The conventional view portrays modern architecture as a high artistic practice established 
in opposition to mass culture and everyday life. It has focussed on the internal life of the 
supposedly autonomous, self-referential object made available to a detached viewing 
subject, an art object. In doing so, it has neglected the overwhelming historical evidence of 
modern architecture’s continuous involvement with mass culture.” (Colomina, 1994: 14)  
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 This abortive movement occurred in the hyper-nationalist end of the Second World War, encapsulated in the national multi-disciplinary 
symposium on the topic of Overcoming Modernity. This symposium was dissected excellently in Minamoto Ryoen’s 1995 essay “The 
Symposium on ‘Overcoming Modernity’”. 
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Japan’s kindai (modern) architecture was no different in its interface with national culture; whilst 
European buildings retained an exoticism due to their origin, these forms were appropriated and 
integrated in the construction of a modern Japanese self-identity. Of the two wood-block print postcards 
shown below, the first (fig. 5.76) is a representation of Thomas Water’s Ginza Bricktown. As discussed 
in Chapter 3.2, Ginza was the site of the first modern town planning in Tokyo following the Meiji 
Restoration, and was considered an area to be proud of. The tree-lined avenues, masonry buildings 
and smooth roads with a new vehicle type tell the Japanese reader that this is a new kind of space in 
Tokyo. The second print (fig. 5.77) shows the Mitsui Bank of 1927 (following earlier buildings introduced 
in Chapter 3.2), and tells a similar story to the other. Rebuilt following the earthquake of 1923, the 
building was built by a foreign architect, the New York firm of Trowbridge and Livingston, in the Beaux 
Arts tradition, with electric lights, automobiles and alongside to the right was the Mitsukoshi Department 
Store, all drawn with a chic modernist simplicity. Whilst the symbols of modernity gradually changed, 





5.76. ‘The Most Famous View in Tokyo: 
Brick Buildings along the Ginza’ by 
Hiroshige III, c. 1874.  







Demonstration of Japan’s mastery of Taiwan and the rhetorical use of buildings could only be fulfilled 
through publicising the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office and other important public buildings. 
Colomina argues that it is media promotion that distinguishes modern from pre-modern buildings: 
“modern architecture only becomes modern with its engagement with the media.” (Colomina, 1994: 14) 
The use of modern media to persuade both foreigners and Japanese can be seen in the first two 
postcards of the Office below. Postcard one in fig. 5.78 was evidently popular as it was reproduced 
from at least four different angles throughout the colonial period. It shows the Office with two buildings 
to either side (the Communications Department and Taiwan Electric Company, both run by the state). 
All three buildings are in classic Tatsuno style, red brick, Renaissance revival, all colonnaded, with the 
Taiwan Governor-General’s Office fulfilling an axis as the tallest, most coherent of the three buildings.  
 
Postcard two in fig 5.79 was titled “Command View of Governor General Office from plane”, and shows 
the same scene in an aerial shot. This displays not only the three buildings but also the other 
government buildings in this planned district (including the military police headquarters, and the army 
officers’ club). However, beyond the three buildings in the first postcard the effect is not monumental; 
whilst it is an interesting view of the land (and with an authoritative title) it does not serve the purpose of 
showing Taipei as governed by a great and progressive power and so only lasted one edition. 
5.77. ‘Mitsui Bank and 
Mitsukoshi Department Store 
(#3),’ April 1930 [May 1929]. 
(Courtesy of the MIT 














5.78. Postcard one: Taiwan Governor’s 
Office, Communication Department, Taiwan 
Electric. 
(Courtesy of the Digital Archives of the 





















5.79. Postcard two: ‘Command view of 
Governor Office from a plane’. 
(Courtesy of the Digital Archives of the 




















5.80. Postcard four: 30th Anniversary 
postcard of the Administration of Taiwan 
Governor-General’s Office, 1925. 
(Courtesy of the National Central Library) 
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The building’s history and its role as a replacement for the Provincial Yamen was also a theme played 
out in media images. The yamen is shown in the postcards below as overlapped by the image of the 
Taiwan Governor-General’s Office. The angle of the shots in both cases make the Office seem as if it is 
proudly strutting and reaching heavenward due to its tower; in contrast, the viewer is invited to see the 
yamen as low, overly delicate, and even quaint in hand drawn picture in postcard four (fig. 5.80).  
 
Postcard four uses the scenery of Taiwan more prominently for visual effect. With a background of 
Taiwan’s iconic mountain ranges above the clouds, the tallest mountains in the Japanese Empire, the 
wooden architecture sketch within this setting appears to be fitting with nature and yet fragile when 
placed next to the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office. The yamen was still being used as an image in 
1925, six years following the full transfer of functions to the Office. The Office here is shown shrouded 
in shadow, implying a silhouette is sufficient to identify such a well-known building. 
 
The presence of the Governor-General in military regalia in the top image in fig. 5.81 is also notable: 
the postcard was produced during World War I and followed the political dominance of KATSURA Taro 
in Japan, a career military man who had lived seven years in Berlin and was dedicated to strengthening 
Japan’s international position. As Prime Minister, Katsura had signed up for the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance (1902), launched a military build-up (1903) and beat Russia in the 1904-1905 war. 
(Bartholomew, 1989: 146) In postcard three, the Office is automatically associated with the military, 
correlating the achievement of building it directly with the Governor-General himself. 
In a further postcard, number five from 1923 (fig. 5.82), the Office is shown again juxtaposed with 
Taiwan’s natural environment, this time with tropical trees (palm trees) and fruit (lychees), a symbol 
also used in the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office lobby. Both the palm trees and lychee fruit 
emphasise the differences between Taiwan and Japan: Japan is clearly imperial in this view, presiding 
over an island considered exotic by Japanese visitors. The image of fruit was common and displayed 
the role of Taiwan in Japan’s economy: before 1945, in spite of the results of the 1916 Industrial 
Exhibition, its industrial capacity was very low and the economy was focused on exporting agricultural 
products to Japan, particularly sugar and rice. As only ten percent of Japan’s land was arable 
(compared to nearly 25 percent on Taiwan), Japan needed Taiwan to feed its populace and therefore 
Taiwan fulfilled a similar role to that of many European colonies: export of raw produce from the 












5.81. Postcard three: 21st Anniversary of 
the Administration of Taiwan Governor’s 
Office, 1916. 





















5.82. Postcard five: 1923 Postcard in 
Commemoration of the itinerary of Prince 
Hito IV. Source: Lui, Q., 2004. 



















5.83. Postcard six: Postcard of the 
Taiwan Governor-General’s Office with 
the Taiwan Shrine. 
(Courtesy of the Digital Archives of the 




In postcards three to five examined above (figs. 5.80, 5.81 and 5.82) the Taiwan Governor-General’s 
Office is a national symbol of Japan in another land; the recognisable Tatsuno-style architecture used in 
cities across Japan implies the building as standing as one of many symbols of Japanese modernity. 
Because of this, it was much less common to see the Office represented alongside symbols of 
Japanese tradition. A somewhat stark sixth postcard below (fig 5.83) combines Kigo’s Taiwan Shrine 
with the Office. The angles emphasise the most striking features of both buildings: the simplicity of the 
torii gate is at centre-front displaying the ritual threshold that the gate represents, whilst the scale and 
sheer girth of the Office is stressed in the underlapping photograph. The combination does not work 
well visually and is ambiguous in its message, for both buildings are symbols of Japan, but the 
differences are so fundamental that the Office appears incongruous in its representative role.  
 
The seventh and final postcard (fig 5.84) is also the latest produced. Manufactured for the 1935 Taiwan 
Exhibition, the largest exposition held in colonial Taiwan, this postcard uses the Taiwan 
Governor-General’s Office as part of a wider concept, where buildings played the defining role. The 
scene is made up of three elements: first, the background of two mountains, snow-capped Mount Fuji 
and Taiwan’s tallest mountain, Yushan (likely as the mountain is taller than Fuji); second, two of the 
main exhibition buildings, re-purposed for the event, overlap the mountains; finally, a simplified 
silhouette of the Office is set in front of one of two exhibition structures. Futuristic looking, these 
buildings were built for the exhibition as the entrances gates to mark the 40th anniversary of Japan’s 
occupation of Taiwan and to show the results of progress. Most strikingly the juxtaposition of the two 
mountains points to kinship of the islands; the differences between Taiwan and Japan no longer being 
emphasised, in keeping with the new assimilation policy.  
 
 
5.84. Postcard seven: The1935 
Taiwan Exhibition postcard, the 
main venues of the exhibition: the 
Prefecture pavilion (top right) and 
the Civil and Transportation 
pavilion (which was also the 
newly built Assembly Hall) 
(bottom right). 
Source from Lui, Q., 2004.  
(Courtesy of the Digital Archives 
of the National Central Library, 
‘Taiwan Memory’) 
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The stylised buildings overlap and exceed the height of some of the tallest mountains in the world, a 
sign of Japanese modernity exceeding nature. In other postcards in this series there is also no 
incongruence in combining native style buildings with kindai (modern) styles. When different styles 
were drawn together, all were stylised so that the buildings appeared more similar than they actually 
were. It was clear that postcard producers had developed methods of integrating ‘Oriental’ building 
features with modern types. In this final postcard, symbols of power and integration spoke to Japan’s 
growing confidence in the region, which was reflected in the exposition itself to an even greater extent 
than in the 1916 exhibition. In the Dadaocheng Southern Exhibition Hall, in one of the oldest parts of 
Taipei, was an exposition site dedicated to China and South-east Asia, with products from Fujian (the 
adjoining Chinese province to Taiwan), Thailand and the Philippines, alongside a performance room for 
Chinese Opera.  
  
From the above examples it is clear that the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office had a number of useful 
rhetorical purposes. It was used to give an impression of Taipei as a site of colonial modernity, where 
progressive policies were allied to political dominance of the natives, expressed in the monumental 
form of the Office building. The form contrasted well with the Qing Provincial Yamen which became a 
part of the folklore of Japan’s story in Taiwan. There were constant improvements in materials, and 
ambitions rose beyond anything that was built during the Qing period.  
 
The Office was used sometimes as one part of a dual pre-modern/modern identity, since alongside the 
secular authority sat a new Shinto spirituality, as shown in in postcard six. Yet the symbol of continuing 
customary architecture next to a symbol of architectural modernity fit together uncomfortably. This was 
a consequence of the early decision to make a clear stylistic link to the work of the chair of the 
competition jury, TATSUNO Kingo, which precluded any opportunity for the kind of syncretic 
architecture style seen in French Indo-China. Yet this style was more suited to Japan’s interpretation of 
how architecture could appear for public use, representing an imperial nation, confident in its power 
over nature (particularly earthquakes), and able to create an internally coherent colonial capital to 
prove a high level of civilisation. Whilst tentative in representing customary Japanese aspects (though 
they could be seen in close examination), the building was a useful rhetorical device due to its 
purposeful aura of authority, belying the notion of ‘Oriental’ states as weak or fragile. 
 
 
5.5 The Taiwan Governor-General’s Office’s legacy 
The Office, although embodying Japanese nationalism with the emperor system alongside a Seiyō 
class-based exterior, retained a sense of unmovable monumentality despite Japan’s defeat in the 
Second World War. Yet the Office was seriously damaged by American bombs, causing fires to spread 
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throughout the building for three days and making it unserviceable afterwards. The repair work was 
begun by the Taiwan provincial government and was carried out from 1946 to 1947, the deadline being 
the celebration of the sixtieth birthday of CHIANG Kai-Shek (Chi. 蔣介石, 1887-1975 or CHIANG 
Chieh-Shih)170 when it was renamed as ‘Chieh Shou Hall’ (Chi. 介壽堂, lit. Memorial Hall for Chiang’s 
Birthday). It was taken over by the Nationalist (KMT) Government becoming the Presidential Office 
when the central government of the Republic of China migrated to Taipei from Nanjing in 1949. The 
Office has therefore held the highest authority for 95 years now, in spite of the government center (or 
civic centre) of Taipei having moved eastwards since 1990 due to Taipei City’s administrative 
reorganisation. Yet this move towards the east was planned and predicted in the outline for the Taipei 
city plan in 1932, showing the continuities between different periods of Taipei’s history. 
 
After the Second World War the Office, whilst primarily serving the President, was initially shared with 
the headquarters of the Executive Ministry. This lasted until 1957, when the Ministry was moved out to 
what was Taipei Town hall from the Japanese colonial period (built in 1940). The Office then became 
entirely the Presidential Office, and its monumental status was formally declared following its 
announcement as a national heritage site in 1998. The Office, together with the front plaza (ordinarily 
used as a road), was the major venue for central ceremonial celebrations from 1947 onwards; there 
assemblies were held, and the President received foreign heads of state and other guests, as well as 
providing a variety of significant celebrations, a function continued since the Japanese period. The road 
extending from the front plaza is a 400 metre long boulevard (fig. 5.85) that had been named by the 




                                                   
170
 CHIANG Kai-Shek was one of the most important political leaders of the twentieth century, ruling mainland China in competition with the 
Communist Party from 1928 to 1947 when he was forced to withdraw his forces to Taiwan. As leader of the KMT from 1928 to his death in 
1975, Chiang shaped the party and Taiwan under his rule was a one party state. 
5. 85. The 
Governor-General’s 
Office’s front plaza with 
the 400 metre long 
boulevard.  
(Photograph by Author) 
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The road was renamed again as ‘Ketagalan Boulevard’ to symbolise respect for the history and culture 
of aboriginal Ketagalan (Chi. 凱達格蘭, a Taiwanese aboriginal tribe originating in what is now the 
Taipei basin). This road formed a main venue for parades and airings for Youth Day, Double Ten 
National Day and Independence Day annually since 1950s (all associated with the historical roots of 
the KMT). It was appropriated by surging social movements and political protests from the 1980s until 
today, and for presentations of a variety of diverse ethnic groups and cultural activities such as fairs, 
bazaars, concerts and matches since the 1990s. The grandest event is still Double Ten National Day 
an all-day national event starting with the Flag Raising Ceremony, with parades with tanks forces and 
other army forces a guard of honour, symbolic pailou (Chi. 牌樓, Arch with traditional Chinese 
architectural gating style), with the crowd cheering for the ‘Three Principles of the People’ and hurrahs 
for the Republic of China with peace doves and balloons. (fig. 5.86) As an iconic building, the 





Following the decolonisation of Japan, the Office was altered to represent President Chiang and 
remained ‘Chieh Shou Hall’ until 2006 when, during the first rule of an opposition party in Taiwan, the 
Office was renamed more neutrally as ‘the Presidential Office’. The association with Chiang is gradually 
loosening: an annual celebration for Chiang’s birthday was held until Chiang passed away in 1975. It 
was no accident that the highest Japanese colonial authority building was chosen to deliver Chiang’s 
powerful centralised government: it is a long tradition of Chinese culture to replace the previous ruler by 
5. 86. The parade on 
Double Ten National Day 
in 1957. Source from Wei 
and Gao, 2004. 
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sitting on the previous occupant’s throne, displaying that the new incumbent can live with the pressure. 
The authority invested in the building was absolute: people who passed it had to bow all the way across 
it during martial law in Taiwan from 1949 to 1987; also bicycles and motorbikes were forbidden to go 
past. After the beginning of democracy in Taiwan, the Office with its front plaza became a holy spot for 
protest and rallies, showing its co-option as a national symbol by both the KMT and Taiwanese.  
 
The Office as a flexible image of authority is still successful, and it appears permanent, spread 
throughout the island; this condition seems still indelible in the 21st century. This image of the Office 
was not alone but formed a collective with other Japanese authority buildings (which were not 
destroyed in the Second World War) together forming Taiwan kindai (modern) architecture. Yet whilst 
this representation of kindai architecture had formerly expressed the zeitgeist of the previous Meiji era 
(formally that of Western form and Japanese spirit), after the Second World War it became a symbol of 
supremacy through the cultural appropriation of colonial cognitive maps, with day-to-day propaganda 
images of it appearing on bank notes (fig 5.87 and 5.89), commemorative posters (fig. 5.88), 
magazines and elsewhere. Furthermore, the mainstream colonial kindai architecture was actually 
brought out firmly after the establishment of the Office due to its influence. The legacy in Taiwan, other 




5. 87. One yen note with the 
Taiwan Governor-General’s 






















poster for the Presidential 
succession in 1975. Source 






Colonial periphery to centre  
The story of the legacy of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office is not simply one about the architects 
who were most centrally involved in the building. It also includes how the example of the building 
influenced Japan and its colonies, how the emerging trend of modernity became embodied in this 
building and therefore set on firmer foundations, and how the city planning example of Taipei influenced 
other Japanese colonies. Although it was built in the outskirts of the Japanese Empire, both the centre 
and the periphery were affected. During the Japanese colonial period, the Office was the crowning 
achievement of the urban development of Taipei and provided an impression of the colonial 
administration, as well as impressing colonial architects, urban planners, foreign visitors and natives.  
 
1. Manchuria 
Besides Taiwan, the links between colonial administration and architecture were the most significant 
and deepest in Manchuria. Its urban development was tied in the early years to the South Manchurian 
Railway Company (Jap. 満鉄) which was the chief organisation involved in refracting the kindai 
(modern) into Manchuria. (Sewell, 2004: 220) The first President of the Railway Company was the 
commissioner of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office, GOTŌ Shinpei, and he applied his biological 
principles as first developed in Taiwan onto Manchuria, whilst retaining his ambition to shape the 
colonial environment, building new cities in the taste of the late Meiji era. MIZUNO Rentaro, vice-Home 
Minister when Gotō was Home Minister, recollected in 1930 that Gotō’s goal in Taiwan’s cities was to 
create “civilized urban societies” (bunmei tokai) (Sewell, 2000: 66) and this aim was applied equally in 
Manchuria.  
 
This was possible due to the involvement of the Okada Engineering Company (Jap. 岡田工務所), a 
firm that employed recent graduates of Tokyo University and “helped reshape the southern Manchurian 
landscape to suit the tastes of Japanese empire builders.” (Sewell, 2004: 222) The firm had 
5.89. Two hundred yen 
note with the Taiwan 
Governor- General’s 
Office produced in 2001. 
(Public domain) 
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connections with TATSUNO Kingo171 to the extent that it could be said that Tatsuno, through proxies, 
established the basic tone of Meiji architecture, and this “Meiji architecture in turn became the model for 
empire.” (Sewell, 2000: 73) These architects had a similar reforming spirit to the early pioneers in 
Japan, going through a succession of styles from historic revivalism, through to modernism, thus 
responding to international debates and trends. Eventually the planners and architects of Okada 
Engineering and other bodies designed plans for 140 towns in Manchuria.  
 
In 1942 the president of the Journal of Manchurian Architecture stated that he was grateful to the role 
experimentation in Taiwan and Korea had played in the development of Manchurian architecture. 
(Sewell, 2000: 130) Whilst this influence was initially due to Gotō, Taiwan’s urban planning in general 
translated well to Manchuria, whose residents were culturally related to Taiwan. The experimental 
approach used in Taiwan was also an experience Manchurian colonial authorities learned from, 
particularly in the decade following the Russo-Japanese War (1905) and following the annexation of 
Manchuria in 1931 which created a Japanese-aligned puppet state extant until 1945. 
 
Taipei’s architectural influence lay in efficiently building ‘kindai (modern) paraphernalia and this could 
be seen in Manchukuo’s colonial capital, Changchun, which “was to be a modern capital, one with 
plazas, parks, public transportation, and the other amenities commonly found in a modern urban 
setting.” (Sewell, 2004: 235) This later colonial example shows the influence Taipei exerted as a 
planned seat of colonial power. Yet Japan’s city planning in Manchukuo was radical in comparison with 
both Qing Taipei and Tokyo, where an ambitious colonial government, simultaneously progressive and 
controlling, created an experimental city with a profound influence on later colonial cities, allowing a 
degree of stylistic hybridity that had been denied in Taiwan. In Manchukuo, Sewell wrote that: 
 
“The style of the official buildings was similarly grandiose, as Japanese architects 
attempted to endow the new capital—and thus, the new state—with a distinctive facade, 
one that capped modern buildings with Asian rooflines. In doing so, the architects of the 
Capital Construction Bureau (Kokuto Kensetsu Kyoku 國都建設局) sought to display 
architecturally the goals and values of the new state.” (Sewell, 2004: 235) 
 
Taiwan’s Governor-General’s Office was not directly influential in that it did not provide a prototype for 
what a colonial government building should look like, but this was largely due to the approach taken in 
Manchuria and Taiwan: monumental buildings should reflect the latest trends, and Art Nouveau and 
modernism were in vogue following 1919 in Japan. The Office was influential as a template building 
                                                   
171
 In the first place, MAEDA Matsuoto was the first ‘architect adventurer’ in Manchuria arriving in 1904, and his mentor was IKEDA Kentaro, 
himself a previous assistant to Tatsuno. 
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within a colonial urban area: the buildings of highest authority should be monumental with distinctive 
facades, reflect modern fashions, become easily operational as national symbols, and therefore crown 
any urban plan. Due to Manchuria’s status as an informal colony there was no Governor-General’s 
Office, but this symbolic purpose could be seen in buildings such as Manchukuo’s Hall of State (1936) 
and the Manchukuo Supreme Court (1938). 
 
2. Korea 
The Taiwanese template for urban development was largely followed in colonial Korea as well. Korea 
was made a Protectorate of Japan in 1905 following the Russo-Japanese War. It was formally annexed 
in 1910, a timing which allowed many of the lessons learnt from Taiwan to be applied in Korea, even 
though the overall approach differed in some obvious ways. Having a similar political system to colonial 
Taiwan, an Official Residence was built in 1911, and a site was reserved for a Governor-General’s 
Office from 1912. (Jung, 2013: 45) After the death of the German designer, Georg De Lalande 
(1872-1914), of the Office in 1914 construction began in 1916 and the Korea Governor-General’s Office 
was complete in 1926. The Korean Office was provocative and ultimately counter-productive in a way 
not seen in Taiwan: it overlooked the city, built to the south of (and within the compound of) the 
Gyeongbok Palace, the centuries-old residence of the Korean kings and a symbol of Korean nationality. 
The Palace had been mostly dismantled at this point, yet the remains could no longer be seen from the 
city centre. The Korea Governor-General’s Office towered over the palace, symbolising how the 





5.90. Georg De Lalande: View of 
the Korea Governor-General’s 
Office from the Gyeongbok 
Palace shortly before its 
destruction. 






Like the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office, Korea’s Office represented modernity through its 
application of technologies. Whilst Taiwan’s first fully reinforced concrete building was constructed in 
1909 (Moriyama’s Taiwan Telephone Exchange), two years before Japan’s first ferro-concrete building, 
the Korea Governor-General’s Office was a beneficiary of this experimentation and became the first 
building in Korea to be wholly constructed using ferro concrete. (Jung, 2013: 45) This decision was only 
made after De Lalande had passed away and the technical and financial expense of a masonry 
building proved prohibitive. After 1925, city and provincial buildings mostly used reinforced concrete, 
including the City Halls in Seoul (1925), Gunsan (1928), Sinuiju (1931), Incheon (1932), and Gaeseong 
(1937). (Jung, 2013: 46). 
 
Like the Taiwan Office, the Korea Governor-General’s Office was faced in masonry (this time granite 
rather than brick tiling) and the appearance of European grandeur underpinned the building. The lobby 
was particularly notable, being far less imperial in character than the Taiwan Governor-General’s 
Office’s lobby, possessing a lighter modernist and Orientalised space whilst appropriating Classical 
revival elements (Fig 5.91). The Composite frieze above the stairs is highly decorated as is usual in the 
order. The grandeur of the lobby was recognised through its use as the setting of the U.N. ceremony of 
1950 marking the return of Seoul to South Korean control.  
 
 
5.91. The lobby of the 
Korea Governor-General’s 
Office of Korea. Source 
from Lin, M., 2009. 
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Following independence, the Korean Governor-General’s Office was used as a national museum. Once 
restoration had begun on the Gyeongbok Palace in 1989, a debate on the symbolism of the building 
resurfaced. In 1995 (the fiftieth anniversary of the end of Japanese rule and the eight hundredth 
anniversary of the Gyeongbok Palace) the Office began to be demolished; by the following year it had 
all been destroyed but for one stone which is displayed outside the Korea Independence Memorial. 
(Shie, 2009: 34) In Korea, the legacy of the Governor-General’s Office was as symbol of imperialism 
and national humiliation rather than a useful symbol of modernity, even though the Korean Office was 
designed by a European rather than a Japanese.  
 
The differences in the legacy of the Offices reside in Japan’s differing cultural and political relationships 
with Taiwan, and Korea: Korea’s then recent history as the ‘hermit kingdom’, and Japan’s past 
denigration of Korea, meant that the purpose of public architecture could not be the same as it was in 
Taiwan. Koreans largely rejected the notion that the Japanese could be more civilised than them, given 
that Confucianism and Buddhism had reached Japan through delegations from the Korean peninsula. 
Instead, Japanese rulers often integrated Korean and Japanese architecture as symbolising a new 
world order, particularly at public showings such as Expositions:  
 
“the 1929 Exposition [in Seoul] had abolished the image of the West as the symbol of 
modernity. Instead, it celebrated the imagery of ‘Korea’ as a sign of the ‘co-prosperity’ 
between Japan and Korea. This new sensitivity was most clearly spelled out in an official 
speech made by Japanese Prime Minister Hamaguchi Osachi at the opening ceremony: 
‘We will try to achieve unity and harmony between Japan and Korea, and the prosperity of 
our nation and fellow countrymen.’ This speech expressed a change in the Japanese 
colonial strategy of ‘modernizing’ Korea. Yet it also showed a shift in the way Japan 
represented the colony. If the 1915 Exposition presented Korea as an ‘uncivilized’ space 
that could only be enlightened by the grace of Japanese colonialism, that of 1929 depicted 
Korea as a partner, sharing with Japan the ‘spirit of the Far East.’” (Kal, 2005: 508-9)  
 
In Korea, Japan could not leverage architecture as successfully as they did in Taiwan to mould the 
self-identity of the island’s natives into believing they were merely semi-civilised, and instilling a 
motivation to reach the ‘level’ of Seiyō modernity. New paths had to be taken in Korea, which walked a 
line between co-prosperity and harsh reprisals against Korean nationalism. This fitted with Japan’s 
overall policy for foreign relations: the early twentieth century writer HISHIDA Seiji wrote that Japan had 
“on the one hand, consciously adopted the Anglo-Saxon principle of national freedom and equality of 
opportunity, but it had, on the other hand, kindred sympathies and traditional relations with the 
backward nations of Asia.” (Hishida 1905: 258)  
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Pre-colonial Korean buildings in Seoul were retained to a greater extent than in Taipei, though most of 
the pre-existing architecture of Seoul was demolished during the Japanese occupation. The 
propaganda remained similar to Taiwan; one Japanese guidebook in 1919 recommended visitors to 
“make acquaintance with the old attire, peculiar customs, and distinctive architecture of this 'Hermit 
Kingdom' which is no longer shut off from the rest of the world, but is now passing through a great and 
rapid change under the progressive policy of the Japanese administration." (Henry, 2005: 665) Korea’s 
political situation and cultural position was sufficiently different to prompt the Japanese into a harsher 
approach to urban planning and architecture, and they were less successful in their execution of these 
policies.  
 
Overall, the architectural ethos in colonial Korea was similar to that in Taiwan: expositions were held to 
showcase the Japanese administration (at first in Renaissance Revival buildings, later in eccentric 
modernist structures) (Kal, 2005: 523), monumental architecture was built for official government 
functions, and the Governor-General of Korea took the lead in postannexation urban reforms. (Henry, 
2005: 662) In addition to policies such as land-pooling, which were adopted in Korea after being 
introduced in Taiwan (Jung, 2013: 18), the city planning pre-dispositions in colonial Taipei were also 
influential in Seoul: for instance, the characterisation of the natives as dirty and needing to sanitise the 
entire city, and the separation of the Japanese neighbourhood (to the south as in Taipei) from the rest of 
the city. (Henry, 2005: 664) Widening the roads, even straightening them in Seoul, was also executed in 
colonial Korea, revising the geomatic city planning with an open road system (Jung, 2013: 11); this 
could not be done in Tokyo due to entrenched landowners’ interests. (Henry, 2005: 661) The emphasis 
on axiality in the city, centred on the Korea Governor-General’s Office, which was designed as the 
locus of the city in Seoul (Jung, 2013: 11) overlooking the city colonial population, followed a model first 
successfully applied in Taiwan.  
 
3. Taiwan 
Besides the influence of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office outlined in this Chapter (instituting a 
colonial architecture competition system, altering the habits of its inhabitants, being used as a test bed 
for new architectural materials, and becoming a national symbol of integration and power), the Office 
also had a central influence on Taipei’s development. Following the 1905 Urban Correction plan, the 
city was reshaped around the site selected for the Office in the south-east of the walled-city. Its 
eastward orientation contributed to the future urban development of Taipei:  
 
“In Chinese tradition, the façades of houses face north or south. But the 
Governor-General’s Office faces east. Of course, in a modern city developed according to 
a grid pattern, many buildings would face east or west, and only about half would face 
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north or south. Nevertheless, having a much older building with a very extensive façade 
facing eastward contributed to Taipei’s geographical development eastward, north 
eastward, and southeastward directions.” (Shie, 2009: 30) 
 
This focus on the east has resulted in a new modern metropolitan area, including what was the tallest 
building in the world, Taipei 101, located on a road directly east from the Presidential Office. Today the 
city centre of Taipei is not in the old walled city, but centred on this new monument. This investment 
focus to the east has meant that the old Qing dynasty areas of Mengjia and Dadaochen (to the west 
and north respectively) have been neglected, and even nowadays these areas are less developed 
economically. (Shie, 2009: 31) The Japanese orientation of the Office still influences Taipei’s urban 
development direction.  
 
The lead architect of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office, MORIYAMA Matsunosuke, soon became 
the leading architect in Taiwan following his commission, and began several other projects 
simultaneously, including Taipei City Hall, Taichung City Hall, and Tainan City Hall, as well as many of 
the major railway stations.172 As these were built with the same stylistic inspirations as the Office, the 
early Japanese colonial architecture can be viewed as a corpus of work crowned by the Taiwan 
Governor-General’s Office. In 1914 IDE Kaoru became the Construction Director of the Civil 
Construction and Maintenance Division, then became more prominent, remaining in Taiwan until his 
death in 1944. Whilst Ide’s request to build in hybrid styles was refused, from the 1920s onward he built 
in modernist forms freely, most notably the Assembly Hall introduced in Section 5.2, as part of the trend 
to reflect the buildings of Japan within the colonies.  
 
The body of architectural work built under the directorship of Moriyama and Ide gave a coherent look to 
the cities of Taiwan. Buildings formed an important part of the impression of the colonial administration, 
and prior to the construction of the Office, a number of notable buildings (described in section 4.4) had 
been built on similar lines, providing the context for the Office itself. The reception of these buildings by 
foreigners was crucial to their success as authentically modern objects suited to a Great Power. Within 
15 years of the colonisation of the island, foreign residents such as the Brit George W. MacKay were 
already positive about the urban developments: “Of the public buildings which adorn the cities there are 
innumerable ones. Schools, post office, banks and hotels, many constructed in Western style are to be 
found everywhere. While in Taihoku, the government buildings and colleges are among the best in the 
Far East.” (MacKay, 1911: 183) Writing in the Journal of Race Development, MacKay found that 
“[w]ithin these last few years the principal cities in Formosa have undergone a remarkable 
                                                   
172
 Whilst the pre-eminent colonial architect in Taiwan, Moriyama’s return to Japan in 1921 was much less successful. He struggled to find 
important commissions as a private architect, though his most famous construction was the Imperial Pavilion at Shinjuku Gyoen National 
Garden in Japan, later known as the Taiwan Pavilion, given its stylistic influences. 
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transformation. The crooked, dirty, narrow and uneven streets of the past generation have been done 
away with. In their places there now exist broad, clean, and well paved streets. Those in Taihoku, the 
capital, or Kelung are equal to any of the best avenues to be found anywhere in Yokohama or Tokyo.” 
(MacKay, 1911: 182) It can be surmised that urban reforms directly affected the experience of visitors 
and residences and were a significant component in giving a positive impression of colonial 
administration. 
 
The Taiwan Governor-General’s Office, once built, became the key architectural attraction in Taiwan for 
foreign visitors. This impression was guided, as shown by the experience of Owen Rutter: a British 
colonial official in Borneo. Rutter was invited on a ten day guided tour Taiwan at the invitation of 
Japanese administrators, and subsequently wrote a book (in 1923) and several articles about his 
experience. From this it is clear that following the construction of the Office the estimation of the city 
was heightened, with Rutter suggesting “Taihoku is undoubtedly laid out on a finer scale than any other 
city in the [Japanese] Empire”. (Rutter, 1925: 160) This is likely to be a truthful statement, since many of 
the major buildings in Korea and Manchuria were not built until the 1930s, whilst Taiwan’s major official 
buildings were mostly complete by 1920. In a discussion at the Royal Geographical Society, Rutter 
describes his overall impression of the island stating:  
 
“It was amazing to me, having come from the country of North Borneo, which has been in 
the hands of the British for nearly fifty years, to see what the Japanese had done in 
Formosa in just over twenty-five. It was really positively amazing. There were roads 
everywhere. A railway ran from north to south. In Taihoku, the capital, there were finer 
streets… than in the big towns of the Japanese Empire. Money has been poured into 
Formosa by the Japanese; to them it is like a ewe lamb. They have been intent on 
developing it, and they have succeeded. There are fine buildings, and the island has 
wonderful resources.” (Hogath et al, 1927: 286) 
 
According to this impression Taipei was comparable to some of the largest cities in Japan, even if 
Rutter retains a slight tone of dismissal on the worth of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office given its 
expense: “The Governor-General’s Palace, although perhaps not quite so grand as it sounds, is yet a 
residence of considerable dignity.… It is their determination to rule the country permanently.” (Rutter, 
1923: 149) In a later article, Rutter went into more detail on the building, relaying a parallel experience 
to that of the Taiwanese poet CHANG Li-Jun (Chi. 張麗俊, described in Section 5.3) of ascending the 
top of the Office’s tower: “Some of the public buildings would not disgrace any city in the world. The 
Government offices alone cost over £300,000; we went up the little tower that surmounts them to see 
 457 
the view, and it seemed to us a piece of rather violent (but very typical) extravagance that it should 
have been fitted with a special lift, used for no other purpose than to save would-be sightseers like 
ourselves the trouble of walking up a few stairs.” (Rutter, 1925: 160) Owen Rutter’s guide, Takekoshi, 
had defended the expense of the construction to him stating that: “Many objections were raised at first 
to the expenditure, but it seems to me quite justifiable. The fact is that our Chinese and Formosan 
subjects are very materialistic, seeing nothing great save in the glitter of gold, a gorgeous, military 
display.” (Rutter, 1923: 149)  
 
Whilst the Office was positive in revising the opinions of European and American visitors on the worth 
of Japan’s kindai (modern) civilisation, the impression these buildings made on the native Taiwanese 
was far more profound. The Taiwan Governor-General’s Office crowned a new hierarchy of materials, 
consigning timber to a lower position; given that almost all native Taiwanese buildings were made in 
wood, these buildings effectively persuaded natives to change their own building forms. This was part 
of the identity-formation process: the unequal contact zone was extrapolated into Japan’s colonies with 
the roles reversed: the sure power of Japan over the native forces, easily defeated militarily after their 
initial resistance, led to the gradual transculturation of native elites. This mixing and combining of 
cultures after modernity was filtered into Taiwan, resulting in hybrid building forms: 
 
“This refracted new architecture of the Japanese period was characterized by foreign 
features and it introduced certain positive features in terms of environmental 
considerations and diversity of style and building technology to the development of 
Taiwanese architecture. Nonetheless, it is important to note the interactions of imported 
and indigenous cultures. The integration of regional expressions into newly introduced 
‘Japanese Western’ buildings resulted in the creation of the hybrid-style residences, 
street-houses, and tombs. Regional characteristics are expressed in the form of formal and 
spatial components as well as in decorative elements in courtyards, main halls, pediments, 
the kinship tablet, and the building materials. The colonizers imposed an idea of modernity 
that was appropriated locally in Taiwan and thereby transformed into another idea of 
modernity through various hybrid expressions. This hybrid phenomenon presents an 
important feature of refracted modernity.” (Fu, C., 2007: 188)  
 
As shown in the quote above, a significant portion of the legacy of the Taiwan Governor-General’s 
Office and other official buildings was that traditional buildings were adapted to include obvious 
features that incorporated new styles. These official buildings prompted the birth of hybrid architecture 
in Taiwan: most examples of hybrid architecture in Taiwan came after the main official buildings had 
been completed, in the 1920s and 1930s. (Fu, C., 2007: 182-186) Mostly consisting of residences that 
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combined Chinese and European symbolism, these buildings point to the incorporation of new fashions 
within new hierarchies of power.  
 
Whilst these symbols became less influential with the arrival of modernism and Chinese revival 
architecture after the Second World War, European revivalism is even today practised in Taiwan; many 
new high profile public buildings are built in this style. For instance, the most expensive apartment 
block in Taiwan (Di Bao, built 2005), a shopping mall (the Bellavita in Taipei, 2009) and a high end hotel 
(the Mandarin Oriental Taipei, 2014) have all recently been built in an eclectic range of European 
revival styles. Given the rise of China as a bulwark against Euro-American hegemony, and Taiwanese 
native nationalism, these architectural products are often derided as ‘tacky’ and rooted in a time that 
has now passed. Yet whilst the vast majority of administrative buildings in Taipei are modernist (or 
derivatives), the Taiwan High Court of 2004 was built in a clear Classical Revival style; square, blocky 
and sparsely decorated it is reminiscent of Tatsuno’s first commission, the Bank of Japan of 1894. Such 
government constructions are in part a legacy of learning from Japanese rule and the architecture that 
it produced, and in part an engagement with Europe as a site of superiority: superior aesthetics, cities, 
living standards, and power. Rather being part of a national Taiwanese identity, these buildings promote 
exoticism, as Chinese pavilions do in Europe; they speak to the hybrid nature of modernity in Taiwan, 
due to the partial transculturation of elite culture during Japanese rule. The takeover by the Chinese 
Nationalist Party (KMT) after the Second World War meant that the filtered modernity derived from 
Europe still remains influential, muddying the waters of what it means to be ‘modern’ in architectural 
terms for Taiwan. Unlike pre-War Japan where such architecture was a central part of the 
nation-building process, these buildings are a part of a trend towards cosmopolitanism, a difference 
that points to the differing roots of modernity between Taiwan and Japan, which did not have the 
skewing influence of formal colonialisation.  
 
 
Trends of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office’s encapsulated in Japan 
In Meiji Japan, Tatsuno style was so prevalent that it could also be called Late Meiji style (Sewell, 2000: 
123) and therefore it is unsurprising that the main influence of the building was not stylistic: this 
influence was already apparent from the architecture of Conder, Ende and Böckmann, Sone and 
Tatsuno. However it is notable that following his involvement in the competition jury for the Office, ITŌ 
Chūta did build in this style in the Dendô-In in Kyôto in 1912 (fig. 5.92), a building reminiscent of 
Burges’s Harrow Speaking Hall. This implies that the experience of working with Tatsuno and on the 





The Taiwan Governor-General’s Office encapsulated and solidified important trends that had been long 
in gestation in Japan. Fifteen years before the colonisation of Taiwan, the first Japanese architecture 
students had translated their teaching from Conder into a series of hierarchies of materials and 
styles.173 The construction of the Office pointed to the emergence of a viable new material and style, 
suitable for the highest status buildings: revivalism using steel-reinforced concrete. Unlike Katayama’s 
Akasaka Palace (1909) in Tokyo, constructed to be seismic-proof but using expensively assembled 
stone, the Office used cheaper material that could be assembled without importing building materials, 
and without the necessity to use wood as a structural material. Revivalist aesthetics on a ferro-concrete 
frame was a configuration of materials and styles which became the norm for the highest architectural 
commissions in Japan and her colonies for all but a few exceptions following the Great 1923 Kanto 
earthquake until 1945.  
 
The other major influence that the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office had on Japan was in architectural 
competitions. As the first state-led open competition, the ultimate success of the building (in spite of the 
difficulties with selection of design, the quality of entries, and the awards) meant that commissioners 
were often tempted to use design competitions instead of closed commissions. In spite of their 
popularity with government clients, the Office competition’s flawed process became the norm, leading 
architects to complain about irregularities and exploitation of labour. As with the Office competition, on a 
number of occasions one architect had been awarded the first prize only for another architect to receive 
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 SONE Tatsuzo had conflated the two issues, stating that contemporary Japan was home to five architectural styles: “native, 
semi-European, European wooden, brick, and stone.” (Sone, 1879) The first three styles were executed by carpenters in wood, and Sone 
suggests a cultural passage in moving from one style to another: echoing Conder, Sone states that “semi-European” is “tasteless and 
contemptible.” (Sone, 1879)   
5.92. ITŌ Chūta: 
Dendô-In, Kyôto, 
completed in 1912. 
Source from Choi, 
2008. 
 460 
the actual commission. The National Diet Library competition of 1953 followed this unpopular pattern: 
“those setting the rules claimed the right to retain submitted designs, reserved the option of not using 
the winning architect’s design when the library was actually built, and prohibited architects from 
appealing the substitution.” (Reynolds, 2001: 175) High-handedness by commissioners during the 
competition process, underlined by a lack of governing principles, was the rule for many decades 
following this pioneering competition, which solidified the architect’s position as a subordinate to the 
state. 
 
Whilst there is little direct connection, these two influential trends were characteristic of the highest 
status official building in Japan: the National Imperial Diet building. In charting the history of the 
National Diet we can see how Japanese construction methods and materials developed a primary 
importance, and how the first, flawed iteration of an architectural competition became the standard. The 
story of the Diet Building was tied to the drive in the early Meiji period to develop a modern nation-state, 
including democratic apparatus. As shown in Chapters 2 and 3, this movement resulted in a new 
constitution and a national Diet for Japan at the same time as the highest watermark for foreign 
architects in Japan. Given this situation, the Japanese foreign minister, INOUE Kaoru, requested the 
German architects Ende and Böckmann design the building. They submitted two plans for the Imperial 
Diet in 1887, one in masonry style with dome, mansard roofs, attached columns, pedimented 
windows and flanking wings (fig. 5.93), the other in a traditional Japanese style with upswept tiled roofs, 
replacing the domes and classical Western features with Japanese ones (fig. 5.93).  
 
 
5.93. and 5.94. 1st 
(Top) and 2nd (Bottom) 
proposals for Ende and 
Böckmann's Diet 
Building, 1886. Source 
from Sha, Y., 2001. 
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Both designs by Ende and Böckmann were sequentially rejected by the Ministry as the political 
atmosphere changed in the 1890s, and they turned against relying on foreigners for matters of national 
prestige. Ten years later, the American Gothic revival architect Ralph Adams Cram, whilst studying the 
history of Japan, submitted a design for the building in 1898. This design was a fantastical sweeping 
palace complex, with gates, pagodas and upturned eaves, an unashamed reversal of the recent kindai 
(modern) architecture constructed in Japan, in a way that Ende and Böckmann’s design was not: this 







Cram’s design was also rejected, unsurprisingly given the Meiji authority’s lingering project of 
civilisation and enlightenment (Bunmei Kaik shown in Chapter 3, most European architects in Japan at 
some point in their career proposed a nativist design, or a design which would have obvious ‘Oriental’ 
tones to a European, and this was a continuation of an entrenched trend. Such ‘Oriental’ designs were 
anxious attempts “to resharpen the increasingly blurred distinctions between East and West threatened 
by Japan's modernization.” (Reynolds, 1996: 41) The aesthetic similarity between the revival buildings 
constructed in Japan from the 1880s onwards and European buildings were problematic for caricatures 
of Japanese architecture; Cram’s design in particular represented an attempt to reify Kipling’s aphorism: 
‘East is East, and West is West, and never the twain shall meet.’ Ideologically, Japanese ministers did 
not wish Tokyo to be clearly set apart from Euro-American cities. At the same time, there were worries 
concerning reliance on foreign architects and practical reasons to reject these designs such as the cost 
and manufacture of bricks.  
This image can be seen in the printed thesis at the University of Sheffield library. 
 
5.95. Ralph Adams 
Cram with B.G. 
Goodhue, ‘A Proposal 
for the Parliament 
Houses in Tokyo,’ 1898. 
Source from Sha, Y., 
2001. 
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Instead, as with the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office, the building was to be designed by Japanese 
architects with a Seiyō style. This was not an uncontroversial decision however, and the National Diet 
building was not finally agreed upon and built until 1936. In the meantime, again in a parallel to the 
Office, the Diet’s functionaries met in a temporary wooden structure,174 shown in fig 5.96 above. Whilst 
this building was being used, an architectural competition was run. This contest was first mooted at the 
turn of the 20th century, by TATSUNO Kingo, supported by TSUMAKI Yoriyuki among others. Under 
this proposal the entrants should submit a 16th century Italian Renaissance revival design. This notion 
was attacked in the architectural press. An anonymous reviewer stated "national spirit and the spirit of 
the age must be manifested through the architectural style of the building ... after all, one would not 
expect to manifest the spirit of sixteenth-century Italy in Japan's Meiji-period Diet Building.” (Reynolds, 
1996: 43) Such critiques were not dismissed, and influenced further competitions (including the Taiwan 
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 Reynolds notes that, work began on this temporary structure to house the future Diet in 1888, after Ende and Böckmann’s designs were 
rejected. The two-story wooden clapboard building was a much more modest affair than the German architects had proposed. The plan was 
close to the earlier designs, with a central entry and wings for each of the two legislative chambers. The pavilions rising over each chamber 
were lit with Roman-arched windows and covered with simple gabled roofs. (Reynolds, 1996: 40) After this building was burnt down by an 
electrical fire after only two months of use, a second building was constructed which was somewhat larger in 1891. 
This image can be seen in the printed thesis at the University of Sheffield library. 
 
5.96. YOSHII Shigenori and 
Oscar Tietze: Main facade, 
second temporary Imperial Diet 




A second competition commission began in 1918, which was won by WATANABE Fukuzo. This was a 
blockier design than the previous contenders, Neo-Classical without conforming to a particular 
sub-style; the most striking element of the design was the weighty tower at the centre of the front 
façade (fig. 5.97). Designs loaded with historicising ornament dominated the architectural competitions 
in the 1930s and early 1940s, and this design was in line with the later trend. (Reynolds, 2001: 156) 
However, whilst the prize was awarded it was contested for many years by SHIMODA Kikutaro, whose 
Japanese revival design was melded with neo-Classical elements, to the disgust of ITŌ Chūta who 
declared Shimoda’s hybrid design a “national disgrace”. In the context of these disagreements, 
Watanabe’s Diet design was revised by the competition commission. (Reynolds, 2001: 175) 
Watanabe’s design itself followed the floor plan of the Ende and Böckmann 1887 designs, rounding off 
the long series of appropriations made in the Commission’s final design. Whilst Watanabe was not 
involved in the construction of the building, this was in line with the rules of the frequent competitions 






Following the fashions of the time after the 1923 earthquake, sturdiness was a priority and the new Diet 
was constructed with a steel and reinforced-concrete frame, and a facing of gray granite, as the Korea 
Governor-General’s Office had been. (Reynolds, 1996: 45) Whilst the original floor plan was retained, 
the ornamentation of the building was greatly simplified by the committee, and the monumental dome 
was reduced in size and splendour (fig. 5.98 and 5.99). At the time of the Diet building’s completion, 
contemporaries described it as ‘modern style’ (kinseishiki), just as the Taiwan Governor-General’s 
Office had been (though by the 1930s kinseishiki had implications of modernism rather than 
Renaissance revival). Whilst the Diet conformed to some elements of 1930s modernism (such as the 
This image can be seen in the printed thesis at the University of Sheffield library. 
 
5.97. WATANABE 
Fukuzo. Proposal for 
the Imperial Diet 
Building, first-prize 
design for the Imperial 
Diet, 1919 Competition 
of 1918-19. Source 
from Reynolds, 1996. 
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retention of the outlines of columns without utilising column orders) (Summerson, 1980: 120), it is likely 
that the designers arrived at this kindai (modern) style through a process of suppressing potentially 
problematic European and Japanese historicising detail, rather than out of positive affirmation of 
simplified form in line with contemporary modernist thought. (Reynolds, 1996: 45) Given that the final 
style of the building was a result of nearly five decades of discussion, the Diet Building became 
stylistically almost a ‘neutral’ building. Although it was created in a period when nationalism was intense, 
when viewed from afar, there was no obvious feature that harked back to the traditional architecture of 
Japan. It seems that to have had Japanese architectural features would have compromised the 
Japanese government’s persisting desire to be perceived as a broadly conceived ‘modern’ nation state.  
 




The consistent censuring of Japanese and Japanese-hybrid styles in the Imperial Diet building ensured 
that Japanese architecture appeared sufficiently similar to the ‘civilised’ West. At the same time, the 
design did not surrender a sense of Japanese uniqueness. The emperor was given a prominent place 
in the building, with Japan’s parliament the only one in a study of more than a dozen parliaments to 
have the monarch’s throne set high to dominate over both chambers of the Diet. (Parkinson, 2012: 108) 
In terms of decoration, as with the lobby in the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office, some modernised 
native designs were incorporated into the design of the Diet, but these were subtle: “The design does 
include such Japanese decorative motifs as the phoenixes carved in shallow relief over the main 
This image can be seen in the printed thesis at the 
University of Sheffield library. 
 
5.98. Model of Imperial Diet 
Building, Tokyo, 1936. Source 
from Reynolds, 1996. 
5.99. The Imperial Diet 
Building’s tower, Tokyo.  
(Photography by Author) 
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entrance to the Diet and the chrysanthemums carved into the woodwork in the legislative chambers, 
but these represent a relatively minor aspect of the building as a whole.” (Reynolds, 1996: 45) The 
commissioners ensured that the shift from Chinese and past Japanese cultural inspiration to using 
Seiyō and the emperor as a muse was clear and obvious in the building. 
 
The issue of nativeness and authenticity was dealt with through the requirement that all building 
materials be from Japan, which contemporary government publications emphasised keenly. The news 
publication Asahi Shinbun described the building at the time of the opening ceremony as “The 
crystallization of the people's twenty years of effort: The dignity of this great architecture constructed 
purely from domestic products.” (Reynolds, 1996: 45) Such specifications fed into longstanding 
arguments on the capabilities of non-White races, extremely important in 1930s Europe, which were 
understood in Japan as pejorative and refutable through concrete actions. Specific to architecture, 
constructing buildings using Japanese materials and Japanese designers was a refutation of James 
Fergusson’s work (read by Japanese undergraduates under Conder) that Japan was not a race of 
builders. The Diet, and other monumental works of architecture promoted by the Japanese state, were 
intended to elevate Japan to join the great builders of the world, as proven by their technical 
sophistication, as explained by Reynolds: 
 
“The Diet was described as a modern building produced by means of the latest technology. 
One government publication went into great length documenting the large size of the 
structure and offered a chart in which its dimensions were compared with those of other 
great structures in Japan and elsewhere, including the Great Buddha Hall at Todaiji, the 
Pyramids, and the Graf Zeppelin. This was clearly an appeal to national identity through 
pride in Japan's technological accomplishments. Instead of asserting national identity by 
distinguishing Japan from the Other, this was a claim for including Japan among the great 
builders of the world.” (Reynolds, 1996: 45)  
 
Aesthetically conforming to Seiyō notions of fashion and modernity, the Diet was used by the Japanese 
government as a symbol of the nation, promoted abroad through postcards and expositions. In 1935 
the English language annual ‘Japan Illustrated’ captioned a photograph of the Diet with "The Imperial 
moat and the new Diet towering in the background," juxtaposing symbols of the emperor with the 
national governance. (Reynolds, 1996: 46) Photomontages were developed by the International Tourist 
Bureau of the powerful Railroad Ministry which according to Reynolds, included a poster for the 
International Exposition in Paris (1937) with layered images of the Diet Building, the Great Buddha at 
Kamakura, Himeji Castle, modern steel bridges, Mount Fuji, downhill skiers, and a profusion of cherry 
trees. (Reynolds, 1996: 46) Such integration of kindai (modern) symbols with landscapes and 
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traditional buildings was a trend of 1930s propaganda, as shown in the previous section for the 
promotion of Japan in the 1935 Taiwan exposition. These examples hint that, 60 years after the Meiji 
Restoration, a national identity was being formed that could easily pair symbols of the modern together 
with ‘unadulterated’ tradition. This modern/traditional binary was becoming a familiar trope used to 
project Japan to the world.  
 
The main difference between the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office and the Diet Building was in how 
public the parliament building was, allowing the frictions and strains within Japan’s national identity to 
come to the surface. Whilst the design of the Office was steered by the powerful figures of the 
Governor-General and Tatsuno, the Diet Building became controversial as a symbolic manifestation of 
what Japan stood for, to the extent that it ended up as the product of a process of design by committee, 
or rather a long series of committees. It was reduced to a compromise; a neoclassical design denuded 
of much of its neoclassical detail, created for a time and place in which any fully articulated architectural 
style would have generated opposition from one camp or another. (Reynolds, 1996: 46) As with the 
Taiwan Governor-General’s Office it did not resolve long-standing questions over style, and was as a 
result little talked about in the architectural press. However, whilst the Office was also designed by 
committee, it became a powerful example for better reasons: the Office had far more success than the 
Diet Building in projecting a coherent identity, whilst using advanced materials as a demonstration of 
modernity. The Office showed Japanese commissioners that competitions could be successful if well 
steered, and that in the construction of a coherent national identity through architecture, the strength of 
building’s appearance and materials was important. 
 
Following the construction of the National Diet building in 1936, European revivalism became less 
common in Japanese architecture; in the decades following 1945 it became virtually unknown. This 
was a reflection of the rise of Modernism globally, and particularly the reintegration of pre-1853 
principles of construction into kindai (modern) Japanese buildings. The Metabolist Movement, and the 
Tange module as a unit of measurement in the Japanese building process, grew in influence as a 
reaction against the pure Seiyō forms of buildings like the Office and Imperial Diet. With this Movement, 
the configuration of seismic-proof materials within a revivalist encasement was altered so that the 
materials and scientific basis of the building remained intact (allowing a greater scale in the expression 
of space), while the aesthetic fashion moved on. The rise of Modernism in Japan reflected global 
artistic trends, even if the indigenous turn of the Metabolist movement meant that the parallel paths of 
Japanese and Seiyō modernity were becoming clearer. This divergence was in part due to the 
construction of a new identity post-war, for as a newly pacifist country, a nation still proud of its roots, 
yet no longer wishing to dominate its neighbours, Japan no longer needed European styles to 
demonstrate its imperial might.. 
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There was a second reason for the move away from European revival styles. Contrary to the 
expectations of Japanese architects, the European Revival buildings constructed in Japan had little 
effect upon Western notions of Japanese architecture as unchanging and static. ITŌ Chūta’s discourse 
on the relation between Euro-American and Japanese architecture went largely unnoticed outside of 
Japan. Architecture Professor KISHIDA Hideto (Jap. 岸田日出刀, 1899-1966) wrote in 1936 that 
“Generally, visitors from abroad, among whom are included a number of architects, concentrate their 
attention one-sidedly upon the classical aspects of Japanese buildings. They possess amazingly 
child-like ideas regarding our modern architecture.” (Kishida, 1936, quoted in Clancey, 2006: 232) 
Whilst foreign architects and visitors were curious about Japan’s native architecture, it was not because 
it was a model worthy of emulating but because it was novel and interesting, if not valuable enough to 
write about. The American Japanophile Ralph Adams Cram wrote in 1905 on how Japan’s wooden 
architecture was treated by Westerners: “It is dismissed with a sentence. To the western traveller it 
seems fanciful and frail, a thing unworthy of study.” (Clancey, 2006: 19)  
 
This dynamic of Japanese architects attempting to argue with and express their civilisation and 
progress through architecture, whilst facing ignorance from abroad and idealisation of ‘tradition’, would 
continue long into the 20th century. Yet with the adoption of a modernist aesthetic, Japanese 
contemporary architects such as TANGE Kenzo, KUROKAWA Kisho, ANDO Tadao and ITŌ Toyo 
became heralded in Japan, East Asia and even throughout the world. Aesthetically, Japanese authority 
architecture before 1945 had little influence over foreign visitors. It was only when Japan moved 
beyond revivalism and engaged in Modernism that they had impact, producing consciously global 
architecture in a way that European Revivalism never could have done. Ironically, it was this turn to 
Modernism that guaranteed the long-term legacy of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office in Japan 
through the development of reinforced concrete as a modernist building material. Experimental colonial 
architecture produced the capacity to build monumental-scale national architecture whilst protecting 

















This thesis has kept to the theme of its original complex research question of how Japan’s contact with 
Seiyō produced a new notion of the modern, and how this notion was expressed by Meiji architects in 
Japan and colonial Taiwan. Answering this question requires asking two prior questions: first, before the 
encounter with the Great Powers was Japan modern to any extent? Second, how can we know if 
something is still modern if the concept is different after contact with another culture? Both problems 
relate to the first theme of the thesis: that Japan’s modernity involved a revolution of concepts through 
transculturation of elites at its centre. I have approached the first question initially at a linguistic level as 
the language and concepts that the Japanese used was crucial evidence. I found that there was no prior 
notion of the modern in Japanese, although there were vaguely similar concepts, such as the 
Confucian-based concept of civilisation: Bushidō, (Jap. 武士道, lit. the way of samurai) and the labelling 
of foreign Others as siyi (Chi. 四夷, lit four barbarians/foreign tribes). Yet these concepts showed a 
different approach and logic to the modern in English: there was no equivalent notion which implied a 
temporal judgment (current), a normative standard (up-to-date) and a uniform society under continuous 
renewal (new fashion/against tradition); the idea of kindai (modern) had to be created. Therefore it 
seems spurious to claim that Japan was modern in Euro-American terms before the mid-19th century. 
After undergoing the process of elite transculturation, by which Meiji authorities rapidly selected and 
invented from translated materials transmitted from the dominant Great Powers, Japan underwent a 
conceptual revolution which reflected a new understanding of its position in the world and a new 
self-identity: it was only after this that Japan had the potential to become modern. 
 
The second question, how to know if something is still modern if the concept is different after contact 
with another culture, could only be answered decisively by considering many decades of contact and 
translation in Japan. In the early 1870s, when there was a fusing of cultures in Japan (exemplified by the 
buildings of Shimazu), Japan’s politics and society could only be labelled modern to a limited extent. 
Very quickly, however, authority buildings in Japan underwent a process of rationalisation whereby they 
were stripped of traditional decorations and adopted the architectural vocabulary of Europe. By the end 
of the 19th century, continuous and prolonged contact with Seiyō through missions and education 
resulted in Japanese elites agreeing with and reifying the idea of the modern according to Seiyō criteria. 
This long period of gestation meant that the definition of modernity (kindai) was not understood in the 
same way in Japanese as in English until the mid-1910s (almost beyond the period of study). Related 
concepts had a similar process of gradual adaptation: the definitions of science and technology were not 
distinguished in Japanese as they are in English, resulting in architectural practice that was different in 
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tone to that of other parts of the world at the time. Yet whilst different, these variances were not sufficient 
proof that Japan’s modernity was of a type heterogeneous to that defined in European languages.  
 
Given these linguistic discrepancies I took the approach of examining the necessary conditions of 
modernity in Europe and compared these to the necessary conditions of Japanese (kindai) modernity 
during this gestation period. Japanese modernity in the Meiji period had similar but far from identical 
conditions to European modernity, not least in its minor emphasis on personal freedom. I found that 
whilst European modernity was based on critical reason and political dominance over non-Europeans, 
kindai (modern) Japanese authority architecture was made possible by the desire to appear civilised, 
and used critical reason in order to reach this aim. This instrumental use of critical reason meant that 
rationality never achieved the high social and cultural status that it did in Europe at the time: the primary 
purpose of modernising was to appear to fit in with the prevailing world order. The divergence of Japan’s 
modern conditions from those of Europe and America (which were based far more on domination of 
weaker ‘races’) was shown in that Japan was only recognised as an equal civilisation when the system 
of extraterritoriality was removed from Japan after its military defeat of China in 1895, rather than 
following the reforms in manners, attitudes and fashions of the preceding 30 years. This victory and its 
spoils led to a shift in approach for Japan, increasingly imperial and resulting in a more bellicose use of 
foreign relations. 
 
It was the constellation of ideas that entered Japan in the years around the Meiji Restoration that shaped 
the form of Japanese modernity. Whilst it was different from Europe, the same fundamental dynamics of 
reason, concern with national identity, and domineering relationships over weaker states were present in 
both Japan and the Great Powers. In keeping with the European notion of the nation-state, a drastically 
decentralised Shogunal government in the Edo period was replaced by an increasingly centralised 
nation. The unique rapidity of Japan’s conceptual revolution had a telling impact: soon after the 
translation of the word ‘tradition’ into Japanese, ‘traditions’ were revived and reinvented for the purpose 
of nation building. The strongly centralised state was set up around the figure of the Meiji emperor, which 
created a religion out of the folk beliefs of Shinto. After the rump of the Meiji government returned from 
the Iwakura Mission in 1874, the education system, along with all other state institutions, was reformed 
and became explicitly tied to the state’s aims, promoting science and technology, and teaching on the 
civilisation levels of various countries (Takeuchi, 1987: 9) - in effect socially engineering the population. 
The aims of the Japanese state were formed in the context of theories such as Buckle’s, which divided 
the world into two permanent categories: civilised countries and non-civilised countries. Japanese elites 
reveled in disproving such theories, particularly following the institution of a written constitution in 1891.  
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The new nation of Japan needed solid foundations in recreating authentic civilised architecture. The 
translated conceptual framework had to be supported by railroads for transporting building supplies, 
factories to produce bricks (and later iron and concrete), modern technologies, and an architectural 
profession with the capacity to understand and integrate these elements. Given how closely 
architectural issues in Meiji Japan followed the debates in civil society, Meiji architecture was an 
illuminating subject of study in this thesis and provided a suitable platform to explore the initiation of 
Japanese modernity (1853-1919), given the nuances that architecture holds as a process and product, 
artistic and technical, authoritarian and social. Whilst useful, a purely theoretical perspective is not 
sufficient to give an understanding of how kindai (modern) developed and was expressed in Japanese 
history. Through exploring Japanese modernity from the perspective of the architect, it became clear 
how the expression of identity also has a large impact on behaviour. Using Western-style (Yōfū) 
architecture for authority buildings implied a different identity for Japanese authorities, architects and 
office workers; just as wearing suits impacts behaviour, making certain activities ridiculous (such as tea 
ceremony or kabuki (Jap. 歌舞伎, lit. dance-drama), adopting Yōfū architecture inevitably influenced 
behaviour, promoting different habits and ceremonies in Japan.  
 
The leading architectural theorist of pre-Second World War Japan, ITŌ Chuta, believed that Japanese 
architecture should follow three paths: 1) attempting to join the level of Seiyō modernity, whilst 2) leading 
Tōyō and 3) retaining Japanese cultural identity. This led Japan-based architects to create a unique and 
distorted modern architecture: reviving native and Asian architecture, using unprecedented materials, 
and producing an identity with little intrinsic balance. The coherence of Japanese architectural identity 
was further reduced by foreign intellectuals continuing to view Meiji Japan ethnocentrically, and 
understanding Japan as an imitator, ‘a civilisation without any originality’. Whilst Meiji Japan was treated 
as uninventive by these observers, the pioneering studies and applications of seismology, interior 
design, architectural education, and success in establishing recognisable ‘Meiji’ styles made this point 
patently untrue. 
 
Fundamental to attempting to ‘civilise’ to the level of the Seiyō states (whilst adding fuel to accusations of 
imitation) was the adoption of foreign fashions. As seen throughout this thesis, not least in the spatial 
elements of the Governor-General’s Office, the engagement in the latest fashions and technologies was 
key to the revolution in architecture. Meiji architects had extensive contact with foreign architects in 
Japan and in Europe through work experience and study trips, not least displayed during Tatsuno’s time 
working in London in the 1880s and Moriyama’s tour of Europe and America during the construction of 
the Governor-General’s Office. In following the fashions of Seiyō, Japanese architects inevitably felt a 
genuine sense of belonging to Seiyō civilisation which was expressed in the normative spatial designs of 
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authority buildings, and the European value of reason within architecture; for these Japanese 
architecture, reason was both a tool and a desired product for the users of their buildings.  
 
This dynamic was exported to Taiwan and particularly in the case study building. The 
Governor-General’s Office was used to represent a strong nation, unambiguously mastering a 
Renaissance style and avoiding the Orientalist brackets that foreigners were fond of putting around 
Japan. This was achieved through the thoughtful and rigorous use of reason, particularly shown in the 
building’s spatial syntax and circulation. Whilst the building’s image was used in the media as an 
unambiguous symbol of progress, imperial power and nationalism, the structure and contents of the 
building and its environs were in fact more nuanced. By the 1900s, Japanese architects and designers 
were no longer imitating the ‘West’: in fact whilst stylistic similarities abounded there was no example in 
this thesis of a Japanese architect or carpenter who had copied a European building exactly, for the 
buildings were always adapted to needs. Examples of direct replication were scorned, even though they 
did occur as seen in the Office’s design competition. Both the idea that Japan’s importation implied blind 
copying and that it was a corruption of Japan’s ‘national culture’ relied on a false simplified picture of 
what occurred during the process of appropriation: Japan changed the models that it imported from 
Seiyō and remained demonstrably ‘Japanese’. (Sand, 2003: 365) Japan used many creative ways in 
appropriating particular chosen forms in order to join “global trends of fashion and of thought.” (Sand, 
2003: 365)  
 
Regrettably, Japan embraced the trend for a racial conception of the world. This led to the construction 
of ethnic boundaries first used in Hokkaidō, then later in Japan’s other colonies including Taiwan, which 
reified Japan’s superior position within their cosmology. This policy led to some subtle but remarkable 
differences between architecture on mainland Japan and architecture in Taiwan. First, hybrid styles 
were almost never used for Taiwan’s authority architecture, despite pleas from leading architects who 
had proven adept in building in the local minnan style for Japanese expositions. Second, Japanese 
‘traditional’ architectural elements tended to be hidden and existing ethnic buildings, such as the 
Chinese temples and yamen, were dismantled at the earliest convenience, even though these were not 
uncomfortable spaces for Japanese to work in. Officially deemed quaint and unprogressive, Qing 
buildings could also have potentially been used by locals for ethnic nationalist purposes. Third, Tatsuno 
style was propagated with much more vigour than in Japan, in effect presenting a coherent national 
identity. Given that Japanese buildings were undergoing stylistic divergence in the early 20th century, the 
uniformity is striking. As with their legislative policies in Taiwan, Japan’s architectural policy was rational, 
totalising and dominant.  
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Due to its roots in Europe, the architectural vision developed around 1900 had other unfortunate 
consequences. Japanese architects and clients in authority had digested a European colonialist 
mentality first introduced by Conder, who in turn was influenced by his teacher T. Roger Smith. Conder 
followed the tenet of Smith that “They [colonial architectures] ought to be European [in style], both as a 
rallying-point for ourselves, and as raising a distinctive mark of our presence, always to be beheld by the 
native of the country.” (Smith, 1868: 208) Through following this principle, a European image was 
strongly expressed in Japan’s Empire. Japanese architects created a uniform style that inevitably 
promoted Europe and Britain, reifying the cultural hierarchies of the time which made Japan depart from 
its native architecture for public buildings. This characteristic of colonial architecture reflected the 
relatively low cultural power held by Japan in this period. Because foreign architects were hired as 
teachers, and architectural education followed the European mould, the only ‘architects’ recognised by 
the state were those trained in European traditions at Tokyo University.  
 
Since the foundations of architectural education in Japan derived from abroad, the appropriations of 
European motifs and styles “were never made freely. The choice of things Western, which seems at 
times to transcend all other evaluative criteria, replicated relations of power, since the modes of 
interpretation available for Japanese to conceive their social and material world were determined by the 
forces of their political world.” (Sand, 2003: 365-366) When architects made choices of appearance 
these almost always resulted in choosing European forms, even when creatively appropriating fashion 
as the logic of ‘Western thought,’ particularly related to design, had become internalised. For Pierre 
Bourdieu (2001), professionals who have cultural capital but do not own the means of production (that is, 
the things or ideas they use to make something) should be classed as the dominated group. Whilst the 
Governor-General’s Office stands as a symbol of governmental authority, the implied Seiyō authority 
remains. Even when attempting to transcend Seiyō styles, Japanese designers were stuck within this 
dynamic of domination: for example, even original expressions of national identity such as use of stained 
glass in the Governor-General’s Office lobby required a new technology imported from Europe, and 
used refracted artistic ‘traditions’ reinterpreted and split off from forms found in woodblock prints.  
 
In importing such templates for forms and technologies (particularly the replacement of wood with 
masonry) binary splits were caused in Japan that are at the heart of modernity. These splits were 
fractured, however: although Paz states that the modern is “the knife which splits time in two: before and 
now” (Paz, 1991: 4) Japan had a number of continuities that were not present in Europe. Although 
Japanese kindai (modernity) separated the citizens of Japan from her past in public life, this did not 
mean there were not places where customary practices did not continue. Meiji reforms were so fast and 
incomplete, that the point of view of Fukuzawa modernity was not achieved. For Japan was not 
replicating Europe and America socially; the Japanese people had not yet been individualised and 
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‘Enlightened’. If Fukuzawa’s individualistic theory of civilisation had been fully adopted, the notion of 
dualist ‘Japanese’ modernity would not make sense. Fukuzawa asserted that Japanese people were 
each one person, two lives, and they remained so due to the incomplete project of the rationalisation of 
society. Studies of the home in Meiji Japan by Sand (2003) and Choi (2003) have found that rather than 
the modernisation that was seen in public architecture, residential buildings underwent hybridisation, a 
‘third space’, neither imitative nor Euro-American though containing elements of both. 
 
The framework of critical reason was utilised for public buildings to a more significant degree, leaving a 
residual notion that Japan should transcend to a superior sphere of reason, where it could be classed as 
an equal power; this gathered pace after 1919 and the Modernist movement in Japan. Due to the splits 
created through the state’s desire to appear civilised and the consequences of applying critical reason in 
public building construction, Japan’s architectural modernity became dual in three senses: first, 
compared with the rest of the modern world Japan was different (as explored above); second, within 
Japan public modernity ran parallel to a more traditional private life; and third, Japan gradually became a 
state apart from the rest of Asia.  
 
For domestic Japan, the process of becoming kindai (modern) created public architecture that was quite 
different in space, form and structure from commercial, and particularly residential architecture. The 
latter two were generally built by carpenters who had not been inculcated into the scientific world-view. 
In colonial Taiwan in particular, material innovation made kindai buildings increasingly dissimilar to what 
had been made only 50 years before, and the split between administration and residential architecture 
even applied to the Governor-General. Sidelined by intrinsic hierarchies in the architectural system, 
which valued formal over informal education, the Japanese master builders’ own qualifications, and thus 
their status and recognition in their own culture, meant that their numbers became reduced to near 
extinction by the advent of the new professional class of Seiyō trained architects. (Wendelken, 1996: 30) 
Yet although these kindai architects had far greater cultural capital (the power to change their culture) 
than the master carpenters, they were not a dominant group, but were rather dominated from afar by the 
Euro-American architecture corpus, and initially beholden to their changes in fashion. 
 
The split between native/hybrid and imported forms was not taken as inevitable by Japanese designers, 
and Itō was not alone in attempting to reconnect with Japan’s native traditions and to distinguish Japan 
from Seiyō: this became an exercise undertaken across Japanese civil society after the death of the 
emperor Meiji (1912). KIKUCHI Yūko’s (Jap. 菊池裕子) critical study of mingei (Jap. 民芸, lit. ordinary 
functional crafts) theory, an original Japanese aesthetic theory created by YANAGI Soetsu (柳宗悦, 
1889-1961) has shown that whilst Yanagi attempted to create an authentic classification of traditional 
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Oriental crafts, this was impossible due to the notions used: the ideas of tradition and the Orient 
themselves are halves of binaries created through the encounter with Seiyō. She argues that mingei 
theory is a hybrid and modern product created in a complex cultural politics of Orientalism and 
modernisation. Kikuchi points out that “Yanagi problematised Japanese ‘modernity’ as standing in the 
ideas of the culture hegemonies in between the Orient and Occident.” (Kikuchi, 2004: xvii) Yet as with 
Itō’s evolutionary theory of architecture, this theory was created under the modern movement in Japan, 
making an authentic reconnection to the past in the arts and architecture impossible. The teaching of 
architectural history and practice in Japan made the split between architects and carpenters permanent: 
although the professions were linked, a foundational divide was formed. Hybridity was possible and was 
practised by Ito and in Manchuria and Korea, but these hybrids in public buildings relied on Seiyō 
frameworks and technology, being built in kindai materials (as opposed to wooden residential 
architecture), thus recreating underlying binaries of Orientalism. 
 
Japan was not only moving away from their past by becoming kindai (modern), they were also 
separating from her neighbours in East Asia. Alone in their positive response to the potential threat of 
colonisation, Japan was the only state with both the will and the capacity to meet the challenge of the 
Great Powers. (Hobsbawm, 1975: 148) For Tokugawa Japan (unlike Qing China or Joseon Korea) the 
premise of pre-existing cultural hierarchies was eventually accepted (within which Japan and her 
neighbours were initially placed as merely ‘semi-civilised’). Whilst imitating and attempting to adopt the 
trappings of civilisation, architects were able to carry the belief that they were evolving, and had become 
stronger and more civilised than their neighbours. Mirroring the new imperialism of the late 19th century, 
Japan achieved dominance over China, Taiwan and Korea, and the discourse of superiority therefore 
became more legitimate. Rather than Japanese modernity being the product of a popular movement, it 
became the role of Meiji Japan elites to introduce kindai in East Asia as part of their political ascendancy 
and civilising mission. As Japan became the pre-eminent nation of Asia, the narrative of civilising may 
have helped Japanese architects free their spirit and continue their work with fewer misgivings.  
 
Whilst Ito’s three objectives of reviving traditions, progressing in line with Seiyō, and reconnecting with 
Tōyō were pursued, they were not pursued evenly. By the 1930s, rhetorical and material separation 
from neighbours meant that for some “Japan was superior because it represented the culmination of 
East and West, a privileged site between and above its cultural roots in both worlds.” At the same time 
others saw that Japan was “neither Asian nor Western. This Japan was sacred and pure, intrinsically 
superior and separate, and destined to rule.” (Wendelken, 2000: 821) This dichotomy led to a 
persistent uncertainty at the heart of Japanese architectural identity. The purported leadership of Asia 
and Japan’s Asian identity was the most likely aspect to be dropped in Imperial Japan’s authority 
architecture for this reason: the absorption of nationalism, which reached its highest watermark after 
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the 1930s, was incompatible with a wider regional identity. Architecturally, Japan’s modern sense of self 
was rooted less in Asia than in itself, as part of a wide, if loose, confederation of powerful modern states. 
This makes the lack of use of Chinese styles in Taiwan more understandable: even before 1919 GOTO 
Shinpei had based his Taiwan policies on pejorative studies which labelled the Taiwanese as 
over-anxious about death, obsessed with money, and overly concerned with face. (Zhuang, 1991: 140) 
The Governor-General’s Office crystalised Japan’s dominance on the island by threatening them, 
displaying their riches, and giving the opportunity for advancement and high status to those few 
successful natives who could work in the Office. 
 
Japan’s attitude towards Taiwan helped embed Japan’s self-understanding as a uniquely superior race, 
one residing at a different temporal level to the natives. The Office brought the conventional mainstream 
Japanese architecture to Japan through the jury’s revisions, creating an up-to-date design and 
construction process, an efficient spatial functionality, advanced features that utilised innovative 
materials and technologies, and represented Japan’s sense of kindai (modern) identity. Moving far 
beyond Conder’s eclecticism, Japan’s colonial architecture fused appropriate modern elements to 
create a recognisable national development. The European-styled Meiji architecture built in colonial 
Taiwan remains an authoritative form and politically neutral, shown by the continuing current use of the 
Governor-General’s Office. Yet whilst it was functional and often beneficial, East Asian architectural 
modernity inevitably remains tied to Europe and America, particularly in Japan and her former colonies, 
as well as showing a derogatory attitude towards the island’s natives.  
 
In Taiwan the architecture built in the colonial period remains somewhat mysterious. Whilst many 
architectural histories have tracked the origin of Taiwan’s colonial architecture back to Japan, it is 
important for architectural historians to understand the meanings of the forms, spaces and technology of 
Japan’s European-inspired architecture. For the Taiwanese these buildings are two steps removed: 
Taiwan’s position as a refracted container of Japanese colonial kindai (modernity) alongside its 
unintegrated global situation means that European revival architecture such as Queen Anne style is 
very little known, and these colonial buildings require study of Chinese, Japanese and European 
sources. To understand these buildings more fully than comparative case studies would have done, I 
took the approach in this thesis to jointly analyse the roots of the concepts, beliefs, habits and forms that 
were eventually found in colonial Taiwan. In this way Taiwan can be understood as more integrated into 






Suggestions for further study  
1. Conder’s School of Architecture: Given the nationality of Conder, work in the English language should 
be undertaken to examine the influence of the man considered by most Japanese to be the Father of 
Japan’s modern architecture. 
 
2. The development of public architecture in Japan and Taiwan: There were many interesting cases 
among the public architecture of Taiwan and Japan, in particular the public park replacing the temple in 
many major East Asian cities. These developments did not match the use of the city in an organic 
manner, so the functions of parks and other leisure activities are open to misunderstandings and 
replacing temple spaces combined civil and religious functions. In replacing socio-religious spaces, 
some sense of meaning was lost to public life. A study of the history of the East Asian park would be 
fruitful in elaborating the effect of Western town-planning upon customary behaviour. 
 
3. The effect of architectural modernity upon the carpentry profession: the development of the 
profession of architect in Japan was found to change the cultural logic of how Japanese building 
practices functioned. Whilst carpenters had been taught humility and respect, architects under Conder’s 
education system had a sense of aspiration instilled in them, and were taught to act independently. This 
separated architects from building practices of the past, yet led them to dominate the construction of 
authority architecture in the Meiji period. The issue of the history of the surprisingly resilient carpentry 
profession between the Meiji Restoration and today remains a fascinating question worthy of further 
study. 
 
4. How the modern continued to influence Taiwan/Japan after 1919/1945: using and adapting the 
conceptual framework from this thesis, it would be possible to enquire into how the modern in 
architecture evolved and was distorted after 1919 when the Modernism movement took hold in the 
Japanese architectural system. After War World II, the complex influence of modernity continued 
through the new world hegemony of the USA in Japan and Taiwan, whilst the outward dominance of 
Japan had halted. Under these new post-colonial conditions, the notions of the modern altered and 
evolved.  
 
5. Japanese translations of Western concepts into Chinese: finally, that the idea of modernity in East 
Asia was promulgated by Japan, it would be worthwhile to explore how the modern was reinterpreted in 
Chinese through Japanese. Looking through this double hermeneutic would contribute to understanding 
the slow gestation of Chinese modernity. If Japanese early modernity was indeed inventive, what of 



















































 Definitions of Modern from English Dictionary 
 
 
Definitions of ‘modern’ from the Oxford English Dictionary (1989) 
 
Typology Definition Example usage Dates of usage 
Present 
(obsolete) 
(Adj) Being in existence 
at this time, current, 
present (obsolete) 
“Our maist gracious queen 
moderne” 1597 
“The first and modern President 
of the said Society” 1752 
1485 





(Adj) Of or relating to 
the present and recent 
times… relating to, or 
originating in the current 
age or period 
“The writings of the auncient and 
moderne Geographers” 1585 
“The starting point of Modern, in 
distinction from Mediaval, history” 
1864 
“In modern times” 1983 
1585, 1589 
1656, 1676, 1687 
1706,1713,1757,1774 
1810, 1849, 1864 




(Adj) Designating the 
form of a language that 
is currently used, or the 
form representing the 
most recent sig. stage 
of development 
“Overwritten in small Modern 
Greek Hand, about 150 years 
ago” 1699 




1834, 1841, 1869 




(Adj) Designating a 
person or (less 
commonly) a place as 
the contemporary 
equivalent of a historical 
counterpart 
“Turn his domain into a modern 
Babel” 1843 
“If I don’t sleep at once, chloral, 
the modern Morpheus!” 1897 
1791 







(Adj) Of, relating to, or 
designating a current or 
recent movement or 
trend in art, 
architecture, etc., 
characterised by a 
departure from or a 
repudiation of accepted 
or traditional styles and 
values 
“The Phantasiae of the ancients, 
Modern art,… in what is called 
Fancy-Pictures, has… debased” 
1820 
“The modern movement in art” 
1927 
“In arts… modern implies more 
about aesthetics and technique 
than about chronology” 1978 
1820, 1895 
1927, 1928, 1938, 1958, 




(Adj) Of or belonging to 
the present day or a 
comparatively recent 
period of history 
“If such a species be termed 
modern…” 1830 
“’Modern’ climatic conditions only 
became established during 
post-glacial time” 1982  
1822, 1830, 1873 
1934, 1950, 1982, 1992 
Up to date (Adj) Characteristic of 
the present time, or the 
time of writing; not 
old-fashioned, 
antiquated, or obsolete; 




“Moderne warre, is the new order 
of warre vsed in our age.” 1590 
“with modern furniture it would be 
delightful” 1811 
“They’re spatially very modern, 
not at all revival” 1998 
1590, 1598 
1607, 1622, 1676 
1747, 1775 
1811, 1872, 1885, 1898 
1937, 1988, 1998 
Up to date (Adj) Of a person or 
something personified: 
up to date in behaviour, 
outlook, opinions etc.; 
“But England, Modern to the last 
degree, Borrows or makes her 
own Nobility” 1701 
“Modern young woman” 1859 
1701, 1753 
1804, 1859, 1899 
1914, 1975, 1993 
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embracing innovation 
and new ideas 
“..most of whom are Muslim as 







“Alas! That, were no moderne 
Consequence” 1602 
1591 
1602, 1612, 1616 
New fashion (Adj) Designating any of 
a group of typefaces 
developed in the late 
18th and early 19th 
centuries 
“The modern modern or new 
fashioned faced printing-type at 
present use, was introduced by 




1922, 1934, 1972 
New fashion (Adj) Designating a 
secondary school in 
which emphasis is 
placed on subjects 
other than the classical 
languages and 
literature 
“..wish to enter this modern 
school to get off Latin 
composition and Greek.” 1862 
“Three main types of 
school-grammar, modern, and 
technical.” 1944 
1862, 1881, 1884, 1887 




(Noun) A person who 
lives in or belongs to the 
present time; a person 
who belongs to a 
modern period or epoch 
“…of which the ancients write, 
and whome some moderns call 
Gibbar.” 1601 
“No modern has been heard to 
play an adagio with greater taste 
and feeling” 
“…co-existance between 
Neanderthals and moderns in 
Europe” 1992 
1585 
1601, 1616, 1650, 1668 
1717, 1784 







(Noun) Applied to things “Old pictures only true models, 
they having being proved by 
time… fashion may make 
moderns pass” 1797 
“I happened to show it to a 
dealer, expert in ancient coins, 
but whose knowledge of moderns 






(Noun) With the: that 
which is modern 
“Some were allure by the 
modern, others reverenced the 
antient” 1756 








modern – peculiar to 
modern times 
(obsolete) 
“I apprehend that this character is 







(Noun) A person with 
modern tastes or 
opinions, or who 
belongs to the modern 
school of thought on 
any subject; a person 
who advocates a 
departure from 
traditional styles or 
values 
“It will be deemed old fashioned 
by the latest of the moderns” 
1897 
“Most of the moderns deny the 
supernatural character of 
prophesy” 1905 
“Picasso and the early Moderns” 
1991 
1888, 1897 






(Noun) A work of art, 
architecture etc., which 
is a product of a modern 
trend or movement 
“In the visual arts the Walker Art 
Centre house a world-famous 
collection of moderns” 1975 
1959, 1975 
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Up to date (Noun) Short for 
modern first edition 
“Each would be priced well above 





(Noun) Short for 
modern dance 
“Later when I started dancing 
again, I chose modern” 1979 






First usage of definition types: 
 


















































Definitions of ‘modernity’ from the Oxford English Dictionary (1989) 
 





(Adj) The quality or 
condition of being 
modern; modernness of 
character. 
 
“Yea but I vilifie the present times, you say, 
whiles I expect a more flourishing State to 
succeed; bee it so, yet this is not to vilifie 
modernity, as you pretend.” 1672 
 
“Now that the poems [sc. Chatterton’s] 
have been so much examined, nobody 
(that has an ear) can get over the 
modernity of the modulations.” 1782 
 
“Marcrobius is no good author to follow in 
point of Latinity, partly on account of his 
modernity, and partly of his foreign 
extraction.” 1796 
 
“My dear fellow, modernity simply means 
democracy. And when once democracy 
has been forced on us there’s no good 







Something that is 
modern. 
“But here is a modernity, which beats all 


































Definitions of ‘modernize’ from the Oxford English Dictionary (1989) 
 
Typology Definition Example usage Dates of usage 
Recent 
period 
To make or render 
modern; to give a 
modern character or 
appearance to; 
especially (a) to rewrite 
(an old text) in modern 
spelling or language; to 
change (obsolete words, 
language, spelling) for 
modern equivalents; 
 
“I have taken the liberty to modernize the 
language.” 1752 
 
The young generation are modernizing 
these antic [=antique] vestments. 1802 
 
“The text was modernized throughout.” 
1818 
 
“No one ever dreamt of modernizing 





Up to date/ 
New fashion 
To make or render 
modern; to give a 
modern character or 
appearance to; 
especially (b) to remodel 
and refashion an ancient 
building. 
“Capt. Burton is justly severe on the 
unwarrantable modernizing of Camoens.” 
1885 
 “The King has decided to have Eindsor 
Castle thoroughly modernized.” 1901 
“The Gatehouse which gave entrance to 
the now modernized Council House.” 1905 
1885 
1901, 1905 
Up to date/ 
New fashion 
To adopt modern 
customs, habits, ways, or 
the like. (rare) 
“He scruples not to modernize a little; but 
then you see, that it is in compliance with 
the fashion, and to avoid singularity.” 1753 
“Muggleton had modernized so far as to 
have a chitterling tacked into his Holland 
shirt.” 1802 
“Several new schools also, or to modernize 
－’colleges’, for the sons of the prophets, 





























Definitions of ‘modernization’ from the Oxford English Dictionary (1989) 
 
Typology Definition Example usage Dates of usage 
Up to date/ 
New fashion 
The action or an act of 
modernizing; the state of 
being modernized. Also, 
a modernized version.  
 
The Marquis of Winchester’s noble house 
at Englefield has suffered by some late 
modernizations. 1770 
We cannot always judge by the 
modernization of a proper name. 1818 
The Birds is an abridgement, or 
modernization, of the comedy of 
Aristophanes so entitled. 1830 
The town of Bletchingley .. is, despite 
some modernization, an old-world spot. 
1895 
1770 
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Definitions of ‘modern’ in English-Japanese dictionaries 
Present period – New fashion – Up to date – New thinking 
 
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1862  
 
At present, for 
the present 
Recent Recently Close time   
1867 
 
Now, at present 







or like present 
custom 
Song current at 
any particular 
age, present 
style of dress 
[for objects] 
   
1873 
 
Now, at present      
1876 
 
Now, at present 




     
1903 
 
Now, at present      
1914 
 
modern times      
1915 
 






































life e.g. This 
not 
antiquated/old 
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:The dictionaries are, chronologically Hori, Tatsnoskay, A Pocket Dictionary of the English and Japanese Language (Yedo: Kaiseijo kankō, 
1862); Hepburn, James Curtis, A Japanese and English Dictionary: with an English and Japanese index (Shanghai: American Presbyterian 
mission press, 1867); Hepburn, James Curtis, Japanese-English and English-Japanese Dictionary. Abridged by the author [from his larger 
work] (New York: A. D. F. Randolph & Company, 1873); Satow, Ernest Mason, Right Hon., An English-Japanese Dictionary of the spoken 
language (London: Trübner & Co., 1876); Hoffmann, Johann Joseph, Japanese-English Dictionary Elaborated and edited by Le Serrurier, vol. 
1-3 (Leyden: E. J. Brill, 1892); Hepburn, James Curtis, A Japanese-English and English-Japanese Dictionary, 7th edition (Tōkyō: Z. P. Maruya 
& Co., Limited, 1903); Maruya, Saiichi, English-Japanese conversation dictionary (Yokohama: Kelly & Walsh, Ltd, 1914); Inouye, Jukichi, 
English-Japanese dictionary (1915); Satow, Ernest, Sir, An English-Japanese dictionary of the spoken language (Tokyo: The Sanseidō, 1919); 
and Takehara, Tsuneta, A standard Japanese-English dictionary (Kobe: Taishu Wan,1924). 
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ignorance of the 






































Definition type Number of 
occurrences 
Instances 
Present period 16 1862, 1867, 1873, 1876, 1903, 1914, 
1915, 1919, 1924 
New fashion 8 1867, 1915, 1919, 1924 
Up to date 3 1915, 1924 






































Definitions of ‘civilization’ in English-Japanese dictionaries 
Behaviour – Open – Change/develop – Socio-political improvement –  
To teach – Anti-tradition – Society and culture – Historical period  
 
Year 1 2 3 4 
1862  Behaviour made 
proper 
   
1867 NA    
1873 
 










Fukuzawa’s book on 
civilization] 





   
1903 
 




to become civilised  
1915 
 





to civilise away – to 
















The Turks have 
contributed in no way 
to the progress of 
civilization.  －Sun 
(N.Y.). 
civilised nation(s) a civilised 
(enlightened) age 
Eastern (Western) 
civilization E.g. She 
stands at the point 
where Eastern and 
Western civilizations 
meet.  －Lloyd’s. 
 
 
Definition type Number of 
occurrences 
Instances 
Behaviour 1 1862 
Open 1 1873 
Change/develop 4 1873, 1903 
Socio-political improvement 5 1876, 1892, 1915, 1924 
To teach 3 1903, 1915, 1919 
Anti-tradition 1 1915 
Society and culture 3 1919, 1924 
Historical period 1 1924 
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Definitions of ‘progress’ in English-Japanese dictionaries 
Advance/improve – Quicker – Zealous – Ideology - Promotion 
 
Year 1 2 3 4 5 
1862  
 




[notion of speed 
here] 
 
   
1867 
 
To advance, go 
forward, improve 
to be eager for, 
ardent, or 
zealous in the 
pursuit of 
 
   
1873 
 
To advance, go 
forward, improve 
to be eager for, 
ardent, or 
zealous in the 
pursuit of 
 





progress in skill 






















advance develop/grow be promoted   
 
 
Definition type Number of 
occurrences 
Instances 
Advance/improve 12 1862, 1867, 1873, 1876, 1919, 1924 
Quicker 1 1862 
Zealous in pursuit 2 1867, 1873 
Ideology 1 1919 

































































Government-built buildings of 1895: 
 
Buildings for the public (orange): 
1) Railway building  
 
Buildings for administration (red): 
2) Xin Fu (Provincial Governor) Yamen 
3) Bu Zheng Shi Si (Chief administrator of 
province) Yamen  
4) Taipei City Yamen 
5) Tamsha County Yamen  
6) Xie Tai Yamen (Military officer Yamen) 
Education Buildings (blue): 
7) Examination Site  
8) Ming Dao Study Hall 
9) Native learning study hall 
10) Western learning study hall 
11) Deng Ying Study Hall 
 
Military buildings (purple): 
12) Military appliance Institution 
13) City wall  
Religious Buildings (Green): 
14) City God Temple 
15) Tin Hau Temple 
16) Martial arts Temple 
17) Confucian Temple 
 
Source of Map from Shue and 
Huang, 2003. Adapted by Author. 
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Appendix IV 



















Government-built buildings of 1920: 
 
Buildings for education (blue): 
1) -11) Schools and research buildings 
 
Buildings for the public (orange): 
12) Taipei Station 
13) Taipei Hospital 






Military buildings (purple): 
19) Artillery and Infantry Regiments 
20) Headquarters of Army 
 
Buildings for administration (red): 
21) Taipei Municipal Office 
22) Governor-General’s residence 
23) Prefecturral Govt. Residence 
24) Weights and measures Bureau 
25) Governor General’s Office 
26) Law court site 
27) Telephone exchange 
28) Newspaper 
Buildings for Commerce (grey): 
29) Taipei Post office 
30) Monopoly Bureau factory 
31) Monopoly Bureau 
 
Buildings for Finance (light green): 
32) Bank 
 
Buildings for Religion (green): 
33) Chinese Temple 
 
Source of Map from Yang, C., 1996. 
Adapted by Author. 
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Appendix V 







The rules of the design competition were as follows: 
•  The entrants of the competition had to be architects of the ‘Japanese Empire’.  
•  There were two stages of the competition. The requisitions of the design plan were 
different in these two sections. The first stage selected 10 people at most and the 
submission period was between 1st to midday 31st November in Meiji Year 40 (1907). The 
first judgment was in December Meiji year 40 (1907). 
•  The second stage deadline was from the 1st to the 25th of December Meiji Year 41 (1908) of 
work selected from the first stage. The second judgment was between January and March 
Meiji 42 (1909) and the result would be announced in the official newspaper. 
•  The prize from the first stage was 1000 yen for each architect selected; the second stage 
would select three winners with 30,000 Yen for first place, 15,000 Yen for second place and 
5000 Yen for third place; these second stage winners would not get the additional 1000 
Yen reward from the first stage.  
‘The Taiwan Governor-General’s Office design prize’ on the 29th May Meiji 40 (1907) Taiwan Daily News. I have highlighted the 
announcement in red. 
 (Courtesy of the National Taiwan Library) 
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•  The regulations stated that in ‘foreign countries’ these kinds of large competitions normally 
awarded around 3000 Yen to the winners; in Japan, applicants would get a 1000 Yen 
award even if they fail the second stage but pass the first stage.  
•  The name of entrants should be replaced by a cipher; a photo or fingerprint of that 
application should be attached and on the drawing, sealed with the cipher. This cipher 
could not be used again for the second stage entrant.  
•  The competition jury was not allowed to apply or to help entrants. 
•  The relevant information was offered to applicants from 10th June to 31st July Meiji Year 40 
(1907) from the Taiwan Department in the Ministry of Internal Affairs (in mainland Japan). 
•  Considering that the (Japanese) architects were unlikely to understand the geography and 
environment of Taiwan, for this competition the Taiwan Department in Ministry of Internal 
Affairs offered information on related plans, geography, environmental conditions, building 
materials available, transport, wages and prices to all applicants.  
•  Regulations also stated the requisition of the number and size of rooms, the limits of the 
area and configuration of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office, all detailed in the 
regulation volume. 
•  The time period allowed for construction was three years from Meiji Year 43 (1910). 
•  Copying other designs would result in rejection by the competition jury.  
•  The decision on the winner was final, determined by the Governor-General according to 
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 Summary sourced from Taiwan Daily News (1907, my translations), Survey report of the Governor-General’s Office (Shue, C., and Huang, 
J., 2003), the Story of the Governor-General’s Office (Huang, J., 2004) and Guild of President’s Office: from the Governor-General’s Office to 
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Library; the National Taiwan Library; the Taiwan Historica; the National Central Library of Taiwan; 
National Taiwan Museum; and the Official Documents of Taiwan Governor-General Office. 
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RIBA Library Collections; the British Library; and Britain’s National Archives. 
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Special Collections, Keio University Library; Lavenberg Collection of Japanese Prints, the Kjeld Duits 
Collection; the MIT Visualising Cultures Collection; and the Library of Congress Database. 
 
 
